Multiple owners and productivity : evidence from family firms
Buchanan, Bonnie G.; Liljeblom, Eva; Martikainen, Minna; Nikkinen, Jussi (2021-12-12)
Buchanan, Bonnie G.
Liljeblom, Eva
Martikainen, Minna
Nikkinen, Jussi
Routledge
12.12.2021
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2022032825513
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2022032825513
Kuvaus
vertaisarvioitu
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Tiivistelmä
We investigate the productivity of family owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Specifically, we examine whether productivity is influenced by the number of family owners and by family member involvement in daily operations. We find that the productivity of family firms is non-monotonically associated with the number of family owners and with the number of family members who work in the firm. Although prior empirical research has often been associated with positive effects, we identify problematic cases, especially when a few owners are involved. We document a negative effect on productivity if the firm has few but more than one family owner, and if the firm has two or three owners who are involved in daily business operations. In these cases, an external (non-family) Chair (CEO) might mitigate these effects stemming from the family ownership (family working in the firm). The results of our study have practical relevance and policy implications when it comes to questions concerning optimal governance.
Kokoelmat
- Artikkelit [3058]