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Hedging in Immigration Discourse

A Comparative Study of French and Swedish Radio Debates

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ABSTRACT

Migration is an important aspect of multicultural societies and globalization. It is a topic of discussion in the public sphere, in academic literature, and in the media. The link between the media and migration has been researched extensively by analysing representations of migration in the media. Migration is a controversial topic, especially in debates where speakers are expected to elaborate on their personal views. Debates on the role of migration on television and on radio, for instance, differ in political, cultural, and national contexts.

A linguistic tool used by speakers to avoid seeming too straightforward or too direct in their discourse is the use of hedges. Hedging is a linguistic means to soften a statement or to make a statement vaguer and more ambiguous. This phenomenon was first described by Lakoff (1972), and was later adopted by Brown and Levinson (1987) in their theory on negative politeness. Hedging is mostly used in contexts where speakers want to distance themselves from their statements or want to make their statements less straightforward. Hedging can be done in several ways, such as the use of certain verbs, adverbials, or adjectives.

This thesis analyses hedging in a French radio debate and a Swedish radio debate on immigration. Applying discourse analysis, the placement of the hedges and their functions are analysed. The hedges chosen for analysis include epistemic modality (*je crois* and *je pense* in French, *jag tycker*, *jag tror* and *jag tänker* in Swedish), the modal verb 'would' or the conditionnel présent (*je dirais* and *je voudrais* in French, and *jag skulle säga* and *jag skulle vilja* in Swedish), and hedging adverbials (*en quelque sorte*, *vraiment* and *en fait* in French, and *någon/något slags*, *verkligen* and *faktiskt* in Swedish), as these hedges occur frequently. The analyses illustrate the different functions that the hedges have, and the comparative analysis demonstrates differences in the number of occurrences, the placement of the hedges and the functions of the hedges.

KEYWORDS: immigration, media, hedging, French, Swedish

1 INTRODUCTION

Migration is an important issue in today's globalised world. For political, social or economic reasons many people decide, voluntarily or involuntarily, to leave their country and to live in a new country. Discourse on immigration in politics and in the media has been widely discussed, from a socio-cultural and from a linguistic perspective. One way to study this linguistic aspect of the media is to analyse the phenomenon of hedging in discourse on immigration. Hedging is used to soften statements and to avoid seeming too direct. Media debates are specifically interesting in this aspect, considering that the speakers address a large audience and are usually given the opportunity to answer elaborate questions. Debates are also an important framework for the public image of the speakers.

1.1 Research questions and method and material of the thesis

It is difficult to give a clear definition of the term 'hedging', as many researchers have studied hedging from different perspectives and have focused on different aspects of the phenomenon. The concept of hedging was already introduced in the 1970s by George Lakoff, who focused on its property to change the degree of fuzziness, and can therefore be considered as from a semantic perspective (Lakoff 1972: 195). Later, Brown and Levinson (1987) incorporated hedging in their theory on negative politeness and face-threatening acts. By combining the elements of hedging on the one hand and politeness on the other hand, a new interest in the topic of hedging arose, which can be described in a functional perspective. Prince et al. (1982) borrowed from Lakoff's research by using the term 'fuzziness' once again. However, similar to Brown and Levinson (1987), Prince et al. (1982) describe hedging from a functional perspective. Prince et al. (1982: 85) distinguish between approximators on the one hand and shields on the other hand. Approximators include expressions such as *sort of* and *kind of*, while shields indicate the "degree of speaker commitment", such as the expression *I think* (Kaltenböck et al. 2010: 5).

As hedging is a very broad concept, each researcher has re-defined the phenomenon of hedging. For instance, there has been a lot of interest in the role of hedging in academic writing and in language teaching (Markkanen and Schröder 1997). However, certain aspects have not yet or have very little been explored. Firstly, an important factor to consider is that most of the previous research focuses on the occurrence of hedging solely in English. While hedging in other languages has also been described, few studies have, however, taken into account two languages and have made a comparison of the findings from those languages. One of these studies is conducted by Vold (2006), who compares hedging in English, French and Norwegian, and concludes that less hedging expressions can be found in the French data. As there are few other studies, it is interesting to compare two different languages in terms of hedging, and investigate how hedging occurs in specific instances in these languages. Not only may two languages differ in the amount of hedging, but also the way of hedging in general, both from a semantic and from a functional perspective, might be different.

A second element to consider is the data that are used to analyse hedging. As mentioned before, academic discourse has proven to be a resourceful way of studying hedging, and a lot of previous studies have focused on academic writing, even though they might focus on different aspects. In academic writing hedging is often used because it has become a standard in this form of discourse (Markkanen and Schröder 1997: 10–11). Hedging occurs in a lot of situations. Hedging is a strategy to mitigate utterances, and it is considered to occur most when the speaker feels that he or she should protect himself or herself from face-threatening acts or should avoid being too direct and straightforward (Nikula 1997: 192). Therefore, controversial topics or topics which might result in a lot of discussion are prone to evoke hedging. Even academic discourse might be seen as controversial, as new ideas need to be presented clearly yet be presented in such a way that the writer protects himself or herself from criticism. However, by not choosing academic discourse as a source for data, but by choosing other resources, it is possible to acquire data where even more controversial topics are discussed.

It is important for this thesis, however, not only to think about the language, the data and the methods that are used, but also to take into consideration that many other factors

influence hedging as well. It would be rash to claim that these aspects do not have any importance for this research. By taking into account the different societies, it is possible to give an overview of the occurrence of hedging in radio interviews in French and Swedish. These aspects will therefore be discussed as well in the methodology chapter of this thesis.

The aim of this research is to analyse hedging in French, as spoken in France, on the one hand and Swedish, as spoken in Sweden, on the other hand. This research will take previous research on hedging in English as a basis for research on French and Swedish, while linguistic and cultural differences between English and these two languages are taken into consideration. Radio debates that discuss immigration are used as the primary material. The following research questions can then be formed:

(1)   What are the differences in terms of the amount of hedging and the position of the hedges that are used in the radio debates in French and Swedish?

(2)   What are the functions that the hedges have in the radio debates in French and Swedish?

(3)   In which contexts do the hedges occur?

By combining data that have little been studied in terms of hedging, namely radio debates on topics that can be considered controversial, on the one hand and an analysis of two different languages, namely French and Swedish, on the other hand, it is possible to explore aspects of hedging that have not yet been researched.

The reason for choosing French and Swedish as the two main languages in this research are manifold. Firstly, French and Swedish are part of two different language families, with French being a Romance language and Swedish being a Germanic language. Therefore, there are significant grammatical and lexical differences between these two languages, and this might have an impact on how hedging is expressed (for instance, by means of modality, adverbs or particles). The hedges in these two languages may also

have different functions or different semantic uses. However, the similarities between the hedges in the French and the Swedish radio debate are an equally important aspect of the analysis.

Another important element is the fact that these two languages are spoken in two different societies. Hall (1976), for instance, made the distinction between high-context cultures and low-context cultures, and he stated that France is a high-context culture and Sweden is a low-context culture. However, France and Sweden also differ in several other aspects. A main aspect that may be different in these societies, and that is important for this thesis, is how they deal with immigration. France and Sweden have a very different past in terms of immigration. Yet, while there are differences in the specific laws and public opinions in respectively France and Sweden on immigration, both societies are similar in the sense that they have put more restrictions on international migration, as is apparent from their respective immigration policies. The same trend can be found in many other societies in Western Europe (Loescher 2002: 35; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 2013: 1). This also has consequences with regards to racism and the way that immigration is dealt with in France on the one hand and Sweden on the other hand.

The material for this analysis are radio debates. Radio debates are interesting, as the speakers usually know in advance what topic will be discussed but do not know the exact questions that will be asked. Therefore, they can prepare to some extent for the interview, but it cannot be learned by heart completely. The topic of these debates is immigration and its consequences. As these are quite controversial topics, it is expected that the interviewees might use hedges in order to express their statements while not being too straightforward or to direct. However, not only the fact that these debates were broadcasted in two societies with different cultures and by people coming from different cultures should be considered, but also other elements have to be taken into account. For instance, the setting, the time, people's individual idiolects, and several other aspects are also important for this analysis. Therefore, a more detailed account of these elements is described in the chapter on methodology.

This thesis can be considered to form a link between discourse on immigration, media discourse, and the linguistic phenomenon of hedging. By combining these three elements, it is possible to study how these aspects occur in France on the one hand and Sweden on the other hand. The semantics, the syntactic position and the function of these hedges are discussed in the analysis.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

In the theory part, this thesis first gives a theoretical background on the topics of hedging, immigration in France and Sweden, and media discourse and media language. The first chapter gives an overview of immigration, first in a general sense and then more specifically in the case of France and Sweden. The next chapter, which discusses hedging, gives an overview of hedging as seen from a functional perspective on the one hand and hedging as seen from an interactional perspective on the other hand. The focus then shifts to hedging in French and to hedging in Swedish. Finally, earlier research on media discourse and media language is discussed, focussing both on general characteristics and on media discourse in France and Sweden.

The next section discusses the method and the material. The material, namely radio debates taken from respectively French and Swedish radio, is described both in a more general sense and in detail. Discourse analysis, which is also discussed in this chapter on methodology, is used as a means for studying the radio debates. Additionally, the hedges that are used in the analysis are presented.

The analysis of hedging in the radio debates is divided in subsections. Firstly, the data from the French radio debate is analysed. The analysis distinguishes epistemic modality as a hedging device, modal verbs as hedges, and hedging adverbials. Next, the same analysis is conducted on the data from the Swedish radio debate, with the same structure as the analysis of the hedges in the French debate. Finally, a detailed comparison between these two analyses is presented.

The last chapter provides a conclusion drawn from the analysis of the radio interviews, while also taking into account the theoretical background. By implementing both the analysis of the French and Swedish data and previous information on this topic, a sustaining conclusion is made. Additionally, an appendix which contains the transcription conventions and the abbreviations of the speakers' names is included.

2 IMMIGRATION

The topic of the radio debates is immigration. In order to understand the context in which these radio interviews take place, it is important to understand the situation in Sweden and in France with regard to these topics. Different countries have different immigration regulations, and the public view on immigrants and immigration varies across different countries as well. In this section a general overview of previous research on immigration is given. Next, the specific cases of France and Sweden are discussed.

2.1 Immigration: a general overview

In order to understand the phenomenon of migration, it is necessary to establish a general background which attempts to explain incentives and currents of migration. While migration can be considered a global and current phenomenon, it is important to take into account that 97% of the world population remains inside their country of birth or country of citizenship (Rosenblum and Tichenor 2012: 2). Since only a small fraction of the world's population migrates to a new country, it is therefore interesting to study the motives for and causes of international migration.

A second aspect with regards to immigration is a country's perception on this matter, especially in the case of Europe, which consists of many societies. Geddes (2003: 4) says that European countries tend to perceive international migration as "challenging their territorial, organisational and conceptual boundaries". Globalisation and Europeanisation are dynamics that challenge the classical citizenship model which was typical for European nation states (Siim 2013: 617). Important aspects of immigration policies in Europe include immigration border control policies and integration policies (Roos 2013: The Regulation of Immigration by the EU section, para. 6).

One way of categorising immigration is suggested by Bovardsson and Van den Berg, who describe the length of their settlement in a new country as a possible way of grouping immigrants. Whereas some immigrants plan to settle in a new country permanently,

others only live in a new country during e.g. tourist season or harvest season. Therefore, it can be said that in many cases, this temporary migration is bound to work opportunities in other countries. (Bovardsson and Van den Berg 2009: 14–15)

The reasons for migration are extremely varied, but they can be broadly divided into two major categories, namely political incentives and economic incentives. The migrants that move away from their country for political reasons can be refugees from "violent conflict, political persecution, state regime change, environmental degradation, and natural or human-made disasters, or even victims of slavery and human smuggling" (Fussell 2012: 26). A second reason consists of economic opportunities. As described before, some immigrants work in another country during tourist season or harvest season than the one they live in during other times of the year. But even immigrants that plan to settle permanently in a new country may have economic motives. An important factor in this context is the poverty threshold, a widely accepted assumption stating that the poorest do not have the intention or the means to migrate (Black et al. 2006: 45). Many European countries have had a high demand for immigrant workers. However, while demand of immigrant workers is a necessary condition for labour migration, it is also insufficient to explain all international economic migration (Fussell 2012: 28). Neoclassical economic models of migration also focus on economic differences between a migrant's country of origin and the country to which they migrate, but also note the aspect of self-selection into a migration stream (Fussell 2012: 27–28).

This self-selection is partially linked with either voluntary or involuntary migration. Voluntary migration is in many cases motivated by a desire and a search to improve the individual's life standard and thus enhance the individual's well-being (Fussell 2012: 38). Migrants voluntarily leave their country in search for a better life, economically or politically. Involuntary migration, on the other hand, is often caused by political, social or religious elements that force the people to move away from their country. However, it is difficult to maintain this categorization of migration, as most immigration is neither entirely voluntary nor entirely forced (Samers 2010: 11).

Bovardsson and Van den Berg describe a theory of immigration that divides migrants' incentives into push factors and pull factors. Push factors include poverty, famine, unemployment, violence, and discrimination. Pull factors include personal freedom, employment, educational opportunity, family reunion, and peace. Therefore, it can be said that a combination of push factors and pull factors stimulate migration. However, there are also certain factors that discourage migration, namely stay factors and stay away factors. Stay factors include family ties, social status, and cultural familiarity. Stay away factors include language barriers, cultural barriers, and lack of political rights. (Bovardsson and Van den Berg (2009: 5–7)

Four categories of migrant incentives can be distinguished (Bovardsson and Van den Berg 2009: 6):

> (1) negative incentives that *push* people to emigrate, (2) positive incentives that *pull* immigrants to the destination country, (3) positive incentives that induce people to *stay* at home, and (4) negative incentives that cause people to *stay away* from a foreign country. When the *stay* and *stay away* factors are strong relative to the *push* and *pull* factors, immigration is unlikely to occur on a large scale. On the other hand, when the push and pull factors are strong relative to the stay and stay away factors, immigration will grow, as has occurred worldwide over the last few decades.

However, not only stay factors and stay away factors discourage migration in some cases, as transport costs, time of travel, entry and exit visas and possible fines also play a role in the decision regarding migration (Bovardsson and Van den Berg 2009: 5–7).

An important element in studies on migration is the phenomenon of prejudice, as immigrants often face this issue. Zick et al. (2008: 240–241) point out that subtle prejudice, in contrast with blatant prejudice is based on three components, namely a traditional values factor, the fact that the outgroup's culture is considered to be very different from the ingroup's culture, and the ingroup's denial of sympathy or admiration for the outgroup. Blatant prejudice, on the other hand, is generally connected to more explicit expressions of fear, envy or hatred (Zick et al. 2008: 241). It consists of threat/rejection items and intimacy items, whereas subtle prejudice consists of items

tapping traditional values and cultural differences (Olson 2009: 370). Blatant prejudice is therefore seen as less socially acceptable than subtle prejudice (Olson 2009: 370).

One of the most discussed theories in terms of social group dynamics is the Social Identity Theory (SIT), which was developed by Tajfel (1982). SIT looks at a person's individual identification with a group, which is "constituted firstly by a reflexive knowledge of group membership, and secondly by an emotional attachment or specific disposition to this belonging" (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 25). A key notion in this context is social accentuation, which consists of an accentuation of similarities within a group and differences between groups (Hogg 2013: 540). Tajfel (1982: 21) distinguishes two major functions of social accentuation, namely the cognitive function and the value function. The cognitive function uses categories in order to systematize and simplify the network of social groups, whereas the value function focuses on subjective value differentials, resulting in a more emphatic accentuation (Tajfel 1982: 21). For immigrants, this identification with a group is an important element of integration. Immigrants are often viewed in a negative light due to the fact that the society considers them as outgroup members (Phinney et al. 2001: 501). However, integration in the new society can lead to membership of the social ingroup, which leads to a more positive identity (Phinney et al. 2001: 501).

