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European Germany or a German Europe?

Discursive articulation of German nation-state identity in the editorials and commentaries of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during the first year of the Euro Crisis

Master's Thesis

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	2
LIST OF TABLES	3
ABSTRACT	5
1 INTRODUCTION	7
1.1 Research Aim	10
1.2 Material and Method	11
1.3 Structure of the thesis	12
2 EUROPE AND NATION-STATE IDENTITY	13
2.1 The idea of Europe	13
2.2 The history of European Integration in brief	14
2.3 The European Monetary Union and the euro	17
2.4 Europe and the nation-state	20
2.4.1 Nation-state identity	20
2.4.2 Transformation of nation-state identity: critical junctures	22
2.5 Post-structuralist discourse theory	24
2.5.1 Post-structuralist model of nation-state identity and Europe	30
2.5.2 Articulation of German nation-state identity from late 19 th century to early 21 st century	35
3 EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES	42
3.1 Journalistic texts and text functions	42
3.2 Editorial	44
3.3 Commentary	48
4 DISCOURSE LINGUISTICS	50
4.1 DIMEAN model	50
4.2 Application of the DIMEAN model: Keywords and semantic roles	53
4.2.1 Keywords indexing nation-state and Europe	54
4.2.2 Predicate classes and semantic roles	56
5 DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION OF GERMAN NATION-STATE IDENTITY AND EUROPE IN EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES OF THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG	66
5.1 Quantitative Analysis of Keywords	67
5.1.1 German keywords	67

5.1.2 Europe and EU related keywords	75
5.1.3 Deictic expressions	81
5.2 Qualitative analysis of keywords.....	82
5.2.1 Germany as an economically strong country	82
5.2.2 Germany as the “pay master”	88
5.2.3 D-Mark and the stability promise of the euro	92
5.2.4 The German EMU and culturalization of divergences.....	95
5.2.5 Transfer union, citizens and sovereignty.....	106
5.2.6 German interests and the government	112
5.2.7 Renegotiation of Germany’s pro-European identity	122
5.2.8 EU, Europe and Germany.....	128
5.3 Summary of discursive articulations on the transtextual layer.....	138
6 CONCLUSIONS	144
WORKS CITED.....	146
APPENDIX: Translations of the excerpts from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	159

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The life-cycle of nation-state identities	23
Figure 2. Relationship between the general concept of nation(-state) and unique nation-state identities	30
Figure 3. Theoretical model on the interaction between discursive constructions of nation-state identities and ‘Europe’	31
Figure 4. Different articulations of German nation-state identity.	41
Figure 5. Semantic map of German keywords	69
Figure 6. Semantic map of Europe and EU related keywords	76
Figure 7. Discursive constructions of German nation-state identity and ‘Europe’ in the editorials and commentaries of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2010	143

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Structural theories of editorials	46
Table 2. Characteristics of an editorial	47
Table 3. Comparison of predicates classes and process types	57
Table 4. List of semantic roles	59–62
Table 5. List of circumstantial elements	63–64
Table 6. German nation-state and capital	70
Table 7. German politicians and institutions	72
Table 8. German citizens	73
Table 9. Europe and EU related keywords	77
Table 10. Member states	78
Table 11. Deictic expressions	81

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the study is the discursive articulation of German nation-state identity and Europe in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* during 2010, the first year of the euro crisis. The material consists of editorials and commentaries. As evaluative and argumentative text types they both contribute to and reflect the public discourse on a given topic, and therefore engage in politics, defined in the broad sense as negotiation and struggle over the attribution of meaning within society.

The theoretical background of this study is in post-structuralist discourse theory and its application in a model originally designed for foreign policy analysis. The concept of *nation-state identity* is used to describe the relationship between Europe and the nation. Although not often contested, nation-state identities are subject to redefinition at times of crisis, defined as *critical junctures*. The euro crisis is treated as a critical juncture that has the potential to induce discursive change.

The methods for analyzing these discursive articulations are taken from German *Diskurslinguistik*. The methodological approach include both quantitative and qualitative analyses of specific keywords. These keywords were partially derived from previous research of nationalist discourse in the media and included words related to the German nation-state, EU and Europe. These words were then categorized into *semantic roles*, on the basis of which their relationships and positionings could be analyzed.

