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Roman Kushnir

Transformations of Estonian Russians' cultural identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union

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Author: Roman Kushnir
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ABSTRACT:

After the fall of the USSR the cultural identity of Russians in Estonia has experienced drastic changes. This study analyzes and systematizes these transformations within Manuel Castells' theory of resistance and project identity. Also the role of the media in identity construction is analyzed. The concepts of resistance and project identity are central to this research. Besides Manuel Castells' scheme the main theoretical framework includes Bernhard Giesen's concept of the media as identity constructor. Manfred Beller's notion of image, Geert Hofstede's theory of culture, and Stuart Hall's view of cultural identity are applied as supportive theoretical perspectives.

The primary sources are media materials from Estonia and Russia. For their analysis Norman Fairclough's critical discourse method is used. The secondary sources consist of the materials on history of Estonia, Russia and the Russian minority in Estonia.

The research suggests that Estonian Russians have two ways of cultural identity creation. The elder generation has constructed a form of resistance identity based on opposition to the dominant Estonian culture. This identity has also been created by the Russian media. Other Estonian Russians have chosen project identity, which tries to redefine their position in Estonian society. The media of Estonia and the Estonian Russian community play the major role in its construction. Both types of identity are manifested and constructed by the media.

This study also revealed that both identity models have their problems. Resistance identity faces the suspicion of Estonians while project identity is also not always accepted as loyal to Estonia. At the same time project identity is more likely to solve the problem of the Russian minority in Estonia.

KEYWORDS: Estonian Russians, Cultural Identity, Project Identity, Resistance Identity, the Media in Identity Construction

1 INTRODUCTION

The situation of the Russian minority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is a broadly discussed and controversial issue. The image on Russians living in the Baltic region varies from the image of them being an oppressed people to that of them being occupiers of foreign countries, or a fifth column infiltrated and now maintained in those countries by Russia. Sometimes they are portrayed as simply a threat to the peaceful development of the local cultures. At the same time Baltic Russians themselves have a variety of self-images: some identify themselves with the culture of the local population and view themselves not as Russians but as Baltic Russians while others prefer to keep their Russianness safe and build up their cultural identity on the ties between them and the Russian Federation. This variety is in sharp contrast to the situation in the Soviet period when Russians in the Baltic region had a single dominant identity; to a major extent the transformations of their cultural identity took place in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR. These changes are interesting and require thorough research.

In this study attention will be paid to the mentioned transformations of Russians' identity. To be more precise, the focus will be not on the whole Baltic region but on Estonia, which is chosen because of its significant Russian minority and still acute problems connected to the Russian question. This research will study how Russians in Estonia reacted to the new conditions of life and how they transformed their cultural self-identification after the fall of the Soviet Union. The situation in Estonia is not unique: it is a general tendency of the Russian minorities in the post-Soviet space.

1.1 Background

During the Soviet period Russians lived in all the republics of the USSR. The government promoted Russian migration since the integration and assimilation of the nations of the Soviet Union was seen as a part of the special Soviet identity-building (Tampere 2005: 144). This migration served other purposes as well: in some territories

the newcomers reconstructed the countries after World War II; in others they built up new industry. The ideological aim was associated with the notion of helping small republics to build communism. As a result of this policy significant Russian communities emerged in almost all parts of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a hard blow to their position, as the members of these communities suddenly turned from citizens of the USSR to stateless inhabitants of independent foreign countries. Approximately 25 million ethnic Russians were left in the "Near Abroad" (Castells 1998: 255). Many Russians outside the borders of the RSFSR (the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) had to rebuild their life under the new circumstances.

In the 1990s the Russian minorities faced the challenge of adaptation to the changed situation. In Ukraine and Belarus the changes were fairly painless owing to the common roots of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians, their common history, and the relative similarity of their languages (Rywkin 2003: 5). Nevertheless, Ukraine and Belarus are not the only parts of the collapsed federation in which the significant Russian population is represented. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the sizable Russian communities have to adapt to the environment, which drastically differs from that of Russia. In some Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics the adaptation is impeded not only by vivid otherness of their traditional life but also by the anti-Russian ethnic upheavals, riots and terrorism. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the situation is not so acute; the dominant population does not make a practice of riots and purges of Russians, but nevertheless the process of Russian adaptation to the new conditions is very difficult.

All three countries faced considerable inflows of Russians after becoming the parts of the USSR in 1940. During the Soviet period the particular identity of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nations was viewed as "a part of the 'bad past' " (Tampere 2005: 144). The collapse of the Soviet Union enabled Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to return to their pre-Soviet cultural practices. However, in the 1990s the policy of securing their cultures higher status was to a certain extent obstructed by the sheer scale of Russian communities within the national borders.

In the case of Estonia this minority, representing Russian but not Estonian culture and language, was perceived as a potential threat to the revival of the national cultural practices (Tampere 2005: 161-162). Therefore, in the 1990s some protective measures were made by the Estonian government. The most well-known of them were ethnic citizenship, and residence and language requirements for receiving the full set of Constitutional rights. Under these circumstances Estonian Russians had to re-build their once dominant identity. The loss of their dominant status was a fact of life, and the transformations of the cultural identity (the movement towards specific Estonian Russian identity) were accepted by the Estonian Russian minority. From the early 1990s onwards Russians in Estonia had to choose whether to identify with the Russian Federation or Estonia. The process of new identity construction was strongly influenced by the media of both Estonia and Russia as well as by the minority itself.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze and systematize the Estonian Russian minority cultural identity transformations within the chosen theoretical framework of Manuel Castells' identity concept. More specifically, the major focus of the study will be on the transformations which can be defined as resistance and project identity construction: the first maintains the survival of a group's specificity under unfriendly conditions, while the second leads to building a new identity. At the same time the role of the media in these two types of identity creation will be analyzed.

1.3 Material and Method

Since this work will analyze the transformations of Estonian Russian cultural identity and the role of the media in identity construction it is necessary to use the media as a source of the study. At the same time it is vital to pay attention to the history of Estonian-Russian interaction and the Russian community in Estonia in order to

understand the background of the identity transformations. The list of applied sources can be divided into the primary and secondary ones.

The primary sources are those elements of the print media in Estonia and Russia, which reflect the contemporary situation of the Russian minority from different perspectives and are one of the significant instruments of Estonian Russian cultural identity construction. The whole mass of the applied media materials can be divided into three subgroups. The first one includes the newspapers of the Russian community in Estonia: *Molodoj Estonii* [Estonian Youth], *MK-Estonia*, *Stolitsa* [The Capital] etc. The second subgroup consists of the Estonian newspapers such as *Eesti Päevaleht* [Estonian Daily Paper], *Eesti Ekspress* [Estonian Express] etc. The third subgroup comprises the newspapers published in the Russian Federation. The following papers belong to this category: *Argumenty i Fakty* [Arguments and Facts], *Izvestia* [The News], *Komsomolskaya Pravda* [Komsomolsk Truth] etc. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations of quoted primary sources are my own.

The secondary sources can be divided into three subgroups as well. The first represents the materials on the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. It includes such works as Wolfgand Mitter and Leonid Novikov's *Educational Policy and Minority Issues in the Soviet Union* (1985), Nicholas Riasanovsky's *A History of Russia* (1969) and many others. The second subgroup are the materials on the history of Estonia such as Aivar Kriiska's and Andreas Tvaur's *Viron esihistoria* (2007), Toivo Miljan's *Historical dictionary of Estonia* (2004), Raivo Vetik's *Inter-Ethnic Relations in Estonia 1988-1998* (1999) etc. The third subgroup consists of the works on Estonian Russians' history. To this group belongs Elmira Fedosova's article *Ot beglyh staroverov k gosudarstvennoi kolonisatsii. Formirovanie russkoi diaspory v Pribaltike (XVIII-XIX vv.)* [From the refugees the Old Believers to the State Colonization. Construction of the Russian diaspora in the Baltic region (17th-19th centuries)] (2009), article *Pravoslavie na Estonskoi zemle* [The Russian Orthodoxy in Estonia] (2009), Kaja Tampere's article *From Majority to Minority: Changes of Ideologies, Changes of Identities* (2005) etc.

The latter article is one of the most significant secondary sources used in the actual research since Kaja Tampere focuses on the history of the Estonian Russian minority in the 1990s and pays special attention to the identity transformations taking place in that period. My work owes a great deal to this article, with some reservations will be apparent. Tampere is quite optimistic towards the future of Russians in Estonia and views their integration into Estonian society as inevitable. His article was published in 2005, two years before the Bronze Night (Russian riots in 2007), which has drastically changed the situation. Nevertheless, in spite of this problem Tampere's research is quite relevant to this study.

Since in this work media materials will be studied, elements of the method of Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis of the media have been chosen as the most suitable. Nevertheless, concentration on the linguistic elements of the analyzed text which this method presumes is not so significant for this research and will not be paid attention to while applying the method. This analysis focuses on the communicative event and the associated order of discourse (Fairclough 1995: 54–56).

Fairclough (1995: 54-56) defines discourse as "spoken or written language use". According to him, language use is always constitutive of social identities, social relations and a system of knowledge and belief; any text makes its contribution to shaping these aspects of society and culture (ibid. 55). The critical discourse analysis approach considers the discursive practices of the community – its normal ways of using language – in terms of networks which Fairclough calls 'orders of discourse' (ibid.). He notes that social and cultural events often manifest themselves discursively "through a redrawing of boundaries within and between the orders of discourse" (ibid.). In this research the cultural events of the 1990s (the collapse of Soviet Man's cultural identity, re-establishment of the local Estonian identity and so on) are discussed. Therefore, this redrawing of boundaries and discursive manifestation is central to my critical discourse analysis.

As the current research focuses on the transformations of Estonian Russians' cultural identity, which are often manifested in the media, the analysis of media discourse is

necessary. Fairclough's critical discourse analysis includes the analysis of the relationship between the text, discourse practice (various aspects of text production and reception) and sociocultural practice (situational context or the wider frame of the society and culture). The order of discourse is analyzed in terms of its structure and relationship to other orders. Nevertheless, for our research this aspect is less significant than the analysis of communicative event, and while working with media materials we will not look at their order of discourse. Thus, if an article on Estonian Russians' cultural identity is analyzed, the focus will be only on the communicative event: the context of the actual article (Estonian Russians in post-Soviet Estonia), the rhetorics of the text (language methods of acceptance or contrast – such as "we" or "they" referring to the Estonian Russian minority etc.) and some aspects of the way the article is received (its influence on minority identity formation).

1.4 Work Structure

This work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of the research and its basic concepts. The second concentrates on the history of Russians in Estonia before the period of the Soviet governance (the 11th century-1939) and from the period of the Soviet presence to the Estonian independence (1940-1991). The second chapter also focuses upon the issue of Soviet Russians' legitimizing identity in Estonia. The third chapter pays attention to the measures of re-establishment of the Estonian cultural identity independence in the post-Soviet period. The sudden change of geopolitical situation allowed the nation to revive its cultural practices after the decades of the Soviet presence. The fourth and fifth chapters describe the transformation of Estonian Russian cultural identity in terms of resistance and project identity. The conclusion gives the main results of the research.

This study will analyze the transformations of Estonian Russians' cultural identity taking place in the 1990s. I will apply Manuel Castells' tripartite notion of collective identity (as divisible into legitimizing, resistance and project identity) to systematize these changes. I will also use Fairclough's method of critical discourse analysis to work

with the primary sources – the media materials. The media have played a significant role in these transformations and have to be analyzed. Next, however, it is necessary to explain the general theoretical framework and to define the core concepts.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CONCEPTS

This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of the research at hand. As the study concentrates on the issue of cultural identity, I will define the key concepts related to that notion. Culture and identity have been given innumerous over the years. Therefore it is necessary to clarify how the concepts will be treated here.

There are many theories which give their particular definitions to the term *culture*. For this research I will use the concept of Geert Hofstede (2005: 4), who defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others". It is always a collective phenomenon because it is shared with people from the same social environment. According to this theory, culture is manifested through symbols, heroes, rituals, and values (ibid. 6–7).

Symbols are words, gestures, pictures, or objects which carry some specific meaning only recognized by those who share one culture (Hofstede 2005: 7). New symbols can be easily developed, while the older ones can disappear; one culture can copy the symbols of the others (ibid.). Another element of culture manifestation is heroes. They are persons (real and imagined) who possess characteristics which are valued by the culture. Besides symbols and heroes, culture is manifested through rituals which are collective activities, superfluous to reaching desired aims, but which are viewed as a socially essential by the culture. The list of rituals includes various social and religious ceremonies and discourses – the way of a language use in communication. The last element of cultural manifestation consists of values. They are broad tendencies of preference of certain states of affair over others. The theory of Geert Hofstede has been chosen because this definition of culture suits to the situation of Russian culture in Estonia: the collective programming of mind which distinguishes Russians from Estonians, and which is manifested through the particular Russian values, rituals, symbols, and heroes. It is also necessary to define the notion of cultural identity.

According to Stuart Hall (1990), there are two definitions of cultural identity. Firstly, it can be defined in terms of belonging to one shared culture. It is "a sort of collective 'one true self', hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves', which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common" (ibid.). Within this definition people's cultural identity reflects the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide the individuals as "one people" with stable frames of reference and meaning beneath people's actual history (ibid.). This "oneness" underlies all the other, more superficial differences. Thus, cultural identity can be viewed as a collective, shared history.

Secondly, another definition of cultural identity is built not only upon the points of similarity, but also the points of difference. These differences "constitute 'what we really are'; or rather – since history has intervened – 'what we have become' " (Hall 1990). Through these differences the uniqueness of "oneness" is constituted. In this definition cultural identity is a matter of "becoming" as well as "being"; it belongs both to the future and to the past. In that sense the cultural identity comes from somewhere, has its own history, and undergoes constant transformations (ibid.). It is subject to the continuous "play" of history, culture and power.

This type of definition has been chosen due to the fact that the cultural identity of Russians in Estonia in fact is based on the sense of common Russianness on the one hand, and on the history of their constant transformation on the other. Estonian Russians' cultural identity depends on the historical changes which have shaped its uniqueness. The influence of these transformations led me to use Manuel Castells' typology of identity to demonstrate what stages the cultural identity of Russians in Estonia has passed.

In conducting this study I have applied as a main theoretical background Manuel Castells' (1997: 8) concept of distinction between three possible forms of collective identity. As Castells writes, there can be legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and project identity. The first is introduced to extend and rationalize one's group domination in a particular society. Legitimizing identity generates a set of organizations and

institutions, as well as organized social actors who reproduce the identity that rationalizes structural domination. Resistance identity is generated by the people who see themselves as oppressed and/or stigmatized by the dominant group. The aim of resistance identity is to maintain their survival in this position and fight for their own specificity against imposed principles. The third, project identity, is related to a new identity which defines one's position, but also plans transforming the prevailing social structure. The theory of Castells also can be related to other notions of identity.

Castells (1997: 7) perceives identity not as something given, but as something constructed during a human being's life: "The construction of identity uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memories and from personal fantasies" (ibid.). Thus, one's identity can be constructed and transformed using the building materials mentioned. Stuart Hall's (1990) concept of cultural identity as undergoing constant transformations on the basis of history, culture, and power also expresses the similar opinion on the identity's changeable character. Thus, the theory of Hall supplements and supports Castells' main theory of this research. It is vital to admit that Castells applies his scheme to social processes, and refers to a social identity.

Moreover, while working with Castells' theory it is necessary to remember Ting-Toomey's distinction between primary and situational identity. The primary one includes cultural, ethnic, gender and personal identity (Ting-Toomey 1999: 29). The situational one includes role, relation, and symbolic interaction identity (ibid.). Manuel Castells (1997: 6–7) emphasizes that roles and identity are different things: roles are defined by the norms of social institutions, and their meaning depends on the arrangements between individuals and these institutions, while identities are sources of meaning for the social actors themselves. In this research the focus is on primary identity – the cultural one – not on the roles. Manuel Castells' scheme of legitimizing, resistance and project identity forms corresponds quite well to the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia, as its cultural identity has gone through all three positions of Castells' theory.

After the beginning of the Soviet presence, Russian cultural identity in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania suddenly achieved the status of legitimizing identity. This one was introduced to extend and rationalize Russians' domination in the local societies. Their identity was promoted by the official power, and their dominance over the local population was extended through the policy of russification. More specifically, it was not Russians who had to study Estonian, but Estonians who had to study Russian. Then after the collapse of the Soviet Union the status of the legitimizing identity was returned to Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian cultural identity. Russians reached the stage of resistance and project identity.

On the one hand, some proportion of the Russian minority in Estonia can be viewed as organizing collective resistance against Estonianisation of the country on the basis of their own Russian cultural identity. New conditions of life are perceived by them in terms of exclusion, and a threat to them and their culture. At the same time these conditions have made Russians feel pride in their own culture and identity, to tighten bounds between each other, to call the Russian Federation to their protection. Nevertheless, the choice of a project identity has also found its own supporters within the Russian community.

Not all the representatives of the Russian minority in Estonia wish to resist the new governmental policy of Estonianisation. Some of them have decided to construct a project identity which is intended to redefine their position in society and the society itself. They do not wish to be entirely assimilated by Estonian culture so as to lose their cultural identity. Neither do they want to simply resist their new minority position in the Estonian community. Thus, they prefer to accept the policy of Estonianisation (learning the national language, acquaintance with Estonian culture, receiving citizenship of the state) but at the same time to remain Russians. This group of people has created the non-traditional cultural identity in which the interwoven elements of Russian and Estonian cultures are involved. This project identity can transform the whole situation within Estonian society, which has a problem of tension between Estonians and Russians.

In this work special attention will be paid to the role of the media in the construction of Estonian Russian cultural identity. Bernhard Giesen (1996: 11–12) notes that the media is an important constructor of identity. He defines the media "as a cultural practice that is not just a mechanism guaranteeing of a nation's cultural identity, but also a process through which identity is created" (Tampere 2005: 168). Thus, the media of Estonia and the Russian Federation play a significant role in the process of Estonian Russian identity-building. They create and popularize the image of Russians in Estonia; this image is given to the Estonian Russian community as an object of identification. At the same time Estonian Russians themselves construct their image through their own media as an intermediary.

It is necessary to explain the meaning of "image" in this study. As Manfred Beller writes (2007: 4), image can be understood as a mental silhouette of the other, who appear to be determined by the characteristics of family, group, tribe or race. This image rules one's opinion of others and controls one's behavior towards them (ibid.). In this research the image has to be perceived as not only a mental silhouette of the other, but also a mental silhouette of the self, since the Estonian Russians' image is created not only by the Estonian and the Russian media; the Estonian Russian media also takes part in this image-creation, and reflects the people's self-image.

The concept of perception is related to the image. Beller defines perception as a "way of seeing and judging" (Beller 2007: 4). He notes that members of different groups perceive matters from their specific, distinctive perspective, and calls this phenomenon a "selective perception". As a result of this perception judgments are made on the basis of perceiver's point of view which is called "selective evaluation" (ibid. 5). This theory suits the situation of the media role in Estonian Russian identity creation: both Russian, Estonian and Estonian Russian newspapers create the image of the Russian community in Estonia, while the readers perceive and judge this image from their particular perspective.

On the whole, the theoretical framework of this work draws on Manuel Castells' tripartite scheme of identity: legitimizing, resistance and project identity. Bernhard

Giesen's notion of the media as a constructor of identity also is a primary theory of the study. Stuart Hall's theory of cultural identity, Geert Hofstede's concept of culture, and Manfred Beller's notions of image and perception are used as the supplementary theories.

3 HISTORY OF RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA

The territory of modern Estonia was inhabited by its local people in approximately 9000 BCE (Zetterberg 2007: 23). Estonians made the great westward trek from the Ural mountains to reach the territory of present-day Estonia (Laar 1992: 1). Their name Eesti comes from the Roman historian Tacitus' term Aestii – the tribe living on the shore of the Baltic Sea (Tacitus 1998: 23). The language of Estonians belongs to the Balto-Finnic branch of the Finno-Ugric group of languages.

While studying Estonian Russian cultural identity one can look at the long and rich history of Russians' existence in Estonia. The first Russian settlements appeared in the land in the 11th century. Russian migration was slow and gradual, but its basis was successfully created. Russians and Estonians began to interact with each other from this period onwards. Russian rulers made some efforts to dominate Estonia.

3.1 History of Russians in Estonia before the Soviet period

In 1030 Russian prince Yaroslav the Wise founded in Estonia the town called Jurjev (Yurijev). The latter was built on the place of the ancient Estonian stronghold Tarbatu (Tartu) (Kriiska & Tvauri 2007: 170). Thus, a vassal dependence of the land on Russia was established. In 1224 Jurjev was captured by German crusaders.