Social Construction Theory was developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993). While this approach is mostly used in political science studies, the ideas can also be employed in social sciences. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 335) define their theory as follows:

> The social construction of a target population refers to (1) the recognition of the shared characteristics that distinguish a target population as socially meaningful, and (2) the attribution of specific, valence-oriented values, symbols, and images to the characteristics. Social constructions are stereotypes about particular groups of people that have been created by politics, culture, socialization, history, the media, literature, religion, and the like. Positive constructions include images such as "deserving," "intelligent," "honest," "public-spirited," and so forth. Negative constructions include images such as "undeserving," "stupid," "dishonest," and "selfish."

These social constructions are not static, but they are dynamic and fluctuating in time (Short and Magaña 2002: 701). Schneider and Ingram claim that a target population can

either be powerful or weak with regards to their political resources and to the degree of unity within the target population (O'Connor and Netting 2011: 146). A second aspect with regards to target populations is their construction in the eyes of others, as target populations can be either positively constructed or negatively constructed.

Schneider and Ingram distinguish four types of target populations, namely advantaged groups (powerful and positively constructed), contenders (powerful and negatively constructed), dependents (weak and positively constructed) and deviants (weak and negatively constructed). Immigrants can be seen by officials and other instances in different ways. Some officials focus on the fact that immigrants are oppressed and that they need the same policies as a dependent target population, whereas other officials state that they are powerful and do not deserve aid from the government. Also, as immigrants can be categorised in different groups, such as illegal immigrants, migrant workers and refugees, officials might see these different groups as different target populations. (Schneider and Ingram 1993: 335–336)

2.2 Immigration in France

France is an interesting case to study when it comes to immigration policies and public opinion on immigration, as there are a number of contradicting aspects to this topic. Toro-Morn and Alicea (2004: 75) note that there is an interesting contrast between the fact that France has strong anti-immigrant political parties, but at the same time there is a strong antiracist tradition, which is also reflected in the French laws, such as the regulations concerning hate speech.

Immigration was encouraged by the French administrative authorities until 1974 (Schain 2012: 63). However, even in the days when immigration was encouraged, French policy-makers distinguished between desirable immigrants and less acceptable immigrants by encouraging the former group of immigrants to apply for permanent settlement and discouraging the latter group of immigrants (Schain 2012: 63–64). Even in the early 1980s, France was still described as multiracial and pluricultural in political discourse

(Kastoryano 2002: 26). France can even be considered a model of how a particular society can become a melting pot of different cultures (Toro-Morn and Alicea 2004: 79). In addition to that, France has strong civil right laws and liberal citizenship requirements that promote integration of immigrants (Toro-Morn and Alicea 2004: 79). However, during the 1970s and 1980s, France was confronted with the problem of illegal immigration becoming more common (Bailey 2009: 75). By sanctioning employers who hired illegal workers and by granting payments to illegals that leave France voluntarily, France has attempted to reduce the number of illegal immigrants (Bailey 2009: 75–76).

It is important to take into account the role that former French colonies play with regards to immigration and nationality. Several post-colonial minorities settled permanently in France. Blatt (1997: 52) even names for instance reminders from the era of decolonization as an important element with regards to the revival of anti-immigrant discourse in France. The population in France can be classified in three groups, namely French by birth, French by acquisition and foreign (Kastoryano 2002: 23). As Kastoryano (2002: 23) notes, national and ethnic origin is not stated in official documents in France, and this therefore leads to statistical invisibility of ethnic ancestry once French nationality is obtained by immigrants. A distinction is made between foreign immigrants on the one hand and French nationals of immigrant origin, which includes immigrants from former French colonies (Feldblum 2003: 14).

In current years, France focuses on a control of the external factors of immigration, including migration, border control, and security, and on a control of internal dynamics of immigration, including ethnic and race relations, integration, and multiculturalism, on the other hand (Thomas 2013: 7). In the case of France, external control strategies are preferred to internal control strategies, and this is expressed in territorial closure and sovereignty (Hollifield 2004: 200). Welfare benefits are another aspect that is used to control immigration, as France imposes restrictions on civil and social benefits for immigrants (Hollifield 2004: 201).

A country's economic situation is an important element when studying immigration and racism. Economic stagnation has been pointed out as a reason for anti-immigration

discourse (Schuerkens 2012: 113). In the case of France, economic difficulties leads to the stigmatisation of immigrants, as they are perceived as an economic threat, both in terms of job availability and social security (Schuerkens 2012: 114).

Political orientation is another aspect that is important to take into account. Jolly and DiGiusto (2014: 470) say that individuals who identify themselves with parties that are politically right or center are generally less tolerant and have less positive attitudes towards immigrants. In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen is often mentioned as an example of right-wing extremism. Right-wing parties are concerned with the issues of crime and they ask for stricter immigration controls (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009: 67). Le Pen unified a number of extreme-right groups under the Front National, which evoked "negative reactions to pro-immigrant social policies, the new mobilization among second-generation immigrants, and media-saturated events about immigrants" (Toro-Morn and Alicea 2004: 74).

The media are an important element in immigration discourse, as is illustrated by Schuerkens (2012: 123), who gives the debate on the prohibition of wearing a headscarf in state schools as an example of media discourse on immigrants. In 2004, this topic attracted a lot of public interest, and consequently the French media gave a lot of attention to this debate (Schuerkens 2012: 123). This prohibition not only stirred debate, but also created an activist association, called *Mouvement des Indigènes de la République*, which can be translated as 'Movement of the Indigenous of the Republic' and which aims to solve racial inequalities in France (Bassel 2014: 537, 545).

2.3 Immigration in Sweden

Sweden was first known as an emigrant country, especially in the period between 1850 and 1930 (Benito 2012: 335). From 1930 onwards, however, there was a shift where the number of immigrants grew whereas the number of emigrants declined (Benito 2012: 335). Especially after World War II, Sweden was in need of labour forces for their growing industries, and therefore welcomed European labour immigrants (Bevelander

2009: 286-287). After the Swedish economic growth fell to a lower level in the early 1970s, labour immigration decreased as well (Bevelander 2009: 288). There was, however, an increase in other types of immigration, as well as in the number of immigrants from non-European countries (Bevelander 2009: 288). In the early 1970s, there were four main domains of migration, namely free movement for citizens from Nordic countries, labour migration to a limited degree, family migration, and asylum-seeking migration (Geddes 2003: 108–109).

Today, Sweden is classified as a welfare state, as it employs the Nordic model as its main form of government. Geddes (2003: 3) says that welfare states have an important role with regards to the categorisation and to the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. Instead of accommodating cultural and ethnic subgroups, Sweden's first and foremost emphasis is on national cohesion and belonging (Siim 2013: 621). This idea of national cohesion and belonging is an important aspect of welfare states, where equality plays an important role in societal structures. However, there has been concern that immigration policies from the 1970s singled out immigrants and thereby focused on their otherness instead of creating a sense of belonging to the Swedish society (Camauër 2003: 74).

In addition to Finland, which was a part of Sweden from the 13th century up to 1809, Sweden also had overseas colonies, including New Sweden in America and Cabo Corso in Africa (Peterson 2007: 213). However, other than Finnish immigrants, most immigrants to Sweden are not originally from these former overseas colonies, as is for instance the case in France. The colonization period therefore played a smaller role in Swedish society with regards to immigration than in for instance France. However, an interesting observation by Deutscher (2002: 95–96) states that the close geographical proximity between Sweden and Finland actually prevents the Finnish immigrants' integration in Swedish society because it is easy for them to maintain their Finnishness due to the fact that they can move between Sweden and Finland freely. In contemporary Sweden there are now five national minority groups, namely the Sami, Tornedal Finns, Swedish Finns, Roma/Gypsies, and Jews (Camauër 2003: 72). However, among these minority groups, the Sami population is the only indigenous Swedish minority (Camauër 2003: 72).

Siim (2013: 621) gives three domains in which Sweden differs from most European countries with regards to immigration policies. Firstly, Swedish politicians have rejected the introduction of citizen tests, and learning the national language and national history is not considered a condition for citizenship (Siim 2013: 621). In Denmark, for instance, immigrants are still required to take a language test in order to receive a residence permit (Goodman 2014: 221). Second, Swedish introduction programs are still voluntary (Siim 2013: 621). Third, immigrants are not allocated to a certain place to live, but they have the freedom to choose (Siim 2013: 621). However, immigration in Sweden has become more restricted, and it is difficult for immigrants from countries outside of the European Union and European Economic Area to receive a residence permit for other than humanitarian reasons (Benito 2012: 335). Since 1952 there is free movement between the Nordic countries, and in 1995 this policy was extended to all citizens from members states of the European Union (Geddes 2003: 108).

In recent years, Sweden focuses on improving three major problems related to immigration. First, there is the integration of immigrants in suburbs (Benito 2012: 343). Second, there is discrimination of young immigrants or children of immigrants when searching for a job (Benito 2012: 343). Ensuring full employment for every Swedish citizen is one of Sweden's central social-economic pillars (Bevelander 2009: 286). Third, there is the fact that there is a high rate of unemployment among refugees, which makes it difficult for them to be accepted in society (Benito 2012: 343). These last two elements have become increasingly problematic in recent years. There is a lack of economic integration of immigrants, which can partially be explained by the fact that immigrants have a weaker welfare inclusion and the fact that many benefits and pensions are based on earlier income (Bevelander 2009: 297).

Changes in the public opinion on immigration are partially linked to changes in Sweden's political structure. There was a substantial amount of attention for integration issues during the 2002 general election, as is exemplified by the Liberal Party's proposal to introduce a language requirement as a condition for Swedish citizenship (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012: 70). At the same time, Sweden Democrats, a populist right-wing party,

started to gain more support and would eventually influence Swedish politics (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012: 70). Sweden's status as a welfare state has enabled radical right-wing parties to get support from the public by claiming that immigrants abuse the system of a welfare state and that they live at the expense of the native population (Crepaz 2008: 53). A change in policy with regards to immigrants can be shown with the example of sufficient funds to pay maintenance as a condition for the reunification of immigrant families, which was introduced in 2010 (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012: 73).

3 MEDIA DISCOURSE

For this research, it is important to take into account that radio language, and media language in general, is different from the language heard in everyday situations. Radio language is also different from the discourse that is found in written media or television discourse. First, a general overview on media discourse is presented. Then, radio interviews and radio debates are discussed. Finally, the focus shifts to the more specific cases of France and Sweden.

3.1 Media discourse: a general overview

A lot of research focuses on visual aspects of media, and as radio has become less popular than television, studies on radio discourse have become less prominent in research (Tolston 2006: 3). However, the discourse of the media is an important element in media studies, as the way something is said is as significant as the topic of the discourse (Talbot 2007: 10). This idea is central to discourse analytic studies. The language of media is different from everyday language, as it is aimed at more people and is more influential. Media discourse, especially when written, follows writing and editing rules that are common in journalism (Cotter 2010: 23). It can even be claimed that the discourse in news events, for instance, is not only a technical procedure, but also takes a political and ideological aspect into account, as the process of composing information through attributing values and significance is not neutral (Hassane 2009: 121). While claiming that every news event has an ideological and political motive is an overstatement, it is true that ideology and politics can be communicated through the way a news event is constructed, in particular in the textual or verbal aspect of a news event (van Dijk 1997).

Tolston distinguishes three key concepts in media studies, namely interactivity, performativity, and liveliness (Tolston 2006: 9–14). Interactivity refers to active listening and to the ways it could be achieved, such as using language which provokes the listener (Tolston 2006: 9–14). It should even be noticed that there is a possibility of interaction not only between the producer and the listeners, but that even listeners can interact with

each other through an audience community (Talbot 2007: 4). Performativity consists of the fact that the mediated interaction on television and radio is, in fact, a type of performance (Tolston 2006: 9–14). Finally, liveliness refers to the fact that the interaction in media should feel lively and spontaneous (Tolston 2006: 9–14).

Two major participants can be discerned in media. On the one hand, there are those that produce the media and that are responsible for how the media is presented. On the other hand, there is the audience, which consumes the media (Talbot 2007: 4). An interesting contrast exists with regards to the role of the media and this first group, the reporters. On the one hand, as the media have a large influence on the general public, the media can become a performance displaying political, economic or social interests of the government in power (Higgins 2008: 34). However, a popular image of reporters is that of the defender of the democratic public's interests, which is contrary to the aforementioned aspect of the media (Higgins 2008: 34–35). Whereas this description makes the interests of the government on the one hand and the interests of the general public on the other hand two contrasting elements, the media can choose to assume a position which is located in between these two poles.

The listeners or audience also plays an important role, and they can be described as "the silent, yet listening, audience" (Rendle-Short 2012: 95). In some cases, interviewers even refrain from producing response tokens or verbal acknowledgements in order to demonstrate that they are in fact not the intended audience of the interviewee or speaker (Rendle-Short 2012: 95). As technology advances, it becomes easier for the audience to interact with the producers of the media, through phone-ins and live webchat, for instance (Talbot 2007: 4). Radio, for instance, can be seen as a democratic medium for public debate, as there is a possibility for radio programmes to include phone-ins or other forms of public participation (Talbot 2007: 27). Radio, and media in general, however, mediate messages, and therefore an event can be reported differently by means of language. In terms of voicing people's opinions in an unmediated way, Wei (2013: 231) says that discussion programmes that allow members of the public to discuss social and political issues are a popular media genre. However, as these public voices are unmediated, there

is a risk that issues are depoliticised and are presented in a sensationalist form (Wei 2013: 231).

Sensationalism is an important aspect that should be taken into account when studying media language. Related to this aspect, it can be said that media often focuses on negativity rather than positive events, which is called "media malaise" (Wolfsfeld 2011: 81). However, it is important to note that sensationalism is strongly related to the type of media, as hard news can generally be considered to be less sensationalist and more serious (Wolfsfeld 2011: 79).

3.2 Radio debates and radio interviews

Spoken interviews, such as radio and television interviews, are different from interviews in written media, as written interviews are edited and transcribed, while live interviews on radio and television are not. In fact, Chantler and Stewart (2009: 73) claim that radio interviews carry more impact than newspaper interviews, as listeners get even more information from the way in which a question is answered, because of hesitations and other verbal clues, than from the actual words that are spoken.

Radio interviews can have different question formats. Beaman (2011: 67–68) distinguishes several types of questions that can be used in interviews, including open questions, closed questions, confrontational questions, and probing questions. In radio interviews, open questions are used most, as the interviewee can elaborate on their reply (Beaman 2011: 67). In addition to the questions that are asked by the interviewers, they also often include introductory remarks before their questions (Chilton 2004: 75).

Impartiality from the interviewers' side is an important aspect of radio interviews. In a study on political radio interviews in the United Kingdom, for instance, Chilton (2004: 77) says that radio institutions in the United Kingdom are obliged to be impartial and balanced, and they cannot explicitly approve or disapprove of statements from the interviewees. While this observation describes the situation in the United Kingdom, it can

be said that similar conditions in political interviewing can be found in several countries in Europe, including France and Sweden. However, this impartiality is not always applied, as interviewers express their disapproval when addressing extremist political actors, due to the fact that these interviewers speak on behalf of the democratic polity (Chilton 2004: 77–78). It can therefore be said that interviewers can in these cases be considered "not so much neutral as representative of an institution that is representative of a political consensus" (Chilton 2004: 78). While Chilton's observation refers to the United Kingdom, this non-neutral stance of interviewers occurs in several other countries as well. Also, not every political interview is partial, and in many instances the interviewer maintains a neutral stance, but it is important to be aware that impartiality does occur in interviews.

3.3 Media discourse in France

After the liberation of France in World War II, French media was used by the government for political control (Hill and Manahan 2011: 24). In recent years, however, radio in France has become diverse, as it is no longer restricted by being a state monopoly (Kuhn 2000: 325). It can therefore be said that fewer restrictions are put on the content of the media. In fact, a lot of news articles and news stories are polemical and may include multiple points of view and the possibility of the news story being a basis for wider debate (Lefkowitz 2013: 148).