The study found that the German nation-state identity is articulated in a way that emphasizes its economic power while attempting to justify an orientation based on national interests, Germany's leadership role and a break from the country's pro-European past by the fact that the euro's stability is at stake. While the meaning of what it means to be "European" becomes thus contested in the light of the country's past, there is also some emphasis on continuity with the past.

KEYWORDS: Discourse analysis, nation-state identity, European integration, euro crisis, media

1 INTRODUCTION

The euro crisis is a serious political crisis for the entire EU. The crisis has left the EU torn between opposing demands for more sovereignty and solidarity, with the economically more prosperous member states typically insisting on greater sovereignty while the economically weaker member states have usually supported a higher degree of European integration in exchange for greater solidarity from the EU (Hayward, Rüdiger & Wurzel 2013: 2).

Germany is undoubtedly the most economically powerful nation-state within the European Union. Ever since the end of World War II, it has also been an ardent supporter of the process of European integration (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002). Thus, when the financial crisis hit Europe, it was from Germany that solidarity and European spirit was most expected. It therefore came as a shock to many when, as the extent of Greece's financial plight became clear in early 2010, Angela Merkel's Germany vehemently refused that the country be given aid unless it is at the verge of bankruptcy, and even then only under extremely punitive conditions and partially administered by International Monetary Fund. In March 2010, an author of the Wall Street Journal remarked that "Germany has cooled to European unity, except on its terms" (Walker 2010).

The euro crisis has indeed brought upon a visible shift in Germany's relationship to Europe. It has been stated, for example, that "German nationalism is back in vogue" (Gratius 2012). Merkel's cold pragmatism has been contrasted with the pro-European vision of former chancellor Kohl, who unlike Merkel would not likely have threatened that the member states which breach the deficit limits enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht should be excluded from the EMU (Walker 2010). Merkel earned both the title *Eiserne Kanzlerin* (Iron Chancellor), a reference to the famous chancellor Otto von Bismarck of the 19th century (Kornelius 2010), as well as *Eiserne Lady* (Iron Lady), a comparison with the former, famously tough British premier minister Margaret Thatcher (Lob 2010).

Merkel's focus on German interests is a definite break from the previously pro-European line of German foreign policy. Inklings of a shift were however already in the works during the Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. By advocating for Germany's right to defend its own interests, he took a more calculating and distancing attitude towards Europe than his predecessor Kohl, who in turn had emphasized the interwoven nature of German and European interests (Hellmann, Weber & Sauer 2008: 98).

This renewed emphasis on national interests, instead of the common European vision that had prevailed during the Cold War, was characteristic of the whole European political landscape in the 1990s. In Germany, however, this shift in orientation started to take foothold only after the end of Kohl's chancellorship in 1998 (Milzow 2012). Some authors, like Marcussen and Roscher (2002) and Wæver (2005) emphasize however that the changes that took place during Schröder's chancellorship were more at the level of style and rhetoric and had less to do with actual policy content. In other words, the underlying identity of a "European Germany" that the country had assumed at the end of World War II was not questioned. It is possible that the euro crisis has brought about a deeper transformation of this identity.

In both foreign and German media, concerns have been raised about whether we are hearing the echoes of the past with Europe once again heading towards German dominance, albeit this time in economic terms and through the euro (Salminen 2015, Mardell 2015, Fischer 2015). The leading German news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, even remarked that for Merkel "Europe is not a matter of war and peace, but of euros and cents" (Blome, Hesse, Pauly, Pfister, Reiermann & Schmitz 2015). In defense of the German government's policies, the German minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, had two years earlier stated in the British newspaper *The Guardian* that Germany's wish is not to fashion Europe in its image, but the continent must nonetheless be able to compete (Schäuble 2013). As the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* commented, however, Germany's image outside is now that of a "dark puppet master" and "a European hegemon", and what is therefore called for is more humility on Germany's side (Kornelius 2015).

Politics involves a constant renegotiation of meanings given to events and actions. This negotiation of and struggle over meaning take place both in political speeches as well as in the news media, which frame and interpret the statements and actions of political actors. The news media's importance in shaping and setting the agenda for policy discussions has been well researched (e.g. Bucher & Straßner 1991; Wittkämper 1992; Le 2010). Therefore, the media also plays a significant role in the politics of meaning and steering the perception and interpretation of events. The comparisons between Merkel and her predecessors, the attributions of nicknames with historical connotations and the concern for returning German dominance is an example how political events are put into a historical context and thus given a particular meaning: a shifting relationship between Germany and Europe.