An important cultural element of Russian migration to Estonia was religion. Russians founded not only towns and fortresses, but also churches and monasteries. The first Russian Orthodox churches in Estonia were built in the 11th century (Miljan 2004: 420). The spread of the Russian Orthodoxy in the country was quite peaceful (Pravoslavie na Estonskoi zemle 2009). Nevertheless, the number of Estonian adherents remained fairly low. The Estonian population was entirely Christianized only in the 13th century by German, Danish, and Swedish crusaders (Miljan 2004: 204). Thus, the religious influence of Russians was limited and short-term. The German knights'

invasion put an end not only to Russian rule. Nevertheless, there still existed a third way of Russian expansion in Estonia – at this particular moment not through direct conquest or conversion but through trade.

From the second half of the 13th century close trade relations between Russia and the Western Europe led to the establishment of the Russian settlements in Estonia. It was the natural intermediary between Europe and Russia. Russian merchants carried their goods through Estonia and settled there. These settlements promoted contacts between Russians and Estonians.

The Russian settlements in Estonia faced a serious challenge of war. In the 16th century the Livonian war (1558-1583) began. Russia attempted to capture the Baltic region. This military conflict changed the position of the Russian community in Estonia. As a result of the first victories the major part of Estonia was captured by Russian forces, and for some period was a part of the Russian state. Nevertheless, Russian rule over the land ended after the end of the Livonian war.

The results of the Livonian war were not successful for Russia. According to the peace treaties in 1582 Russia had to leave all the Baltic territories: its army and settlers had to be withdrawn from the region. Thus, the Livonian war almost eliminated the Russian settlements in Estonia. However, quite soon the state of affairs was changed due to the flow of refugees from Russia.

At the end of the 16th century Russian serfs began to flee to the Baltic region from the oppression by their landlords. Some of them came to Estonia. These serfs were not only refugees from Russia. Another group of coming people were the so-called *starovery* [the Old Believers]. They were the followers of the Russian Orthodox Church who resisted the church reforms in Russia. The Baltic region as a safe haven from oppression was chosen due to its population's tolerance of the refugees' religious views (Miljan 2004: 421).

The sudden change of state of affairs in Estonia came with the Great Northern War (1700-1721) of Russia. The victory of the Russian Empire meant the beginning of Russian domination over the Baltic region (1721-1918). According to the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721 Russia acquired Estonia (Riasanovsky 1969: 249). Russian migration to the region took the form of an official full-scale colonization of the received province. Russians arrived in Estonia as the legal state settlers from the first years of Russian domination (ibid).

Nevertheless, if we compare this province with the other regions of the Russian Empire, we can note that Russians did not entirely dominate in society. As in the Grand Duchy of Finland the non-Russian aristocracy and merchants (Germans in that case) still remained influential. Often they were more influential than the newcomers from Russia (Fedosova 2009). However, some limitations of former competition with German merchants placed less obstacles in the path of Russians.

The 19th century was a century of Estonian russification. Hoyer (1993: 97) writes that "the very first measures towards russification were taken during the 1830s". The czars wanted to tighten the ties between the centre and the periphery; the same processes took place also in the other Baltic provinces and in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Russian as a language was introduced into Estonian school system. The first Russian textbooks for Estonian children were printed. In the period of the 1840s-1860s approximately 60 000 Estonians were baptized by the Russian Orthodox church (Fedosova 2009). Nevertheless, the main stage of russification began in the 1880s. Miljan (2004: 423) writes that "Russian was mandated as the language of all public administration, and of instruction in all schools including the University of Tartu". The majority of teachers and civil servants were replaced by the loyal Russians or at least the pro-Russian Estonians. The Estonian newspapers had either to speak in favor of this policy or avoid the topic altogether for fear of being closed down (Hoyer 1993: 96).

This process of russification was intended by the imperial authorities to "break both the privileges of the Baltic nobility and thus the separatist status of the Baltic provinces" (Miljan 2004: 423). The same processes of cutting the privileges of the local aristocracy

also took place in such regions as Poland and Finland; Russian rulers wished to weaken the anti-imperial Polish nobility and the Swedish upper class in the Grand Duchy of Finland (ibid.).

The imperial measures of strengthening the ties between Russia and Estonia led to the gradual turning of Estonians toward their language and national cultural values in a way unexpected by the Russian authorities. According to Jansen (2004: 88), "active proponents of an Estonian society began to develop an Estonian-language communication network". Some Estonian newspapers, publishing and cultural societies were created as a response to schools with the Russian language of instruction. Miljan (2004: 423) suggests that russification supported the national awakening of Estonians. The coming events brought drastic changes in the Russian and Estonian position in Estonia.

The revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the Russian Empire influenced the Russian communities in the Baltic region. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became independent states. The civil war in Russia led to the flow of refugees from the land. Approximately 15 000-18 000 Russian emigrés stayed in Estonia (Eliseeva 2009). The growth of the Russian community of the country after the revolution was mainly caused not by the wave of emigrés but by the change of the borders between Russia and Estonia in the 1920s.

According to the Soviet-Estonian treaty of Tartu in 1920, Estonia received the territories where approximately 40 000 Russians lived. Due to this territorial growth Estonia in 1922 had a Russian population of 92 000 people, 8.2 per cent of the country's total population (Miljan 2004: 421). Thus, the Russian community began to live in the sovereign state of Estonia. Despite some initial conflicts with Estonians the Russian minority managed to adapt to the changed conditions of life.

The life of the Estonian Russian community in the 1920s-1930s was relatively stable. On the one hand, the adaptation to new conditions demanded some efforts from Russians. On the other hand, the Estonian government took measures which secured the

position of the minority in the country. The Law on Cultural Autonomy of 1925 gave Estonian Russians the right to establish their cultural associations which could organize, administer, and monitor public and private educational institutions in the minority native language (Miljan 2004: 161).

The Estonian state decided to ease the Russian adaptation through the measures of the Estonian language learning. In 1922 the presence of the Estonian language in the study program became the obligatory requirement for school registration (Eliseeva 2009). In the 1920s-1930s the national language learning was thoroughly organized in all Russian schools of Estonia. On the whole, the level of Estonian teaching in Russian schools was high. Nevertheless, the study suggests that Estonian Russians, while adapting to the new conditions, did not want to lose their Russian cultural identity through full integration (Isakov 2003).

In the 1920s-1930s the Russian minority in Estonia took the measures to secure its cultural allegiance. For a significant part of emigrés and Estonian Russians the entire denial of their Russianness was the same as the betrayal of their motherland (Isakov 2003). The cultural activities of the Russian community were promoted. Russians organized song festivals, popularized Russian culture among their young people, and published Russian books and magazines (Eliseeva 2009).

Thus, Estonian Russians avoided full integration into Estonian society, and as far as one can understand one of the major reasons was their fear of forgetting their Russianness in case of the integration. They adapted to the new Estonian environment, but all their cultural activities demonstrated that Russian culture still existed, and they still belonged to it. On the other hand, the Estonian population tolerated the Russian community. “This ethnic Russian share in the Estonian population was considered indigenous by Estonians and remained constant” (Miljan 2004: 421). The future drastically changed the position of the Russian community in Estonia, and the position of Estonians themselves. These transformations were closely connected to the Soviet domination over the region which began in 1939. The Soviet presence meant the new cultural identity of both groups of the land citizens.

The Russian minority in Estonia had a long history, but the specificity of the modern Estonian Russian cultural identity was established mainly after the beginning of the Soviet presence. Nevertheless, the pre-Soviet history can be studied to demonstrate that the interaction between the two nations began quite early, and their mutual relations were not as bad as many modern Estonian researchers (Miljan, Talvet, Vetik etc.) presume. In the next sub-chapter attention will be concentrated on the position of the Russian minority under Soviet rule.

3.2 Position of the Russian minority in Estonia under Soviet rule. Legitimizing identity

The policy of the Soviet Union played more significant role in constructing the cultural identity of the Estonian Russian than imperial policy. The authorities of the Russian Empire frequently did not take special care of Russians living in the Baltic provinces, and did not take influential measures for their cultural identity promotion. The measures of russification were taken only at the end of the 19th century, and although their scale was planned to be big, the actual implementation did not strongly change the position of Russians in Estonia. Ironically, true russification was conducted by Soviet leaders who used in their propaganda sound claims of equal respect to all nations of the USSR. The study suggests that Soviet russification suddenly made Russian cultural identity legitimizing.

According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), legitimizing identity is introduced by the dominant group of a society to extend and rationalize its domination – thus, in the Soviet period Russian cultural identity was introduced by the new masters of Estonia to explain the reasons for their domination over the local people, and to spread their power. The cultural policy of the USSR in the region tried to make the cultural identity of Russian group legitimizing. New education programs in Estonia concentrated on the achievements of Russian culture, almost completely ignoring the ones of Estonia. The history of Estonian culture was thus re-written to make an impression that only Russians

were its major benefactors. Almost all measures in the cultural sphere promoted the position of Russian cultural identity. These measures will be described later, but now attention will be paid to the changes in the structure of the Estonian Russian minority after the beginning of the Soviet presence.

In the 1940s the major part of the old Russian community faced purges by the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Soviet secret security organization) (Estonia 1940-1945: Reports of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity 2006: 312). Thus, the community of Russians who peacefully coexisted with the local people in independent Estonia was purged – it was not eliminated altogether but it became weakened and intimidated. Due to Soviet migration policy a new Russian community in the country was created.

The leaders of the Soviet Union promoted Russian migration to Estonia. In 1945-1991 the Russian population grew from 23 000 to approximately 475 000 people (Chin & Kaiser 1996: 97). A majority of the newcomers consisted of workers who were to contribute to the industrial development of Estonia. At the same time soldiers and officers of the Red Army were also sent to Estonia to maintain the security. The new Russian minority appearing in unfamiliar country with unfamiliar conditions of life began to create a new cultural identity according to the policy of Soviet leaders.

This study suggests that the cultural identity of the old Russian community was as dispersed, multifaceted and heterogeneous as the Russian community itself. From the peasants and the Old Believers to Orthodox noblemen the borders of the Russian minority were drawn (Fedosova 2009). We can see that these groups commonly created their own cultural identity and avoided being united. Moreover, the cultural identity of the local population was kept safe. Despite the czarist government making attempts to conduct the policy of russification in the country, it never pretended to eliminate Estonian cultural identity altogether, it never considered Estonian culture to be something dangerous to the empire. Soviet rule changed the situation – on the one hand, leaders of the USSR did not wish to entirely destroy the local cultural practices; on the

other, they decided to free a place for Russian dominating culture in order to tighten the ties between the centre and the periphery.

As it had been in the czarist age, russification of the remote provinces was still used as a means of strangling potential local separatism and strengthening relations between Moscow and the periphery. Any memories about the independence of Estonia and its culture (as far as one can understand the logic of Soviet leaders) might be a ground for future separatist tendencies; therefore, through criticizing of sovereignty cultural remnants and the spreading of Russian culture one could promote the idea of the impossibility of Estonian separate existence. Despite the fact that in Constitution there was the union republic's formal right to secede from the USSR, Soviet policy of maintaining all-Union integrity made it clear that Soviet leaders would not allow Estonia to restore its independence (Miljan 2004: 147). The process of russification was also related to the utopian dreams of the USSR leadership about the communist society without national and cultural differences.

In 1972 the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, announced the beginning of a new historical period of creation of the Soviet people – people of the new internationalist culture (Miljan 2004: 424). The objective of this ambitious task was to assimilate all the nations of the Soviet Union into a homogeneous Russian-speaking mass and to build up the New Soviet man, who would not be burdened with any national feelings (ibid.). Thus, any national identities, excluding Russian, were clearly the obstacles in the path to the New Soviet man. Therefore, for Soviet leaders it was vital to make Estonians to forget about their country's sovereignty.

Leaders of the Soviet Union did not want to allow any memories of the 22-year sovereignty to be made public and tried to criticize them. Soviet leaders justified their actions as a struggle against fascism and capitalism (Tannberg 2005). The measures included purges of some Estonian cultural figures, the undervaluing of some cultural objects such as national literature, theatre, monuments, and propaganda about the allegedly inferior character of Estonian culture during the independent period. Some national poets and playwrights were arrested and sent to Siberia, some fled from

Estonia. The Estonian theatre institute and the Artist Institute of Tartu were closed (Miljan 2004:424). In the universities the departments of Estonian history were abolished (ibid.). In the school system the national history was reduced to a minor subject. By the end of 1940, all the newspapers of the independence period were abolished in Estonia (Hoyer 1993: 164). The mass media of the Estonian Soviet Republic became the strictly controlled means of pro-Soviet propaganda whose aim was to shape the Estonian public mind to believe in the benefactors of the elder brother – the Russian people.

The sphere of Estonian art had to be re-shaped according to the will of Soviet leaders. "Those whose work was influenced by national traditions were charged with the sin of nationalism" (Hoyer 1993: 182). Special bodies maintained obedience to Moscow. *Glavlit* [The Main Literature Committee] performed the functions of a censor. The same organizations as *Glavlit* existed in other spheres of art; thus, Estonian culture was developed according to the USSR patterns to suppress the memory of its short-term independence. The process of its ideological discredit was launched.

We can feel that the main aim of Soviet propaganda was to prove that Estonian culture of the independent republic was a slave of capitalism; Estonian identity in general was portrayed as a part of the "bad past", representing the "bad days" and "not trendy in the new and progressive Soviet society" (Tampere 2005: 144). On the one hand, we can admit that pre-annexation Estonia was a capitalist state, and that fact had some influence on its culture. On the other hand, in 1918-1940 Estonian culture actively developed, and this period was fruitful for it, because the government supported its development (Weidemann 2009). The spheres of science and education concentrated on issues of the Estonian language, history and literature. However, my study suggests that Soviet propaganda interpreted the period of 1918-1940 as something bad, and the desire to feel oneself Estonian rather than Soviet was condemned in Soviet society. Thus, the place for promoting Russian cultural identity in Estonia was free since the competing Estonian culture was undervalued and criticized by the propaganda. Soviet rulers began to shape the cultural identification of the Russian minority in Estonia. They wanted to

make it the dominating, legitimizing identity. The research revealed that the Communist Party arranged a full-scale agitation campaign of Russians' status promotion.

Firstly, one measure of the Soviet policy towards the cultural identity of the Russian minority was the rise in self-esteem of this minority. Books, articles, and films viewed Russians in Estonia very positively. For instance, in the 1940s new Estonian writers such as Hans Leberecht, August Jakobsoon, Juhan Smuul touched the topics of Estonia's transformation into the union republic, the Great Patriotic war, life in the Soviet Estonian rural areas, and glorified Russians as great heroes: liberators and benefactors. New history programs in Estonian schools and universities also created an idealized picture of Russians.

According to the official Soviet point of view, Russians and their culture always brought Estonia peace and florescence. Ironically, even the period of czarist rule (despite the fact that it was publicly condemned in the USSR) was described as something good for Estonia. On the one hand, Russians had quite a soft policy towards Estonia, and the official point of view was not totally wrong. Under the rule of the Russian Empire, Estonia was in a better position than many other provinces of Russia. According to Fedosova (2009), its population had more civil liberties than ordinary Russians, and its national elite was kept safe.

On the other hand, we note that the official point of view to a significant extent ignored the facts that Russians waged wars to conquer Estonia or conducted the policy of russification, which was negative to Estonians. Consequently, the Soviet picture of Russians' role was an idealization of history: the positive side of the Russian rule was emphasized, while its negative side was hidden. At the same time, Russian culture was portrayed as the contributor of Estonian successful development, whereas German or Swedish cultures were viewed as oppressing ones. In fact, in some cases Swedes and Germans had a tougher policy towards Estonian culture than Russians (Miljan 2004: 65). For instance, they baptized Estonians by force and imposed German or Swedish cultures on them, while Russians made less effort to impose Russian culture. Nevertheless, Russians also had a tough policy and could not be idealized. Under the

Russian Empire, Estonia faced russification, which resulted in better opportunities for Russians. However, Soviet propaganda did not show the multi-faceted picture of Russians' influence and concentrated on the positive side. The results of the Soviet policy of promotion were simple – the Russian minority of Estonia was proud of its own culture, and happily identified itself with such a splendid image.

Soviet propaganda was quite successful. Being proud of one's own culture is a natural phenomenon, but Russians sometimes did not only take pride in their own Russianness but also perceived the national Estonian culture as something lower than the Russian one as the consequence of a decades-long agitation by the USSR. Their identity was made legitimizing. As Castells (1997: 8) states, this form of identity of the dominant society group or institution rationalizes its dominating status in the community. In the Soviet period one's own Russianness was said to be a reasonable explanation of its dominating status in Estonian society. Not only propaganda constructed Russian cultural identity as legitimizing.

Another measure of legitimizing identity construction was the language policy of the USSR. In Estonia the Estonian language was alive as the main means of the local people's communication, but the Russian language turned from the language of a small minority to an influential *lingua franca*. Soviet propaganda proclaimed that the ability to speak Russian was a form of profit for every individual. According to the agitation, children learning Russian "want to understand the programmes of all-Union (central) television, they dream of travelling to Moscow and want to be able to converse with their contemporaries in Russian" (Mitter & Novikov 1985: 129). Those Estonians who could speak Russian fluently had an opportunity of better employment. In the Baltic region schools the education process lasted not 11 years, as in other regions of the Soviet Union, but 12 since the Soviet rulers wished young generations of Estonians also to speak Russian (Zetterberg 2007: 693). The situation demonstrated to the local people that the success in life could be achieved only if a person spoke fluent Russian. This language policy also resulted in the promotion of the Russian minority's self-esteem.

The status of Russian as a *lingua franca* shaped the formation of the Russian minority cultural identity. Russians began to feel that their language, an inalienable part of their culture, was a subject of pride. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania there was almost no necessity for Russians to study the Baltic languages. According to Mitter and Novikov (1985: 130), "only the Russians have the full range of educational and cultural facilities (including modern mass media) available in their mother tongue everywhere". Thus, the cultural identity of Russians was artificially made to be based on its members' admiration of the super-power and high, privileged status of the Russian language.

In the Soviet period the identity of the Russian community was to a major extent formed by the activities of the Communist Party in Estonia. It encouraged migration to build up a significant Russian population in the land – a third of the whole population. From the first days of the Soviet presence the place was cleansed for the cultural identity of the new rulers – the old, pre-revolution Russian society in the country along with some cultural actors of independent Estonia faced repression. Then after a period of purges and agitation campaigns Russian cultural identity became legitimizing.

I tend to feel that Russian cultural identity obtained the status of legitimizing through the measures of the Soviet government. Russians themselves appeared in the land through the Communist Party-organized workforce flow (Miljan 2004: 421). Frequently, the newcomers from internal regions of the USSR knew nothing about Estonia – only propaganda materials about the once bourgeois state, whose population chose the way of becoming the part of the Soviet Union. Communist agitation about the character of pre-Soviet Estonia and its culture almost excluded the opportunity that many Russians arriving in the country would try to get acquainted with the achievements of the host culture. On the whole, Russians came to an almost entirely unknown environment, which perceived them as the occupiers. On the other hand, Russians themselves viewed their flow as a fraternal help to the oppressed small nation. Russians were taught to perceive their own culture as something ideal, always positive, without any disadvantages, whereas the negative sides of the culture of a sovereign republic were thoroughly exaggerated. Thus, Russian cultural identity looked at itself only positively. As a result of this there was set a ground for the future shock of the

Russian community in Estonia, caused by their insufficient adaptation to Estonian reality.

We can note that despite its alleged strength the cultural identity of the Russian minority in Estonia in fact was fairly weak; the main problem was that it to some extent depended on the support of the Soviet state. On the one hand, in many cases Russian culture and national traditions were persecuted or ignored in the USSR (Castells 1998: 43). As Castells (ibid.) states, "Russian nationalism was generally repressed as much as the cultural identity of the non-Russian subjected nations". On the other hand, the Soviet state promoted the policy of russification in the media, language and culture. In major institutions of the Soviet Union such as the army and the KGB the leaders were overwhelmingly Russian (ibid.). These measures gave the Russian identity a legitimizing status.

The artificial character of it made evident that this cultural identity would not be able to face any significant challenges. Russians were taught not to think about the possible crises and problems related to non-Russian cultures of the Soviet Union - communist leaders proclaimed that Soviet society was a society without crises and a society of true freedom, while Soviet way of life was an atmosphere of true collectivism and comradeship, the strengthening friendship and monolithic nature of the country's nations and nationalities (Brezhnev 1977: 570). Any significant problems of the Estonian Russian community were solved by the super-force of the Soviet regime rather than by the efforts of Russians themselves. Thus, Russians frequently even did not know that there had been any resistance against their domination. The worldview of Russian cultural identity was protected from any criticism of its leading position in non-Russian society. Consequently, I tend to think that the future problem of Estonian-Russian relations in the 1990s was prepared by the policy of the Soviet Union: Russians were taught to view themselves and their culture as benefactors, and their language as *lingua franca*, so any possible changes of such situation were to cause Estonian Russians' concern.