It is important to note that it is mostly standard French that can be heard on radio. Even though the regional identity is an important aspect in France (Kuhn 2006: 29), most of the media, both written and spoken discourse, is in standard French. Ager (1990: 8) says the regional language is used less at home, partly due to the fact that topics of public importance are discussed on television and on radio in standard French. While Ager's findings stem from the beginning of the 1990s, they are still found relevant in France's contemporary society. Language policies in France even take measures to ensure that French equivalents are introduced for English terms with regards to new inventions and technologies (Adamson 2007: 12).

3.4 Media and immigration in France

French society has seen a progressive evolution where the limits of acceptable discourse and verbal expression have become more loose, which in turn has resulted in a discourse in which xenophobia and racism have become more common and have even become a norm (Hassane 2009: 122). However, Benson (2013: 117) states that the French media tend to minimize the amount of attention that is given to anti-immigration groups. It is also said that the French media prioritizes the representation of minorities and diverse civil society voices, and that French journalists tend to write in a more dismissive way about the far right political parties (Benson 2013: 122). This means that racism and xenophobia are condemned by the French media. The French media rather focus on sameness by using discourse that emphasizes the sharing of a collective past (Costelloe 2014: 334–335).

More attention to immigrant and minority voices can be found in the prevalence of minority media in France. These minority media consist of two main components, namely Arab/Muslim media and African/Caribbean media (Hassane 2009: 119). Hassane (2009: 119–120) describes that these media focus on cultural references and facilitate the presence of these ethnic groups in the general media. This representation of immigrants and minorities in the general media is an important aspect for how they are viewed by the public opinion. It is said that immigrants are often represented in a distorted light of otherness (Hassane 2009: 121).

In France, there are continuous debates on the politicization of immigration and fair treatment of immigrants with regards to criminal justice (Body-Gendrot 2013: 729). Reisinger (2007) describes the portrayal of crime in media, which includes a phenomenon that is described as the rise of insecurity in France (Reisinger 2007: 26). With regards to racism, one newspaper in particular is discussed, namely *Le Figaro*, which is said to have a racist view of crime which stipulates that immigrants are the cause of crime (Reisinger 2007: 28). This example shows that the media are not always neutral, including the topic of immigration.

3.5 Media discourse in Sweden

Sweden experienced a media explosion in the 1980s, and Swedish radio took advantage of this enlarged interest in media by increasing the output from 20.000 hours to over 300.000 hours per annum (Malm and Wallis 2003: 146). However, with newer technologies taking the lead, there is a decline in print media, even though Sweden is known to have a strong newspaper tradition (Trappel et al. 2011: 46–49).

A study by Ekström (2011: 151) on political interviews in a Swedish talk show displays that "formal interviewing was mixed with chatty, jovial, humorous, and person-oriented conversation" in this specific talk show. This can be referred back to one of Tolston's key concepts of media language, namely liveliness (Tolston 2006: 11). By combining a serious topic with lighter conversation, the impression of a spontaneous interview is created.

In terms of the language that is used in the media, it can be said that the Swedish media have developed a tolerant attitude with regards to the language variety that is used in the media (Winsa 2005: 235). However, interviewees in debates still try to adopt the formal pronunciation (Winsa 2005: 235).

3.6 Media and immigration in Sweden

In certain media discourse, immigrants are portrayed negatively and are described as an exception in the mainstream Swedish society (Dahlstedt and Herzberg 2007: 191; Bauder 2011: 22). Milani (2007: 125) observes in his study on the views of Swedish newspapers on standardized language tests for immigrants that educational discourse in newspapers assumes that immigrants' knowledge of Swedish is insufficient and that they are unwilling to engage with the Swedish society. However, it is noted that this assumption does not take into consideration that acquisition of the Swedish language is in part affected by social and economic factors (Milani 2007: 125). This description shows that

media is not always neutral, and that their discourse on immigration is often based on controversial assumptions.

This is confirmed by Roald (2004: 70), who states that Swedish media mostly focus on problematic cases, which leads to a disproportionately large number of reports of immigrant crime and only little attention to successful immigrants. It can therefore be said that immigrants mostly enter the Swedish media in a context of negative framing (Dahlgren 2005: 226). However, Roald (2004: 70–72) notes that, when compared to Danish media, Sweden maintains a decent perspective and refrains for example from releasing names and nationalities of criminals with an immigration background.

As in France, there are certain forms of minority media in Sweden. It is perceived that these minority media are an important element for immigrants, both socially and culturally (Djerf-Pierre and Levin 2006: 177–178). Broadcast minority content is publicly funded and is produced in the framework of public broadcasters (Mihelj 2012: 68).

4 HEDGING

Hedging can be defined as "a discourse strategy that reduces the force or truth of an utterance and thus reduces the risk a speaker runs when uttering a strong or firm assertion or other speech act" (Kaltenböck et al. 2010: 1). In a broader sense, hedges can also convey indeterminate or inexact messages (Mauranen 2004: 174). Two main perspectives to hedging can be discerned, namely a functional approach and an interactional approach. Two major researchers that have studied hedging are discussed in this chapter, namely Lakoff (1972) and Brown and Levinson (1987).

4.1 Hedging from a pragmatic perspective

The term 'hedging' was first described by George Lakoff (1972: 195), who defines hedges as words that are used to "make things fuzzier or less fuzzy". He was not concerned with the communicative properties of hedges, but rather with their logical properties (Markkanen and Schröder 1997: 4). Lakoff departs from the idea that utterances are rarely completely true or false, but most utterances can be described as being somewhat true and somewhat false (Piotti 2014: 19). According to Lakoff, even words or phrases that denote the reinforcement of class membership can be considered as hedges, and are referred to as intensifiers (Fraser 2010: 17).

The term was given an altered definition by Brown and Levinson (1987: 145), who state that a hedge is "a particle, word or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or a noun phrase in a set; it says of that membership that it is partial or true only in certain respects, or that it is more true and complete than perhaps might be expected". Brown and Levinson's definition is similar to George Lakoff's view in the sense that hedges can be detensifiers or intensifiers (Markkanen and Schröder 1997: 4), even though the definition of hedging is seen from a different perspective. While Brown and Levinson (1987) focus on the semantic properties of hedging, they also include a communicative aspect in their description of hedging. Brown and Levinson no longer mention 'fuzziness'

in their description of hedging, but instead name the modification of the degree of membership as a characteristic of linguistic hedges.

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), hedging is a negative politeness strategy. Negative politeness implies avoidance, and Brown and Levinson say that negative politeness consists of "assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the addressee's negative-face wants and will not (or will only minimally) interfere with the addressee's freedom of action", and therefore negative politeness is marked by restraint and formality (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70). However, as is noted by Nikula (1997: 192), hedging does not only protect the face of others, but hedges are also used to protect the speaker's own face. This is also stated by Beeching (2002: 21), who says that hedges simultaneously down-tone a remark in order not to offend the interlocutor and protect the speaker from criticism.

It should be noted that different hedges have specific profiles of use and that hedges have different functions depending on their context (Mauranen 2004: 174). The function of hedges can be strategic or epistemic (Mauranen 2004: 174). Hedges such as 'just' and 'a little bit' are strategic, as they are used to soften an expression, whereas hedges such as 'kind of' and 'or something' are used in an epistemic context to indicate openness (Mauranen 2004: 174). In this thesis, both strategic and epistemic hedges are discussed.

Brown and Levinson (1987) divide hedges in two major categories, while also describing two other kinds of hedges that do not fall in either of these two larger categories. The first group is the category of hedges on illocutionary force, also referred to as 'performative hedges'. These hedges avoid commitment to certain assumptions as a "primary and fundamental method of disarming routine interactional threats" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 146). An example of a performative hedge is the Japanese particle *ne*, which has similar operations as tag questions and the expression 'I wonder' in English (Brown and Levinson 1987: 147).

The second category consists of hedges addressed to Grice's Maxims. These hedges are also called 'quality hedges', and they convey that the speaker does not want to take full

responsibility for the truth of his statement, as is for instance the case with the following English expressions: 'I think', 'I believe', 'I assume' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 164). This category, in particular, is an important element to consider for this thesis.

A third set of hedges defined by Brown and Levinson, which is not described in as much detail as the previous two categories, is that of the hedges addressed to politeness strategies, which function as notices of violations of face wants (Brown and Levinson 1987: 171). These hedges include words and expressions such as 'frankly' and 'to be honest'.

Finally, a fourth group of hedges are defined as 'prosodic and kinesic hedges', which indicate tentativeness or emphasis. Brown and Levinson (1987: 172) observe that these hedges can be verbal, such as hesitations, or non-verbal, such as a raised eyebrow or a frown. These hedges are often signs of the presence of a face-threatening act (Brown and Levinson 1987: 172).

Another important concept with regards to hedging is modality, and in particular epistemic modality (Markkanen and Schröder 1997: 6). Epistemic modality markers are defined as linguistic elements that qualify the writer's commitment (boosters) or lack of commitment (hedges) in terms of the truth of the proposition (Vázquez Orta and Giner 2008: 173). Epistemic modality in general can also be defined as a speaker's verbal evaluation with regards to the likelihood of a statement or a situation (Nuyts 2001: xv). Epistemic modal constructions can function as hedging devices. With the following example,

(1)   It may be true

Vázquez Orta and Giner (2008: 172) show that hedging and epistemic modality may in fact overlap. They also say that "[s]ometimes also the deontic meanings of modals allow interpretation as hedges" (Vázquez Orta and Giner 2008: 172). Therefore, it can be said that not all instances of epistemic modality can be analysed as hedges, but in some cases it is possible to consider epistemic modality as hedging.

Epistemic stance has also been discussed by Kärkkäinen, who, among other things, discusses the polysemous meaning of the phrase 'I think' in English. Whereas for instance Swedish and French make a distinction between cogitation and belief, English does not. In Swedish, for instance, there is a distinction between the verbs *tänka*, which expresses cogitation, and *tycka*, which expresses belief. The same holds for French, where the verb *penser* expresses cogitation and the verb *croire* expresses belief. English, on the other hand, only use the verb 'to think' to express both of these notions. This distinction between cogitation and belief is an important element in the analysis of this thesis, which focuses, among other things, on the Swedish verbs *tänka*, *tycka* and *tro*, and the French verbs *penser* and *croire*. (Kärkkäinen 2003: 110–112)

4.2 Hedging from an interactional perspective

Hedging should not only be considered from a functional perspective, but its interactional aspects are also extensively researched. Hedging in interactions often has different motivations, depending on the context, the topic, and other situational elements. These socio-cultural aspects are an important element in this thesis, as this thesis not only considers hedges from a grammatical or linguistic perspective, but they are also seen from a socio-cultural perspective.

One of the most important questions concerning hedging is the motivation to hedge certain statements. Luukka and Markkanen (1997: 168) name impersonalization as one of the reasons for hedging, especially in scientific writing. As academic and scientific writing assumes an impartial and neutral position from the author, hedging can be used to avoid statements that are too strong. Some other aspects that are often described in the light of hedging are vagueness, evasion and politeness (Fraser 2010: 25–29).

The formality of a situation is an important aspect to take into account when analysing the phenomenon of hedging. Farr et al. (2004) have found that hedging occurs more in formal contexts than in informal contexts. In formal contexts, speakers are more aware of

the possibility of asymmetrical speech relationships. However, other research suggests that hedging enhances informal interaction rather than formal interaction between two speakers. For instance, O'Keeffe's analysis of phone-ins during radio interviews shows that Irish radio presenters frequently use hedges in order to create a pseudo-intimate environment (O'Keeffe 2005: 339–340).

Uncertainty is another aspect that is related to vagueness and hedging. Uncertainty can both imply that the speaker is not entirely sure of the truth of his or her utterances and that the speaker is not willing to be held responsible for their utterances. However, Nugroho (2002: 20) finds that the opposite might also be true, and she states that hedging might also occur in those instances where the speaker is, in fact, sure about their statements. However, as unhedged statements are viewed as too strong and too direct, hedging is preferred as it is seen as more acceptable (Nugroho 2002: 20). In these cases, it is not possible to determine whether hedging is used to denote uncertainty or merely to avoid seeming too certain or too direct.

Hedging in evasive utterances often occurs when discussing controversial and taboo topics, which is linked to Fraser's (2010: 27) second element in terms of hedging, namely the use of evasive utterances. Evasive utterances occur when the information from another speaker fails to meet the expectation, and evasion is therefore highly dependent of a hearer's interpretation (Fraser 2010: 27). Krajewski and Schröder (2008: 604) say that hedging in taboo contexts involves the avoidance of giving definite answers or giving non-committing answers, which creates vagueness. The aim of hedging taboo topics includes avoiding conflict or avoiding break-off of communication (Krajewski and Schröder 2008: 604). There is a clear link between evasive utterances and taboo topics, as evasion is a way of avoiding elaboration on taboo or controversial subjects. However, not all interaction which includes evasive utterances is taboo or controversial. For instance, Fraser (2010: 27) gives the following example of an evasive utterance:

(2)   A: How is she? B: *In some ways*, she is lovely.

The third element described by Fraser (2010: 29) is politeness, which is also Brown and Levinson's main concern with regards to hedging. As has been described earlier, Brown and Levinson describe hedging as being a negative politeness strategy (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70). Politeness is especially interesting when it is studied from a cross-cultural perspective, as that which constitutes as polite behaviour and polite interactions varies greatly across cultures (van Dijk 1997: 54). In fact, some societies do not experience directness as impolite (van Dijk 1997: 54). In the context of hedging, this would mean that hedging might not occur as often in these societies as in other societies.

4.3 Hedging in French

When it comes to research on hedging in specific languages, and not just from a general perspective, English is the language which has been studied the most in this aspect. Other languages have not received the same amount of research, and therefore it is difficult to find previous studies on this topic.

Research on hedging in French has been conducted on the verbs *sembler* and *penser*, the adverbs *vraiment* and *réellement* and the adverbials *en fait* and *d'une certaine façon*, and also passivization is named as an important means of hedging in French (Fagyal et al. 2006: 209–211). Celle (2009: 26) also notes the French adverbs *apparement* and *évidemment* as manifestations of epistemic modality, and she says that these two adverbs are interesting as they signal the need for confirmation of the truth of the utterance by other data. Epistemic modality can be used as a hedging device in certain contexts, and this description of *apparement* and *évidemment* can therefore be seen as relevant to research on hedging as well.

Marshman (2008: 144) finds in her research that hedging is more prevalent in English than in French. However, an opposite observation was made by Stewart (2012: 308, 317), who says that the number of performative hedges in parliamentary speech is much higher in French debates than in English debates. A similar conclusion as Stewart (2012) was drawn by Vold (2006: 80), who finds that English-speaking and Norwegian-speaking

authors use a greater frequency of epistemic modality markers indicating uncertainty than French-speaking authors. In this respect, however, it should be noted that a general conclusion on hedging by respectively English-speaking authors and French-speaking authors cannot be reached, as only specific hedges have been studied (Vold 2006: 80).

4.4 Hedging in Swedish

While it seems to be the case that there is very little research on the topic of hedging in Swedish, a lot of evidence that counts for hedging in English can also be applied to hedging in Swedish. As both languages belong to the same language family, some hedges are the same (i.e. they can be directly translated) or some hedges are similar (i.e. there is no direct translation, but there are similar ways to accomplish the same expression). Some elements of hedging are discussed in previous studies, for example epistemic modality (Vold 2006), but hedging as a whole is not discussed. Also, it is mostly the semantic properties of these verbs and particles that is discussed in previous research, and only with a lesser extent its wider meaning in different interactional contexts.