News coverage is often itself informed by certain world views and ideologies (Van Dijk 1988; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995). The perspective of the media also tends to be highly nationalized, to the extent that media texts are said to play an important role in the reproduction of the "imagined communities" of nation-states (Anderson 1983; Billig 1995; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010; Mihelj 2011). Even when reporting on European issues, the media in different European countries tend to take on a national perspective on the issues (Machill, Beiler & Fischer 2006). This has been shown to be the case in the coverage of the euro crisis as well (Picard 2015).

There have been several studies investigating the coverage and presentation of the euro crisis in the media. By far the largest is a cross-national study by the Reuters Institute which studied the perceptions of Europe in the press coverage of the crisis between 2010 and 2012 (Picard 2015). Tzogopoulos (2013) investigated stereotypes in the coverage about the Greek crisis in various European broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, while a study by Papathanassopoulos (2015) focused on the reactions on the Greek crisis in the international press. A special volume of *Discourse & Society* titled *From Grexit to Grecovery: Euro/crisis discourses* (Wodak & Angouri 2014) contains seven studies that approach the portrayal of the crisis from a discourse analytical perspective.

The present study is another contribution to this existing series of studies on the euro crisis in the press. It builds on the insight that the media has the power to represent reality, and often does so from a national perspective, with this national perspective becoming increasingly highlighted during a crisis (Brookes 1999; Mihelj 2011).

1.1 Research Aim

This study focuses on Germany and its identity as it is portrayed in German domestic press. Following the claims made both in foreign and German press about Germany having abandoned its former pro-European path, this study investigates how Germany's identity and its relationship to Europe is represented in the German domestic press during the first year of the euro crisis. According to Papathanassopoulos (2015), the German press devoted proportionately the largest number of articles to the euro crisis compared to the newspapers of other countries. This is not surprising in light of the fact that Germany was asked to give the biggest financial contribution towards rescuing Greece. If, as earlier studies suggest, reporting on European affairs tends to be projected through a national lens and a crisis tends to increase the degree to which this national perspective is polarized, Germany's identity and role in Europe should also come into a sharper focus in the domestic press coverage of the crisis.

In order to bridge the relation between media texts, language and the conceptualization of Germany's identity vis-à-vis Europe, this study utilizes the concepts of *nation-state identity* (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002) and *discourse* in the post-structuralist tradition of Foucault (e.g. 1972) as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985). More specifically, the study builds on the post-structuralist framework introduced by Wæver (2002, 2005) for the purpose of analyzing the relationship between the representations of nation-state identity and Europe. This model has previously been used by Bärenreuter (2005) in his study on representation of the Swedish national identity in the news coverage of the Jörg Haider affair in Austria in 2000.

1.2 Material and Method

The data used in this study consists of 21 editorials and 11 economic commentaries dealing with the euro crisis published in the the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) in 2010. The FAZ is major center-right, conservative-liberal daily with a circulation of 382 000 (Koopmans & Pfetsch 2007: 62). It has one of the world's largest networks of correspondents, which makes it by and large independent from press agencies (Voxeurop 2012). It is cooperatively run by five editors. In 2014, it was the second widest sold broadsheet nationwide newspaper in Germany (Statista 2015) It has also been found to take more critical position both towards the process of European integration and European insititutions than most other German media (Koopmans & Pfetsch 2007: 77–79).

Editorials and commentaries were selected due to the explicitly evaluative and interpretive nature of these text types and because they are most likely to represent the official line of the newspaper (cf. section 3.2). This would also make them more likely to provide robust material for the analysis of discourses surrounding Germany and Europe. The articles were handpicked from the paper copies of the newspaper, which were archived at the library of the University of Basel, Switzerland.