The collapse of the USSR transformed the cultural identity of the Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As we have already seen, the main cornerstone of the Russian dominating position was the Soviet state. In my opinion, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the collapse of the cultural identity of Soviet Russians because it to a major extent depended on the cultural policy of the USSR. In the 1990s Russians had to re-build their cultural identity and to study how to face challenges without the support of the mighty Soviet regime. They had to live in states which drastically returned to their pre-annexation cultural practices. Russians and their identity faced the necessity to transform in order to find a way in the new environment. The next chapter will focus on the re-establishment of Estonian independent culture, which caused the transformations of the cultural identity of the Estonian Russian community.

4 RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF ESTONIAN CULTURAL INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

In this chapter the main focus will be on the measures taken by the Estonian government to restore the higher status of national culture after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These measures to a major extent changed the identity of Russians living in the land. Before analyzing these changes I will demonstrate how the environment was transformed due to the new governmental policy on the protection of Estonian culture. We will not discuss the great entity of the whole post-Soviet culture of Estonia, but concentrate on some influential tendencies of the re-establishment of cultural independence. The transformations to a major extent began after the fall of the Soviet state, taking place in the 1990s.

After the collapse of the USSR Estonia had the opportunity to develop its culture as the sovereign one. The government could concentrate on the restoration of the national music, literature, cinema, research into the country's history, and promotion of the Estonian language's status. As the leading newspaper *Eesti Päevaleht* summarized the goals of this promotion in 2008, "What are the state interests of Estonia? To keep Estonianness [sic] and our culture" (Kollist 2008, translation mine). Nevertheless, the Estonian government had to face difficulties connected to this cultural revival.

The serious problem of the revival was the significant number of Russian citizens living in Estonia who often expressed a desire not to be a part of the new Estonian society, to live separately, to maintain only their own culture and language. The sizable non-Estonian community posed a certain threat to the small nation and culture whose representatives scarcely numbered a million (Talvet 2004: 129). Estonians had to begin their cultural identity revival under a constant existential threat to their culture and language, since in the country there was a large group of people which frequently did not express any wish to integrate into Estonian society or to learn the Estonian language (ibid.). In the 1990s the total population of Estonia was approximately 1 400 000

people: 71.8 per cent were Estonians, 21.6 per cent Russians, 2.1 per cent Ukrainians, 1.3 per cent Byelorussians, 0.9 per cent Finns and 1.6 per cent others (Tulskiy 2001). This situation was particularly dangerous to the small nation of Estonia, as it could lead to a situation when foreign culture and language again would rise over Estonian ones and submit them as something secondary. Therefore, Estonian culture's dominating status was legally protected in order to guarantee its security.

Other problems of post-Soviet Estonian culture were connected to the phenomena of previous decades – russification and censorship exerting strict control on national art. After the collapse of the USSR the Estonian government began solving these issues. Firstly, it tried to find a way to restore the higher status of Estonian identity after the period of the promotion of only Russianness, and to protect the national culture under the conditions of a significant non-Estonian group in the country. Secondly, the government planned to eliminate all the censoring bodies. In a free sovereign state *Glavlit* and other similar agencies were no more needed. The policy of the young Estonian state searched for a solution to the cultural problems set in the Soviet era.

The easiest task was to liberate Estonian culture from the influence of the numerous censoring organizations of the USSR, since they did not outlive their master – the Soviet regime. These bodies could not exist without the strong support of the authorities who had provided them with the right to promote and punish. *Glavlit*, various pro-Communist professional unions of composers, writers, and artists became history along with the collapse of the Soviet state. In the early 1990s the censorship of print publications and mass media was officially abolished in Estonia. The professional associations of cultural figures lost their Communist orientation and commonly became non-political. The era of ideological control was past, and national cultural figures received their long-awaited freedom of creation, thus being able to touch once forbidden topics of their own Estonian cultural practices, the fight for their independence, and conflicts caused by controversy between Estonian and the Soviet culture. The same process of liberation took place not only in the sphere of art, but also in the media.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the communist newspapers were either abolished or privatized, and new national papers appeared instead of them. For instance, the Soviet-era leading paper *Rahva Hääl* [People's Voice] was privatized in 1993 and gradually turned into the non-political Estonian daily *Eesti Päeväleht* [Estonian Daily Paper] (Hoyer 1993: 269). In the period of the early 1990s there appeared 47 new national newspapers and 44 magazines (ibid. 263).Thus, the mass media turned into a means of national unification. The topics of the uniqueness of Estonian culture, pride in being the Estonian, glorification of national and cultural sovereignty were raised. The freedom of art and speech in Estonia was achieved. Unfortunately, the process of a return to pre-Soviet Estonian culture was not so smooth, although Estonians, despite all difficulties, finally managed to revive the latter. The main problem and obstacle of the revival was the decades-long USSR-maintained policy of russification of the country and culture.

The most important aim of independent Estonia was to destroy the chains on its own culture which were forged by the measures of Sovietisation and russification taken by the Soviet regime. In the 1990s Estonians felt more sympathy towards the West and considered their culture to be an unalienable part of European culture. As the national newspaper *Postimees* wrote in 2003, "It is possible to remain Estonians only in the case of being Europeans. We [Estonians] should join European culture. We are a part of European culture" (Luik, Nyganen, Engelbrecht, Surva & Kiviräkh 2003).

In the 1990s the government took a number of measures to eliminate the stereotype that Estonian culture has always been a subject of the country's masters – either Germans, Swedes or Russians. In national universities departments of Estonian history, art, archeology were re-created, and researchers set out to prove that the invaders and conquerors did not create Estonia's culture: it successfully existed before the beginning of crusaders' or Communists' rule. Scientists took the course of demonstrating how unique was the culture which was mistakenly perceived as the dependent copy of other cultures. Russians were portrayed as bad rulers harming Estonian culture, while the time of Germans' or Swedes' rule was presented as "peaceful and prosperous" or "the Good Old Swedish Era" (Miljan 2004: 65–66). In fact, the influence of Swedish and German

culture contributed much to the development of Estonian culture: Swedes and Germans printed the first books in Estonian, encouraged reading, and promoted literacy (ibid.). On the other hand, they treated Estonians as their serfs and used cruel methods to baptize them. Estonian rebellions were not a rare event during the period of Swedish and German rule (Samarina 2009). At the same time Russian rule was milder because nobody forced Estonians to be baptized as Orthodox Christians, and their culture had an opportunity to develop (ibid.). Thus, the one-sided image of Russian imperial period as the time of Estonians' oppressions is not correct.

The focus of Estonian education was also on pre-Soviet culture, on its achievements and peculiarities. The short-term period of independence was hailed as a flourishing era. Conversely the period of the Soviet domination over Estonia was described according to the new textbooks as "just as bad as Nazism" (Laar 2008). Nevertheless, this interpretation is not correct since the Soviet Union made much for the development of Estonia. Non-Russian union republics received more resources than the RSFSR, their leaders were the local people, and the population had more rights than average Russians (Castells 2004: 43). At the same time the period of sovereignty was not ideal and had its own problems of a weak Estonian economy, civil rights violations, and less opportunities of education for the population (Samarina 2009).

On the whole, the education programs in schools and universities were transformed to demonstrate to Estonian students that their culture created significant masterpieces not only during the period of foreign domination over it, but also in the period of independence. The Estonian Education Law of 1992 proclaimed the necessity of "the preservation of the Estonian people, culture, and nation [sic]" (Vetik 1999: 93). Another measure of cultural policy of new Estonia was the Estonian language protective measures, since the Soviet era of Russian as a *lingua franca* challenged its status.

In the USSR-controlled Estonia there was no attempt to eliminate its language, but its position was weakened by the fact that one could live in the country using Russian as a main means of communication. According to the Population Census of 1989, only 18 per cent of non-Estonians claimed that they commanded the Estonian language (Vetik

1999: 71). At the same time "it would be realistic to estimate that about 3/4 of Estonians commanded Russian fairly well at the end of [the] Soviet period" (ibid., Vetik's translation). After the collapse of the USSR the status of Estonia was legally protected.

The period of the 1990s was a time of legislative action aimed at the promotion of Estonian language status. In 1992 the citizenship law was accepted; it gave the rights of citizens only to those who were citizens before the Soviet presence, and to their descendants. Those who wish to apply for citizenship should not only live in Estonia for two years, but also pass an exam of language proficiency in Estonian. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia in 1992 defined Estonian as the state language. In Vetik's words, "it guarantees citizens the right to Estonian-language education, individuals' rights to conduct affairs and communicate with local governments in Estonian, and prescribes conducting affairs of government in Estonian" (Vetik 1999: 99).

In 1993 *The Elementary and Upper Secondary Schools Law* stated that Estonian was the main language of instruction in the country's schools, while elementary schools with alternative languages of instruction had to maintain studying Estonian as a subject. In 1995 *The Law on Language* of the Estonian Republic was adopted in order to proclaim the leading position of the national language of Estonia. According to it, all languages besides Estonian were defined as foreign (Vetik 1999: 72). Using other languages in oral communication in public institutions could be accepted only with the agreement of the public authorities and if the authorities commanded other languages. The state also set a strategy of learning the Estonian language in non-Estonian groups.

In 1998 the Estonian parliament accepted *The Language Learning Strategy for the Non-Estonian Population*. According to Vetik (1999: 72), "the strategy stipulates that the language policy should guarantee the status of Estonian as the official language". The strategy planning for the period 1998-2012 was to guarantee the possibility to study Estonian for all Estonian inhabitants through a variety of educational programs. Thus, it was aimed at guaranteeing the status and development of the Estonian language, at solving the problems set by the Soviet policy of russification. Estonian became the main means of communication, strengthened by the governmental acts in maintaining its

dominating status and trying to popularize it within the non-Estonian groups. Learning the Estonian language meant also learning Estonian culture – thus, the strategy contributed to the reinforcement of the national culture through making it accessible to others non-Estonian part of the country's inhabitants. This learning was planned to lead to easier socio-cultural adaptation of non-Estonians to the conditions of the state. For the promotion of Estonian culture and language new educational programs were set up – the focus was on the younger generation of non-Estonians.

In the spring of 1998 two educational strategy documents – "*A Learning Estonia*" and "*Educational Strategy in Estonia*" were completed in order to develop the process of non-Estonians' studying national language in primary schools (Vetik 1999: 92). These documents created a new national curriculum which developed new textbooks, new programs of teacher development, new technological aids etc. More and more classes had to take place partly or wholly in the Estonian language. According to the development program, by the year 2003 two technical subjects and two other subjects had to be taught in the Estonian language in schools based on other languages (ibid. 93).

The aim of these measures was to make non-Estonian students finishing schools speak the national language fluently: "this would mean he or she would be able to gain Estonian citizenship without supplementary language exam, and also the elimination of linguistic and cultural barriers" (Vetik 1999: 92). These measures were planned to contribute to the process of the integration of non-Estonian groups into Estonian society. The Estonian government assumed that a person learning the Estonian language from primary school was more likely to successfully integrate into the new reality constructed by the policy aimed at the return to higher status of Estonian culture.

On the whole, during the period of the 1990s the Estonian government took major measures to free place for the development of Estonian culture, to secure it as a dominant, to guarantee its leading position. The political course of the whole state was concentrated on the re-establishment of higher status of Estonian culture and its protection. The government tried to unite Estonians on their common identity, to maintain its high position, and to guard the Estonian language. The aim of the system of

education was officially proclaimed to be preservation of Estonian culture. Laws made the Estonian language the main and primary language of civil service. The whole concept of citizenship now was based on a person's allegiance to pre-Soviet Estonian community – Estonians were encouraged to be the country's citizens. As for the applicants of the non-Estonian background of a citizenship, their acceptance was based on their ability to learn the Estonian language. The revival of Estonian culture was closely connected to the integration of non-Estonian minorities into the society. For performing this aim numerous programs of the promotion of the Estonian language within non-Estonian groups were set up.

Due to the state-accepted programs and projects, non-Estonian groups in the society were offered an opportunity to at least partially integrate into the entity of the Estonian cultural community through the process of learning the Estonian language and culture. This integration began from the schools and universities – when a non-Estonian individual received their first knowledge of Estonia. Then, it continued into adult life – applying for citizenship demanded proficiency in the Estonian language; participation in the country's political life was impossible without knowing its language; the language fluency Estonian was a strong guarantee of better employment for non-Estonians. At the same time these measures were planned to provide stronger social unity and tolerance in Estonian society.

Nevertheless, the Council of Europe has condemned the negative impact of Estonianisation on the Estonian Russian minority (Surskaya 2010). In 2010 it criticized many measures of Estonianisation and demanded that the Estonian government should change its legislation in order to guarantee the rights of minorities, especially Russians (ibid.). The experts of the Council of Europe noted that the interests of Russians have to be taken into consideration while planning any information or educational reforms; the minority identity should be respected by the state. According to the Council of Europe, the new principle of citizenship has almost excluded Russians from the political life of the country (Perechen osnovnyh pretenzij i rekomendatsij mezhdunarodnyh organizatsij i NPO k Estonii po pravam natsionalnyh menshinstv 2010). Russians cannot vote or be elected; they cannot influence the life of their state and are not represented sufficiently

in the country's business and elite (ibid.). Russians' socio-economic conditions of living are worse in comparison with those of Estonians, and Russians face far more problems of employment than Estonians (ibid.). The Council of Europe stated that the cultural specificity of Russians should be recognised; the right of Russian schools in Estonia to use Russian as the main language of instruction should not be challenged. On the whole, it demanded that the measures of the promotion of the Estonian language should be supplemented with guarantees of the minorities' right to study in their national language (ibid.). The policy of integrating was criticized for concentration on teaching Estonian only, while according to the experts the language policy did not give Russians the media in their mother tongue and did not protect their language (ibid.). Moreover, the integration was said to be slow; the Council of Europe called on the Estonian government to integrate Estonians and Russians into the one society to avoid interethnic tensions.

The Estonian government has frequently promised the Council of Europe that it will take the measures to solve the problem of the Russian minority, but in fact the situation remains negative (Zaytseva 2009). The government does not want to ease the process of the citizenship application or give Russian the status of second official language (ibid.). Nevertheless, the European criticism has had some impact on Estonians, and the Estonian authorities have taken some measures to help Russians (ibid.). In 2000s the government was trying to hire more civil servants who can speak Russian fluently. Thus, those Russians who do not speak Estonian will receive an opportunity to communicate with officials in Russian. Some TV-programs in Estonian got Russian subtitles (ibid.). However, despite all these measures the situation of the minority remains acute. Estonian Russians have to adapt to the new conditions.

The new situation created by the Estonian cultural revival has established the dilemma of Estonian Russians. They still have to choose whether they should adapt to the transforming conditions of cultural policy or not. Russians have different views on their cultural identity life in post-Soviet Estonia. As Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) notes, the crucial issue is whether the Russian minority, "a Big Brother" in the recent past, will develop an identity of its own, embedded in the given territorial-historical environment

which they share with the majority, or whether this minority will still represent, not only for others, Russia and its interests. Some Russians have constructed their identity on the principles of resistance.

5 TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN TERMS OF RESISTANCE IDENTITY

This chapter will focus on the transformations of Estonian Russian cultural identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of the USSR in 1991 resulted in the loss of what Castells calls a legitimizing identity among Estonian Russians. It was replaced by either resistance or project identity. In this chapter the focus is on the former one.

According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), resistance identity is the one embraced by those who are in a devalued sociopolitical position and feel stigmatized by the logic of domination. In Castells' (ibid.) words, these people build trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to those of the dominant group. Resistance identity is thus aimed at guaranteeing survival in a non-friendly environment. To a large extent, some proportion of the Estonian Russian minority appears to have acquired precisely this kind of cultural identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the 1990s Estonian Russians were not ready for the new Estonian cultural policy, perceived it as a threat and resisted it. The measures promoting higher status of Estonian culture were viewed by some Russians as a form of purposeful, intended aggression towards their culture. Therefore, the Estonian cultural revival has led to the anxiety of some proportion of Russian minority. This anxiety is caused by the conditions under which many Russians have difficulties in everyday life due to their culture and language (or due to absence of knowledge of the Estonian ones because of the policy of the Soviet Union). As a result of the cultural policy transformations in the 1990s, the minority began to face the problems. One of the main difficulties remains the language problem.

In the 2000s the transformation of language policy and reduction of the Russian language to the language of the minority has had an impact on the issue of Estonian

Russians' employment and political activities. So, when Estonian has become the only official language, proficiency in it is demanded everywhere, and inability to speak it inevitably closes the road to a better career. Kaja Tampere's (2005: 160-162) interviews with the Russian workers of Narva Power Plant vividly demonstrate that the new conditions are hard for many Russians living in Estonia – due to the language problem they have to "do the jobs no Estonian would want to do" as the opportunity of better white-collar job requires fluency in Estonian; Russians with no skill in Estonian have "nowhere to go", cannot "get work anywhere else but here in Narva". Another problem of the Russian minority in the 2000s is the "numbness" of Russians due to the transformations of the language policy. The new citizenship law provides with the rights of a citizen only those Russians who are able to pass the proficiency exam in Estonian.

In addition to the problems of language transformation the Russian minority faces the problem of the cultural redirecting of Estonia and the subsequent radical revaluation of the Russian role in Estonian history. The image of Russian has in many aspects turned from being that of a benefactor to an occupier. As the Estonian Russian daily *Den za Dnem'* writes, "for many years Russians have been hearing that they are occupiers in Estonia" (Rusakov 2009). The Soviet era has been criticized, and the sovereignty period is promoted. At the same time many Estonian Russians do not accept this new view. As Kaja Tampere's (2005: 160) interviews of Russian workers demonstrate, in the 1990s the following opinion prevailed: "we were brought here [to Estonia] to build up the energy industry, produce light for the entire Estonian population, and now we seem to be thrown into the dustbin". The review of the Russian role along with the language problems and problems of adaptation have led to anxiety in the Russian minority.

There is no doubt that for Russians the adaptation to the new situation has not been easy. "It would be too much to ask that [sic] historical influences to be erased from people's memories immediately" (Tampere 2005: 156). The serious concern of the Russian minority is the fear of full merging with Estonian culture and resulting gradual loss of Russianness. This fear has led to the emergence of various Russian associations preserving their culture and sense of self.

Russian cultural identity in Estonia is marked by a process of internal associating and building a small internal world of the community. This uniting is primarily based on a person's Russianness, one's pro-Russian (in many cases pro-Soviet) attitude to the new Estonian environment, adherence to the values of Russian culture, and a desire to maintain the Russian language's high status as a major means of communication. When Russians have lost their identity dominating positions, the transforming conditions of being are a catalyst of the centripetal tendencies of creating some form of their own small world based on the feeling of belonging to Russia. Many Russians express their desire to remain Russians and not to be integrated. At the same time they concentrate only on the positive side of Russia's influence and condemn the Estonian reevaluation of the history. Those Russians who have chosen the path of resistance wish their world to be closed from the external influence of Estonian life. If one paraphrases Manuel Castells, this situation is close to "*the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded*" (Castells 1998: 9, original italics). This uniting and own world-building is closely connected to the process of establishing political organizations which are aimed at the defense of Russian cultural identity and its status promotion.

Uniting some Russians over the issue of the protection of the Russian minority interests under the conditions of the new reality has been encountered by the process of establishing pro-Russian political organizations. These organizations are intended to guarantee the safety and security of Russian cultural identity. In 1993 the Representative Assembly of the Russian-Speaking Population was established. In Vetik's words (1999: 45), "its stated aim was to represent the interests of this section of the population, whose views would otherwise not be heard in Estonia's state institutions". Interestingly, this assembly included not only Russians, but also a major number of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union. As the members of the organization said: "the Russian speaking population - these are the Ukrainians, and Belarusans, and Jews, and Tatars. All we Russian speakers have been put under the same socio-political circumstances" (Laitin 1998: 278). It was considered important for this organization to take a constructive approach, to observe the legal principles of Estonian Republic and to defend Russian-speaking people's interests only by constitutional means (Vetik 1999: 45).

In 1993 *Russkaya Obschina Estonii* [the Russian Community of Estonia] was established. Its aim was "the preservation and development of Russian culture and spirituality" (Russkaya Obschina Estonii 2009). This community intended to represent and protect the interests of its members in state, public, cultural and commercial organizations, to promote acquaintance with their cultural heritage, to establish legal educational bodies, to accept and help the Russian Orthodox Church in the sphere of maintaining the spiritual culture of Russians and to provide them with legal advice (ibid.). In the 1990s the Russian minority did not only want to preserve its culture, but also wished to actively participate in Estonian political life.