Vold (2006) researches Norwegian in her analysis on epistemic modality and hedging in research articles. As noted earlier, Vold (2006: 83) concludes that there is more hedging and a higher frequency of epistemic modality markers in Norwegian and English than in French. Vold (2006: 74) used the following Norwegian epistemic modality markers: *kan* (Swedish: *kan*), *se ut* (Swedish: *se ut*), *anta* (Swedish: *antaga*), *synes* (Swedish: *synas*), *kanskje* (Swedish: *kanske*), *mulig* (Swedish: *möjlig*), and a number of other epistemic modality markers. By using a similar list for Swedish, it is possible to get a perspective of hedging and epistemic modality in Swedish, as Swedish and Norwegian are very closely related.

5 METHOD AND MATERIAL

This thesis uses radio debates as the data for its analysis. The analysis consists of discourse analysis. First, the material and its source are described. Next, a general overview of discourse analysis and the specific type of discourse analysis conducted in this analysis is given. Finally, the hedges which are selected for this analysis and the perspective from which these hedges are analysed are presented.

5.1 Material

There are many aspects that have to be taken into account in order to establish a satisfying overview of the context in which the interview or debate takes place. Elements such as the speakers, the topic, the audience and the setting should be considered. All interviews and debates in this analysis are linked to topics on immigration in its widest sense, even though the specific content and questions may differ in the different debates.

For this analysis, two radio debates are chosen, one radio debate which is conducted in French and was heard on a French radio channel, and one radio debate which is conducted in Swedish and was broadcasted on a Swedish radio channel. Concerning the two radio debates that were chosen for the analysis, some differences in terms of their structure can be noted. In the French radio debate, each speaker was allowed to speak for a long time, with very few interruptions from the host and no interruptions from the other speakers. The host appointed each speaker in the debate a time to speak, and even though she occasionally asked for clarifications or a personal remark, she generally did not interrupt the speakers. In the Swedish debate, on the other hand, interruptions from the host were more common, and there were also a few times that the speakers were interrupted by other speakers in the debate. As there were more speakers in the Swedish debate, the time allocated for each speaker was shorter.

5.1.1 Migrations: la désunion européenne

The French radio debate is taken from the radio channel *France Culture*, which is described as a high-culture channel that specialises in drama and discussion (Haine 2006: 161). The debate is available online as a podcast. The segment during which this debate takes place is called *Affaires Étrangères*, which is translated as *Foreign Affairs*. The title of the debate is *Migrations: la désunion européenne*, of which the English translation is *Migrations: the division of Europe*. The total length of the segment is 44 minutes and 55 seconds. This debate was broadcasted on 26 October 2013 and can be found as a podcast on the website of France Culture.

The interviewer is Christine Ockrent, a Belgian-born journalist who has been active in the French media for a long time. She has been previously affiliated with France 3, but left this position after having been nominated as general manager of *France Monde* (Labourdette 2009: 92). The guests of this debate are Geneviève Jacques, Sylvie Goulard, and Ferruccio Pastore. Geneviève Jacques is the president of *Cimade - Service œcuménique d'entraide*, which is a protestant association that offers assistance to refugees and immigrants in France. Sylvie Goulard is a member of the European Parliament and active in the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Ferruccio Pastore is a manager of the *FIERI*, an Italian research institute that studies migration. He is Italian, and not a native speaker of French, but he lived in France for a long time and has an excellent command of the language.

5.1.2 Hur mycket fri rörlighet tål EU?

The Swedish radio debate that is analysed is from the Swedish national radio channel *P1*, which is mainly a speech channel with little music content (Malm and Wallis 2003: 147). The program to which this debate belongs is *P1 Debatt*, which is translated as *P1 Debate*. The title of the debate is *Hur mycket fri rörlighet tål EU?*, which can be translated as *How much free movement does the EU tolerate?*. The total length of the segment is one hour, 26 minutes and 33 seconds, and the debate was broadcasted on 4 May 2014. It is also

available as a podcast on the website of Sveriges Radio. As the interview is too long to analyse in its entirety, only the first 40 minutes of the debate will be taken into account, excluding the first guest, Moa Svan, as she starts of the debate by narrating a comedic situation with regards to free movement which is not relevant to the actual debate topic.

The debate is led by Alexandra Pascalidou. An interesting remark in the context of this thesis on immigration discourse is that Alexandra Pascadilou, who is originally from Greece, admitted recently that she has received racist remarks and threatening letters. Alexandra Pascadilou has led a lot of debates and programs on immigration policy and feminism. A variety of guest speakers appear in this segment, all of which are noted on the podcast's website. Apart from the debate host, there are six other speakers that are analysed in this thesis. David Qviström is a journalist and a writer. Daniel Suhonen is head of Katalys, a union institution. Fredrik Segerfeldt is a writer and a liberal debator. Joanna Ahlkvist is a radiologist originally from Great Britain, and it should therefore be noted in her case that she is not a native speaker of Swedish. Marie Wedin is a spokesperson for the Swedish Medical Association. Finally, Thomas Hammarberg is a EU commissioner for human rights and has also co-author of a report on the situation of the Roma in Europe. All these speakers are native speakers of Swedish, with the exception of Joanna Ahlkvist.

5.2 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is defined by Paltridge (2012) as an examination of language patterns. It considers the link between language on the one hand and social and cultural contexts on the other hand. Discourse analysis also studies the effects that language has on social identities and relations and how points of view and identities are constructed through language. (Paltridge 2012: 2). It can therefore be said that discourse encompasses both text and context, and text refers both to written and to spoken communication (Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 2004: 4).

Paltridge (2012: 16–17) also refers to discourse communities. Discourse communities can be described as a group of individuals who share an activity (Paltridge 2012: 16). However, the degree to which these different people are members of a particular discourse community differs for every individual (Paltridge 2012: 16). Additionally, it is important to note that people have a variety of social identities and discourse community memberships (Paltridge 2012: 17).

In this thesis, there are several aspects that are analysed for the discourse analysis of hedging in radio debates on immigration. First, the placement of the hedges in an utterance are discussed. It is important to observe whether the hedge occurs before, in the middle, or after the statement, as this placement might have an influence on how the statement is perceived by the listeners or audience. Second, the function of these hedges is considered, as one hedge may have different functions in different utterances. The context of these hedges and the utterances in which they are used are also considered in this analysis. It can therefore be said that both the syntactic properties and the semantic properties of the hedges are analysed.

5.3 Selection of hedges and their semantic meaning and translation

A selection of hedges has been made for analysis in this thesis. This section will elaborate on this selection, and the translation of these hedges in French and Swedish is also presented. Most of the hedges that are chosen for this analysis are taken from a list provided by Lakoff (1972: 196). For this analysis, hedging expressions have been chosen that occur fairly regularly in discourse. The hedges have been divided in three major categories, namely hedging through epistemic modality, hedging through the use of modal verbs, and hedging adverbials.

The first category consists of epistemic verbs. Two major verbs in the realm of epistemic modality are the verbs 'to think' and 'to believe'. While these two verbs can be used interchangeably in some contexts, it is important to distinguish between the semantic meanings of these verbs. The verb 'to think' can be translated in French as *penser* and in

Swedish as *tänka*. This verb does not express a speaker's belief or judgment, but only expresses that a person admits that he or she does not have full knowledge of a certain topic or event. The verb 'to believe', however, does express a speaker's opinion or judgment. By using this verb, however, a person is able to hedge their statement by emphasizing that it merely is their opinion, and not a general fact. In French this is expressed by the verb *croire* and in Swedish by the verbs *tycka* and *tro*.

It can be quite problematic to distinguish between *tycka* and *tro*, as *tro* can for instance potentially be replaced with *tycka* and vice versa in some sentences and utterances, while it is not possible to do so in other sentences and utterances. In general, it can be said that the main difference between *tycka* and *tro* in Swedish consists of the fact that *tro* still expresses doubt to some extent, and concerns the question whether the statement is true or false (Viberg 2004: 143). The verb *tycka*, on the other hand, simply expresses a personal view or opinion on a certain topic, and can be linked to the aspect of the statement being good or bad (Viberg 2006: 143).

The second category that is analysed consists of modal verbs. In this thesis, two constructions have been chosen with the modal verb 'would'. The first construction is 'I would say', which is translated in French as *je dirais* and in Swedish as *jag skulle säga*. This phrase in French and Swedish can be linked with epistemic modality to some extent, because it also expresses a speaker's opinion or it can also be a display of knowledge. However, it is a different way of describing a statement, as a speaker uses modal verbs instead. The second phrase with a modal verb is 'I would want', which is translated in French as *je voudrais* and in Swedish as *jag skulle vilja*. This phrase can occur in discourse where the speaker expresses that he or she wishes to do or to say something.

The third type of hedges that is discussed in this thesis is the category of hedging adverbials. Firstly, 'sort of' will be analysed, which can be translated in French as *en quelque sorte* and in Swedish as *någon slags*, *något slags* or simply *slags*. In English, the hedge 'sort of' can modify a verb or an adjective, or it can take the function of clausal modifier (Trousdale 2010: 58). This last function, as clausal modifier, is not the case for the Swedish *någon slags*, *något slags* and *slags*, however. 'Sort of' can also be seen as

an 'adjuster word', which is used to "adjust a mismatch between a thought and its linguistic representation" (Aijmer 2002: 192).

The word 'really' is also one of the hedges that is named by Lakoff, together with some varieties, including 'a real' and 'in a real sense'. This hedge is fairly common in spoken discourse. The closest translation of 'really' in French is the word *vraiment.* In Swedish the word 'really' can be translated as *verkligen.* Two major readings of the hedge 'really' can be distinguished, namely the use of 'really' for emphasis and the use of 'really' for reinforcement of scalar property (Paradis 2003: 194). Whereas the first function of 'really' emphasizes the subjective judgment, the second function pertains to the degree of an assertion (Paradis 2003: 194). In this thesis, an analysis can be made on whether similar functions exist in French and in Swedish.

A third hedge adverbial is the hedge 'in fact'. In French, 'in fact' can be translated as *en fait*, and in Swedish the word *faktiskt* is used. This adverb can be described in terms of its literal meaning, but also as an adversative adverb, and it combines the meaning of epistemic adverbs and adversative adverbs (Schwenter and Closs Traugott 2000: 11–12). Additionally, 'in fact' can also be used by speakers to denote that a stronger argument follows the previous argument (Schwenter and Closs Traugott 2000: 12). Therefore, three different functions of the hedge 'in fact' can be distinguished in English. In this thesis, the same framework will be used to analyse if the same functions exist for the French hedge *en fait* and the Swedish hedge *faktiskt*.

6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, the radio debates will be analysed. The analysis will take into account the amount of hedging, their placement in an utterance and their function in the discourse. Concerning the placement, it is important to note that a hedge might be placed before, in the middle or after a statement. The statement in this analysis refers to the main content or the main idea of the utterance.

In the case of the French radio debate, the host gives an introduction in which she describes the current situation before the start of the debate. In this introduction, she also presents the three guests of the debate by stating their names and their relation to the topic of the debate. When introducing Sylvie Goulard, the host also notes that she is on the phone from Cracow. However, although one other guest is also on the phone, the interviewer only refers to this at the very end of the interview, by saying that Sylvie Goulard was on the phone from Cracow and Ferruccio Pastore was on the phone from Rome. As there are no hesitations during the host's introduction, it can be argued that this introduction has been prepared in advance. In addition, the introduction can be found in a written version on the website of *France Culture*, which strengthens the assumption that the host read the introduction as a text that was written in advance. The introduction is therefore omitted from this analysis.

As for the Swedish radio debate, a similar introduction is given. The host of the debate, Alexandra Pascadilou, describes, among other things, the background and the topic of the interview and she explains how the audience can participate in the debate via social media. She does not introduce the guests who will speak beforehand, in the introductory statement, but she presents each speaker before they are given a turn to give their opinion on the topic and on questions asked by the host. Immediately following this first introduction by the host, a speaker named Moa Svan gives an additional introduction by narrating an amusing personal experiences with regards to the topic of the debate. Since both the first introduction by Alexandra Pascadilou and the comedic introduction by Moa Svan cannot technically be seen as part of the actual debate, they are not included in the analysis.

6.1 Epistemic modal verbs as hedges

The first part of the analysis focuses on epistemic modality as a hedging device in the French and the Swedish radio debate. For this analysis, several verbs have been chosen. The verbs belong to a group of verbs that denote thinking and believing, and for this analysis only the first person singular are considered (*je crois* and *je pense* in French and *jag tycker*, *jag tror* and *jag tänker* in Swedish).

6.1.1 Epistemic modal verbs as hedges in the French radio debate

The French verb *croire* translates into English as 'believe', and by using this verb, a speaker expresses his or her beliefs and opinions. The verb *penser*, which can be translated as 'think', on the other hand, only signals that a speaker is not sure of their statement and a speaker expresses doubt about the validity of their statement by using this verb, and can be analysed as cogitation. Both *je crois* and *je pense* can either be placed at the beginning of the statement or at the end of the statement, or in the middle of the statement as a dependent clause.

In the French radio debate, the number of instances where the phrase *je crois* is used (seventeen instances) is much larger than the number of times the phrase *je pense* is used (one instance). The phrase *je crois* can be found in the discourse of all four speakers. The following examples illustrate contexts in which *je crois* is used:

(1) GJ: 1 **je crois** que c'est important (.) de se souvenir (.) et de mettre
         I believe that it is important (.) to remember (.) and to put exactly

      2 en perspective justement et avec les chiffres aussi ça
         in perspective and the same with the numbers

(2) FP : 1 **je crois** qu'il (.) y a des aspects positifs (.) un processus entamé
         I believe that there (.) are positive aspects (.) an initiated process

	2	le thème en agenda (euh) des instruments (--) task force (.) pour la
		the topic in question (euh) the tools (--) task force (.) for the
	3	Méditerranée (.) des échéances pour des décisions qui seront (--)
		Mediterranean (.) the terms for the decisions that will be (--)
	4	on espère (.) prises dans les prochains mois
		we hope (.) taken in the next months

(3)	GJ:	1	mais quand on (.) si on veut revenir l'histoire de Lampedusa et de
			but if we (.) if we want to return to the history of Lampedusa and
		2	la Méditerranée (.) on est dans des chiffres (.) beaucoup plus
			the Mediterranean (.) we are in numbers (.) that are much more
		3	réduit, et (euh) et **je crois** que c'est très important quand
			reduced and (euh) and I believe that it is very important, when
		4	on parle de Lampedusa (euh) de bien comprendre que des (.) que
			we talk about Lampedusa (euh) to understand well that the (.) that
		5	des mouvements de boat people s'agit pas de clandestins (--)
			the movements of boat people doesn't concern clandestines (--)
		6	c'est des boat people qui tentent de (.) d'arriver en Europe pour
			it is the boat people that try to (.) to arrive in Europe to
		7	être protégés
			be protected

An interesting observation on these examples is that, in all three examples above, the phrase *je crois* is placed at the beginning of the utterance, before the statement is made. This observation is also noticeable in most of the other utterances with *je crois*. The phrase *je crois* could in the examples that are mentioned here equally well be placed at the end of the statement in terms of grammaticality. By placing it at the beginning of the utterance, though, it is emphasized that the speaker expresses her own view and her own beliefs on the topic.