The method combines the corpus-driven, multilayered approach from German *Diskurslinguistik* (discourse linguistics) (e.g. Warnke 2007; Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a) with a special focus on specific keywords. These keywords will be analyzed with the help of semantic roles, a concept originally based on the work of Fillmore (1971). The semantic roles in this study are derived from Peter von Polenz (2008) and M.A.K. Halliday's (1985) Systemic Functional Grammar.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 presents the overall theoretical framework of the study. It proceeds from a brief discussion of the history of the idea of Europe, European integration and European Monetary Union (EMU) to introducing the concept of *nation-state identity* and a theoretical approach based on post-structuralist discourse theory. A historical outline of Germany's nation-state identity will also be given at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 3 introduces the journalistic text types to be analyzed in the study: editorials and commentaries. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a genre-theoretical justification for the choice of text types by outlining function, purpose and prevailing characteristics.

Chapter 4 presents the methodological tools which help in approaching the research question and the theoretical model outlined in chapter 2 by analyzing concrete texts. It briefly introduces the DIMEAN model of the German *Diskurslinguistik* and its application within the study with the help of analytical tools provided by previous research and the work of von Polenz (2008) and Halliday (1985).

Chapter 5 shows the results of analysis by applying the methods provided in Chapter 4. These results will then be interpreted against the theoretical model from chapter 2. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions derived and suggested directions for further research.

2 EUROPE AND NATION-STATE IDENTITY

This chapter introduces the ideas of *Europe* and *nation-state* as well as models for conceptualizing their mutual relationship. First, the history of the idea of Europe will briefly be outlined, and subsequently the history of the European integration and the European Monetary Union will be discussed. Section 2.3 will then focus on the concept of *nation-state identity* and its interrelationship with the idea of Europe. Section 2.3.1 will introduce a social psychological model of this relationship, while 2.3.2 will present a post-structural model that serves as the theoretical framework upon which the analysis will be based.

2.1 The idea of Europe

In the course of history, there have been different conceptions of what Europe is, both geographically and culturally. According to Ruonala (2011: 15), while the EU has become almost synonymous with Europe itself in more modern times, especially in other parts of the world, these two are nonetheless distinct.

According to Wintle (2013), the EU can be seen as just one manifestation of Europe in recent centuries, but not the only representation of what Europe is or should be. Just as many thinkers over the centuries have expressed their ideas about the essence of Europe, there have also been many proposals on how to bring about its political unity, beginning in the Middle Age (Morgan 1996). The EU can be seen as the first relatively successful attempt of realizing the idea of Europe in a political and institutional form.

While the EU lends itself more readily to a clear definition in terms of its institutions and member states, this is less the case with ‘Europe’. In official policy documents, ‘Europe’ and the ‘peoples of Europe’ are used as more or less self-evident constructions, but both historically and in contemporary usage the denotations of the term are anything but clear and unambiguous (Boxhoorn 1996: 134; Ruokonen 1996: 22).

Europe has been imagined in many different ways over time and across countries: Europe as a community of nation-states (e.g. De Gaulle's vision of Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals"); Europe as a set of values; Europe as a "third force", a kind of democratic socialist alternative to both capitalism and Communism; a modernising (Western) Europe as part of the Western community, based on liberal democracy and social market economy; or a Europe based on Christian, and in particular, Catholic values, including strong social obligations. (Stråth 2002: 38)

Although many claims have been made and continue being made for what Europe is, where it lies and what its borders are, it remains an unstable term (Pagden 2002: 45). It is less a concrete entity and a clearly defined geographical space than an "idea and a normative center" (Stråth 2002: 14). Europe can be defined in terms of geography, cultural heritage, religion, economics or politics, but none of these dimensions lend themselves to an exhaustive and uncontested definition (Smith 1992: 68–70). Europe is a contested concept whose meaning is not yet fixed (Diez 1999); not a single fact but a word figuring in many constellations (Ruokonen 1996: 32). It could be said that as long Europe has been conceptualized, its experience of itself is a question – the question of Europe (Burgess 2002: 432).

2.2 The history of European integration in brief

The EU was built on the ruins of World War II, with the goal of establishing permanent peace on the continent. In Euro-nationalistic narratives, the continuity between the ideas of European unity existing before 1950 and the founding of the European Union is often exaggerated, as if the EU was a culmination of a teleological process (Swedberg 1994). According to Passerini (2002: 192), on the other hand, scholarly literature on the history of the EU typically underrates the link between previous ideas of unity and institutional reality of the EU. In order to not to overestimate the continuity, therefore, the ideas can be seen as a fertile soil, as necessary but not a sufficient condition for the realization of the EU sprout.