In 1993 *Russkaya Partiya Estonii* [the Russian party of Estonia] was organized. It proclaimed itself as "the conservative party of the Russian minority in Estonia" and the "political national-democratic body of the Russian population of Estonia" (Russkaya Partiya Estonii 2009). In 1995 the party was represented in the Estonian national parliament Riigikogu (six out of 101 seats), and in 1996 it created the Russian faction in Tallinn City Council. The Russian party stated in the program that it was responsible for the fate of Estonian Russians and it had to protect their interests. According to the program statement, "Russians have lived in Estonia since the dawn of time. The Russian minority is an inalienable part of the history and culture of the Estonian state", and the priority aim was "the securing of our [Russian] traditions, history, culture, language, ethic and spiritual values" (ibid.).

In December 1995 the First Congress of Russian Citizens of Estonia met in Tallinn with 190 delegates (Laitin 1998: 278). It deputy chairman Petr Rozhok stated that "the goal of the newly formed Estonian Republic Association of Russian Citizens was to indicate to Russian-speakers in Estonia which candidates they should vote" (ibid.). On October 17, 1993 Estonian Russians and Russian speakers took an active part in the local elections in Estonia. In Tallinn City Council, Russian electoral blocs won 27 out of 64 seats (Vetik 1999: 46). The aim was simple – the Russian deputies in Estonian councils could represent the interests of the Russian minority, be the voice of their electors' common Russianness. As one leader of the Estonian Russian groups Yuri Zhuravlev put

it, the aim of the Estonian Russian political forces was a situation when Russians voted for Russians (Yuri Zhuravlev 2009).

In actual fact, there are far more various Russian associations than this study has listed. However, even a small list describing these groups demonstrates that to a major extent they are build up on the foundation of resistance identity. A significant number of the organizations use in their rhetoric such words and expressions as "we will be unheard if we are not united", "united we should represent our [Russian] interests", "our Russianness should be protected" (Vetik 1999: 45-46). Yuri Zhuravlev, the Estonian Russian leader mentioned, uses even more aggressive words: "We should protect the interests of [Estonian] Russian people, the people whose children's right to study in the mother tongue has been stolen" (Yuri Zhuravlev 2009). Thus, the organizations view the current environment of Estonian Russians' cultural identity as something threatening, dangerous or at least unfriendly. The programs of these associations emphasize the necessity of the preservation of Russianness by all possible means.

On the other hand, resistance identity commonly includes not only cultural preservation, but also resistance, challenge to the dominant identity. In this case, in the 2000s Russian political organizations typically avoid the rhetoric of any challenge to the dominating Estonian culture (for fear of being dissolved), but the practical activities of some associations are aimed at the struggle for a more significant extent of Russian control over Estonian political and cultural life. More Russians in the country's councils can mean not only better representation of Russian minority interests but also louder voices demanding pro-Russian rather than pro-Estonian evaluation of Russian culture role in Estonian history, past Soviet successes, and the results of the decades-long Russian domination over the land. Another measure of Russian cultural identity protection and resistance to the dominating Estonian cultural identity is a tightening of the ties between Estonian Russians and Russians in the Russian Federation.

The actions (taken both by some Russians in Estonia and the Russian government) of uniting Russians and Estonian Russians, and securing Russian cultural identity of the latter are to some extent associated with the activities of *Mezhdunarodnyi sovet*

rossiyskih sootechestvennikov [International Council of Russian compatriots] and its Estonian branch – *Soyuz organizatziy rossiyskih sootechestvennikov Estonii* [Association of Russian compatriots' organizations in Estonia]. This International Council proclaims its main goal as "the promotion of uniting and coordinating the activities of compatriots' public organizations in the name of securing ethnic identity and the national uniqueness [of Russians]" (Mezhdunarodnyi sovet rossiyskih sootechestvennikov 2010). For its achievement the Council declares the necessary actions as consolidation with Russian diasporas abroad, promotion of the creation of a united Russian cultural, informational and educational space in order to strengthen the solidarity of Russian diasporas, and their international position, and the development of the conditions necessary for increasing cultural, intellectual, and business links between the abroad Russians and Russia itself. The work of the Council is supplemented by its local branch in Estonia.

The Estonian branch of the Association of Russian compatriots continues the policy of the central body towards the Russian minority in Estonia. This association describes the basic directions of its activities as the support, assistance and promotion of Russian compatriots and their organization under the standards of international law, international treaties between Estonia and Russia, and Estonian legislation in the sphere of human rights and liberties; securing and developing Russian uniqueness, culture, language, education and system of information in Russian; the creation of the favorable conditions for the implementation of the programs for promoting the compatriots; organizing a system of equal, many-sided mutually beneficial relations with Russia; cultural and educational measures as well as a child and youth policy.

Through the organizations of compatriots Russia exercises some influence on the minority in Estonia. To a major extent this influence has led to an increase in Estonian Russians' resistance identity tendencies. One of the most vivid forms of Russian identity activities for fighting Estonianisation has been the establishment of a separate Russian world within Estonian society. This world includes a specific Estonian Russian information system, theatre, various cultural associations etc. To some extent, the

community world resembles the Russian quasi-state located in Estonia. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon deserves to be described.

The Estonian Russian information system includes TV and radio channels, newspapers and Internet-portals. Many Estonian Russians mainly watch the so-called *Perviy Baltiyskiy kanal* [First Baltic channel] which is the Baltic-oriented branch of *ORT* [*Obschestvennoe Rossiyskoe Televidenie*, Public Russian Television]. It usually broadcasts the news and music of the Russian Federation in Russian. The minority in Estonia has several Russian-language radio channels such as *Raadio 4* [Radio 4], *Semeinoe Radio* [Family Radio], *Narodnoe Radio* [People's Radio] and some others. The representatives of the Estonian Russian community own and publish their Russian newspapers which include *Den' za Dnem* [Day by Day], *Molodoj Estonii* [Estonian Youth], *Narva, Narvskaja Gazeta* [Narva Paper], *Nasha Gazeta* [Our paper] etc. Estonian Russians have also created their information system in the Internet: *Russkiy Portal* [Russian Portal, www.veneportaal.ee], providing the Russian minority with information and analytic materials, and *Portal Russkoi Obschiny Estonii* [Portal of Russian community of Estonia, www.baltija.eu], promoting unity and equality of Russians in Estonia.

The characteristic of the above-mentioned Russian information system is that it to some extent reflects the Estonian, Russian and world events from the position of Russia, or at least from the position of the Russia-influenced minority in the state. The surrounding reality is frequently seen by Estonian Russians' newspapers through the lens of their specific community, and this lens is not always the same as the Estonian media. Special attention is paid by this information system to the everyday life of the Russian minority, its relations with the Estonian authorities, the impact of Estonianisation on its existence, cultural events of Estonian Russians and their history. Many newspapers try to advocate the presence of Russians in the state, use the rhetoric of the thousand-years long mutual coexistence of Estonians and Russians, and pay attention to the positive consequences of Soviet domination over the Baltic region. Thus, some Estonian Russians live in the world of their own news, and perceive reality from the position of their information system. However, such Russians' cultural space consists not only of their own

newspapers and radio channels. Its most important elements are Russian cultural activities (plays, operas, books publishing, exhibitions, and concerts).

The resistant tendency of some Estonian Russians' cultural identity is not only related to the desire of self-isolation from Estonianisation, but also to the aspiration to continue developing their particular culture even in the territory of a foreign state. Due to this development, it is possible for some Estonian Russians to interact only with Russian culture and avoid contact with Estonian cultural activities. *Russkiy Teatr Estonii* [the Russian Theater of Estonia] exists in Tallinn. It is the only professional Russian theater in Estonia (Russkiy Teatr Estonii 2009). This theater provides audiences with Russian classics. It views its aim as the preservation and continuation of the Russian theatre traditions. Besides the theater Russian cultural centers are also presented by the association of Estonian Russian writers.

The literary activities of Estonian Russians are promoted by *Objedinenie Russkih literatorov Estonii* [Association of Russian writers of Estonia], publishing office *Russkiy Telegraf* [Russian Telegraph], and the Estonian branch of *Soyuz pisatelei Rossii* [Association of Russian writers]. The Association of Russian writers of Estonia unites Estonian Russian novelists, poets, critics and literature researchers. Its aim is to promote young Russian poets and writers, to translate Estonian literature into Russian and conversely, to create new textbooks for Russian school in Estonia, and to develop relations with Russia (Objedinenie Russkih literatorov Estonii 2009). As one member of the association Ivan Gavrilovitsch proclaims, "Russia can live without us, but we cannot live without Russia" (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000). The publishing office *Russkiy Telegraf* maintains close cooperation with this association, publishes the work of its members and disseminates them in Estonia (Russkiy Telegraf 2007). The Estonian branch of *Soyuz pisatelei Rossii* aims to develop connections with Russian literature, to support the publication of modern Russian and Estonian Russian writers and poems, and to promote Estonian Russian literature in the region (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000).

Various literature associations are connected to the central Moscow association *Soyuz pisatelei Rossii* in the same way as it was in the Soviet period. The resistant tendency of

Russian cultural identity is demonstrated by the fact that Estonian Russian associations have actively advocated the necessity of keeping strong ties with the Russian Federation instead of integrating into Estonian society. These publishing activities allow Estonian Russians to speak proudly of their own and Russian Federation literature as if it contrasts with the literature of independent Estonia. The aim is to restore the status of Russian books and keep minority Russianness secure. According to Vladimir Illyachevitsch, one of the leader of Estonian Russian literature association: "Only by choosing the path of self-restoration can we secure the future for Russian culture and literature in the Baltic region" (Vladimir Illyachevitsch 2000).

The sphere of music is also represented in the Russian minority cultural space. Estonian Russian music has continued to develop, and the artists maintain close relations with Russia. The activities of Estonian Russian musical groups, choirs and bands are associated with *Soyuz russkih prosvetitelskih i blagotvoritelnyh obschestv v Estonii* [Association of Russian educational and charity organizations of Estonia] which organizes Russian concerts and festivals (Soyuz russkih prosvetitelskih I blagotvoritelnyh obschestv v Estonii 2003). Most attention is paid to Russian music. The association organizes concerts in almost all towns with significant Russian communities, and maintains close cooperation with Russia (ibid.).

Another part of the security system of Russianness is Estonian Russians' sphere of education. According to the Estonian Russian teachers, 63 Russian schools exist in contemporary Estonia, and the parents' demand for Russian education for their children still remains high (Eliseeva 2009). The education programs also differ from the major Estonian schools. For instance, the re-evaluation of the history of Estonia under the Soviet rule in new Estonian textbooks is often criticized by some Estonian Russian teachers, since a significant proportion of them graduated from the Soviet pedagogical universities and do not wish to pay attention to the problems of the Soviet period. In some cases official textbooks are not used, but preference is given to the textbooks of the Russian Federation or the textbooks composed by Estonian Russian themselves. According to some Estonians, it is due to the schools that Russians' problems of living in Estonia appear. Since the system of Estonian Russian education often applies an

entirely different approach of viewing the country's history than the official schools, the students receive an interpretation of events which can create problems in their future adult life in Estonia (Burlakov 2008).

Commonly the main problems of the interpretation of Estonian history are related to such events as the beginning of the Soviet presence in 1940 and the Great Patriotic war. These controversial issues have radically different approaches and attitudes. On the one hand, official Soviet history portrayed the Soviet presence as the "fraternal" help to the oppressed nation (Estonskaya Sovetskaya Sozialisticheskaya Respublika 2009). The Great Patriotic war was viewed as a holy war of all the republics of the Soviet Union. The members of the Estonian resistance movement ("forest brothers") were either ignored in the official textbooks or portrayed as "Hitlerites' servants" and "Nazi collaborators" (ibid.). This Soviet image has been accepted by Russians and remains dominant (Laar 2009).

On the other hand, Estonian history views the Soviet presence as occupation, the war as the change of the oppressors from Communists to Nazis and back, and Estonian resistance as a source of "national pride for the Estonians" (Parming 1992: xiii-xv). This interpretation emphasizes that Soviet rule was imposed on Estonia and Estonians had reasons to resist, but at the same time it ignores the following fact: according to Castells (2004: 43), leaders of the Soviet Union funded the development of the union republics very well. The occupying powers do not commonly invest significant funds in the development of the occupied territory. The Estonian Russian education system generally promotes the Soviet image of history, which is totally different from the one of the Estonian official history, and this controversy causes the problems (Burlakov 2008).

This education system portrays the idea of its integration into the Estonian education system in negative terms. Thus, we can conclude that it to some extent promotes resistance tendencies of the minority cultural identity. The main concern of Russian teachers is the fear that, due to Estonianisation, their schools will disappear, and the only means to avoid it is to resist and keep Russianness safe (Eliseeva 2009). Many

Estonian Russian teachers perceive themselves as in the front line of preserving Russian history, culture and language in Estonia.

Their resistance to Estonianisation, of course, remains within the frame of legality – teachers and students loudly speak about their need to study in Russian, write to the media in favor of the Russian schools, and take part in discussion with Estonian officials. The Russian minority resistance identity is to a large extent manifested through the media. Moreover, its role in identity construction is significant. As Berhard Giesen (1996: 11–12) writes, the media both guarantee national cultural identity and at the same time construct it. In this research the focus is put not on a nation, but on a minority. However, the study suggests that the media influenced the Russian minority in Estonia in the same way: guaranteed its cultural identity and constructed it. Therefore, it is vital to focus on the Estonian, Russian and Estonian Russian mass media to understand this influence.

Although it cannot be said that the Estonian media constructed the resistance identity of Estonian Russians in a direct way, it influenced some Russians, directing them towards resistance. In the 1990s-2000s some proportion of the media defined many Russians rather negatively as aliens and occupiers (Tampere 2005: 169). It drew a clear line between Estonian and Russian cultural identity as divided by the alien character of Russians in Estonia. Thus, in some cases the media excluded Estonian Russians from the social life of the country and did not recognize them as equal citizens. This exclusion may have made some Estonian Russians feel themselves to be in a position stigmatized by the dominant social group, Estonians. As a result of this feeling they behaved according to Manuel Castells' theory of resistance identity, and generated the latter to oppose their exclusion. In fact, the exclusionist view on Russians in Estonia was not shared by the all the media, and the Estonians themselves. But many Russians had an impression that they were totally rejected by the whole nation. The following article will be discussed as an example of this view.

The Estonian journalist Tiit Made's recent article (2010) openly proclaims that a significant number of Russians in Estonia are "the fifth column of Russia" (Made

2010). In Made's words, they are the tools of Moscow, its brute force. Moreover, he feels that the Bronze Night (the Estonian Russian riots caused by the relocation of the war monument in 2007) was "the failed effort of riot provoked by Russia" (ibid.). In his opinion those Russians who express sympathies towards the Russian Federation are "the occupiers" (ibid.). He tends to think that the presence of pro-Russian forces in Estonia is a threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the Estonian republic (ibid.).

Thus, the recent article demonstrates the widespread exclusionist view on Estonian Russians who are portrayed as something dangerous to Estonia. At the same time the view mentioned in this particular case is to some extent provoked by the shock of many Estonians caused by the Bronze Night (which will be discussed in the next chapter). The Russian riots scared many Estonians, and it is not surprising that some proportion of the media, especially the conservative newspapers, still present rather radical measures to prevent such events in the future. Nevertheless, in the 2000s due to such articles many Russians have begun to feel that if they are not accepted by the Estonian state, they should be orientated towards Russia, which will be able to defend them. The clear distinction between the dominant nation and the Soviet-period immigrants in the media has made Russians tighten their mutual relations and unite around their common Russianness. In the 2000s a proportion of the media has created an image of an unfriendly environment in mind of some Estonian Russians, and they have begun to establish their cultural identity on the basis of antagonism towards Estonians and their culture.

Not all the newspapers of Estonia present such a one-sided view of Estonian Russians. It can be said that in many cases some proportion of the Estonian media tries to solve the problem of tensions between many Estonians and Estonian Russians, but there are the situations when even the peaceful articles can direct the latter towards resistance identity due to the difficulty of different values and views on the history. Commonly these differences are related to the perception of the Soviet presence. For example, the article by the Estonian political leader Mart Laar (2009) in *Postimees* demonstrates a more positive view of Estonian Russians, encourages the dialogue, but at the same time touches the topic of the Soviet presence and unintentionally offences the minority, thus

promoting its resistant tendency. The author of the article proposes that both Estonians and Russians in Estonia can better their mutual relations through communication, but then he makes the serious mistake. He notes that many Russians perceive Soviet history as their own, and any criticism of it is perceived as offence to them (Laar 2009). At the same time he speaks of the Soviet presence as an occupation and annexation, thus, according to his own logic, offending Estonian Russians.

The consequences of these unintentional offences can be simple: many Estonian Russians, especially older generation, perceive Soviet history as something ideal and holy, and even the one word "occupation" can immediately destroy any perspective of a successful dialogue between Estonians and Estonian Russians. The latter do not want to recognize themselves to be occupiers; if the dominant group of the society imposes a stereotypical negative view on Soviet past on them, they will resist and construct an identity based on the principles of antagonism between them and Estonians. It should be understood by the Estonian media that many Russians do not like harsh criticism of the Soviet era, and such a topic can be avoided altogether for a better dialogue. Their identity is to a significant extent based on the sense of pride in the Soviet Union, and if one challenges the USSR, it means that their identity is challenged too.

The Russian media has played a more direct role in resistance cultural identity formation. Since the Russian newspapers are quite popular among a minority, and there is no language barrier, it can be said that they are very influential and directly influence many Estonian Russians to construct resistance identity. The media often use the topic of shared allegiance to Russian culture, the common Russianness of those who live in Russia and in the post-Soviet states, and encourage foreign Russians to preserve their Russianness at any cost. The policy of integration is viewed as a threat to Russian culture, while those who resist it are promoted and encouraged. In many cases those Russians who have decided to integrate into Estonian society have received far less attention than the resisting ones to make an impression that all the Estonian Russians embrace resistance identity and rely on the Russian Federation. Thus, all that measures can make some Estonian Russians feel that resistance is better than integration, and they will build their cultural identity on the principles of resisting the dominant culture.

In the Russian media there is a tendency to perceive the Estonian Russian minority as oppressed and stigmatized, and the Russian Federation as the only hope. The article by the deputy editor Yuri Moiseenko (2009) in *Argymenty i Fakty* is an example of this attitude. Its author notes that the Estonian government has adopted "the task of the destruction of the Russian world" in order to make the local Russians be "people without a motherland, without culture – without this national ground that makes a Russian person Russian" (Moiseenko 2009). He proclaims that Russian culture and language are forbidden in Estonia, and the only hope of Estonian Russians is the help of the Russian Federation.

The articles, which portray integration into Estonian society as a way of losing a person's Russianness and intentionally distort the information on the aims of the Estonian government's minority policy, may be a strong factor pushing some Estonian Russians towards closer relations with the Russian Federation, their self-isolation from Estonian social life and therefore organizing collective resistance against the alleged destruction of their Russian world. Nevertheless, the Russian media does not use only the fear of losing a Russian worldview, but also applies the theme of Soviet history perception (more specifically, the issue of whether the Soviet presence was fraternal help or occupation).

Commonly the majority of the media of the Russian Federation offers an idealized view on the Soviet period, while the Estonian review of the past is harshly criticized. The following articles will be discussed to demonstrate it. The deputy editor Aleksandra Samarina in her article (2009) published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* idealizes the Soviet era and criticizes the reevaluation of it as something blasphemous. According to her, the new educational policy of Estonia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is unfair, since it views the Soviet presence as only negative. Samarina (2009) notes that in modern Estonia "all the benefits that the union republics received from the USSR are thoroughly concealed"; the fruits of mutual co-existence and cooperation of Estonians and Russians in Soviet period are said to be ignored by Estonian educational policy. Samarina herself perceives the Soviet era in Estonia as totally positive.

Sergei Orlov's editorial (2009) in *Svobodnaya Pressa* is an example of the same one-sided view of the Soviet period. Although the article mostly concentrates on criticism of post-Soviet Estonian educational and language policy, the author pays some attention on the Soviet period as if contrasting Soviet and modern Estonia. He states that "during the Soviet period, called [in modern Estonia] 'the years of the atrocities' the Estonian language did not die, but received development and assistance" (Orlov 2009). Orlov notes that almost all the elite of the modern republic of Estonia graduated from the Soviet universities; according to him, "in bourgeois Estonia these people who to a major extent have a rural background would not have had any chance of higher education" (ibid.).