However, in the debate, there are also exceptions to this observation, as there are some instances where the phrase *je crois* is placed in the middle of the utterance, or rather, is placed in a dependent clause, as is illustrated in the following utterances:

(4)   FP: 1   en même temps il y a des des signes (.) politiques **je crois**
    at the same time, there are political (.) signs I believe to be

                  2   préoccupants (euh) (.) le chancelier allemand a dit (.) très
    preoccupying (euh) (.) the German chancellor has said (.) very

                  3   clairement que (.) il n'est pas question de toucher à la règle
    clearly that (.) there is no possibility of touching upon the

                  4   fondamental (.) du système européen d'asile
    fundamental laws (.) of the European asylum system

(5)   CO: 1   comment (euh) (--) vous m'avez signalé que le parlement
    how (euh) (--) you reported to me that the European parliament

                  2   européen avait voté (euh) (.) **je crois** à l'unanimité de toutes ses
    had voted (euh) (.) I believe unanimously by all its

                  3   formations politiques une (--) une résolution (euh) au milieu de la
    political formations a (--) a resolution (euh) in the middle of the

                  4   (.) de cette semaine pour rappeler quoi pour rappeler les principes
    (.) of this week to recall what to recall the European principles

                  5   européens en matière de (.) d'asile ou en matière d'assistance aux
    in terms of (.) asylum or in terms of assistance to

                  6   réfugiés qui se noient parce que déjà c'est pas la même chose
    refugees that drown because already it's not the same thing

Examples (4) and (5) display utterances where the speakers do not place the phrase *je crois* at the beginning of their statement. The main difference between examples (1-3) on the one hand and examples (4-5) on the other hand is that the latter examples have the hedge *je crois* as a dependent clause of their statement, whereas examples (1-3) have the actual statement in a subordinating noun clause. In example (5), for instance, by saying *il y a des signes politiques je crois préoccupants* instead of *je crois qu'il y a des signes*

politiques préoccupants, the emphasis of this utterance is *signes politiques*, and not *je crois*. It therefore means that the hedge *je crois* in examples (4) and (5) does not refer to the entire statement, but only to a small part of it, respectively *à l'unanimité de toutes ses formations politiques* in example (4) and *préoccupants* in example (5).

The use of *je crois* in example (5) is also an interesting example in terms of its semantic properties, as it is different from the previous examples where the phrase *je crois* was used. In this example, *je crois* does not express the speaker's own beliefs, but rather she uses *je crois* to express doubt about the validity of her statement. By using *je crois*, the host expresses that she is not sure that it was in fact a unanimous vote. Therefore, it can be said that the use of *je crois* in this example refers to the speaker's cogitation rather than the speaker's belief. In this particular example, *je crois* could have been substituted with *je pense* and retain the same meaning.

There are four other instance where this type of different use of the verb *croire* occurs, such as in the following examples:

(6) CO: 1 donc là on parle (.) des (.) réfugiés c'est-à-dire des gens qui
so there we talk (.) about (.) refugees that is to say people that

2 ont réussi à ne pas se noyer (.) dans le canal de Sicile (.) et
have succeeded in not drowning (.) in the strait of Sicily (.) and

3 qui (euh) (.) entrent dans un processus (--) encadré (--) c'est le
that (euh) (.) enter into a supervised (--) process (--) that's the

4 cas de l'Italie **je crois** avec une loi (.) que (.) votre gouvernement
case in Italy I think with a law (.) that (.) your government

5 voudrait maintenant mettre en cause la la loi (euh) (--) bon c'est
now would like to question the the law (euh) (--) well it's

6 fini sous l'impression de la Ligue du Nord à l'époque (.) mais
finished under the impression of the Lega Nord at the time (.) but

7 il y a un processus (.) et puis il y a des gens qui passent à côté de
there is a process (.) and then there are people that pass next to

8	ce processus (.) et qui sont effectivement à ce moment-là
	that process (.) and that are effectively at that moment
9	accueillis par la famille qui est déjà (.) installé (euh) en
	welcomed by family that is already (.) settled (euh) in
10	Allemagne (.) ou en Suède ou en France
	Germany (.) or in Sweden or in France

(7)	CO :	1	en fait c'est en partir de 99 (--) que l'Europe a quand-même
			in fact it is starting from 1999 (--) that Europe has nevertheless
		2	mis au point (euh) des règlementations (euh) un régime de
			issued (euh) reglementations (euh) a temporary
		3	protection temporaire (.) ça **je crois** que c'est au moment de (.)
			protection regime (.) I think that was at the time of (.)
		4	Kosovo (.) ça c'était en 99
			Kosovo (.) that was in 1999

The use of *je crois* in examples (6) and (7) expresses the speaker's doubt about the validity of their statement in terms of correctness. In these two examples, *je crois* cannot be associated with the speaker's belief. Therefore, it can be said that it is possible in these examples to use the verb *croire* in terms of correctness in addition to its conventional meaning.

Another observation in the previous examples is that there are no pauses after the hedge *je crois*, even there might be natural pauses occurring after this type of hedge. In all these examples, *je crois* is followed by the rest of the utterance without any pauses. Hesitations can be signs of the speaker being insecure or unwilling to express a statement. However, it is also possible to consider this element as an indicator of the fact that the speakers once again wants to emphasize that the statement is their personal opinion by not allowing ambiguity due to hesitations or pauses. In fact, the other instances in the French radio debate show the same trend, with only one notable exception where the speaker hesitates after his use of *je crois*:

(8) FP: 1 mais à courte terme **je crois** que (euh) (.) les mesures (.)
            but in the short term I think that (euh) (.) those promised (.)

         2 promises-là (.) on revoit (.) des renforcements des appareils de
            measures (.) one reviews (.) the reinforcement of control

         3 contrôle et de sauvetage dans (.) dans la mer méditerranée dans le
            apparatuses and the rescue in (.) in the Mediterranean sea in the

         4 canal de Sicile en particulier (--) sont la la seule chose qu'on peut
            strait of Sicily in particular (--) are the the only thing that we can

         5 faire
            do

In example (8), there are also several shorter and longer pauses in the statement that follows the hedge *je crois*. The context of this utterance is not directly controversial, but as the speaker gives his personal opinion on a particular situation, it might be that the speaker wishes to choose his words carefully and therefore pauses. However, the speaker only names two aspects of possible measures, and might therefore choose not to discuss more controversial measures.

While *je pense* is not used as a hedge in this corpus, it is interesting to consider its use, as the function might differ from its conventional use. As stated earlier, there is only one instance where the phrase *je pense* is used in the French radio debate, namely in the following utterance:

(9) SG: 1 et (.) j'étais aujourd'hui en Pologne à Cracovie **je pense** vraiment
            and (.) I was today in Poland in Cracow I really think

         2 (euh) au moment (euh) toutes ces parties de l'Europe aussi
            (euh) at the moment (euh) all these parts of Europe also didn't

         3 n'avaient pas accès à la liberté
            have access to liberty

As is clear from this example, the phrase *je pense* does not express a personal opinion or personal belief, but instead this statement expresses that she thinks about a certain

situation. Therefore, *je pense* neither expresses belief nor cogitation, but it merely expresses that the speaker has this thought on her mind. Thus the phrase *je pense* in this context cannot truly be considered a hedge. It is also interesting to note that the speaker uses another hedge, namely *vraiment* immediately after the phrase *je pense*. Additionally, the expression *je pense* is placed before the statement, which is also similar to the majority of the examples on *je crois*.

In the French radio debate, the observation can be made that the phrase *je crois* occurs mostly before the statement, as this is the case in twelve of the seventeen instances. By placing *je crois* before the statement, it is emphasized that the statement concerns the speaker's opinion. In five instances *je crois* is found embedded in the sentence, and not before the statement. In these instances *je crois* only refers to a specific phrase instead of the whole statement or proposition. Concerning the phrase *je pense*, it should be noted that there is only one instance of *je pense* in the debate, which is not enough to draw conclusions on the occurrence of *je pense* in general. Another note is the fact that *je pense* in the context where it was used does not denote cogitation, but merely reflects a thought on the speaker's mind.

There are five instances where the use of *je crois* is not consistent with its semantic meaning. The phrase *je crois* usually expresses the speaker's belief and opinion, but in this analysis there are five occurrences of je crois where it instead expresses cogitation. All of these instances can be attributed to the discourse of the host. It can therefore be considered as idiolect, as there are no other instances of this different use of *je crois* in the rest of the debate.

6.1.2 Epistemic modal verbs as hedges in the Swedish radio debate

In Swedish, there are three epistemic verbs that are semantically closely related, namely *tro, tycka* and *tänka*, but still express a slightly different meaning, similar to the two French verbs that were discussed earlier, namely *croire* and *penser*. The main difference between these different verbs is that the verb *tänka* merely expresses a fact according to

a person's knowledge, however, no personal opinion or personal beliefs are attached to this verb. *Tycka* and *tro*, on the other hand, express a person's beliefs about a topic. It is important to note that the inversed forms, namely *tror jag*, *tycker jag* and *tänker jag*, should also be taken into account, as this is the usual form of these phrases if it is placed after or in the middle of the statement. *Jag tror*, *jag tycker* and *jag tänker* is can also be placed at the beginning or in the middle of the statement.

In the Swedish debate, there are five instances of the phrase *jag tror*. The following three utterances include all these instances where *jag tror* occurs:

(10)	DQ:	1	**jag tror inte** att vi är (--) (euhm) (--) ja **jag tror** att det är vidare
			I don't think that we are (--) euhm (--) yes I think that that is the
		2	tanke så både på politiker att väcka denna debatt men
			afterthought so both about politicians to raise this debate but
		3	också på (--) oss (.) journalister (--) vi är inte särskilt intresserade
			also about (--) us (.) journalists (--) we aren't exactly interested
		4	utav Europa
			in Europe

In the discourse in example (10), the speaker hesitates to continue his utterance and instead starts anew. The speaker's first instance of *jag tror* is a negative formulation of this phrase, namely *jag tror inte* (I don't think). Both times the speaker starts his utterance by mentioning *jag tror*, and the fact that it is repeated twice stresses the speaker's intention to express his personal opinion.

(11)	FS:	1	och det är (.) obehagligt å se kandidater till
			and it is (.) unpleasant to see candidates to
		2	Europaparlamentet som står högt upp på socialdemokraternas
			the European parliament that are high on the list of the
		3	lista (.) som går till val på att minska den fria
			social democrats (.) that go to the elections to restrict the free

	4	rörligheten (.) och det är just de fackföreningar som Suhonen
		movement (.) and that is exactly the trade unions that Suhonen
	5	(euh) arbetar (euh) [för
		(euh) works (euh) [for
DS:	6	[det här
		[this
FS:	7	(--) och **jag tror** det är oerhört problematiskt men (.) sedan så (.)
		(--) and I think this is incredibly problematic but (.) then so (.)
	8	alltså ja ursäkta du pratade om flera punkter (.) alltså jag [får
		so yes sorry but you talked about several items (.) so I [get
AP:	9	[a men du får (.) a absolut du får en punkt till och
		[yeah but you get (.) yeah absolutely you get one more item and
	10	sedan så får Daniel också komma in
		then Daniel can also chime in

In example (11), the first speaker (FS) is briefly interrupted by a second speaker (DS), but the first speaker manages to continue his statement by raising his voice while saying *jag tror*. Similarly to example (10), the speaker uses this phrase to signal that the statement is his personal opinion, and by placing it in the beginning of the utterance, the speaker even uses this phrase to be able to continue speaking.

(12)	AP:	1	men språkförbistringen är nog en vardag i den (.) fria rörlighetens
			but language confusion is probably a normality in (.) a
		2	(euh) Europa och EU där (.) manniskor faktiskt
			(euh) Europe and EU with free movement where (.) people in fact
		3	kan röra sig fritt och (euh) (--) **jag tror inte** det är ett större
			can move freely and (euh) (--) I don't believe that it is a big
		4	problem att man kanske blandar ihop en och ett
			problem that one sometimes mixes en and ett

In this example the negative formulation is used. The function of *jag tror inte* is similar as its positive formulation, as it is used by the speaker to express her personal view. An

interesting element in example (12) is that the word *faktiskt* (in fact) is used. This indicates that the host not only uses epistemic modality as a hedging device, but also uses other forms of hedging in her utterance.

(13)　FS:　1　a men (.) man får skilja på **tror jag** liksom den globala
　　　　　　　yeah but (.) one has to differ between I believe like the global
　　　　　2　migrationen och (.) rörligheten inom EU (.) det är ju två olika
　　　　　　　migration and (.) movement within the EU (.) this is two different
　　　　　3　saker
　　　　　　　things

In terms of placement of the phrase *jag tror*, it is shown in examples (10-12) that it is placed before the statement, while in example (13), the phrase *tror jag*, the inversed form, is placed in the middle of the utterance. By using *jag tror* as an introduction to the statement that follows, the fact that it is the speaker's own opinion is in such a way emphasized. However, in the case that it is mentioned in the middle of the utterance, as is the case in example (13), then this emphasis is lost. Additionally, the same phenomenon which can be seen in example (12), where another hedge is used together with the phrase *jag tror*, occurs in example (13) as well, where the hedge *liksom* is placed immediately after *tror jag*. The function of the use of *tror jag* in example (13) is to express the speaker's view that there is a distinction between global migration and migration within the European Union.

The use of *jag tror* in all five instances during the debate is linked with the speaker's belief or opinion, both in positive formulations and in negative formulations of the phrase. In this corpus material, there are no instances where it denotes the speaker's cogitation. Also, in all five instances with *jag tror* or its inversed form, there are no pauses or hesitations after the use of this hedge. In example (10), there is a pause and an instance where the speaker hesitates, but this is not linked to the use of *jag tror*, as the speaker pauses in order to restart his statement in a different way. Therefore, it can be said that *jag tror* functions as a way to stress that the statement is concerned with the speaker's

opinion and should not be understood in terms of correctness, but rather in terms of the speaker's belief.

The phrase *jag tycker* and its inversed form *tycker jag* occur fourteen times in the course of the Swedish debate. Its use can be illustrated with the following examples:

(14)   DS: 1   ni vill ju att människor ska komma hit (.) och ta med sig (.)
                     you want that people have to come here (.) and take with them (.)

         2   sin rumänska lön (.) eller sin spanska lön (.) eller sin
              their Romanian wages (.) or their Spanish wages (.) or their

         3   nigerianska lön (.) kanske dubbla den då (.) men varför inte (.)
              Nigerian wages (.) maybe double them then (.) but why not (.)

         4   ge dem riktig lön (--) **jag tycker** gärna fri invandring men
              give them the right wages (--) I think well of free immigration but

         5   först (.) så säger jag inte andra klassers medborgskap (.) du vill ju
              first (.) I say no to second-class citizenship (.) you do want to

         6   ha andra klassens medborgskap
              have second-class citizenship

In example (14) the speaker addresses another speaker in the debate, rather than the host or the audience in general. It can be said that *jag tycker* is used in this example by the speaker to express his view on immigration. The phrase *jag tycker* is in such a sense used to differentiate between his own views on the one hand, which is referred to by *jag tycker*, and what the speaker believes is the other person's belief on the other hand

(15)   DS: 1   **jag** (.) **tycker** det (.) **jag tycker** det (.) alltså (.) **jag tycker** att för
                     I (.) believe that (.) I believe that (.) so (.) I believe that because

         2   jag (.) vill ha frihet (.) men jag vill inte ha andra
              I (.) want to have freedom (.) but I don't want to have second-

         3   klassens medborgarskap (.) alltså jag (.) jag har ett exempel (.)
              class citizenship (.) so I (.) I have an example (.)

	4	min pappa kom hit (euh) 1965
		my dad came here (euh) in 1965
AP:	5	från
		from
DS:	6	från Finland (--) han var arbetarklass han jobbade på byggen
		from Finland (--) he was working class he worked in construction
	7	(.) han jobbade som rivare (.) han jobbade som flyttkarl
		(.) he worked as a demolition worker (.) he worked as a mover

The reason why the speaker repeats the phrase *jag tycker* several times at the beginning of his utterance in example (15) seems to be because he had been interrupted during his discourse before, and he was avoiding being interrupted again by raising his voice and repeating the beginning of his statement. It is interesting, however, that it is exactly the phrase *jag tycker* that is repeated. This might show emphasis on the fact that the speaker wishes to express his own opinion, and it might also show that the speaker does not want to be interrupted by other speakers' opinion while stating his own opinion during the debate.