A testimony to the role of ideas are the memoirs of Robert Schuman, one of the founding fathers of European integration: He saw that the “choice” of Europe by France was the fruit of a community of spirits, saved from both “Hitlerism” and Communism; the concretization of this community of spirits being the erection of a system of economic co-ordination and regulation based on the principles of market liberalism (Burgess 2002: 430). According to Burgess, here in the words of Schuman first manifest the two perhaps irreducibly different discourses that underlie the European project: the discourses of *cultural community* and *economic rationality* (ibid.: 431).

However one might see the link between previous ideas and the EU of today, the EU is nonetheless the most important of all attempts to date to bring about European unity and to realize the “idea of Europe” (Wintle 2013: 9). The official foundation of the EU was the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Burgess 2002: 424–425). Its founding was based on pragmatic considerations of nation-states concerning the conditions that would ensure peace in Europe – a large part of which was about controlling Germany via coordination of the industries relevant for warfare (Mikkeli 1999: 122–123).

Robert Schuman’s original vision was explicitly federalist, aiming towards a United States of Europe. Jean Monnet, however, the principal architect of the Schuman Plan, understood that a federal Europe would not be created overnight, but a united Europe would be the result of concrete, incremental achievements, which will cumulatively create a sense of solidarity (Mikkeli 1999: 128). Through this “Monnet Method” of integration, political unity and peace would be achieved “less by grand design and more by stealth” (Rosamond 2000: 53).

After the Treaty of Paris in 1950–51, the the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the creation of the European Economic Community paved the way for deepening integration in various policy areas, such as agriculture and transportation. With the fusing together of the treaties on the ECSC and the Euratom (collaboration in nuclear energy) in 1967, the term European Community came to be used more and more frequently. In 1973, Britain,

Denmark and Ireland joined the Community, followed by Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1980. (Mikkeli 1999: 123–125)

In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA), which had the aim of creating a single European market (SEM) within the next five years, was ratified by the member states. With the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, the European Community was transformed into the European Union, which was joined by Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. (Mikkeli 1999: 124) In 1999 and 2001, the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice were signed, which both had as their partial goal to prepare for the expected Eastern enlargement (Weidenfeld 2004: 38–39). This enlargement took place in 2004–07 with the accession of 12 new states.

The history of European integration to this day is a continuous dialectic between the national and supranational, of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. According to Weidenfeld (2004), even the whole history of Europe, not just of the integration, can be characterized as a dialectical conflict between nations, interests and world-views, and between differentiation and unification. The EU has not eradicated these tendencies, but has become a vehicle in which these tendencies play out in a peaceful manner while striving towards harmonization. (Weidenfeld 2004: 25–26)

Another way Weidenfeld describes this dialectic is as that of crisis and reform: whenever a status quo is reached, the nation-states tend to be reluctant to give it up by making reforms, even if required to do so by the appearance of novel problems. Such postponed and neglected reforms contribute to the regular crisis experiences with which the EU finds itself confronted from time to time. Sooner or later, these crises and problems finally bring about attempts at reform, which lend the EU the form it has today. (Weidenfeld 2004: 25–26)

With every furthering enlargement it has become more and more difficult to find convergence in both economic and political sense. Institutions and policies framed with the original six in mind are less applicable to a Union of a significantly larger number of member states, all with their different historical experiences, political traditions,

conceptions of nationhood, ethnicity and religion, economic development and policy structures. (Fella 2002: 3)

The member states have different reasons for having joined the Union and different ideas about the direction the integration should take: The British, the Danish, the Irish and even the French have each in their own way signaled the limits of their willingness to engage in a further integration. This is because of the implied loss of national sovereignty brought about by every further step. The question of sovereignty has indeed been central to all objections to European integration. (Cohen 2002: 260)

According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 344–345), Germany has traditionally been an eager advocate of further integration, and France, with the exception of the De Gaulle regime, has also pursued pro-European policy lines; Britain, on the other hand, has always preferred a looser form of cooperation. The Nordic states, with the exception of Finland, have also tended to view Europe as their “Other” (Hansen & Wæver 2002).