Although these two articles do not call on Estonian Russians to resist in a direct way, for me it is clear that the articles of such type in the Russian media make readers perceive the Soviet period as only positive one, while Estonian re-evaluation of it is portrayed as something blasphemous and offensive to Russians. At the same time this Russian picture is one-sided just as only negative view on the Soviet past. Leaders of the USSR funded the development of Estonia, and its people lived better than in many union republics, but at the same time in the Soviet period many Estonians were purged and sent to Siberia. Today the Russian media concentrates only on this funding and development of Estonia under the Soviet rule, while the Estonian one focuses only on repression. Both pictures are incomplete and one-sided. However, in this antagonism of approaches to the Soviet history many Estonian Russians prefer to take Russia's side. As I have said, the older generation of Estonian Russians commonly perceives any criticism of the USSR as a personal offense. Thus, the Russian media speculating about the past makes them to construct the identity which is based on the rejection of Estonian image of history, the resistance to the imposed view of the Soviet Union. As a result of this resistance, many Estonian Russians identify themselves with Russians of Russia.

The Estonian Russian media could be viewed as the most influential constructor of Estonian Russians' resistance identity. In many cases some Russians cannot read the Estonian newspapers, so the Estonian Russian dailies are their only source of

information. Given that fact, the media of the minority has a significant impact on some Estonian Russians and the construction of their cultural identity.

Although the resistance mood is not shared by all the journalists, some of them propose the way of antagonism to the dominant culture as a positive measure of protection of Russianness. The most radical ones offer self-segregation as the best way. The Estonian Russian sociologist Valeria Boltova's article (2010) in the newspaper *Vesti* is an innovative example of this approach to Estonian Russians' cultural identity construction, since it promotes the ideas of self-segregation of the minority. According to her, "Russians in Estonia should build a big barrier between themselves and Estonians to survive and to preserve their national specificity and culture"; Russians and Estonians should live independently from each other (Boltova 2010). She proclaims that the Estonian state only takes care of Estonian culture; so, Russians should preserve their identity on their own account (ibid.). The only force which will be able to help them is the Russian Federation (ibid.).

One can note that this article is very similar to those which are published in Russia. The indifferent Estonian attitude towards Russian culture is emphasized as much as possible, while no attention at all is paid to the possibility of Russians' successful integration into Estonian society. On the contrary, the article encourages people not to integrate and not to have contacts with Estonian culture. Under the influence of this message, some Russians prefer to base their cultural identity on the barrier from any contacts and to guard their Russianness from any impact of Estonian culture. They voluntarily choose the way of the self-segregation, ignoring the possibility of integration; the resistance principle of their cultural identity is promoted.

There is a tendency in the Estonian Russia media that some radical articles do not only promote self-segregation, but also emphasize the differences between Estonians and Russians, and the Estonian state indifference to the minority as a reason to avoid mutual contacts. The following article is an innovative example of this tendency. The Estonian Russian journalist Jana Toom's article (2008) in *Stolitsa* is an interview with Maxim Reva, one of the resistance movement leaders who perceives Estonian governmental

policy as a "cultural genocide" and openly promotes self-segregation (Toom 2008). Maxim Reva expresses the opinion that Estonian Russians and Estonians cannot be united: they are too different. "We and Estonians have a different history. I will never agree that my grandfather was an occupier" (ibid.). On the whole, he does not believe that Estonia can be motherland for the local Russians since the Estonian state does not need Russians. Reva encourages Estonian Russians to "wash our hands of the affair" of Estonia and pay attention to the preservation of their Russianness, work with the younger generation and cooperate with the Russian Federation.

Some other articles in the Estonian Russian media can be viewed as an example of the Russian Federation's means of influencing resistance identity building. Although the majority of them is far less radical than the previous articles, and commonly does not offer a way of self-segregation as the best solution to the problems of cultural preservation, the tendency of promoting the ideas of all-Russian unity appears to be popular among them. It is not surprising that according to many articles logic, this unity should be led by the Russian Federation, and Russian diasporas abroad should follow it. On the one hand, nobody calls Estonian Russians to resist integration. On the other hand, the mentioned unity presupposes that there will not be any separate Estonian Russian culture, and Baltic Russians will follow Russia. This obedience can inevitably lead to the controversy and consequently to the resistance to Estonian cultural policy. Therefore, these articles also promote the resistance identity among Estonian Russians.

The article by one of Estonian Russian cultural associations leaders Boris Krooming-Suharev (2002) in *Molodoj Estonii* promotes all-Russian unity and claims that the Russian culture of Estonian Russians can be preserved only by close cooperation with Russia (Krooming-Suharev 2002). Krooming-Suharev emphasizes the necessity of creation of a "united Russian space"; Russia and Russian diasporas abroad should unite their spiritual life for further development of Russian culture (ibid.). The possibility of Estonian Russian culture's separate existence is not even discussed. Thus, this article is also an example of orienting Estonian Russian cultural identity towards the Russian Federation; the preservation of cultural specificity is connected only to the help of Russia.

On the whole, part of the Estonian Russian media prevents local Russians from choosing the way of project cultural identity construction and presents the united Russian culture as a preferable object of self-identification. Undoubtedly, this point of view is not expressed by all the Estonian Russian media and not all the Russians in the land identify themselves with this culture. Nevertheless this approach to the question of identity has its admirers in Estonia. The Russian media argument about the way of integration as a threat to Russianness is often repeated in the Estonian media. As a result some Estonian Russians prefer self-segregation to integration and stay in their little world to build a resistance identity. However, in many cases Russians stay in this world unwillingly, because Estonian society sometimes does not accept them. Their resistance identity can be a form of response to their offence (speculation of Soviet occupation, over-criticism of Russians' role in Estonian history, exclusivist views of some Estonians) rather than a means to save their Russianness or avoid integration.

The borders of the Russian minority's world do not cover only culture, information system and education: they also include the sphere of everyday life. Hobbies, entertainment, sports, leisure, social associations – all of these also have their Russian analogues in Estonia (Russkiy portal 2009). It seems to me that it can be named some form of hidden Russian community life. Estonian Russians can join their own associations (scouts', war veterans', teachers' associations), visit Russian rock-clubs and discos, listen to Russian bands, eat in Russian restaurants and cafés – thus, the significant part of their life can be hidden from Estonian population. Russians can live in their little world with no or only few contacts with Estonia and Estonians.

According to *Russkiy portal*, the creation of the Estonian Russian information system and cultural space, allows Russians "to form their own isolated world of Estonian Russians who observe events in Russia and on the territory of Estonia from a particular point of view, and build up their own subculture" (Russkiy portal 2009). Estonians complain that some Estonian "Russians still consider themselves as a part of Russia. They are not interested in Estonian sports, Estonian TV, Estonian language, Estonian culture and history" (Burlakov 2008). This situation has found its reflection in the

humor of Estonian Russians – in the 1990s there had appeared the popular joke: “I will go to Tallinn to see Estonia” (Russkiy portal 2009). Thus, in the 1990s many Estonian Russians did not perceive their periphery provinces as Estonia, if the only place to see Estonia according to their logic was the capital region.

The tendency to isolation has sometimes led to absurd incidents: in the “Russian” province of Ida-Virumaa the election poster of Edgar Savisaar, who had been depicted while playing chess, was perceived by local Russians as an advertisement of some famous chess player coming to town (Russkiy portal 2009). This situation of knowing nothing about the Estonian election candidates serves to demonstrate how a proportion of Estonian Russians has not been interested in the political life of Estonia. In the border regions local Russians come to the Russian Federation and back many times a day as to the market square or to the neighbor street to buy food, newspapers, visit friends and relatives on the other side of the border. Thus, some Estonian Russians resist the ongoing Estonianisation through hiding in their little Russian world and through active participation in the fight for their better position in Estonian society via their political organizations.

On the whole, in the 1990s-2000s some Russians constructed a resistance identity, and the media played a significant role in this construction. According to Castells (2005: 8), resistance identity is created by those people who are in positions devalued by the logic of domination; in that case their resistance is caused by the desire to save their identity and to oppose the principles imposed by the dominating group. The process of this identity creation is still contributed by the media of Estonia, Russia and the Estonian Russian community. The media can be viewed as an important constructor of the Estonian Russian resistance identity. On the whole, the media of the Russian Federation and the Estonian Russian community make the readers identify themselves with pure Russian culture and avoid integration and Estonian Russian cultural identity construction. At the same time the Estonian media view the way of resistance identity as something dangerous but also recognize that this way is chosen by many Russians in the state. Nevertheless, as this study will demonstrate, the Estonian media present the way of the project identity as more suitable.

6 TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN TERMS OF PROJECT IDENTITY

This chapter will focus on another phenomenon of Estonian Russians' cultural identity transformation. A significant proportion of Russians has not accepted the idea of a resistance identity and wants peaceful adaptation to the new life. The cultural identity of these people has changed during this adaptation; they use the elements of Estonian and Russian cultures to construct their identity which differs from the identity of Russians from the Russian Federation and the resistance identity of some Estonian Russians. This new identity, I argue, is close to Manuel Castells' idea of project identity.

According to Manuel Castells (1997: 8), project identity is the creation of a new identity on the basis of available cultural material. This new identity redefines the position of its builders in society, and seeks a transformation of the overall social structure. Castells relates this description to social identity in the specific contexts of a network society. Nevertheless, the research suggests that this term of project identity also suits the situation of Estonian Russians' cultural identity transformation. As he explains, "the building of identity is a project of a different life, perhaps on the basis of an oppressed identity, but expanding toward the transformation of a society" (ibid.).

He provides the example of feminism, which does not only seek to create a new female identity, but also to change the whole structure of society and the family (Castells 2005: 8). If one compares this example with the situation in Estonia, one can see that they have some similarities. As feminists wish to establish the new identity of a liberated woman, some Russians want to construct a new identity which will unite their inherited allegiance to Russian culture with their loyalty to Estonia and its culture. Feminists look for a society which would be drastically changed by the transformation in women's position, while Russians in Estonia want to live in a society where the problem of Estonian-Russian relations is solved. They dream of a society where Estonian Russians could live in harmony with Estonians, and their cultures would peacefully coexist.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of this chapter I should repeat what I have stated in introduction. Many sources which are applied in the chapter, including the work of Tampere, view too optimistically those Estonian Russians who are constructing a project identity. In fact, the situation in Estonia is not very smooth, and the tension between two nations still exists, and it is clear that the successful solution to the problems of Estonian Russians will demand decades. At the same time Tampere often views the situation as if these problems have already been solved. However, as the Bronze Night showed they have not. Some groups of Estonian Russians support the integration, some do not.

In the 1990s the Russian community split into those who resisted Estonianisation, and those who wished to adapt; this division is to some extent connected with the split of the generations. It is necessary to explain how heterogeneous the Russian minority is, since this heterogeneity is the source of difference of the attitudes towards the Russians' cultural identification. Belonging to a particular group often defines a person's view on their cultural identity.

The Russian sociologist and journalist Vladislav Shurygin (2005) proposes an overtly simplified categorisation of Estonian Russians. The whole Russian population of Estonia can be divided into three groups. The first group is the older generation, mostly senior citizens and retirees. They feel a strong nostalgia for the Soviet period. As the Russian newspaper *Zavtra* writes, "They are the people for whom modern Estonia will never become their home state" (Shurygin 2005). Their worldview is the old Soviet-style worldview, and their identity is "connected with the communist past, which was benevolent and provided a lot of privileges" (Tampere 2005: 156). Their motherland is the Soviet Union, where the major part of their life was spent, and where they were the Big Brothers to the other nationalities of the USSR (ibid. 172). Obviously, for this generation integration into the new Estonian society is very difficult. They have been strongly influenced by Soviet ideology, and they do not want to lose their once dominant and privileged position (ibid. 144). "They opposed Estonian re-independence

and they did not understand the changes taking place in Estonia, which were against their religion" (ibid. 144–145).

The second group is quite close to the first. It consists of the people who were adults on the eve of the fall of the USSR (Shurygin 2005). In the 1990s these people also faced the difficulties of integration into the new world. Their identity often resembles that of the first group, and their motherland is the Soviet Union rather than Estonia. In post-Soviet Estonia they are concentrating on their family life rather than on national politics (ibid.). In that point I cannot totally agree with Shurygin. As the fourth chapter on the history demonstrated, in the 1990s the older generation was very active in national politics and tried to influence the Estonian government. The Russian organizations and parties were usually created by the first and second groups of Shurygin's classification. As he states, although the majority of the second group resist Estonianisation and build up a resistance Russian identity, some people try to adapt. They study the official language, apply for citizenship, get acquainted with Estonian culture and identify themselves with Estonian Russians. However, the third group – Estonian Russian young people – is the most active in the new cultural identity building. Therefore, this chapter will concentrate mostly on them.

The third group is the younger generation of Estonian Russians who were born either in the last years of the Soviet Union or in the 1990s. Their attitude to Estonianisation and the new reality of life is generally more enthusiastic. The specificity of Estonian Russian young people is in the fact that they perceive their country of living as their motherland. This phenomenon has eased their successful adaptation to the new conditions. They do not personally remember the years of Soviet domination over Estonia, and, despite the fact that a significant proportion of them were born in the Soviet Union, they do not look on the USSR as the motherland. Nor do they perceive the Russian Federation as their home: "Commonly for the Russian children growing up in Estonia the motherland of their parents has already become alien" (Russkiy portal 2009). They have not seen the privileged position of the Russian community during the Soviet time. Another factor influencing young Estonian Russians is the absence of the

ideological impact of Communism on them. The younger generation has been less influenced by party propaganda than their parents.

Nevertheless, the young people do not deny their Russianness, and allegiance to Russian culture, since it is their families' culture, and this younger generation was raised up in the atmosphere of Russian culture. I should admit that Shurygin's division of Estonian Russians is fairly simplified. The attitude to integration is not always connected to the allegiance to these groups. In many cases some proportion of the younger generation expresses the resistant tendency and demonstrates loyalty to the Russian Federation, although generally young Estonian Russians prefer to build up project identity and are more loyal to Estonia than to Russia.

The younger Russians have had contact with Estonian culture and language from childhood. For them it is easier to adapt to the new conditions, since the language is not a problem for them. They learn Estonian almost from the first years of their life and can speak it as a second mother tongue. The constant interaction between both Russian culture of their families and Estonian culture of the surrounding reality has led to the phenomenon of Estonian Russians' younger generation living between two cultures, Estonian and Russian. This position between two cultures has led to a problem of self-identification.

As Estonian Russians themselves admit, for their younger generation the question of cultural self-identification in the 1990s was rather painful, since they could not exactly say to which culture they belonged. They were born in the period of a vacuum, when the Soviet Union had already collapsed, and the Russian Federation had become for them a foreign state. According to Russian opinion polls, in the 1990s about 40 per cent of Estonian Russian young people faced difficulties while trying to define their identity (Russkiy portal 2009). As the members of the Russian community in the country said, "The identity split for Russians in Estonia became the familiar and inevitable stage of personal development" (ibid.). Finally the cultural identity of young Estonian Russians has taken the form – "I am not Estonian, I am not Russian, but I am Estonian Russian" (ibid.).

In the 1990s a new cultural identity emerged. Therefore, today the younger generation identifies with Russians in Estonia or Estonian Russians - not the nationality, but the identity (Russkiy portal 2009). They identify themselves as Russians in Estonia or the native Russians of Estonia (Tampere 2005: 172). In the sphere of cultural identity these people are on some invisible border between Russia and Estonia. As Laitin (1998: 160) states, "the (nonlinguistic) cultural divide separating Russians and Estonians is eroding". They accept the cultural practices of Estonians, their rituals and norms, and they take on cultural characteristics once thought to be distinctive of Estonians. In the 1990s all Estonian Russians were viewed by Estonians as the people who did not understand the Estonian "sense of reserve, privacy, keeping one's personal distance" (ibid. 159). But now, in the 2000s many Russians in Estonian towns interact in public places far more like Estonians than Russians in Moscow: they are quieter and more respectful of privacy. According to Western social polls, many Russians in Estonia feel themselves closer in basic values to Estonians than to Russians in Russia (ibid.). Sometimes, looking at the behavior of Estonians and Estonian Russians, even Estonians cannot distinguish between them, since the significant proportion of the younger Estonian Russian generation has accepted the norms of Estonia (ibid. 159-161).

The construction of this new cultural identity has been strongly influenced by the media. It cannot be only a mechanism guaranteeing cultural identity; it is also a creator of this identity (Giesen 1996: 2). Thus, Estonian Russian cultural identity has to some extent been built up by the media, both the Estonian, Russian, and Estonian Russian. The media represent the views of the minority which has decided to integrate into Estonian society, to identify with Russians living in Estonia, and to accept Estonian culture. The term "Estonian Russian" is actively used in the press, which has gradually made it popular. Estonian Russians themselves use the media to demonstrate their specific cultural identity.

The writer of this study will now discuss the role of the media in Estonian Russians' cultural identity creation. The Estonian media have made the contribution to Estonian Russians' cultural identity construction, although the articles on the topic of the Russian

minority demonstrate the variety of the attitudes towards the minority. Descriptions of the Russian-language population include both negative (excluding membership of society) and positive ones (the enthusiasm) (Tampere 2005: 165–166). According to the Estonian media, local Russians' identity has considerably changed, and Russians who have lived in Estonia for a long time are not like Russians in Russia any more (ibid.). The media also note that many Russians regard Estonia as their homeland (ibid.). Sometimes the media use the concept of "our country" while writing about Estonian Russians. This "our country" is loved and respected by either Estonians or Estonian Russians (ibid. 166). At the same time the newspapers sometimes tell their readers about the relative closeness between Estonians and Estonian Russians: "we are not so different" (Repson 2010). Estonian Russian young people who speak Estonian fluently are encouraged by the media. Those of the Russian population who express a desire to integrate into Estonian society are called "our" Estonian Russians (Palo 2010). Nevertheless, we cannot fully agree with Tampere, whose view on the media role is too optimistic. As was demonstrated in the fourth chapter, a significant proportion of the Estonian media can only criticize Estonian Russians and deny their closeness to Estonians, although some articles contribute to integration in a more objective way.

The topic of Estonian Russian integration in the media is an influential factor of Estonian Russian cultural identity establishment. The articles "Интеграция начинается с молодых" [Integration begins from the youth] (2010) by Urve Palo and "Прозябание русских партий говорит об интеграции" [Stagnation of Russian parties is a testimony of integration] (2010) by Alo Raun in the major Estonian newspaper *Postimees* are the interesting examples of Estonian Russian perception. In fact, both articles recognize that Russians have taken steps towards of their integration, and should not be considered as disloyal.

In the first article, the former minister of population Urve Palo notes that there is a need to integrate Estonian Russians. She also emphasizes that some success in their integration has already been achieved (Palo 2010). In her opinion, the forefront of this integration consists of younger Estonian Russians, and the results of the integration depend on them. "If Estonian and Russian children will spend more time together, it

promises for us a more tolerant society in the future" (ibid.). At the same time many Estonian Russians have already demonstrated their desire to integrate. As Palo writes, "we take pride that our young Estonian Russians speak Estonian increasingly better" (ibid.). She notes that 60 per cent of Estonians and Estonian Russians want their children to attend kindergartens with Estonian as the language of instruction together; she proposes that the ongoing integration should be deepened by the efforts of both sides (ibid.). At the same time she emphasizes that Russian culture and language in the Estonian Russian schools should not be ignored.

Thus, this article represents a view of Estonian Russian identity, its recognition by Estonians. Young Estonian Russians are not only "our" Estonians: they also are a source of pride. They are willing to integrate into Estonian society, they do not show a desire to be isolated from Estonians. In fact, their cultural identity is promoted by this article, since it acknowledges that many Estonian Russians are loyal to Estonia, are "ours". Estonian Russian identity, which is to some extent based on integration is encouraged to further development; the exclusive view on Russians of the 1990s has been replaced by the assumption that at least Estonian Russian young people are loyal to Estonia and its culture.

Estonian journalist Alo Raun's article (2010) is another example of the new perception of Estonian Russians. According to Raun, many Estonian Russians have been integrated into Estonian society, and have had the same political preferences as Estonians (Raun 2010). The evidence is simple: according to the sociologists, "Russian-speaking and Russian national parties have not been successful. Russians do not support "their" parties sufficiently and do not vote for them" (ibid.). Alo Raun emphasizes that this situation means that Estonian Russians vote for Estonian political parties, and their integration is a fact (ibid.). Raun also notes that in many small towns of Estonia Estonian Russians speak the official language fluently and are perceived by Estonians as compatriots (ibid.).

One can notice that in this article there is the same attitude to Estonian Russians as in the article of Urve Palo: they are viewed as the supporters of integration, loyal

compatriots, adherents of Estonian political parties. Their cultural identity is supported by the acknowledgement of their closeness to Estonians (they vote for the same political parties), while those Russians who wish to resist Estonianisation are viewed as "stagnating" (Raun 2010). In this article one can see the duality of the Russian image in the Estonian media. Those Russians who have constructed a resistance identity are viewed in negative terms, while Estonian Russians with a project identity have a more positive image. Nevertheless, the claim that the Russian parties are stagnating seems to me non-objective, because there are still some parties and organizations of the Russian minority which promote resistance and have their supporters.