(16)	DS:	1	alltså (.) fascismen i [Europa
			so (.) fascism in [Europe
	AP:	2	[le Front National i Frankrike
			[the Front National in France
	DS	3	Front National i Frankrike (.) vi har liksom Sverigedemokraterna
			Front National in France (.) we have like Sweden Democrats
		4	kan (.) jag vet inte vad de kan få i Sverige (.) alltså vi har en
			can (.) I don't know what they can get in Sweden (.) so we have a
		5	(.) en en våg av främlingsfientlighet och **jag** (--) **jag tycker** att
			(.) a a wave of xenophobia and I (--) I believe that
		6	frågan om (.) om (.) fri rörlighet och framför allt
			the question about (.) about (.) free movement and in particular
		7	kanske också rörligheten in i EU som är verkligen (--) där det
			maybe also movement within the EU that is really (--) where it

8	handlar verkligen om hur säger jag flyktingstatusen och rätten att	
	really concerns the how do I say refugee status and the right to	
9	(.) att migrera hit och få ett annat liv	
	(.) to migrate here and get a different life	

In example (16), there is a longer pause after the speaker first says *jag* (I) and then says *jag tycker*. Also, the phrase *jag tycker* is placed before the statement, and, similarly to previous examples, the hedge is in that case emphasized. The context of example (16) is rather controversial, as it concerns political parties and policies on immigration.

The following example also discusses a political view on migration:

(17)	TH:	1	så det började som ett begrepp (.) som skulle säkerställa att man
			so it started as a concept (.) that would ensure that one
		2	skulle kunna få jobb (.) i andra länder att man skulle kunna röra
			could get a job (.) in other countries that one could move around
		3	sig fritt (.) och senare där begreppet vidgas lite (.) så
			freely (.) and later when the concept was expanded a little (.) then
		4	gäller det inte bara de som är arbetssökande utan studenter och
			it didn't only include those jobseekers but also students and
		5	andra också (--) alltså det här är nog kanske den viktigaste
			others as well (--) so this is probably maybe the most important
		6	delen (.) **tycker jag** (.) utav det här (.) Europaprojektet som vi
			part (.) I believe (.) of this (.) Europe project that we
		7	pratar om (.) men sedan har det varit problem och det ska vi väl
			talk about (.) but then there have been problems and we will
		8	diskutera
			discuss that

In this utterance, there is also a shorter pause after the hedge *tycker jag*, which might indicate that the speaker needs some time to think of what he is about to say. Additionally, in example (17) the phrase *tycker jag* is placed in the middle of the utterance, which is

different from examples (14-16). In this utterance, the speaker also uses other hedges in his utterance as well, in addition to *tycker jag*, in this case the word *nog*, which is translated in English as 'probably', and immediately followed by *kanske*, which can be translated as 'maybe'.

When considering all instances of *jag tycker* and its inverted form in the debate, it is shown that this hedge is placed before the statement, namely in eight out of fourteen instances. In four instances, this phrase is placed in the middle of the statement, and in two instances it is placed at the very end of the statement. In the Swedish debate, all instances where *jag tycker* occurs express the speakers' opinion and beliefs. This is the regular meaning and use for this hedge, and it can be compared to the use of *jag tror* in the previous segment, where all instances were also linked with belief rather than cogitation.

The phrase *jag tänker* occurs six times in the course of the debate. It should be noted, however, that most of the instances concern the phrase *jag tänker på*, which is different from *jag tänker att*. *Jag tänker att* denotes doubt about a statement that a speaker is about to make and limits the speaker's degree to which he or she commits to the statement, whereas *jag tänker på* refers to the fact that the speaker simply states what is on their minds, when they for instance think of another example. This phrase can therefore not be considered to be an example of hedging. This is quite similar to the situation in English, where the phrases 'I think that' and 'I think about' also denote different conceptualizations. The difference between *jag tänker att* and *jag tänker på* is illustrated in the following examples:

(18) JA: 1   och även om (euh) (--) den engelska kulturen och svenska
              and even if (euh) (--) the English culture and the Swedish

       2   kulturen ligger väldigt nära varann (euh) det är fortfarande så att
              culture are very closely alike (euh) it is still so that

       3   (.) jag har blivit rättad (.) till exempel och inte förstått
              (.) I have been corrected (.) for example and didn't understand

4	att någon (euh) försöker säga åt mig att jag är fel (--) (euh) (.)
	that someone (euh) tried to tell me that I am wrong (--) (euh) (.)
5	och **jag tänker att** (.) det får mig å tänka (.) hur svårt det måste
	and I think that (.) it makes me think (.) how difficult it must
6	vara om man verkligen kommer från ett annat land som är väldigt
	be if one really comes from a different country that is very
7	(.) a annorlunda kulturellt från Sverige
	(.) yes different culturally from Sweden

(19) AP: 1 men du talar om den fria rörligheten för läkare **jag tänker** också
          but you talk about free movement for doctors I also think

      2 **på** den fria rörligheten för (.) patienterna
          about free movement for (.) patients

As is shown in example (18) and (19), the meaning of utterances changes depending on whether *jag tänker att* or *jag tänker på* is used, as the first might express doubt, whereas the second expresses simply a thought on the speaker's mind. Example (18) is in fact the only example where the construction *jag tänker att* occurs in the Swedish debate, and even in this example the speaker does not complete her statement, as she breaks off her statement even before she has said the actual statement. The speaker then resumes a new statement with the phrase *det får mig å tänka hur svårt det måste vara* (it makes me think how difficult it must be), which in fact can be seen as a variation of *jag tänker på*, as it is simply a statement of her thoughts, but not a way to express that she feels rather unsure about a statement.

The examples concerning the hedge *jag tror* show that the placement of this hedge is mostly situated before the statement, as this is the case in four out of the five instances in this debate. In addition, this hedge denotes cogitation in all the instances in this debate.

From the examples including the phrase *jag tycker* it is noticeable that all these instances denote belief, and there are no instances where this hedge refer to cogitation. When considering all fourteen instances of the phrase *jag tycker* in the debate, it is placed before

the statement in eight instances, and it occurs four times in the middle of the statement and two times at the end of the statement. An interesting observation is that the instances where the use of *jag tycker* comes after the statement can mostly be situated in the beginning of the interview.

As for the phrase *jag tänker* it should be noted that there is only one instance in the debate where *jag tänker att* is said, and even in this case the utterance is interrupted and the speaker starts anew with a different word choice. The phrase *jag tänker på* is excluded from this analysis on hedges, as it does not denote doubt and can therefore not be considered a hedge.

6.2 Modal verbs as hedges

The modal verb that is chosen for this analysis is 'would'. Two common phrases with the verb 'would' are chosen for analysis. The first construction with the modal verb 'would' is 'I would say', translated in French as *je dirais* and in Swedish as *jag skulle säga*. The second phrase is 'I would like', which is translated as *je voudrais* in French and *jag skulle vilja* in Swedish. An important factor is that there is no verb in French that expresses the English modal verb 'would'. Instead, the construction 'would say' is expressed by conjugating the main verb in the *conditionnel présent*.

6.2.1 Modal verbs as hedges in the French radio debate

The first construction with modal verbs analysed in this thesis is the phrase *je dirais* (I would say). This hedge is linked with epistemic modality as it expresses a speaker's opinion or belief. In the French radio debate, the construction *je dirais* is used once:

(20)   SG: 1   bonjour d'abord (euh) (--) oui le parlement a pris position
              good day first, (euh) (--) yes, the parliament has taken a position

2	cette semaine à la majorité des groupes (.) **je dirais** modérés
	this week by the majority of the groups (.) I would say moderate
3	mais avec une très grande majorité sur une résolution qui essaie
	but with a very big majority on a resolution that tries
4	en tous cas (--) de poser (.) le problème dans sa dimension la plus
	in any case (--) to place (.) the problem in its widest
5	large
	dimension

In this example, the phrase *je dirais* is placed in the middle of the statement. It is used to qualify the phrase *à la majorité des groupes* (by the majority of the groups). As *je dirais* only refers to this phrase, it cannot be placed at the beginning of the utterance while retaining the same meaning. Additionally, the fact that the verb *dire* is conjugated in the *conditionnel présent* in this example is an important aspect in this context, as it denotes a more careful way of expression than *indicatif*. By using the *conditionnel présent*, the speaker expresses uncertainty.

The second construction with the modal verb 'would' is *je voudrais*, which can be translated as 'I would like' or 'I would want'. In the French radio debate, there are two instances of this construction:

(21)	CO:	1	**je voudrais** qu'on (.) qu'on en vienne (euh) aujourd'hui (.) et aux
			I would like that we (.) that we get to that (euh) today (.) and to
		2	réglementations de l'Europe sur ces questions
			the reglementations of Europe on these questions

Example (21) expresses the host's wish to address certain topics at a later time during the debate, and instead of using the realis mood, the conditional mood is used to express this wish. One of the possibilities why the speaker chooses to hedge in this utterance might be that the speaker is unsure whether her statement can be fulfilled, either because she has little control on whether the topic can be discussed at a later time. In this example, *je*

voudrais is placed at the beginning of the utterance, which in this case is the most logical placement from a grammatical perspective.

(22)   SG: 1   c'est pas une guerre d'institutions parce que (.) je crois moi **je**
                   it's not a war of institutions because (.) me I believe I

             2   **voudrais** adresser à l'attention des auditeurs c'est (.) est-ce que
                   would like to draw to the attention of the listeners it is (.) is

             3   l'organisation du monde telle qu'il est (.) un état nation
                   the organisation of the world as such that it is (.) a nation state

             4   avec un territoire (euh) et tout à fait adapté au 21ième siècle
                   with a territory (euh) and completely adapted to the 21st century

             5   (.) à l'évidence non (--) à l'évidence non
                   (.) evidently not (--) evidently not

In example (22), the speaker addresses the listeners (albeit indirectly), and it is interesting to note that this is the only instance where the audience or the listeners are mentioned. Also, in example (22) the speaker uses the word *moi* as an additional assertion, and even uses the hedge *je crois* before *je voudrais*. One possible interpretation of the speaker's use of *je voudrais* is that she implicitly asks for permission to the host to address the audience directly. The sequence of hedges in this example, namely *je crois moi je voudrais* shows that the speaker expresses very strongly that her statement concerns her own views or beliefs. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that that this hedge is placed at the beginning of the statement, which creates emphasis on this particular hedge, as is the case in example (21).

6.2.2 Modal verbs as hedges in the Swedish radio debate

The English phrase 'I would say' is translated into Swedish as *jag skulle säga*. In this radio debate, there are no instances where *jag skulle säga* is used. There are sixteen instances of the modal verb *skulle* (would), but it is never placed together with the verb *säga*. One possible explanation for the lack of instances containing *jag skulle säga* could

be that it is replaced by phrases and hedges with similar functions. In some cases, the phrase *jag tycker* can be used instead of *jag skulle säga*.

The second construction with the modal verb *skulle* is the phrase *jag skulle vilja*, which is translated as 'I would want'. There is one instance where this construction is used in the Swedish radio debate:

(23)   AP: 1   mm **jag skulle vilja** att Fredrik (.) Segerfeldt svarar på (euh) (.)
                     mm I would want that Fredrik (.) Segerfeldt answers to (euh) (.)
                2   dessa (--) a
                     these (--) yeah

In this utterance, the host asks one of the speakers to comment on another speaker's statements. By using a modal verb (*skulle*), the utterance becomes hedged and less direct than when the modal verb would have been left out. If the utterance had been unhedged, it may have been understood by the speaker as an order. The use of the modal verb, however, makes the utterance resemble a proposition or a request rather than a direct order to speak. This observation can be linked to Brown and Levinson's description of hedging as negative politeness, which entails restraint and formality (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70). *Jag skulle vilja* is placed at the beginning of the statement in this utterance, similar to the French examples (21) and (22) with *je voudrais*.

6.3 Hedging adverbials

A second type of hedging is expressed through adverbials. The hedging adverbials that are analysed in this thesis appear in Lakoff's list of hedges (Lakoff 1972). The hedging adverbials that are chosen for analysis are 'sort of' (translated in French as *en quelque sorte* and in Swedish as *någon slags, något slags* or *slags*), 'really' (*vraiment* in French and *verkligen* in Swedish), and 'in fact' (which translates as *en fait* in French and *faktiskt* in Swedish).

6.3.1 Hedging adverbials in the French radio debate

The first hedging adverbial analysed in this chapter is the phrase *en quelque sorte*, which can be translated in English as 'sort of'. In the French radio debate, there are two instances of the hedge *en quelque sorte*. Both of these instances can be found in the discourse of the host.

(24) CO: 1   alors vous (.) vous (.) vous insistez (euh) à juste titre sur le fait
    so, you (.) you (.) you correctly insist (euh) on the fact

2   que (.) en 2009 s'agissant de la Libbie il y avait quelqu'un qui
    that (.) in 2009 concerning Libya, there was someone who

3   faisait (--) le sale boulot (euh) c'était tout simplement Kadhafi (.)
    did (--) the dirty work (euh) that was simply Kadhafi (.)

4   donc est-ce que cela veut dire que (euh) quand on externalise
    so does this mean that (euh) when we outsource

5   (euh) des mesures de ces gens (euh) (--) pour pour pour parler
    (euh) the measures taken by these people (euh) (--) to talk

6   cyniquement (euh) (--) on regrette **en quelque sorte** ces régimes
    cynically (euh) (--) one sort of regrets those authoritarian

7   autoritaires (.) qui ont été déboulonné par (euh) les révolutions
    regimes (.) that have been toppled by (euh) the Arab

8   arabes ou (euh) s'agissant de la Libbie (.) par une (.) une
    revolutions or (euh) in the case of Libya (.) by a (.) a

9   intervention européenne
    European intervention

In this case, the hedging phrase *en quelque sorte* is clearly used to soften her statement. This topic of this utterance can be considered to be quite controversial. This is also evident from the fact that the host prefaces her comment by saying *pour parler cyniquement* (to talk cynically). Additionally, this utterance contains a lot of hesitations, which in turn is interesting in the context of this controversial utterance. It is clear from the context of this

debate and her position in the debate that she does not mean what she says in this utterance, and only poses a hypothetical question in order to elicit discussion from another speaker whom she was addressing at that moment.

A different use of *en quelque sorte* can be discerned in the following example:

(25) CO: 1 et donc (.) on en revient toujours de la part des pays d'entré qui
and so (.) we return always to the role of the country of entry that

2 sont soumis donc à cette réglementation qu'on appelle le
are subjected to, so, this regulation which we call the

3 réglementation de Dublin (euh) aux principes (.) sur lesquelles les
Dublin regulation (euh) of the principles (.) on which the

4 chefs d'état et gouvernements hier ne n'ont pas voulu (euh)
country leaders and governments yesterday haven't wanted (euh)

5 remettre en cause (euh) le principe que le pays d'entré doit (.)
to question (euh) the principle that the country of entry has to (.)

6 off… doit (.) **en quelque sorte** réceptionner (--) et offrir
off… has to (.) sort of receive (--) and provide

7 l'hébergement et (.) enclencher un processus
accommodation and (.) launch a process

It can be said that the function of *en quelque sorte* in example (25) is to broaden the concept of *réceptionner et offrir l'hébergement* (receive and provide accommodation). By using the phrase *en quelque sorte*, the speaker implies that this should be done in the best way possible, even if it is in a limited way. *En quelque sorte* therefore makes the terms *réceptionner et offrir l'hébergement* vaguer.

Both in example (24) and example (25) the phrase *en quelque sorte* is placed before the statement. In both utterances, *en quelque sorte* could also be said after making the general statement. However, by mentioning *en quelque sorte* before the statement, the speakers hedge more explicitly. The function of *en quelque sorte* differs in these two examples,

however. Whereas its function in example (24) is to soften the statement, *en quelque sorte* is used in example (25) to make the concepts that it refers to vaguer.

