Monopolistic and game-based approaches to transact energy flexibility

Gazafroudi, Amin Shokri; Shafie-khah, Miadreza; Prieto-Castrillo, Francisco; Corchado, Juan Manuel; Catalão, João P. S. (2019-09-27)
 
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https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2944200

Gazafroudi, Amin Shokri
Shafie-khah, Miadreza
Prieto-Castrillo, Francisco
Corchado, Juan Manuel
Catalão, João P. S.
IEEE
27.09.2019
doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2944200
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https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2020040210217

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Tiivistelmä
The appearance of the flexible behavior of end-users based on demand response programs makes the power distribution grids more active. Thus, electricity market participants in the bottom layer of the power system, wish to be involved in the decision-making process related to local energy management problems, increasing the efficiency of the energy trade in distribution networks. This paper proposes monopolistic and game-based approaches for the management of energy flexibility through end-users, aggregators, and the Distribution System Operator (DSO) which are defined as agents in the power distribution system. Besides, a 33-bus distribution network is considered to evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches for energy flexibility management model based on impact of flexibility behaviors of end-users and aggregators in the distribution network. According to the simulation results, it is concluded that although the monopolistic approach could be profitable for all agents in the distribution network, the game-based approach is not profitable for end-users.
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