Often Estonian Russians use interviews in the Estonian newspapers as a means of publicly proclaiming their Estonian Russian identity. For example, in Estonian Russian journalist Andrei Babin's article (2007) in *Postimees*, the interviewee Anatoli Shmigun, an Estonian Russian sportsman, declares that "I feel that I am not the Russian who lives in Russia. I am the local, Estonian Russian" (Babin 2007). On the one hand, the interviewee admits that he has not been entirely assimilated and does not want to become entirely Estonian. On the other, he emphasizes that he has become Estonian Russian, and for him Estonia is his homeland. Thus, through the media many Estonian Russians strengthen the position of their cultural identity by proclaiming their loyalty to Estonia and rejecting the Russian Federation.

Thus, the Estonian media admit that the Russian community in Estonia is not homogeneous, and that some Russians have created a specific Estonian Russian cultural identity. These Estonian Russians do not resemble Soviet Russians, and they express respect towards Estonian culture in the sphere of language, history, and traditions. Their loyalty is often emphasized by the media; in fact, the articles demonstrate a new image of Estonian Russian – from occupier and alien to a source of pride and "our" Estonian Russian, while those who have chosen resistance identity are viewed as the fifth column of Moscow. This image is a simplified one, since it ignores the people who are loyal both to Estonia and Russia and do not recognize the Soviet presence as occupation, or those who are neutral to both cultures.

Although the major attention of the Russian media is paid to those Russians who have created a resistance identity and do not wish to integrate or adapt, sometimes they also write about those who have turned from Russians into Estonian Russians. Just like the Estonian media, the Russian one admits that some Russians living in Estonia do not resemble Russians in Russia any more. They tell about the phenomenon of Estonian Russians – the people who have adapted to Estonian society and identify themselves with Estonia rather than with Russia (Trifonov 2009).

Due to the claims of some Estonian Russians about their otherness and closeness to Europe and European values, the Russian Federation mass media sometimes ironically call Estonian Russians "Euro-Russians" (ibid.). In fact, many young Estonian Russians look like Europeans in appearance, behavior and worldview. At the same time this assumption is close to a stereotype, since those Estonian Russians who accept the European character do not always deny their Russianness. The Russian editor Michail Chernov's article (2004) in *RBK Daily* is a revisionist example of Russians' approach to Estonian Russians' cultural identity. Chernov (2004) admits their otherness, and emphasizes that these people "were not at all the 'fifth column' of Russia in the Baltic republics". According to him, the significant proportion of Baltic Russians do not feel any sympathies towards Russia, and wish to integrate into a united Europe (ibid.). Despite the precedents of discrimination, Baltic Russians are the patriots of their republics and support the idea of independence from Russia. In their minds Russia is associated with a low level of life, crime, and corruption of the civil service (ibid.). On the whole, the article is critical towards Estonian Russians for their stereotypical views on the Russian Federation, and lack of Russian patriotism.

In Chernov's view, Estonian Russians are more enthusiastic about Estonia and the European Union than about the Russian Federation: "Baltic Russians are in fact Europeans in their minds" (Chernov 2004). Thus, the article demonstrates Estonian Russians' opposition to Russia: for them their homeland is a place of stability, peace and prosperity, while the Russian Federation is perceived as something negative and dangerous. Their future is in Estonia, in Europe, but not in Russia. Their self-

identification is based on the assumption that they are Europeans; to them European order and stability are more preferable than Russian chaos.

The editorial by the Russian journalist Michail Shurygin (2005), published in the newspaper *Zavtra*, also pays attention to the points of difference from Russia. Shurygin states that to younger Estonian Russian "modern Estonia is their life" (ibid.). This part of the Russian community lives in Estonia, perceives the surrounding world as its own, and identifies itself with this world (ibid.). For the younger generation Russia is only some spiritual category, a part of family history and cultural tradition rather than some real motherland (ibid.). Young Estonian Russians are in general more active and free than young people in Russia: they know many foreign languages, travel in Europe and study in European universities.

Shurygin also emphasizes that many Estonian Russians are disappointed in Russia and that this disappointment makes them different from Russians of the Russian Federation. Many Estonian Russians feel that "in the most difficult years Russia simply cheated its compatriots and betrayed them" (Shurygin 2005). As Michail Shurygin (ibid.) writes, this feeling of "national orphanage" causes the existing attitude towards the Russian Federation, which varies from total disappointment and negation to proud indifference. On the whole, this article acknowledges that the younger generation has already acquired a specific Estonian Russian identity, while a significant proportion of the older generation does not feel sympathy towards Russia, which did not help the community in the 1990s. It is an acknowledgement of the independent character of Estonian Russian culture, which perceives Estonia as the homeland, while Russia is the ancestors' motherland. These articles have had an influence on Estonian Russian cultural identity creation, since they have emphasized and justified the sovereignty of Estonian Russians, and have not pretended to make them feel themselves the same as Russians in the Russian Federation, and even have admitted Russian guilt before them.

One can note some distinction between those who resist and those who integrate in the articles of the Russian media. If the Russian media pay attention to the Russian community, they commonly use the term "Russians in Estonia", while if they rarely

touch upon the issue of those who have the mixed Estonian-Russian cultural identity, they use the term "Estonian Russians" (Novaya Gazeta 2003) or "Baltic Russians" (Trifonov 2005). The media emphasizes that those who wish to integrate have become another kind of Russian who shares the values of Estonian culture (ibid.), and whose Russian identity is eroding (Smerdova 2007). The Russian media admit that Estonian Russians have their own cultural identity, and could not be viewed as "ordinary Russians" any more. The Estonian Russian media also influence their identity creation.

The Estonian and Russian media have made much for Estonian Russian cultural identity, but the major contribution has been made by the Estonian Russian media. It was they who started to use the term "Estonian Russian" more actively. Some of them emphasize the split between Russians and Estonian Russians. According to many columnists, Estonian Russians are better than Russians. For instance, in the newspaper *Narvskaja gazeta* the journalist Aleksandr Mauzer demonstrates this opinion and criticizes the Russian town of Ivangorod as "the graveyard of Narva history" because of Russians' indifference to its historical and architectural treasures (Mauzer 2009). His article is very interesting, since it can be an example of some Estonian Russians' negative attitude to the culture of the Russian Federation. Looking at the bad condition of ancient mansions and graveyards in Russia, Aleksandr Mauzer makes the statement: "For us, true Europeans, it was a shocking sight" (Mauzer 2009).

Thus, Russians in the Russian Federation and Estonian Russians are opposed in the article; the latter are "true Europeans", civilized and refined, who would not allow the history to be destroyed, and the former are some barbarians (although the article does not use this word, Aleksandr Mauzer bitterly complains of Russians' indifference to their culture and its architectural treasures, and it is clear that he considers Russian Russians to be inferior than Estonian Russians), who do not care for the preservation of ancient monuments. At the end of the article it is said that in Ivangorod the situation is so bad that "we [Estonian Russians] feel the shame" (ibid.). Another sign! Russians and Estonian Russians are divided into "they" and "we", which means that some Estonian Russians in their media reject their mutual close relationship, and tell about Estonian

Russian uniqueness, at the same time emphasizing the closeness between Estonian Russians and Estonians.

Some Estonian Russian media contribute to the construction of Estonian Russian cultural identity by re-defining the relations between Estonian and Russian culture, and emphasizing the shared values of Estonians and Estonian Russians. *Narvskaja Gazeta* writes about the necessity of creating new shared Estonian-Russian values to unite the society (Denisov 2010). The Estonian Russian editor Rodion Denisov (2010) emphasizes the necessity of being united, since the situation of Estonian-Russian confrontation in the country is used by "unfriendly forces to harm our state". According to his article (2010), "one of these values could be our history" (ibid.). Thus, Denisov perceives Estonian Russians as the same citizens of the country as Estonians, and in his view Estonia is "our" state, while Estonian history is "our" history. He admits that this history has had periods of "alienation between our nations", although there also were episodes when both Estonians and Russians acted together (ibid.). "Why does Estonian historiography say nothing about those Russians who fought together with Estonians at the dawn of Estonian sovereignty?" (ibid.). At the same time the Soviet period, which destroyed this peaceful tradition, has to be forgotten, Denisov proposes.

Rodion Denisov offers some measures to popularize Estonian-Russian shared history. "I am sure that it is necessary to begin state-supported research of our state with the emphasis on the contribution to its creation which was made by the representatives of all the peoples living in Estonia" (Denisov 2010). New studies, textbooks, leaflets, media articles and web-sites on the topic of shared history have to be established (ibid.). On the whole, this article represents Estonian Russians' new approach to their cultural identity and history. In the Soviet period the topic of the Liberation war or Russians fighting together with Estonians was not discussed by the media, and Russians based their cultural identity on such historical events as the Great Patriotic war and communism-building in the post-war decades. Now the cultural identity of those who wish to integrate is built upon the episodes of being and fighting together: the Liberation war and the Russian Empire period. If one applies Geert Hofstede's (2005: 7) concept of heroes as one form of culture manifestation while working with the media,

it is possible to note that in the articles this new Estonian Russian cultural identity uses a new set of heroes – the heroes common to the imperial and sovereignty period, and the heroes common to Estonians and Russians. The Estonian Russian media also emphasizes not only shared heroes and shared history, but also the shared culture of Estonian Russians.

The Estonian Russian newspaper *Molodoj Estonii* wrote in 2009 that Estonian and Russian cultures were related to each other, and the distance of alienation between them was being reduced by the efforts of Estonian artists (Ashihmin 2009). The article was entitled "Сближение параллельных миров" [The convergence of the parallel worlds] (2009). Estonian Russian deputy editor Evgeni Ashihmin (ibid.) admitted that "Estonian and Russian cultures in Estonia are like the parallel worlds". In his words, they were related, but they also differed from each other, and there was still much misunderstanding and prejudice (ibid.). Nevertheless, due to the efforts of Estonian cultural figures the bridges between these parallel worlds were being built. According to Ashihmin, these dialogues between the cultures can provide Estonians and Estonian Russians with the opportunity to know more about each other. Thus, some Estonian Russians have left behind the Soviet image of the Big Brothers of subordinate Estonian culture and perceive the latter as an equal one. Estonian Russians' cultural identity is now built on the principle of respect towards the dominant nation's culture rather than on the Soviet assumptions of Russians' benefactor role.

In 2009 *Viru Prospekt* described the younger generation of Estonian Russians who interacted with Estonian culture from the childhood (Vikulov 2009). As the article on the Estonian Russian upper secondary school in Vannalinna (2009) noted, "for us [the teachers and students of the Estonian Russian upper secondary school] it is very important to study the culture, and traditions of Estonian people" (ibid.). At the same time these teachers stated that "for us the preservation of Russian identity is crucial" (ibid.). The interviewee, the rector of the school Tatiana Stepanova, stated that in the next decade all graduates from Russian upper secondary schools would speak Estonian very well. According to her, learning the Estonian language in schools would create a generation of loyal Russians speaking Estonian as their second mother tongue (ibid.).

Thus, the article demonstrates that at least many Estonian Russian teachers think that integration is possible without eradicating allegiance to Russian culture.

On the whole, the Estonian Russian media present the image of the new culture and new cultural identity which have been made of the elements of both cultures – bilingualism of young people who speak Estonian and Russian fluently with respect to the both countries' traditions, knowledge of the common history of Russia and Estonia, and interest in Estonian and Russian culture. The close contacts of two cultures are perceived as the perspective of development rather than a threat to Russianness. The self-identification with Estonian Russian is not a source of fear or concern, the media proclaim.

Thus, the media have played a significant role in the creation of a specific Estonian Russian cultural identity creation. Firstly, the media are the means of announcing one's self-identification, and through the papers Estonian Russians tell about their specificity, their difference from Russians living in the Russian Federation, and the distinctive features of their local Estonian Russian culture. Secondly, the media demonstrate the Estonian attitude towards the new culture and identity, some confirmation of the fact that many Estonian Russians are "our" Estonian Russians, more loyal and respectful to the country than Soviet Russians. Thirdly, the newspapers and magazines express the opinion of the Russian Federation about the new Estonian Russian community and culture – recognition of the Estonian Russian otherness, the more European character of the community, the erosion of the purely Russian cultural identity and its transformation into a mixed Estonian Russian identity. In fact, during the post-Soviet period some Estonian Russians have not only accepted Estonian cultural elements, but have also mingled them with their Russian ones.

The new Estonian Russian cultural identity is specific, since it often unites and intermingles the elements of Russian and Estonian cultures. For instance, in the 1990s many Estonian Russian youngsters transformed their names to sound more Estonian-like, while remaining their Russian names. A girl called Christina (female name widespread in Russia) could transform her name into the more Estonian Christiina

(Russkiy portal 2009). This girl had accepted some part of Estonian culture, and identified herself with this culture, since she decided to transform her name to be more suitable for the Estonian environment. Changing one's name towards one which is more Estonian is an opportunity for better acceptance by the Estonian population (Tampere 2005: 167).

The Russian language is also an object of cultural influence. The Russian language in Estonia differs from the one of Russia. It is not an entirely new language; the main difference is that its vocabulary includes some words from the Estonian language. Estonian Russians do not even notice that they use the Estonian words while speaking Russian (Russkiy portal 2009). For instance, "such words as *kaubamaja*, *suits*, *amet* etc. have truly become a part of the local Russian language" (ibid., italics mine). During interviews with Estonian Russian young people, the following opinion on the language was given: "I cannot say that I do not have a perfect command of Russian. Sure, I do. It is my mother tongue. But my Russian differs from that which is spoken in Russia" (ibid.). On the other hand, many Estonian Russians, especially young ones, can speak Estonian as well as their mother tongue.

When Russians in Estonia faced the language problem after the fall of the Soviet Union, many families decided to ease their children's integration into the new life through attendance at Estonian schools and kindergartens; thus, the children began to study Estonian very early. As Estonian Russians themselves admit, for the children and teenagers attending Estonian schools the language problem can be solved quite quickly: "After some weeks [in Estonian kindergarten] my daughter was able to speak the state language fluently" (Russkiy portal 2009). Thus, from childhood some Estonian Russian children are between two languages, and if Estonian is not a mother tongue for them, it is to some extent close to this status. The sphere of history is also an example of two cultures intermingling.

In the 1990s some Estonian Russians re-evaluated their view of Estonian-Russian coexistence: they united Estonian and Russian images of history. On the one hand, due to these changes now, in the 2000s some Russians express respect towards the sacred

topics of Estonian history, for instance, the Liberation war of 1918. On the other hand, they also draw attention to the deeds of those Russians who participated in these events. For example, they speak about "these Russian people who heroically fought shoulder to shoulder with Estonians in the ranks of the Estonian army at the dawn of Estonian independence" (Denisov 2010). Many Estonian Russians also feel interest in the history of the Russian community in the 1920-1930s.

The history of the emigrés' community is perceived as an example of the successful coexistence of two cultures in sovereign Estonia. On the one hand, Estonian Russian articles on this coexistence emphasize the fact that, during the sovereignty decades, Russian culture in Estonia was developed, and preserved by the emigrés (Meimre 2007). On the other hand, according to the articles, Russians in pre-Soviet Estonia did not ignore the cultural life of the land, and worked in Estonian media, participated in both Estonian and Russian cultural events, and published their books in two languages (ibid.). Thus, many Estonian Russians use history to create a new image of the self.

Manuel Castells (1997: 8) notes that project identity is the new identity built by the social actors on the basis of any cultural materials available for them in order to redefine their position in society. Some Russians in Estonia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, have begun to create the new cultural identity on the basis of united elements of Estonian and Russian cultures. These elements include language, history, patterns of behavior. The self-perception as Estonian Russians with their specific culture (not similar to the culture of the Russian Federation), uniting Estonian and Russian ones, can help Russians in Estonia to redefine their position in society from the "occupiers", "Soviet-period immigrants" or "aliens" (Tampere 2005: 169) to patriots and loyal citizens of Estonia. However, project identity seeks not only redefinition of its builders' position, but also their society itself.

According to Castells (1997: 8) project identity tries to transform "overall social structure" by redefining the social actors' position in society. In the Estonia of the 2000s this process of transformation takes place among some part of the Estonian Russian community. After sovereignty restoration Estonian society is facing some antagonism

between the dominant nation and former country's masters – Russians. The existence of a significant Russian minority with not always sufficient loyalty to Estonia and its culture is a cause of the Estonian people's concern. As Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) writes, small nations are vulnerable to the political and cultural expansionism of big nations; the presence of these enclaves of big nations on the territory of small nations only exacerbates the situation. Thus, in Estonia there is an anxiety that the Russian community in the country could be an instrument of political pressure from Moscow. Therefore, Estonian Russians are perceived by the dominant nation with some degree of suspicion. Through their new cultural identity, some Estonian Russians are trying to redefine their position in society and change the social structure – to reconcile the split between Estonians and Russians. For the achievement of this goal the project identity of these Russians has to be based on an open expression of loyalty towards both the Estonian state and its culture.

Firstly, the cultural identity of some proportion of Estonian Russians' younger generation is strongly based on the assumption of Estonia as their homeland; their loyalty belongs to Estonia. Kaja Tampere (2005: 172) gives the example of those Russians who reached adulthood in the 1990s and now perceive the blue-black-white tricolor as "the flag of their country". These Russians are proud of Estonia as their home country. For instance, during Eurovision, many Estonian Russians expressed the following feelings: "When I watched Eurovision on TV, I worried about Estonia. I just wished that Estonia's song would win. Later I was proud of my country" (ibid.). The anniversary of the Republic of Estonia in 2000 was celebrated by Estonian Russian papers (ibid.165). For many Estonian Russians events in the Russian Federation are "foreign matters", while events in Estonia receive their major interest. According to the portal of Estonian Russians, their media can pay some attention to the news from Russia, but the major topics are generally the local news (Russkiy portal 2009). At the same time Tampere's view often does not include those Russians who remain patriots of the Russian Federation. The fourth chapter has demonstrated that many of Estonian Russians still consider themselves to be Russians.

Secondly, some Estonian Russians in the 1990s began to demonstrate their interest in Estonian culture to fight the Soviet-period stereotype about the Big Brother who had felt indifference towards any culture differing from Russian, or about Russians in Estonia who had lived in an isolated Russian world and had been disrespectful and disloyal to the culture of their country of domicile. Estonian Russians actively demonstrate that Estonian culture is not a culture of some foreign state, but a culture of their homeland, and they are loyal to it. They try to persuade Estonians to understand that the new generation of Estonian Russians will perceive Estonian culture as part of their cultural identity.

Sometimes this demonstration of loyalty is even excessive, since many Estonian Russians do their best to prove that they are neither the Soviet-time oppressors of Estonian culture, nor rude Russians from the Russian Federation with no respect for Estonia. As Laitin (1998: 159) stated, "some Russians are making conspicuous efforts to show that they are different from the Russians in Russia". For instance, young Estonian Russians who have studied Estonian from childhood criticize the older generation for speaking Russian on the street. According to young people, it is "wrong", and on the streets people have to use only Estonian (Russkiy portal 2009). In the 1990s such situations were not rare in Russian families (ibid.).

In the 1990s some Estonian Russians retreated into an isolated world of the Russian language, while others began to get more acquainted with Estonian culture through visiting Estonian theatres, reading Estonian literature, and watching Estonian films; the problem of language was also being solved. Young Estonian Russians broadly perceive the necessity of studying Estonian and passing language test not as offending obligation but as an opportunity for a better life, employment, and a perspective for a future career. Estonian Russians' younger generation has actively begun learning the national language and passing the exam for citizenship. All these measures of Estonian Russians in creating their project cultural identity are to prove to Estonians that Russians in the country are as loyal as the local population, so as to reconcile the society, which was split after the fall of the USSR.

Some Estonian Russians have made efforts to unite the split society of Estonians and Russians around the idea of their common homeland and common history, to eliminate the wall between the two cultures, to demonstrate that there is no need of suspicion towards Estonian Russians. But have they managed to transform the structure of the split Estonian society? It is a deeply controversial question, but it is possible to say that they have managed to achieve at least partial success.

A proportion of Estonian society has changed its attitude towards Estonian Russians. "Definitions of "them" [Estonian Russians] now display a greater openness (especially compared with the early 1990s), and negative and excluding terms show a decreasing tendency [sic]" (Tampere 2005: 170). Some Estonian political parties, especially the moderates and the Centre party, emphasize that the younger generation of the Russian minority will become active Estonian citizens and view the Estonian Russian community more positively (ibid.). Thus, in the 2000s Estonian Russians are described by Estonians also in positive terms - as loyal and active citizens of the country. Some partial reconciliation and change of social structure has been achieved. At least some proportion of Estonian society does not perceive the Estonian and the Estonian Russian communities as opposed to each other. The situation is far from the total reconciliation, but the first measures of solving the problem of Estonian-Russian antagonism have been taken. The events of April 2007 partially proved that the situation was difficult.