2.3 The European Monetary Union and the euro

The introduction of the euro was justified by two important needs: firstly, as a way to counter wild fluctuations in exchange rates; secondly, as a way of completing the single market; and thirdly, as a both technical and symbolic step towards a political union (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 23). While the explicitly stated motive behind introducing the euro was the gain of wealth and influence for Europe, it was also seen as the potential core for a more federalistic Europe (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 35). The euro therefore has great symbolic value for the European project. To borrow the ideas of Burgess (2002: 431), it can be viewed as a meeting point of economic rationality and cultural community.

Already in the 1960 there had been plans for a monetary union. The reason for these plans was the incompleteness of the common market: It was realized that in order for a true single market to exist, there had to be a common currency. The EEC treaty had

mentioned the need for coordinating economic policies, but the Community had been given no powers to realize this coordination. Furthermore, a single currency meant a significant loss of sovereignty for the states adopting it and would have constituted another step towards a political union. (Vanthoor 1997: 71–86)

Given impetus by the turbulences in the international monetary system in the 1960s, in 1969, Community leaders discussed the principle of an economic and monetary union (EMU) in Hague and agreed to control fluctuations in the value of their currencies and make more effort towards coordinating their national economic policies. These plans for achieving EMU were shelved at the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the ensuing international monetary turbulences. (Vanthoor 1997: 75–89)

In 1979 a new initiative was launched, carrying the name European Monetary System. It had the goal of creating a zone of monetary stability and controlling fluctuations in exchange rates. It used an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) based around an accounting tool called the European currency unit (ecu). In 1989, the Commission president Jacques Delors wanted to bring the EMU a step further by conceiving a plan with the aim of fixing exchange rates and turning the ecu into a single currency. He convinced both German and French leaders of the necessity of creating a single currency together with a single market. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany agreed, on condition of a further political integration in a federal model. (Villes 2001: 18)

The Treaty of Maastricht established the completion of the EMU as a formal aim. A number of economic convergence criteria concerning inflation rate, public finances, interest rates and exchange rate stability were set in the treaty. The “no bail out” clause of the treaty prohibited member states overtaking each other’s liabilities. All this was to ensure the stability and credibility of the common currency in the long term. The rules and regulations surrounding the common currency inscribed in the Treaty of Maastricht all in all carried a German signature, with the exception that the German demand for a political union to accompany the monetary union was not realized. (Hillenbrand 2004: 251)

In 1997 the European Council decided to adopt the Stability and Growth Pact, which was designed to ensure budgetary discipline after the euro had been created. In 1998, the independent European Central Bank (ECB) was established, modeled after the German *Bundesbank*, whose monetary policy had been deemed superior to all other European banks in the preceding decades (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 26). Like the *Bundesbank*, the ECB had the sole aim of ensuring price stability (Patomäki & Minkkinen 1997: 64). In January 1999, the third stage of the EMU was entered, whereupon the euro became a real currency (Pihkala 2008: 228).

The currency union had its critics at the time of its planning, mainly in the USA and Germany (Patomäki & Minkkinen 1997: 62; Pisani-Ferry 2011: 22). The biggest reason to reject the euro was the lack of economic convergence – dissimilar economic policies and unequal levels of competitiveness – among the states participating in the EMU. The Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact both aimed towards achieving convergence, but both have been insufficiently adhered to by the member states: Germany and France were the first members to break the deficit limits established by the Pact, which led to reforming the treaty to a more lenient direction. (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 54)

The European financial crisis that began in late 2009 has constituted a major crisis for not just the EMU but also the EU: what began as a sovereign debt crisis has turned into an existential crisis for the project of European integration. Even if not all member states are members of the EMU, the currency union is a key aspect of the EU: so much so that the impending collapse of the EMU during the financial crisis has put the legitimacy and viability of the whole European project into question. The crisis has revealed the faults of the EMU, and for some commentators it marks a crossroads between disintegration on one hand and further integration towards a federal state on the other (e.g. Patomäki 2013).

2.4 Europe and the nation-state

While the EU was founded in order to overcome the destructive effects of nationalism by means of introducing a supranational order, nations continue to play a role in the shaping of the EU. The EU has also shaped the nations participating in the integration project, not just by them having to adopt its rules and regulations, but also by shaping their identity. In this sense, EU has become synonymous with Europe, and during the process of integration the member states (and even non-member states), have had to define their relationship vis-à-vis Europe: this relationship can be conceptualized with the help of the term *nation-state identity* (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002; Marcussen & Roscher 2002), based on Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory. This will pave way for introducing the post-structuralist model of Waever (2002, 2005) in section 2.5.1.