The word *vraiment*, which can be translated in English as 'really', occurs five times in the entire debate. The following example is taken from the host's discourse:

(26)   CO: 1   pour autant (.) avez-vous (euh) (.) avez-vous été **vraiment**
            even so (.) have you (euh), were you really

       2   surprise (euh) par la la médiocrité des résultats (.) de ce
            surprised (euh) by the the mediocricy of the results (.) of the

       3   sommet s'agissant encore une fois du problème des flux
            summit concerning once again the problem of migration

       4   migratoires (.) ou est-ce que politiquement en ce moment les
            streams (.) or politically speaking at this moment do the

       5   dirigeants européens (.) n'ont pas d'autres (.) attitudes possibles
            European leaders (.) have no other (.) possible attitudes

The way that the first question is presented, by adding the word *vraiment*, already implies an answer, and the first question can even be considered to be a rhetorical question. While the speaker still has the freedom to answer the question as they want, the host expects to receive a specific answer by the way that she phrases her question. This is also clear by the answer which is then given by the speaker, who admits that indeed she was not surprised. Therefore, it can be said that the function of *vraiment* in this utterance is not the same as its function in the following examples:

(27)   GJ: 1   on est conscient (.) que ils souffrent l'avant mauvais (.) et on est
            we are aware (.) that they suffered badly before (.) and we are

       2   convaincu qu'il faut **vraiment** (euh) ramer sur un certain nombre
            convinced that one should really (euh) struggle with a number of

       3   d'idées
            ideas

(28)	SG:	1	oui c'est pour ça que vous m'incitez à faire cette émission parce
			yes that's why you made me want to do this broadcast because
		2	que (.) on a **vraiment** l'impression qu'il y a une classe politique
			(.) one really has the impression that there is a political class
		3	qui est en train de perdre son sang-froid
			that is losing their cool

Examples (27) and (28) show the use of *vraiment* as a strengthening of respectively *il faut* (one should) and *on a l'impression qu'il y a une classe politique qui est en train de perdre son sang-froid* (one has the impression that there is a political class that is losing their cool). Example (26), on the other hand, seems to have the same function at first sight, but it is important to note that this expression is part of a question and the tone of the utterance is rather sarcastic. In all three examples above, and even in all other instances of *vraiment* in the debate, it is used for emphasis rather than reinforcement of degree properties, which indicates that the uses of *vraiment* in this debate cannot be considered hedges. Also, in all five instances of the hedging adverbial *vraiment* it occurs before the statement, which is a normal position for this adverbial, as it is placed before the phrase it refers to.

Another hedge in French is the use of *en fait*, which can be translated as 'in fact' or 'actually'. *En fait* occurs ten times in this radio debate. Most of the instances (six instances out of ten instances in total) where *en fait* is used, it is done by the radio host, such as in the following example:

(29)	CO:	1	donc **en fait** (.) quand on lit (euh) (.) les les (euh) (--) les
			so in fact (.) when we read (euh) (.) the the (euh) (--) the
		2	conclusions qui (.) comme souvent enfin comme toujours
			conclusions that (.) as often well, as practically
		3	pratiquement dans les sommets sont rédigées avant que le sommet
			always in the summit are edited before the summit
		4	se tienne (.) (euh) qu'est-ce qu'on voit une aide accrue pour (euh)
			takes places (.) (euh) what do we see more aid for (euh)

5	les pays d'origines et les pays de transit (.) (euh) les
	the countries of origin and the transit countries (.) (euh)
6	renforcements mais (.) pas chiffré (euh) (--) des systèmes de
	reinforcements but (.) not quantifying (euh) (--) monitoring
7	surveillance (--) **en fait** (.) (euh) le problème vu d'Italie (euh)
	systems (--) in fact (.) (euh) the problem as seen from Italy (euh)
8	(--) Ferruccio (.) c'est évident qu'aujourd'hui la concentration (.)
	(--) Ferruccio (.) it is evident that today the concentration (.)
9	des flux (euh) (--) des réfugiés se faites dans le canal de Sicile
	of refugee (euh) (--) streams are found in the canal of Sicily

In this portion of discourse, *en fait* is used two times. In both instances, *en fait* is used to introduce a more specific statement or an example. It is interesting to note that in both cases there is a short pause after the use of *en fait*. There are relatively many pauses in this utterance, even though the topic is not particularly controversial. In both instances of *en fait*, it is placed before the actual statement is made, which is a regular placement for this hedge. While it is grammatically possible to place *en fait* at the end of a statement, it would make it seem more like an addition rather than actually part of the statement. The same counts for the other instances of *en fait* in the radio debate, such as in the following example:

(30)	CO :	1	il y a eu des pics (euh) (.) dans le (euh) la quantité de
			there have been peaks (euh) (.) in the (euh) the quantity of
		2	réfugiés tentant de rejoindre le continent européen (.) et (--) **en**
			refugees trying to reach the European continent (.) and (--) in
		3	**fait** c'est en partir de 99 (--) que l'Europe a quand-même mis au
			fact it is starting from 1999 (--) that Europe has nevertheless
		4	point (euh) des règlementations (euh) un régime de protection
			issued (euh) reglementations (euh) a temporary protection
		5	temporaire (.) ça je crois que c'est au moment de (.) Kosovo (.) ça
			regime (.) I think that was at the time of (.) Kosovo (.) that

	6	c'était en 99
		was in 1999
FP:	7	oui (--) oui **en fait** le 99 a été une année pic (.) d'arrivés
		yes (--) yes in fact 1999 has been a spike year (.) for arrivals
	8	(euh) dans ce cas aussi (.) principalement en Italie l'Italie a la (--)
		(euh) in this case also (.) mainly in Italy Italy has the (--)
	9	la chance d'être (.) un quai (.) mm projeté dans la méditerranée
		the luck of being (.) a wharf (.) mm casted into the Mediterranean

In example (30), it is interesting that the discourse of the second speaker seems to mirror the discourse of the first speaker in using the hedge *en fait*. Both speakers namely use this hedge to refer to *99*, the year 1999.

Examples (29) and (30) both show instances where *en fait* is used by the speakers to propose a stronger argument than an argument that was given before, or to introduce an example which illustrates their statement. This is the case for nine out of ten instances of *en fait* in the French debate. In this context, the use of *en fait* is not used as a hedge, but is used as an argumentative strategy to develop a more precise statement or example.

One instance shows a different function, however:

(31)	CO:	1	Frontex (.) donc il faut le (.) le rappeler (euh) cette (.) l'agence qui
			Frontex (.) so one has to (.) to repeat (euh) this (.) the agency that
		2	a été créé en 2005 (.) pour assurer **en fait** la (.) la sécurité
			has been created in 2005 (.) to ensure in fact the (.) the security
		3	(euh) (--) si l'on peut dire des accès (.) à l'Union (.) Européenne
			(euh) (--) so to say of the access (.) into the European (.) Union

In example (31), the function of *en fait* can be analysed as a literal meaning of 'in fact', where it is meant that Frontex factually ensures the security of access into the European Union. Therefore, the use of *en fait* in this utterance is different from the use of *en fait* in examples (29) and (30). In example (31), too, the use of *en fait* in this context cannot be

analysed as being a hedging device. It is also interesting to note that *en fait* is placed in the middle of the statement in example (31), and not before the statement as is the case in examples (29) and (30).

When considering all instances of *en fait* in the debate, it can be noticed that in eight cases *en fait* is placed before the statement, while in two cases *en fait* is placed in the middle of the statement. Other than example (31), the second instance where *en fait* is placed in the middle of the statement is the following example:

(32) CO: 1 et alors (.) ce qu'il faut rappeler (.) ce qui est très
              and so (.) that which should be remembered (.) that which is very

       2 très difficile à accepter c'est que (--) (euh) la réglementation
          very difficult to accept is that (--) (euh) the European

       3 européenne (euh) et (.) (euh) les lois de la mer (.) sont telles
          reglementation (euh) and (.) (euh) the laws of the sea (.) are thus

       4 (.) qu'il faut **en fait** attendre (.) que ces gens soient sur le
          (.) that one should in fact wait (.) until these people are at the

       5 point de se noyer (.) pour avoir le droit de les sauver
          brink of drowning (.) to have the right to save them

In example (32), *en fait* is used to stress the word *attendre* (wait), which in turn signals the introduction of a stronger argument. While this hedge is placed in a different syntactic position than the majority of the other instances, it can be said that its function is the same as in eight other instances where *en fait* is used.

When comparing the three hedging adverbials in the French radio debate, it can be noted that in most cases the hedging adverbials are placed before the statement. By placing these adverbials in the beginning of an utterance, they are emphasized. In the case of *en quelque sorte*, which occurs two times in the debate, two different functions can be distinguished. In one instance *en quelque sorte* is used to soften the statement, while in the other instance it is used to broaden a concept and to make it vaguer.

The second hedging adverbial, *vraiment*, occurs five times in the debate's discourse. Two different functions of the hedge *vraiment* can be distinguished, namely degree reinforcement and emphasis. In this context, only the use of *vraiment* which pertains to degree reinforcement can be considered as hedging.

The hedge *en fait* occurs ten times in the debate. In nine out of the ten instances the function of *en fait* is to introduce or signal a stronger argument. However, there is also one instance where the literal meaning of *en fait*, namely 'as a fact', is used by the speaker. These uses of *en fait* can, however, not be considered as instances of hedging.

6.3.2 Hedging adverbials in the Swedish radio debate

The first Swedish hedging adverbial is *någon slags* or *något slags*, which is translated in English as 'sort of', similarly to the French hedging adverbial *en quelque sorte*, and which in Swedish is placed before a noun. In the Swedish radio debate there are two instances where this hedge is used:

(33) AP: 1 men okej så skräms propaganda eller inte men (.) men jag har
but okay, so propaganda is intimidating or not (.) but I have

2 förstått saken så (.) menar du att vi inte ens behöver vara rädd
understood it that (.) you believe that we don't even need to be

3 att det kommer väldigt många fattiga människor eller hemlösa
afraid that a great amount of poor people or homeless people

4 eller (.) marginaliserade människor utan att vi faktiskt ska låta
or (.) marginalized people will come but that we should in fact let

5 människor klara sig på (.) **något slags** existensminimum (.) hur
people manage themselves on (.) a sort of subsistence level (.) how

6 ska vi tänka egentligen enligt dig
should we actually think according to you

In example (33), *något slags* is used to broaden the concept of *existensminimum* (substistence level). At the same time that this hedge broadens the concept of *existensminimum*, it also makes it vaguer, which at the same time makes the statement become less straightforward. *Något slags* therefore qualifies the noun and is placed before the noun it refers to.

(34) AP: 1 men vad tycker du att man ska göra du är ändå en
             but what do you believe that one should do you are after all a

         2 liberal debattör (.) du har skrivit böcker (.) om det här (.) vad
             liberal debater (.) you have written books (.) about this (.) what

         3 tycker du att man ska göra ska man liksom öppna
             do you believe that one should do should one like open

         4 gränserna mot (.) EU ska den fria rörligheten (.) som EU
             the borders of (.) the EU should the free movement (.) that the EU

         5 har som **något slags** fundament (euh) utvidgas till att gälla i
             has as a sort of foundation (euh) be expanded to apply to the

         6 hela världen
             whole world

The function of *något slags* in example (34) is similar to the function in example (33). However, in example (34), the use of *något slags* does not broaden the concept of *fundament* on its own, but it rather broadens the notion of the degree to which the EU has free movement as a foundation. It can be considered in such a way that the EU has several elements as its foundation, not only free movement, and by adding *något slags* to the utterance, this thought is made clear by the speaker.

Another form of *någon slags* or *något slags* that is also fairly common in Swedish is simply the word *slags*, which is not used together with a noun. There is one instance of the word *slags* in the discourse of this radio debate:

(35) MW: 1 och (.) den andra möjligheten som vi har problem med fortfarande
             and (.) the other option that we still have problems with

2   det är att de läkare som kommer in från länder utanför EU
     is that the doctors that come from countries outside of the EU

3   (euh) (--) de (.) har (.) rätt lång tid innan de kan komma
     (euh) (--) they (.) have (.) a really long time before they can come

4   (.) och börja tjänstgöra som läkare (.) det tar minst fyra år för
     (.) and start working as a doctor (.) it takes at least four years for

5   de å komma in i systemet (.) och det är ju **slags** onödig
     them to get into the system (.) and that is a sort of unnecessary

6   slöseri med läkares arbetskraft tycker vi
     waste of doctors' labour we think

In example (35), *slags* also refers to a noun phrase, namely *onödig slöseri* (unnecessary waste). In this example, *slags* is used to soften the speaker's statement. As *onödig slöseri* has a negative connotation and can be perceived as a strong opinion, *slags* is used as a hedge to avoid that the statement seems too strong.

When comparing the three instances of *något slags* and *slags*, it can be said that the use of this hedge is always linked to a noun which it refers to, which is *existensminimum*, *fundament* and *onödig slöseri* in the previous examples. However, the functions of this hedge differ in each utterance. In example (33), it is used to broaden the concept of existensminimum. In example (34) it is used to denote that the concept of *den fria rörligheten* (free movement) should be seen as one of the foundations of Europe rather than its only foundation, and can therefore to some extent also be considered as broadening the concept of *fundament*. Finally, in example (35) *slags* is used to soften the speaker's statement.

The next hedge that is analysed is *verkligen*, the Swedish translation of 'really'. This term occurs seven times in the debate. The following examples illustrate the use of 'verkligen' in some of the speakers' discourse:

(36)   TH: 1   så jag håller **verkligen** med om att (euh) den (.) politik som EU
              so I really agree with that (euh) the (.) politics that the EU

2	för gentemot om världen (--) (euh) måste man kritisera (.) den är
	applies around the world (--) (euh) one must criticize (.) it is
3	inte human (.) man har byggt upp en fästning i (.) i Europa och
	not humane (.) one has built a stronghold in (.) in Europe and
4	man har (.) har (euh) inte gjort det möjligt för (.) **verkligt** starka
	one has (.) has (euh) not made it possible for (.) really strong
5	(.) asylskäl (.) att göra sig hörda i Europa
	(.) reasons for asylum (.) to get themselves heard in Europe

The word *verkligen* occurs twice in this segment, once as an adverbial (*verkligen*) and once as an adjective (*verkligt*). In the beginning of this example, the first use of *verkligen* is expressed to emphasize the fact that the speaker agrees with a certain notion. This use of verkligen cannot be considered a hedge, as it does not soften or intensify a statement. When the word is used as an adjective, such as in the phrase *verkligt starka asylskäl* in the second use in example (36), it refers directly to the noun it is placed together with, and it is used to strengthen this noun, which makes this use of *verkligt* an example of degree reinforcement through hedging. It can therefore be said that the word is used to draw attention to the statement; instead of saying for instance *mycket starka asylskäl* (very strong reasons for asylum), the word *verkligt* is stronger than the more common word *mycket*. The use of *verkligen* to strengthen arguments can also be observed in the following examples:

(37)	MW:	1	nej det (.) så här har vi (.) det har vi absolut inte sett
			no that (.) like this we have (.) we have absolutely not seen that
		2	utan det är tvärtom (.) det är **verkligen** en (.) vinna-vinna-lösning
			but it is on the contrary (.) it is really a (.) win-win solution
		3	det här med EU
			this with the EU

Another term that is used to strengthen statements in this utterance is the word *absolut* (absolutely), which in this example is used to describe that the speaker, or in this case, the organization or association for which the speaker stands, as she uses *vi* (we) instead

of *jag* (I), does not agree with a statement that was previously posed by the debate host. In combination with the word *verkligen* that is used later in the utterance, this provides with an interesting parallel in the discourse of the speaker: first, she uses *absolut inte* (absolutely not), which can be seen as a rather extreme negation of the previous statement, and then she uses *verkligen* (really), which can be considered as a rather extreme assertion of her own statemement.

(38) JA: 1 och även om (euh) (--) den engelska kulturen och svenska
and even if (euh) (--) the English culture and the Swedish

2 kulturen ligger väldigt nära varann (euh) det är fortfarande så att
culture are very closely alike (euh) it is still so that

3 (.) jag har blivit rättad (.) till exempel och inte förstått
(.) I have been corrected (.) for example and didn't understand

4 att någon (euh) försöker säga åt mig att jag är fel (--) (euh) (.)
that someone (euh) tried to tell me that I am wrong (--) (euh) (.)

