Born after the Volcker Rule : Regulatory change, managerial remuneration and hedge fund performance
Bowe, Michael; Kolokolova, Olga; Yu, Lijie (2023-09-06)
John Wiley & Sons
06.09.2023
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe202401021055
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe202401021055
Kuvaus
vertaisarvioitu
© 2023 The Authors. European Financial Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
© 2023 The Authors. European Financial Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Tiivistelmä
Substantial remunerative benefits accrue to managers of new hedge funds launched after the implementation of the Volcker Rule if their previous employer is a large US bank. After the rule, ex-bankers' funds charge higher management fees and receive more flows as compared with other new hedge funds established during the same period. This phenomenon is related to changes in investor perception of the distribution of skills of new fund managers rather than to the actual differences in skills. Ex-bankers' funds are indistinguishable from other funds in terms of performance, risk, and liquidation probability, both before and after the Volcker Rule.
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