One of the significant watersheds in the history of the Estonian Russian community in post-Soviet Estonia was the so-called Bronze Night or April unrest. In April 2007 the Estonian authorities relocated the monument of the Great Patriotic war in Tallinn. Since the topic of the war heroes is "sacred" for many Russians, this relocation was viewed as blasphemous and led to open riots. Some proportion of Estonian Russians condemned the relocation but did not support the riots. The media gave a variety of views on the event. The Russian media in general viewed the riots as some heroic response of patriots, and the Estonian media perceived the unrest as the actions of Russian vandals and looters, or criticized either the protesters or the government which relocated the monument. The Estonian Russian media condemned the looters but also criticized the relocation.

The Russian political leaders viewed the situation in negative terms. Vladimir Putin, then the president of the Russian Federation, was tough on Estonia after the monument relocation and used the media as a means to criticize the decision to relocate the Bronze soldier. On the whole, Putin rejected any Estonian claims of Russian guilt and condemned the policy of historical re-evaluation of the Great Patriotic war. He noted that Estonia had intentionally spoiled relations with the Russian Federation and jeopardized the situation by its inappropriate measures, such as the relocation of the war monument (RIA Novosti 2007). Putin defined the policy of Estonia as "ultra-nationalist policy which does not take into account either the problems of the fight against Nazism or the current situation (ibid.). Occasionally Putin even used the term 'neonazism' while speaking about the re-evaluation of Soviet history in the Baltic countries.

This mood was widely shared in the main Russian newspapers, which commonly condemned the Estonian decision to relocate the war monument and justified the consequent riots. According to the Russian media, only the Estonian side was guilty of the April unrest, while Estonian Russians were patriots protecting their common history and the memory of the Great Patriotic war. The resistance to the relocation was viewed as heroic. Looting was almost entirely ignored in the media. On the whole, this reaction was a part of a trend of promoting resistance among Estonian Russians. The following articles give the examples of the Bronze Night as it was viewed in the Russian media.

The editorial by Vladimir Sungorkin (2007) in the Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on May 1, 2007 condemned the relocation and reflected the opinion of the Russian political elite: "It is necessary to begin a boycott against everything which is connected to Estonia. A boycott against the actions which they [Estonians] make against our soldiers. Mere protesting is not enough" (Sungorkin 2007). According to the article, the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, who was in charge of the relocation, became "a political dead body" (ibid.). The article referred to the Estonian sociologist Juhan Kiviräkh, who asserted that the riots and looting were intentionally provoked by the prime minister to discredit the protectors of the monument. Thus, the article clearly sympathized with the resisting group of the Estonian Russian community, justified their

actions, and promoted resistance. The actions of the Estonian government were viewed as erroneous. At the same time looting and fighting with the police was ignored.

The editorial in the Russian newspaper *Itogi* on April 30, 2007 demonstrated the same tendency. For instance, the author of the article used the word "destruction" instead of "relocation" while describing the beginning of the events, while the actions of the police were called "purge". The article stated that "on April, 26 the police SWAT violently purged the protestors from the territory near the monument of the Warrior-liberator" (Dybskiy 2007). Then it continued with an obviously false claim that "at the same time the authorities began its [the monument] destruction" (ibid.). Although the article recognized that cases of vandalism actually took place during the Bronze Night, it viewed resisting Russians as protesters rather than looters. The article also referred to the archives of the Red Army to prove that the Soviet soldiers, who were criticized and discredited in Estonia, were in fact war heroes. Thus, the actions of the Estonian government were again interpreted as unfair and unjust, and the riots were viewed as a justifiable reaction on the part of offended and enraged Russians.

On the whole, the Russian media continued promoting resistance identity and used the topic of the relocation as a further proof that integration was impossible. The only way to protect Russian culture and its values among the Estonian Russians was resistance and the support of the Russian Federation. A peaceful solution of the problem was not even discussed in the articles, and their general mood was aggressive and conspicuously one-sided. The street battles were viewed as something good, while the government actions in maintaining security were perceived as cruel. Predictably, the Estonian media provided an almost equally one-sided picture of the incident; the only difference was that they viewed the resistance as something bad and justified the relocation.

On April 28, 2007, two days after the riots Merit Kolli's editorial was published in the Estonian newspaper *Postimees*. The article defined all Russian protesters against the relocation as "looters and thieves". The riots were "the mass destruction and looting of others' property" (Kolli 2007). Moreover, it was emphasized that the Bronze Night demonstrated that the Estonian Russians were not loyal to Estonia at all: "The stranger

showed his new face, or more exactly the forgotten old face. It was not a soldier or a civilian. It was a true Russian hooligan" (ibid.). Soviet history and the war monument were harshly criticized by the article; the annual Russian meetings near the Bronze soldier on May 9 were called "clownery" (ibid.). The article furthermore claimed that the hooligans were supported by the Russian media. The reasons for the resistance were not even paid attention to. Thus, the articles of such a type could promote only the resistance tendencies of Estonian Russian identity since they denied everything which was considered sacred by Russian culture. When the Great Patriotic war and the Day of Victory were viewed as clownery it was not surprising that Estonian Russians would resist to society which promoted these views. If all Russians in Estonia were viewed as hooligans by the official media, the consequence would be a Russian shift from integration. Nevertheless, not all the articles in the Estonian media gave a one-sided image of the Bronze Night.

Despite the criticism of the relocation, many Estonian Russians did not approve of the riots and the influence of the Russian Federation and used the Estonian media as a means to condemn Russia. For instance, the well-known Estonian Russian sportsman Anatoli Schmigun condemned the Bronze Night in his interview published in *Postimees*. In his words, "Russia has provoked a disproportionately big scandal around the Bronze soldier" (Babin 2007). In his words one can find the negation of Russia – for example, he described the extremely poor life of war veterans in the Russian Federation, which preferred not to care about them but to "yell about the monument in a foreign land" (ibid.). This is an opinion which can demonstrate the position of many Estonian Russians, their anger about Russian interference with their life and the consequent riots.

The editorial in *Ohtuleht* on May 7, 2007 is an example of multi-sided view of the April unrest. On the one hand, it recognized that during the riots there were some crimes and vandalism committed by the protesters and the unrest resulted in many million euro losses (Kroonberg 2007). "How much will the pile of bronze and stones cost a taxpayer? For certain, some ten million euro" (ibid.). On the other hand, the article criticized the government decision to relocate the monument, which provoked Russians to begin a riot and spoiled relations between Estonians and Estonian Russian

community: “Before they started to fence the Bronze soldier in, it already seemed that Estonians and Russians were in good relations with each other. But if one gives people an aim to fight for, they will fight. And they will choose which side they are on” (ibid.).

Thus, the article did not use the simplified image of hooligans, but emphasized that those Estonian Russians who were quite normal citizens were provoked to fight. Moreover, it proposed the gradual softening of the situation as a means to solve the problem. For example, it noted that Estonians had to put up with the Russian meeting on May, 9 and not suppress it, since this step would only exacerbate the issue. This article was more likely to influence Estonian Russians to stop resistance and begin a dialogue. It recognized the value of the Russian Day of Victory and condemned the government actions, but also demanded peaceful cooperation in the future. Such articles usually influence the construction of resistance in a negative way since they propose a dialogue as a more suitable means than resistance. They do not negate Estonian Russians but try to make them show their opinion peacefully.

As for the Estonian Russian media, they commonly demonstrated some mixture of Estonian and Russian views of the Bronze Night. Some of them criticized Estonian actions. On April 28, 2007 the Estonian Russian paper *Vesti Dny*a published the editorial “Зачем правые старательно обостряют внутреннюю и внешнюю обстановку” [Why the conservatives thoroughly jeopardize the internal and external situation]. According to the paper, the relocation was promoted by the conservatives, who wanted to spoil relations with Russia and unite their Estonian electorate over the idea of a fight against the internal and external enemies – Estonian Russians and the Russian Federation (Vesti Dnya 28.04.2007). The relocation had to create the image of enemy and give the conservatives the road to power (ibid.). On the whole, the article repeated the assumption of the riots as the provocation of the government and created the positive image of Russians protecting the monument. It called the situation of worsening the Estonian-Russian relations due to the relocation one which could lead to significant economic losses for Estonia. Although the article did not openly proclaim the necessity of resistance, one can note that it portrayed that part of Estonian community in fairly negative terms, thus driving the identity of Estonian Russians

towards the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, some articles of the Estonian Russian media criticized both Estonia and Russia.

On May 7, 2007 the Estonian Russian newspaper *Vesti nedeli* published the editorial, in which the actions of both countries were condemned. On the one hand, the article noted that the Estonian media had exacerbated the situation by proclaiming that all Russians coming to the monument on May 9 and protesting against the relocation were marginals and alcoholics. On the other hand, the Russian media jeopardized the conflict; they "cried about the necessity to protect "our Victory" from the "neo-Nazis" (Vesti nedeli 07.05.2007). Thus, both Russia and Estonia were guilty of the open street battles. Nevertheless, this article openly recognized that many hooligans (both Estonians and Estonian Russians) used the riots as an opportunity to loot and pillage, but also emphasized that the majority of the protesters were not looters. It highlighted the fact that the relocation did not mean the failure of integration, and said that Estonians and Estonian Russians had to begin a dialogue to restore the lost mutual trust: "We should find people who are respected by both sides of the split society. It is vital to persuade these people to represent us to restore the lost trust. It will be very difficult but it is necessary". Thus, some Estonian media avoided using the relocation and the Bronze Night as an opportunity to promote resistance identity but conversely tried to solve the conflict peacefully and supported the project identity of the people who desired peace in society.

On the whole, the media during the riots demonstrated three main views. Firstly, one view perceived the Estonian Russian community as the looters and marginals, and the riots as provocation by the Russian Federation. This view was expressed by a part of the Estonian media. At the same time they proclaimed that integration had failed and noted that Russians would never be loyal to Estonia. Secondly, a proportion of the Russian and Estonian Russian media blamed Estonia for the relocation as act of provocation and supported those who resisted. In some cases the media recognized the facts of looting but mainly it viewed the protesters in a positive way. These media tried to persuade Estonian Russians to build their cultural identity on the principles of resistance to the forces which offended Russian culture and history. Thirdly, some Estonian and Estonian

Russian media reflected the view that both Estonians and Estonian Russians were guilty of the riots. Nevertheless, these media drew attention to the necessity to begin a dialogue and to restore the mutual trust. They promoted project identity by emphasizing the loyalty of Estonian Russians and the previous years of peaceful coexistence.

In the 1990s a proportion of Russians living in Estonia (especially the younger generation) transformed their cultural identity. They chose the way of building the Estonian Russian project identity. Today they have adapted to the new conditions and are trying to find a better place in Estonian society. The older generation misses the high status of Russian culture and considers the Soviet Union to be the motherland, while for young people who were born in independent Estonia their only motherland is Estonia. Estonian culture is the culture of their motherland.

Project identity is built on the basis of available cultural materials by the social actors who want to transform their position in society and the whole social structure; this type of identity suits the situation of the transformation of Estonian Russian cultural identity. The available cultural materials for Estonian Russians are the elements of both the Estonian and Russian cultures (language, history, patterns of behavior): these elements are united to form Estonian Russian cultural identity. By identifying themselves with Estonian culture some Russians demonstrate that they are different from the Soviet-period Russians or Russians from the Russian Federation. They demonstrate their loyalty to Estonia as their homeland and fight the stereotypes that Estonian Russians are the fifth column of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, these Estonian Russians' project identity has met difficulties in being somewhere in the middle between the cultures.

Those Estonian Russians who are creating their project identity face also some problems with their position between two cultures – in some cases they are not accepted either by Estonians or Russians. On the one hand, when many Estonian Russians come to the Russian Federation they are not perceived as Russians. For Russians they are aliens and foreigners (Russkiy portal 2009). They commonly do not know Russian culture and history as well as Russians, and even their Russian differs from the language spoken in the Russian Federation (Ibid.). When young Estonian Russians wish to apply

to a Russian university, they inevitably have to study more about Russian history to pass the exams.

On the other hand, for Estonians Estonian Russians often remain Russians, and are viewed with suspicion. The tendency to change names proves evidence that, even if a person is a loyal citizen, speaks fluent Estonian, respects Estonian culture and considers the country to be the motherland, but has a Russian name, they will not be viewed as compatriots by Estonians. This phenomenon is not positive and demonstrates that there remains tension between the minority and the dominant population. Some Estonians express the opinion that Russians in Estonia are people without motherland (Burlakov 2010). According to them, "Russians do not feel that Estonia is their motherland, and know that Russia will not recognize them [as the compatriots]. The local Russians will never be able to live in Russia" (ibid.). On the one hand, these Russians often feel nostalgia towards Russia, but on the other they have got accustomed to the Western pattern of life in Estonia and cannot accept life in the Russian Federation due to its problems (bribery, corruption, crime). Thus, sometimes Estonian Russians are not perceived positively both by Estonians and Russians, and cannot find the motherland.

Nevertheless, these problems can be solved when some time has passed; Estonian Russian cultural identity is not unique in the post-Soviet space. In many former republics of the USSR one can notice the same or at least similar processes to those which are taking place in Estonia. Some proportion of the Russian population prefers to build a cultural identity which will be able to unite the cultures of Russians and the dominant nation; these Russians accept the values of non-Russian culture, at the same time preserving the values of the Russian one. Similar processes are taking place in Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine and other republics (Laitin 1998: 159). Some proportion of the local Russian community try to emphasize their difference from Russians in the Russian Federation, express loyalty to the national traditions and ways of life, and adapt and integrate into non-Russian society (ibid. 159–160). Their Russian culture has shifted towards the national culture of these countries (ibid. 159). The younger generation, which has not been influenced by the ideology of the Soviet Union, is

typically the forefront of the new cultural identity building advocates (ibid.). The future will show the further fate of this cultural identity in the post-Soviet countries.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This research has studied the transformations of Estonian Russians' cultural identity after the fall of the USSR and paid special attention to the way this cultural identity has been manifested and constructed through the media. As the main theoretical framework of my work I chose the tripartite notion of legitimizing, resistance and project identity by Manuel Castells, and Bernhard Giesen's concept of the media as identity constructor. Manfred Beller's theory of image, and Stuart Hall's notion of cultural identity were chosen as supportive theories. The primary materials of the research were the media materials of Estonia, the Russian Federation and the Estonian Russian community.

Castells' tripartite categorisation worked well and suited the situation of Estonian Russians' cultural identity, although according to Castells this division is used to distinguish various forms of social identity. For instance, he notes that legitimizing identity is established by the dominant institutions of a society to extend and rationalize its domination vis-à-vis social actors, while in this work I used the term to refer to Soviet Russians' dominant position and viewed them as this dominant institution. I used this tripartite categorisation as applicable in the cultural sphere since the same qualities of three categories of identity can belong also to cultural identity. Giesen's notion of the media worked well, although it presumes the construction of a nation's cultural identity via the media rather than the cultural identity of a minority. Nevertheless, the work demonstrated that even a minority in an unfriendly environment can use its own media in the same manner as a nation in order to construct and protect its cultural identity.

The study first drew attention to the history of the Russian minority in Estonia in the pre-Soviet period. Russians established their first settlement in the country in the 11th century. In 1721 Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire. Although the imperial authorities took some russification measures, the Russian influence on the dominant Estonian culture was not as significant as in the Soviet era. The Russian minority in the pre-Soviet period was dispersed and heterogeneous and did not have a single cultural identity. The beginning of the Soviet presence in Estonia in 1940 changed the situation.

The study focused on the history of Soviet Estonia and demonstrated how the legitimizing identity of Estonian Russians was constructed. According to M. Castells' categorisation, this type of identity is introduced by the dominant institution or group to extend and rationalize its domination. Russian migration from the USSR brought a new Russian population, which replaced the existing community. This group became the dominant group of Estonian society, and the Communist Party took measures to extend and rationalize their governance, thus making the newcomers' identity dominant. Pre-Soviet Estonian culture was criticized by Soviet leaders and some of its figures purged, while Russian culture was promoted by a variety of measures. Russians in Estonia had an identity based on the image of Russians as benefactors. Then in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, their cultural identity drastically changed as a result of the revival of Estonian culture higher status.

This work touched upon the issue of post-Soviet Estonian cultural policy and its influence on Russian identity. In the 1990s the Estonian government tried to protect the nation's dominant culture and guarantee its high status. Estonian became the only official language, and the national history was reviewed. At the same time the authorities began the programs of non-Estonians' integration and learning. As a result of these measures Russians lost their dominant status and met the necessity to change their cultural identity. The consequent changes can be systematized according to Castells' theory on project and resistance identity.

The study analyzed the evolution of an Estonian Russian identity. The research revealed that the first years in sovereign Estonia were extremely hard for the minority of Russians since they felt some form of identity vacuum. Under such circumstances, Russians had to take some measures to eliminate this lack of cultural identification, to reassess themselves and their culture. The work suggested that the elder generation's actions of establishing their cultural identity in post-Soviet Estonia could be defined as the measures of constructing resistance identity. Their identity appears to have been strongly based on nothing but opposition to the dominant Estonian culture. This identity was manifested through some Estonian Russian and almost all the Russian media as the only right way of reaction to the policy of Estonianisation and integration while the

Estonian media criticized it as very suspicious something opposing sovereign Estonian culture.

At the same time the study revealed that many Estonian Russians, especially younger generation, created another cultural identity which belonged to the concept of project identity in Manuel Castells' categorisation. This identity was based on the desire to redefine their position in Estonian society by accepting Estonianisation and integration, and also to redefine the society itself. Many Estonian Russian and some proportion of the Estonian media manifested project identity as different from the purely Russian cultural identity; it was viewed as Estonian Russian rather than only Russian, as some identity which intermingled the elements of both cultures. I argue that the aim of this project identity can be a creation of some new legitimizing identity which could be a combination of Estonian and Estonian Russian cultural identity, and this new identity can dominate in Estonian society.

According to the study, the media of the Russian Federation admitted that there were Estonian or Baltic Russians who drastically differed from Russians living in Russia. Interestingly, for the Russian Federation Estonian Russian cultural identity was a source of concern. It was portrayed as eroding Russian cultural identity while the Estonian state perceived it with enthusiasm and expressed hope that this identity would help to solve the conflict between Estonians and Russians in the land. The Russian media concentrated mainly on those Russians who embraced resistance identity; the media not only reflected the situation with them but also promoted the way of resistance by emphasizing the superior character of Russian culture and criticizing Estonian cultural policy.

On the whole, the study systematized the changes of Estonian Russian minority self-identification within the framework of Manuel Castells' theory and revealed two kinds of Russian cultural identity transformation towards the construction of resistance and project identity. The analysis of the media materials demonstrated that both types of identity were manifested and constructed through the Estonian, Russian and Estonian Russian mass media. The media influence was very significant: it was a means of

identity recognition, reflected the opinions on the process of identity construction, and accepted or negated one's particular cultural identity.

The research also revealed that in the 2000s the new models of Estonian Russians' identity have their own problems. The resistance identity in Estonia faces difficulties due to its opposition to the dominant culture and close relations with the Russian Federation; the Estonian media define Russians with resistance identity as the fifth column of Russia. On the other hand, the research found out that those Russians who identify themselves with Estonian Russians are viewed by Estonians with suspicion, and the split between them still exists. The problem has not yet been solved, as not much time has passed since the restoration of Estonian independence. Those who were born in sovereign Estonia are quite young, and cannot yet influence society as much as they wish. Nevertheless, I feel that the future will belong to those who have chosen the way of the Estonian Russian identity, since in the coming decades they will be adults, and it is to be hoped that Estonians will meet Russian people who will be able to speak the official language fluently, know Estonian culture well, and share its values. According to the Estonian Russian press, the new culture of Estonian Russians can be a convergence of the parallel worlds – the combination of both Estonian and Russian cultures – and the new cultural identity should be based on respect towards the dominant culture. The next decades will demonstrate the fate of Russians in Estonia.

This study drew attention to some new avenues of research – the evolution of Russians' cultural identity in post-Soviet space, their adaptation or resistance to the new conditions, their relations with the local population and the Russian Federation, and the role of the media in Estonian Russians' self-identification. One of the promising ways of the new research is to survey some general tendency of Russians' life in the former republics of the USSR after its collapse, some general tendency of their cultural identity development, and the influence of their media on that development. The presence of significant Russian minorities in the former republics of the Soviet Union is a fact of life, and therefore these minorities can be thoroughly studied in order to ease the tension between Russians and the local population.