5 och jag tänker att (.) det får mig å tänka (.) hur svårt det måste
and I think that (.) it makes me think (.) how difficult it must

6 vara om man **verkligen** kommer från ett annat land som är väldigt
be if one really comes from a different country that is extremely

7 (.) a annorlunda kulturellt från Sverige
(.) yes different culturally from Sweden

In example (38), *verkligen* is used to strengthen the speaker's statement. The speaker then uses a word with a similar function as the hedge *verkligen*, namely *väldigt*, which can be translated in English as 'extremely'. By using both of these words, the speaker reinforces her statement.

By analyzing the previous examples containing the hedge *verkligen*, a distinction can be made between utterances where *verkligen* is used for emphasis and utterances where *verkligen* (which in Swedish would then be conjugated to *verklig*, *verkligt*, or *verkliga*) is used for reinforcement. The first use is not an example of hedging, whereas the second use can be considered hedging. In the Swedish debate, six instances of *verkligen* show

that it is used for emphasis, whereas there is one instance where it is used for degree reinforcement. For instance, examples (37) and (38) show that *verkligen* is used for emphasis, whereas *verkligt starka asylskäl* in example (36) shows reinforcement.

The third hedging adverbial is the Swedish word *faktiskt*, which is translated in English as 'in fact'. In the Swedish radio debate, the use of *faktiskt* occurs ten times, and the word occurs solely in the discourse of the debate host. The host of the debate uses the word often in her questions, such as in these examples:

(39) AP: 1   men okej så skräms propaganda eller inte men (.) men jag har
                but okay so propaganda is intimidating or not but (.) I have

      2   förstått saken så (.) menar du att vi inte ens behöver vara
                understood it that (.) you believe that we don't even need to be

      3   rädd att det kommer väldigt många fattiga människor eller
                afraid that a great amount of poor people or

      4   hemlösa eller (.) marginaliserade människor utan att vi
                homeless people or (.) marginalized people will come but that we

      5   **faktiskt** ska låta människor klara sig på (.) något slags
                should in fact let people manage themselves on (.) a sort of

      6   existensminimum (.) hur ska vi tänka egentligen enligt dig
                subsistence level (.) how should we actually think according to you

Example (39) is interesting for its use of *faktiskt*, because the way that she phrases her statement sounds somewhat defensive. It is clear that she wants to evoke a discussion from the speaker, and that she wants to hear the speaker's opinion on her understanding of the matter. By using *faktiskt*, the host indicates an intensification of her argument, which might provoke the next speaker to engage in discussion and to state his or her opinion.

(40) AP: 1   och det ansvaret och den provokationen ska vi **faktiskt** hålla
                and that accountability and that provocation will in fact be

2	vidare om efter nyheterna men jag tänkte fråga dig (.) alltså
	further discussed after the news but I thought of asking you (.) so
3	(.) både Fredrik Segerfeldt och Daniel Suhonen talat om
	(.) both Fredrik Segerfeldt and Daniel Suhonen have talked about
4	(.) det var den fascistiska förförelsen tonen också hinder mot
	(.) it was the fascist allurement the tone as well obstacles against
5	den fria rörligheten i EU (.) vilka tycker du bär
	the free movement in the EU (.) which do you consider are
6	ansvar för den ökade främlingsfientligheten som **faktiskt** är ett
	responsible for the increased xenophobia that in fact is an
7	hinder (.) för den fria rörligheten
	obstacle (.) for the free movement

A distinction can also be made between example (39) and example (40) in terms of the function of *faktiskt* in each utterance. In example (39), *faktiskt* can be considered a type of adversative adverb. In the utterance in example (40), on the other hand, especially in the second instance of *faktiskt*, it is used to introduce a stronger argument. In this context, the speaker signals that there is not only increased xenophobia, but that it even is an obstacle for free movement. The second use of *faktiskt* where it is used as an argumentative strategy to introduce a more specific or stronger argument is not considered an example of hedging.

The distinction between these two functions of the hedge *faktiskt* can also be illustrated in the following two examples:

(41)	AP:	1	vi ska få (euh) (--) träffa Andrea Weslén (.) Andrea (.) du
			we will get to (euh) (--) meet Andrea Weslén (.) Andrea (.) you
		2	är 27 år gammal och du har (.) studerat i Skottland i fyra
			are 27 years old and you have (.) studied in Scotland for four
		3	år och arbetat i Italien (.) du tillhör ju en av de som
			years and worked in Italy (.) you belong to one of those who

> 4   **faktiskt** har gynnat av den fria rörligheten
>
> *in fact has gained from the free movement*

In this example, *faktiskt* is once again used as an adversative adverbial. In this specific utterance, the use of *faktiskt* indicates an opposition between previous statements and the statement that follows the word *faktiskt*. This is strengthened by the fact that the speaker stresses the word *gynnat* (gained) in order to show that a positive aspect will be highlighted.

> (42)   AP: 1   men språkförbistringen är nog en vardag i den (.) fria rörlighetens
>
>   *but language confusion is probably a normality in (.) a*
>
>   2   (euh) Europa och EU där (.) manniskor **faktiskt**
>
>   *(euh) Europe with free movement and EU where (.) people in fact*
>
>   3   kan röra sig fritt och (euh) (--) jag tror inte det är ett större
>
>   *can move freely and (euh) I don't believe that it is a big*
>
>   4   problem att man kanske blandar ihop en och ett
>
>   *problem that one sometimes mixes en and ett*

At first sight, it seems like the speaker repeats the same argument twice. First, she mentions *den fria rörlighetens Europa* (a Europe with free movement). Immediately after that, she speaks of *EU där människor faktiskt kan röra sig fritt* (EU where people in fact can move freely). While both phrases refer to the same concept, the second phrase can be seen as more direct and more explicit than the first phrase, therefore justifying the use of *faktiskt*.

The first hedging adverbial that was analysed is *någon slags*, *något slags* or *slags*, which occurred three times in total in the discourse of the Swedish debate. Two different major functions of this hedge can be distinguished, namely a broadening of the concept it refers to on the one hand and softening of the statement on the other hand.

The hedge *verkligen* occurs seven times in the debate. In six instances, it is used for emphasis, and in one instance it is used for reinforcement. In the utterance where it is

used for reinforcement, it is conjugated as *verkligt* and placed before the noun phrase it qualifies. Only the instance where *verkligt* is used for degree reinforcement is considered as a hedge.

In the debate there are ten instances of the hedge *faktiskt*. This hedge has the function of an adversative adverbial with epistemic qualities in five instances. In the other five instances, *faktiskt* is used to introduce a stronger argument, and can in these instances not be considered a hedge.

6.4 General comparison

The following figure illustrates the number of instances of each selected hedge in this analysis in French and in Swedish.

Table 1. Number of instances of the selected hedges in French and Swedish

	French	**Swedish**
I believe	Je crois: 17	Jag tror: 5 Jag tycker: 14
I think	Je pense: 1	Jag tänker: 6
I would say	Je dirais: 1	Jag skulle säga: 0
I would like/want	Je voudrais: 2	Jag skulle vilja: 1
Sort of	En quelque sorte: 2	Något slags: 2 Slags: 1
Really	Vraiment: 5	Verkligen: 7
In fact	En fait: 10	Faktiskt: 10

Both in the French debate and in the Swedish debate, the number of instances expressing belief through epistemic modality is much larger than instances expressing cogitation. This result can be explained through the use of radio debates as the material for this

analysis. In debates, speakers are expected to elaborate on their personal views on a given topic. By using hedges such as *je crois* in French and *jag tycker* in Swedish, speakers can express that the statement they make is indeed a personal opinion and should not be regarded as a general fact.

In the Swedish radio debate, there is a clear indication that most of the instances where *jag tycker* occurs after the statement can be found in the beginning of the debate. This might be linked to the fact that different people speak at different times during the debate, and individuals have different ways of expressing their opinions; in such a way, some individuals might say *jag tycker* more than others. However, it might also be linked to the topic of the discourse, as the topic of immigration in the beginning of the debate can be considered to be more focused on personal experiences, whereas the focus then shifts to a discussion on immigration in general. In the French radio debate, however, there was no link between the placement of the phrase *je crois* on the one hand and the timing during the debate on the other hand. This might also have a correlation with the topic of the debate, as the tone and the topic is rather formal and serious even in the beginning of the debate, with the speakers giving long and complicated answers and the host interrupting very little.

Both in the French debate and the Swedish debate, the number of instances of the two analysed phrases containing modal verbs is very limited. As for the phrase 'I would say' (*je dirais* in French and *jag skulle säga* in Swedish), only one instance can be found in the French debate and no instances can be found in the Swedish debate. Even though this phrase is used relatively often, both in French and in Swedish, it is surprising that the number of instances in the debates is very limited. However, as the function of this phrase is similar to epistemic modality to some extent, it is possible to consider that other words and expressions were used by the speakers to express their view on a certain situation. The phrase 'I would like' (*je voudrais* in French and *jag skulle vilja* in Swedish) occurs twice in the French debate and once in the Swedish debate. Both *je voudrais* and *jag skulle vilja* are placed before the statement.

The hedge 'sort of', translated in French as *en quelque sorte* and in Swedish as *någon slags*, *något slags* or *slags*, is found two times in the French debate and three times in the Swedish debate. It is important to note that *någon slags*, *något slags* and *slags* can qualify a noun and be placed in front of that noun, whereas *en quelque sorte* can qualify a noun but cannot be placed in front of that noun. The word *slags* on the other hand can fulfill a similar position in an utterance as the French phrase *en quelque sorte*. In the French radio debate, the two instances of *en quelque sorte* both refer to verbs. The function of *en quelque sorte* in the discourse of the debate is to make the verbs vaguer. In the Swedish debate, the two instances of *något slags* and the one instance of *slags* all refer to nouns. The hedge has the function to make the nouns vaguer and less specific. The different grammatical properties are also reflected in the placement of this hedge. In the French debate, *en quelque sorte* was placed before the statement in both instances, whereas *något slags* and *slags* was placed in the middle of the statement before the noun phrase it refers to.

The second hedging adverbial in this analysis is 'really', which occurs five times in the French radio debate as *vraiment* and seven times in the Swedish radio debate as *verkligen*. Both in the French discourse and in the Swedish discourse, in the majority of the instances where this hedge is used it is used for emphasis. Only in the Swedish debate there was also an instance where it is used for reinforcement, which ties in with the use of hedges for degree reinforcement. In the instance where the hedge was used for reinforcement, it was conjugated and used to qualify a noun phrase. Both in the French and in the Swedish debate, the hedge 'really' has a similar placement, namely before the statement. In French and in Swedish this is the normal place for this hedge, even though it can potentially also be placed after the statement.

The hedging adverbial 'in fact', translated in French as *en fait* and in Swedish as *faktiskt*, occurs ten times in the French radio debate and ten times in the Swedish radio debate. Other than the fact that there is an equal amount of instances of this hedging adverbial in the French and in the Swedish debate, another similarity is that in both cases this hedge occurs most in the discourse of the hosts. However, there are also some differences in the use of 'in fact' in both debates, mostly in its function. In the French debate, *en fait* is

mostly used as a way to present a stronger argument, as this is the case in nine out of the ten instances. This use of *en fait* is not considered to be hedging. In the Swedish debate, however, *faktiskt* is used five times as an adversative adverbial with epistemic qualities and five times as a way to introduce a stronger argument. Only its five uses where epistemic qualities are concerned can be considered as hedging. Concerning the placement of the hedge 'in fact' in utterances, it can be noted that in the French debate *en fait* was mostly placed before the statement, whereas *faktiskt* was only placed in the middle of a statement or at the end of a statement. While it is grammatically possible to place *faktiskt* before a statement, the most regular placement of *faktiskt* is usually in the middle or at the end of a statement. Similarly, it can be said that *en fait* can grammatically be placed at the end of a statement, but this is not the most usual placement of this hedge in an utterance.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This thesis aims to analyse the phenomenon of hedging in French and Swedish radio debates through discourse analysis on selected hedges. The first category included the epistemic modal verbs *je crois* and *je pense* in French and *jag tror*, *jag tycker* and *jag tänker* in Swedish. The second category consists of two constructions with modal verbs, namely *je dirais* and *je voudrais* in French and *jag skulle säga* and *jag skulle vilja* in Swedish. Finally, the hedging adverbials that are analysed are *en quelque sorte*, *vraiment* and *en fait* in French and *någon/något slags* or *slags*, *verkligen* and *faktiskt* in Swedish.

Debates are a type of discourse where it is important to express oneself in an exact yet strong way. This is especially the case in radio debates, where speakers cannot use body language to express themselves, and therefore have to choose their words carefully in order to express the message in a right way. Linguistic hedges can be a useful tool to make utterances vaguer or to intensify or soften the utterances, and they can emphasize specific elements of the utterance.

While hedging can be seen as a linguistic phenomenon, it can simultaneously be considered to be a cultural phenomenon. While the practice of hedging expressions is not tied to a specific culture, different cultures and in different languages hedging can be expressed in different ways. It is, however, important to note that every culture and every language has a form of hedging. In this analysis, there are many similarities between the hedges used in the French debate and the hedges used in the Swedish debates, but there are also some significant differences.

It can be observed that the number of instances of the analysed hedges is very similar in the French and the Swedish debate. However, it is important to note that the number of hedges that was chosen for this analysis is not large enough to draw conclusions on the amount of other hedges or hedging in general. Therefore, this observation only takes into account the selected hedges that were analysed in this thesis. Earlier research by Vold (2006) that compared French and Norwegian found that there was a fewer use of epistemic modality markers in French, but the analysis in this thesis does not observe a

substantial difference in the amount of epistemic modality markers that are used in French and in Swedish.

A similar tendency can be noticed concerning the placement of the hedges in the French and the Swedish debate. There are some cases, such as *en fait* and *faktiskt*, where there is a noticeable difference in placement, as *en fait* can be found in the majority of the instances in the French debate whereas *faktiskt* is only found in the middle of the statement. In general, however, it can be said that the placement of the hedges is mostly similar in both debates. In most instances, the hedges are placed before the statement, and this can in some cases reflect that the speakers want to emphasize the hedge that they use.

Some differences between the French and Swedish hedges can be discerned in terms of the hedges' functions. While in several cases the functions of the hedges are similar, such as *vraiment* and *verkligen* being mostly used to express emphasis, some of the hedges express different functions in French and Swedish respectively. This is for instance the case with *en fait* and *faktiskt*, where *en fait* in French is mostly used to introduce a stronger argument, which is not analysed as an instance of hedging. In Swedish *faktiskt* is used to introduce a stronger argument or as an adversative adverbial with epistemic qualities in an equal amount of instances.

In order to observe more instances of hedging, both a larger sample of material and a larger selection of hedges should be used. This thesis was limited to 40 minutes of discourse in each radio debate, but a larger sample could provide more information on hedging. Similarly, a larger selection of hedges, both within the same categories as those that were chosen in this thesis and in other categories, could result in more detailed observations on hedging. In this thesis, the discourse of each individual was not taken into account, even though this might give interesting insights. By considering each individual's idiolect, it could be possible to form a more precise profile of hedging in each individual's discourse.

This thesis compares French and Swedish, which are two languages that belong to different language families and are spoken in different countries. Similar analyses could

be conducted on other languages, such as languages within the same language family or languages that are spoken in even more diverse parts of the world. Other research might also focus on written communication, as there is a difference in language use when written discourse is concerned. Similarly, as this thesis focused on radio debates where there are no visual clues, research on television debates could provide interesting insights with regards to facial expressions and hand gestures. This thesis forms a framework through which further research can be expanded.

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Appendix 1. Transcription conventions

(.)   Shorter pause

(--)   Longer pause

xx-   Incomplete utterance, partial word

[]   Overlapping utterances

Speakers:

CO: Christine Ockrent

FP: Ferruccio Pastore

GJ: Geneviève Jacques

SG: Sylvie Goulard

AP: Alexandra Pascalidou

DQ : David Qviström

DS: Daniel Suhonen

FS: Fredrik Segerfeldt

JA: Joanna Ahlkvist

MW: Marie Wedin

TH: Thomas Hammarberg