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APPENDIX

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Евгений Ашихмин

Сближение параллельных миров

Эстонская и русская культура в Эстонии — словно параллельные миры. Они связаны, но и отклоняются друг от друга. Еще много непонимания, предубеждений. Но не будем драматизировать. Благодаря просветительской деятельности Ингрид Эрилайд, ее коллег и других подвижников, благодаря стремлению самих эстонских литераторов построить мосты доверия нарвитяне и жители других регионов имеют прекрасную возможность знакомиться с разнообразным миром литературы и, что особенно важно для русского читателя, — с современной эстонской классикой. Такие добрые встречи, откровенные диалоги дают возможность народам лучше узнать друг друга, сближают их.

Babin, Andrei (2007). “Anatoliy Shmigun: Ya Estosnkiy Russkiy.” *Postimees*. 05.12.2007 [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/020708/dopolnitelno/den_rozhdenija/26463_1.php

Андрей Бабин

Анатолий Шмигун: Я эстонский русский

Случались ли вам, русскому, дискутировать с эстонцами, среди которых живете, на неспортивные темы? Тот же Бронзовый солдат...
Да, я русский, за тридцать с лишним лет жизни среди эстонцев так и не обэстонился. И никогда не стремился к этому. Но чувствую, что я уже не тот русский, что живут в России. Я — здешний, эстонский русский. А насчет Бронзового солдата вот что скажу. Россия подняла неадекватный шум из-за него. Я 9 Мая звонил сестре — мол, как празднуете? А она мне: «Толик, какой там праздник, когда в кошельке 80 рублей?» Я, когда приезжаю, долги ее оплачиваю, закупаю, что могу. Вчера звонил, и опять тяжко на душе. Болею, говорит, а денег нет на лекарства. Вот так живет провинция в России, а сколько воплей по поводу памятника в другой стране...

Boltova, Valeria (2010). ”Russkih v Estonii spaset segregatsiya.” In *Vesti*. 24.03.2010. [Cited 6.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.vesti.ee/litsnie/18770/

Мнение: русских в Эстонии спасет сегрегация

Для того, чтобы выжить и сохранить свои национальные особенности и культуру, русским в

Эстонии нужно отгородиться от эстонцев большим забором, который позволит существовать параллельно.
Как считает Валерия Болтова, ожидать от эстонского государства заботы об иных, кроме эстонских, культур, языков и народов, не приходится, а это значит, что эстонским русским придется самостоятельно заботиться о сохранении своей идентичности.

Chernov, Michail (2004). “Baltiyskie Russkie ne hotyat byt ”negrami”. ” *RBK Daily*. 28.04.2004. [Cited 17.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.rbcdaily.ru/archive/2004/04/28/54350
Михаил Чернов

Балтийские русские не хотят быть «неграми»

Большинство русскоязычных не испытывают особых симпатий к России, выступают за скорейшую интеграцию своих республик в Евросоюз и намерены активно участвовать в политической жизни единой Европы.
Фактическое угнетение русскоязычных продолжается, несмотря на то, что большинство русского населения ориентировано на интеграцию ЕС и вполне патриотично настроено по отношению к своим республикам. «Местные русские поддерживают идею независимости от России. Между тем, бывая у нас, бизнесмены из Прибалтики видят, что бизнес их защищен от произвола силовиков и государства, чего нет в России», – говорит г-н Собянин. Во многом именно поэтому они связывают свое будущее не с Россией, а с Евросоюзом.
Парадокс состоит в том, что балтийские русские, по сути, являются большими европейцами по духу, чем, собственно, прибалтийские народы.

Denisov, Rodion (2010). “Otkrytoe Pismo Predsedatelju ILR Martu Laaru.” *Narvskaja Gazeta*. 21.01.2010. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.gazeta.ee/index.php?itemid=5148

Родион Денисов

Открытое письмо председателю IRL Марту Лаару

Настало время всерьез заняться созиданием ценностей, которые были бы для эстонцев и русских общими.
Одной из таких ценностей могла бы стать наша история, которая знала не только моменты отчуждения между нашими народами, но и множество дел, которые эстонцы и русские делали сообща во имя единых целей. Почему русские и эстонцы в последние десятилетия зациклены на спорах о событиях 1940 года? Разве ничего другого в истории не было? Давайте вспомним события Освободительной войны, которые дороги для каждого патриота Эстонии. Почему эстонская историография практически ничего не говорит о тех русских людях, которые героически сражались плечом к плечу с эстонцами на заре эстонской независимости в рядах эстонской армии? Этими людьми могут и должны гордиться и эстонцы, и русские. Вспомним имена эстонцев, которые получили за свою доблестную воинскую службу Георгиевские кресты от Российской империи. И подобных примеров в истории Эстонии множество. Цели сближения двух общин и поиска единых ценностей мог бы послужить и предложенный недавно Аймаром Альтосааром месячник Георгиевских лент, в котором приняли бы участие и эстонцы, и русские.

Убежден, что необходимо начать при государственной поддержке изучение истории нашего государства с позиции того вклада, который внесли в его созидание представители всех проживающих в Эстонии народов. Должны появиться соответствующие научные исследования, буклеты, учебники, тематические и дискуссионные интернет-сайты и просто публикации в СМИ.

Krooming-Suharev, Boris (2002). “Russkiy MIR: Contury budushego.” *Molodoj Estonii*. 18.10.2002. [Cited 6.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.moles.ee/02/Oct/18/11-1.php

Борис Круминг-Сухарев

Русский МІРЪ: контуры будущего

А при устойчивой мотивации со стороны России возможно не только сохранение культурного наследия, но и его развитие. Основная область интереса для всех – сохранение общей духовности, развитие культуры в широком смысле слова. Именно этой проблемой озабочены многие видные представители интеллектуальной элиты России, в среде которой все больше прорастает мысль о единстве русского Мира. Их поиски и усилия, а также встречная деятельность русских диаспор вылились в движение «Русский Міръ», подчеркивая самим написанием названия смысл сообщества. Его стержень – многонациональная русская культура, русский язык, русская духовная традиция. Из общности интересов родилось простое предложение: от разделения к совместной деятельности. Цель предельно ясна: создание из краха целостности иного рода.
Главная задача, естественно, не территориальное объединение, а создание единого виртуального пространства «Русского Міра». Мировоззренческое и структурное объединение России и русских диаспор, что позволит создать «Русский Мір», обладающий огромным потенциалом развития.
Вот что пишет сопредседатель-координатор Международной ассоциации «Русская Культура», академик РАЕН Д.И.Ивашинцов: «Именно поэтому, все, кто самоидентифицирует себя в рамках русской культуры, где бы они ни находились, к каким бы политическим или географическим берегам их ни прибило, должны объединиться вокруг идеи возрождения Русского міра, мира как общности людей одной культуры, одного языка, одного нравственного и духовного императива, мира, в котором русский мог бы с гордостью называть себя русским».
Несомненно одно: с такой опорой мы можем жить в европейском сообществе не только как граждане Европы, но и как наследники и носители великой культуры.

Laar, Mart (2009). ”Estontsam i Russkim nado chastche obschatsa.” *Postimees*. 29.11.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=194365

Март Лаар

Лаар: Эстонцам и русским надо чаще общаться

Лаар не исключает, что потомки тех русскоязычных жителей, которые приехали в Эстонию в период советской власти, воспринимают как обвинение в свой адрес разговоры об оккупации и аннексии Эстонии. «Честно сказать, для эстонцев - это сюрприз. Они не предполагают сами, что своими высказываниями они кого-то обвиняют», - сказал Лаар.
По оценке Лаара, прекращение дискуссий на тему истории не снимет проблем. «Люди по-прежнему будут считать себя оккупантами и так далее. Причем для эстонцев это не тема, не суть жизни, но многие русские, наоборот, живут именно этим и интуитивно считают себя оккупантами

даже тогда, когда об этом нет и речи», - сказал Лаар.
Именно это, по мнению Лаара, и отталкивает большинство русскоязычных жителей от активной общественной жизни Эстонии. Он также сказал, что во время предвыборной кампании в его кафе приходили русские люди, и дискуссии в основном велись на тему истории. «Они приходили, задавали вопросы на тему истории. Мало кого волновали вопросы, связанные с жизнью города. Выйти из этого круга мы сможем, лишь общаясь как можно больше», - сказал Лаар.

Made, Tiit (2010). ”Nastuplenie blagosklonnyh k Rossii v Estonii.” *Ohtuleht*. 18.02.2010. [Cited 18.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.inosmi.org/baltic/20100218/158250786.html

Тиит Маде

Наступление благосклонных к России в Эстонии

Эстония после восстановления независимости была все время объектом нападок и давления со стороны России. Когда провалились попытки России организовать апрельский мятеж (события, связанные с переносом памятника Воину-освободителю Таллина от фашистов в апреле 2007 года - Х.С.) и здешняя пятая колонна, несмотря на иностранное руководство, оказалась беспомощной, там, где нужно, быстро переориентировались. Где нельзя справиться силой, нужно помочь советом. Нужно было существенно расширить ставшую осторожной команду, формирующую мнение среди здешних про-российских сил. Тоталитарное наступление про-российских сил бросается в глаза при обсуждении вопроса о необходимости президента отправиться в Москву.

Mauzer, Aleksandr (2009). ”Kladbishe Narvskoi Istorii.” *Narvskaja Gazeta*. 28.10.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.gazeta.ee/index.php?itemid=4710

Александр Маузер

Кладбище нарвской истории

Без прошлого, как говорится, нет будущего. Солидная часть нашего, то есть нарвского прошлого бесследно исчезает на территории сопредельного государства....
Многие памятники нарвской истории находятся на правом берегу реки, и до их судьбы, увы, никому нет дела.
Парусинка — часть единого архитектурного комплекса конца 19 начала 20 века постройки, в который входили район Кренгольм вместе с фабриками и жилыми домами, а также Воскресенским собором и Александровской церковью. То, что мы увидели — это пустые глазницы окон ресторана в знаменитом круглом здании с колоннами, из которых на нас глазела ивангородская детвора. Для нас, формальных европейцев, зрелище было шокирующим.
В свое время в Нарве на старое кладбище в Сийвертси, на Гарнизонное кладбище, где похоронены воины, воевавшие на стороне Эстонии в Освободительной войне, на кладбище Печорского полка, кладбище политзаключенных из ИТЛ, где сейчас расположена гребная база, первыми обратили свое внимание энтузиасты, которые начали тормошить спонсоров и власти, чтобы привести эти места захоронений в порядок. За них более не стыдно, а вот за ивангородское кладбище — наоборот.

Moiseenko, Yuri (2009). ”Slovo ”russkiy” v Estonii teper schitaetsja sinonimom marginala.” *Argymenty i Fakty*. 23.03.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://sz.aif.ru/society/article/3448

Юрий Моисеенко

Слово «русский» в Эстонии теперь считается синонимом маргинала.

В самом деле трудно объяснять восемнадцатилетнему, среднестатистическому студенту из такого же среднестатистического города Энска, что его язык, его культура, его образ мыслей в Европе, которая, как нас порой уверяют, остается оплотом демократии, находятся под запретом. Слово «русский» теперь считается у нас чуть ли не синонимом – маргинала. Зато есть задача по уничтожению русского мира (во всяком случае, на территории современной Балтии) и, судя по этим статистическим данным, она успешно выполняется. В настоящее время в Эстонии проживает до 300 тысяч граждан, для которых русский язык считается родным. Однако можно ли считать их этническими русскими, если сегодня все, чтобы выставить их людьми без родины, без культуры - без той национальной почвы, которая делает русского русским.
- Если эта политика этнического геноцида продлится еще лет 15-20, - высказал свою точку зрения Линтер, - то ее итоги будет более чем печальны: мы получим самую настоящую идеологическую «пятую» колонну. Не русских, а именно русскоговорящих при этом ненавидящих все, чем гордиться Россия.

Orlov, Sergei (2009). “Prezident Estonii schitaet yazyk Pushkina…yazykom zverstv.” *Svobodnaya Pressa*. 25.11.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://svpressa.ru/society/news/17477

Сергей Орлов

Президент Эстонии считает язык Пушкина... языком зверств

В республике придумывают изощренные ходы, чтобы вытеснить русское население на обочину жизни

Думается, причина все-таки в другом. Ту самую лояльность стремятся проявить многие директора и педагоги, потому что государство жестко насаждает эстонский язык в русские школы и карает за «нелояльность».
Но власти решают задачу кардинальнее. Работу по вытеснению русского языка решено начать чуть ли не с грудных младенцев. В министерстве образования и науки обсуждают планы перевода на эстонский язык... русскоязычных детских садов.
Русский язык в Эстонии уже как приговор. Без идеального знания государственного не устроишься на работу и во многие частные структуры. Просто знать эстонский мало – нужно сдать экзамен, а преодолеть этот барьер все труднее.
С другой стороны, за 50 лет советского периода, который Тоомас Хендрик Ильвес назвал «зверствами», эстонский язык не только не умер, но и получил развитие и поддержку. В 1947 году был создан Институт эстонского языка и литературы при Академии Наук Эстонии. В 50-е «советские оккупанты» спрособствовали организации грандиозных праздников эстонских песни и танца. Никто не препятствовал развитию эстонской литературы, кинематографа. Практически вся элита республики, многие представители которой вышли из деревни и в буржуазной Эстонии не имели шанса на образование, закончила советские вузы.

Palo, Urve (2010). “Integratsiya nachinaetsja s molodyh.” *Postimees*. 09.02.2010. [Cited 18.11.2010]. Available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=222257

Урве Пало

Интеграция начинается с молодых

Доверие между представителями разных народов растет, если они постоянно вместе. Бывший министр по делам народонаселения Урве Пало считает, что если русские и эстонские дети будут иметь возможность больше времени проводить вместе, то это обещает для нас в будущем более толерантное общество.

Мы же в Эстонии, похоже, все еще находимся там, где Америка была полвека назад. Мы, конечно, гордимся тем, что молодые эстонские русские говорят на эстонском языке все лучше, но при этом не обращаем внимания на тот факт, что большинство эстоноязычных и русскоязычных молодых людей фактически не соприкасаются друг с другом.

Чтобы в Эстонии росло доверие между разными национальностями, мы каждый день должны соприкасаться, общаться — и я говорю не о нескольких секундах в магазине, когда мы покупаем продукты.

Начинать нужно с молодежи. Последние исследования показывают, что порядка 60% как эстонцев, так и эстонских русских хотят, чтобы их дети вместе ходили в эстоноязычные детские садики.

В то же время у русскоязычных детей должна быть возможность углубленного изучения русского языка и русской культуры. Для них участие в уроках русского с детьми, для которых родным языком является эстонский, едва ли будет интересным. Желание же сохранить свой родной язык и культуру является вполне понятным и похвальным.

Raun, Alo (2010). “Ekspert: Prozyabanie russkih partiy govorit ob integratsii.” *Postimees*. 29.01.2010. [Cited 15.11.2010]. Available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=218409

Ало Раун

Эксперт: Прозябание русских партий говорит об интеграции

Социолог Иви Проос считает, что об интеграции лучше всего говорит то, что русскоязычные граждане Эстонии не выбирают в Рийгикогу «своих».

«По моему видению, это же показывают исследования и анализ: русскоязычные или созданные по национальному признаку партии после восстановления независимости Эстонии не имели успеха. Причина здесь очень проста – русскоязычные избиратели не оказывают «своим» достаточной поддержки и не избирают их в парламент», - сказала Проос Postimees.ee.

«Следовательно, эстонские русские систематически выбирают те партии, которые сейчас присутствуют в Рийгикогу. Если это поведение – не интеграция, то тогда что?», - спрашивает Проос.

По ее словам, процесс интеграции протекает в различных регионах Эстонии по-разному. В небольших городах, где русских мало, они, владея эстонским языком, интегрированы в эстонскую общину, и воспринимаются последней как свои.

Samarina, Aleksandra (2009). “Istoria Umolchaniya.” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. 12.02.2009. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-12-02/2_story.html

Александра Самарина

История умолчания

Школьные учебники ближнего зарубежья искореняют общую память народов

Вывод авторов доклада: за исключением Беларуси и Армении, страны постсоветского пространства вместо объективного изложения исторических событий преподносят школьникам гремучую смесь из мифов по поводу древности своего народа, высокой культурной миссии предков и «заклятом враге» – России.
Шадрин приводит в пример трактовку периода шведского господства в эстонских учебниках в самых позитивных тонах. Хотя, указывает ученый, «именно при шведах, в XVII веке, от голода, чумы и войн погибло четыре пятых населения. Это взято из эстонского энциклопедического словаря...».
И еще одна общая деталь, отмеченная в исследовании российских ученых: упорно замалчиваются выгоды, которые получали сопредельные республики в рамках СССР. Из текста исключены все события, которые можно трактовать как благоприятные плоды совместного существования.

Shurygin, Vladislav (2005). ”Estonskie zarisovki.” *Zavtra*. 04.05.2005. [Cited 14.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.zavtra.ru/cgi/veil/data/zavtra/05/598/51.html

Владислав Шурыгин

ЭСТОНСКИЕ ЗАРИСОВКИ

РУССКИЕ

И третья часть русской общины — это молодёжь, которая выросла уже после 1991 года. Для неё нынешняя Эстония — это её жизнь. Эта часть общины живёт в Эстонии и принимает мир вокруг себя как свой мир и идентифицирует себя с этим миром. Для них Россия лишь некая духовная категория, часть истории семьи и культурная традиция.
По мнению русских, в самые трудные и тяжёлые годы Россия просто "кинула" своих соплеменников и предала их. И это чувство "национального сиротства" определяет отношение к нынешней России. От полного разочарования и даже полного отторжения России — особенно в среде "выживающих", многие из которых откровенно обижены и злы на Россию, "предавшую" их, до спокойного и даже гордого: "а мы всё равно живём!"
Русские здесь привыкли обходиться без поддержки "исторической родины", привыкли полагаться сами на себя. .

Toom, Jana (2008). “Maxim Reva: My umyvaem ruki.” *Stolitsa*. 17.11.2008. [Cited 18.11.2010]. Available at: http://pealinn.tallinn.ee/?pid=85&nid=4132&lang=7

Яна Тоом

Максим Рева: Мы умываем руки

— Примерно треть населения Эстонии связывают общие история и культура. И то что сейчас происходит в отношении этих общих истории и культуры, я бы назвал культурным геноцидом.

— Мы объединены, я бы так сказал, общей трактовкой истории. Я никогда не смогу согласиться с тем, что мой дедушка был оккупантом. Точно так же я никогда не смогу согласиться с тем, что люди, которые надевали мундир СС, боролись за свою свободу. И с этим, я уверен, не может согласиться еще 350 тысяч русских в Эстонии.

— Это как раз то, о чем я говорю — культурный геноцид. Наши дети проходят идеологическую обработку.

— Да, мы разные, но один день в году мы вместе, а должны быть вместе 365 дней. Нам надо работать с молодежью. Надо вытаскивать молодежь из того мракобесия, которое дает сейчас школа. Сейчас у нас есть поддержка со стороны России. Я говорю о таком проекте и фонде, как «Русский мир», который финансирует исключительно гуманитарные и исторические проекты.

— А мы не собираемся объединять русских для борьбы за эстонское государство… Русские для эстонского государства оказались той прослойкой, которая не нужна. И я уверен, что эстонское государство в результате получило огромную массу людей, которым нет до него никакого дела. И когда я говорю, что мы не станем ему — государству — помогать, я не имею в виду, что мы будем его расшатывать, это, как показывает жизнь, и без нас есть кому сделать. Но мы — умыли руки. Однако наш долг, наша обязанность — образовывать своих детей всеми возможными способами. Потому что в противном случае еще через 15 лет мы получим 250 тысяч «жвачек». Людей без мозгов. Плохорусскоговорящих.

Vikulov, Roman (2009). ”Tatiana Stepanova: Statusa gimnazii dobivalis 10 let.” *Viru Prospekt*. 12.09.2009. [Cited 15.11.2010]. Available at: http://www.prospekt.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88:-1-10-&catid=38:2009-09-16-14-21-36&Itemid=12

Роман Викулов

Татьяна Степанова: статуса гимназии добивались 10 лет

То, что у учеников Ваналиннаской школы с эстонским порядок, показал весенний госэкзамен для выпускников 9-х классов по эстонскому языку как родному (!). Средний балл по школе был выше, чем по республике, то есть 4.0.

- Есть мнение, что через 10-20 лет все выпускники русских гимназий в Эстонии будут знать эстонский очень хорошо. Согласны ли вы с этим?

- Пожалуй, соглашусь. Часов преподавания эстонского много. И, судя по тому, с какими знаниями в наш гимназический класс пришли ребята из обычных школ, это вполне реально.

- Именно поэтому для нас очень важно изучать культуру, традиции эстонского народа. Но мы празднуем и эстонские, и русские праздники. Сохранение русского идентитета для нас принципиально.