2.4.1 Nation-state identity

According to Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002: 292) nation-state identities are social identities defining social groups on the basis of mostly territorial criteria; they construct the “imagined community” of a nation-state (see also Anderson 1986). They are closely linked to ideas about sovereignty and statehood, and often contains visions of just political and social orders (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 292).

Any identity is defined in relation to what it is not, so every identity requires an “Other”: an “us” requires a “them” (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 291). In order for an identification process to occur – a sense of inclusion and belonging – a simultaneous construction and exclusion of the ‘Other’ is necessary (Olausson 2010: 143). Creating internal cohesion by means of establishing an external threat has been a universal feature of nation- and state-building in Europe and elsewhere (Wintle 1996: 20): France, Germany and Britain have each derived their identity partially from their mutual historical rivalry. Similarly, ‘Europe’ can become the “other” against which the national community is demarcated (Stråth 2002).

The focus of Risse's and Engelmann-Martin's (2002) as well as Marcussen's and Roscher's (2002) investigation is on the historically shifting conceptualizations of the nation-state identity vis-à-vis Europe in France, Germany and Britain. The authors stress the role of political elites in formulating, manipulating and bringing about shifts in the nation-state identity. Especially in defining the relationship between the nation-state identity and Europe, shifts in this relationship are the result of instrumental and power-related interests. However, existing nation-state identities also define how actors view their instrumental interests (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 293).

According to all the authors, nation-state identities tend to be enduring and not subject to frequent re-negotiation. This is explained partly by social identity theory: social identities are unlikely to change frequently, and partly because nation-state identities are embedded into existing formal and informal political institutions. (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 293; Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 330)

Since the beginning of European integration after World War II, member states participating in the integration project have had to define their nation-state identities not just in relation to themselves, but also in relation to Europe and its deepening integration. Political visions and identity constructions about "Europe" and European order influence and are incorporated into collective nation-state identities to the degree that they resonate with national political cultures, with national political institutions and the ideas about political order embedded in them (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 293).

According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 333–334), ideas about Europe usually appear in various national colors in order to appeal to elite groups and to wider public opinion. Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002: 293) also state that each nation has different ideas of what Europe is or should be, based on the ideas of political order and identity embedded in their own nation-state concept. Marcussen and Roscher delineate five ideal-typical identity constructions, which have been prevalent in different countries during different points in history:

- Liberal-nationalist: “we” confined to the nation-state, political sovereignty in the nation-state; “Europe of Nation States” (Great-Britain, De Gaulle’s France)
- Europe as a community of values (early years of Cold War, re-emerged to some extent after the end of east-west conflict)
- Europe as a third force: a democratic socialist alternative between capitalism and communism, overcoming the boundaries of the Cold War order (French socialist and German social democrats in the early 1950s)
- Modern Europe as a part of the Western Community based on liberal democracy and social market economy (consensual in the Federal Republic of Germany in the late 1950s and underlies more recent changes in French collective nation-state identity)
- Christian Europe (*Abendland*) based on Christian, particularly Catholic, values including strong social obligations. This identity construction of Europe was common among the Christian Democratic Parties in France and Germany during the 1950s, but then increasingly amalgamated with the modern Westernized idea of Europe. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 333).

According to the authors (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 333–334), these five conceptions were heavily contested during the 1950s, and only two of them remained in the dominant discourses of the three countries in the 1990s: the *liberal nationalist* Europe and the modern Western idea of *Europe as a liberal democracy*. The authors point out however that both of these concepts come in their own distinct national colors.

2.4.2 Transformation of nation-state identity: critical junctures

According to Risse and Engelmann Martin (2002) and Marcussen and Roscher (2002), nation-state identities, like all social identities, are unlikely to change frequently. This is due to the fact that the complex and contradictory inputs from the social world are usually integrated into existing cognitive schemes and stereotypes or rejected if they do not fit existing world-views. Therefore nation-state identities are not constantly being renegotiated or questioned and tend to be enduring. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 330)

Change is still possible, however. According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 331–332), there is always some leeway for political elites to make changes in the nation-state identity. This happens particularly at so-called *critical junctures*, when attempts at re-articulating the nation-state identity will have the strongest likelihood of succeeding.

Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 331) define critical junctures as perceived crisis situations that can be complete policy failures, but they can also be triggered by external events: examples in the case of German nation-state identity are World War II and the Nazi regime; for the French nation-state identity, it was the end of the Cold War. The authors claim that in such instances, when old ideas about political order and nation-state have either become irrelevant or failed, elites start promoting new ideas that are more fitting to the newly emerged situation and are line with their own instrumental and power interests (ibid.). The euro crisis can also be held as an instance of a critical juncture. Figure 1 is graphic representation of the life-cycle of nation-state identity, in which a critical juncture represents an opening for redefinition.




Figure 1. The life-cycle of nation-state identities. Reproduced from Marcussen & Roscher (2002: 330).

According to Marcussen and Roscher, due to the enduring nature of nation-state identities, which have their basis in national myths that have become embedded in national institutions and political cultures, there is never complete freedom in

formulating a new nation-state identity. The authors state that in order to be considered legitimate, the new identities need to resonate in some way with what was already in place. The authors call this fit between the nation-state identity and “Europe” *resonance*. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 331)

In this study, the European financial crisis is treated as an instance of a critical juncture, which has the potential to introduce a shift in how the German nation-state identity is redefined and renegotiated in relation to “Europe”. This renegotiation takes place in both the public statements of elites themselves, in the ways they justify their actions, and also in the media that report, contextualizes, interprets and evaluates these statements. In order to better understand how such renegotiation takes place, the concept of *discourse* needs to be introduced. The next section will introduce the general discourse theoretical framework used in this study, while in 2.5.1, a more specific model will be introduced which serves as the foundation of the analysis. This model also has many commonalities with the social psychological approach in the preceding sections, but has the advantage of being more detailed and, due to being based on post-structural discourse theory, lends itself better to an analytical approach based on language.

2.5 Post-structuralist discourse theory

In linguistics, the traditional definition of the term discourse is a linguistic unit, whether written or spoken, which extends beyond the level of individual sentences, i.e. what is often referred to as ‘text’ (Warnke 2007b). Discourse analysis in this sense investigates the way individual sentences or stretches of speech form coherent wholes (Mills 2001: 132). The definition of the term discourse within this study, however, is based on the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1972) and other post-structural theorists, most notably Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985).

The post-structural definition of discourse refers to structures of knowledge that extend beyond the level of individual statements and texts, forming a kind of ultimate context

that delineates what can meaningfully be said about any given topic in a society, whereby they “systematically form the objects about which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 48). This definition has influenced a wide variety of disciplines from philosophy, history, and literary theory, to sociology and social psychology.

Post-structuralism is based on a theoretical paradigm called structuralism. According to structuralist theory, phenomena of human cultural and societal life are only understandable in terms of their interrelations. These interrelations form an underlying structure, in which each individual element receives its meaning through its relationship to other elements within the system. Within linguistics the structuralist paradigm was first introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure in his seminal work *Course in General Linguistics* (1988). According to Saussure’s theory, the signs of a language derive their meaning not from reference to an external world, but from their relationships to each other. The network of signs that constitute a sign system can be visualized as a fishing net, of which each sign forms a knot (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 11).

While in the Saussurean tradition the meaning of each sign is fixed as in an immovable crystal grid of sign relations (*langue*), post-structural theory has moved away from this notion towards seeing meanings as arising from fluid web of interrelations, which means change in meanings is possible over time. In post-structuralist thought, signs form open-ended chains (Derrida 1977) and their meaning can shift in accordance with the contexts in which they are articulated. The interest of structuralism in underlying structures has been traded for the focus on practice, language in use, and on the possibility for meaning to change. While not a post-structuralist thinker himself, Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later work summarizes the view of language characteristic of post-structuralism: “the meaning of a word is in its use” (Wittgenstein 1990: 18).

In the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), which is the theory underlying the model introduced in the next section, the signs forming the web of interrelations are potentially subject to struggles and negotiations which attempt to modify and redefine their meaning. These struggles and negotiations for meaning take place in actual social contexts where language is used. There is a constant attempt to fix the meanings of

signs by placing them in relation to each other, that is, as if trying to freeze the web of sign relations into place. The fixation of meaning can never be completely attained, however, since meaning is ultimately inherently contingent: possible, but not necessary. The aim of discourse analysis is to map out struggles to fix the meaning of signs in particular ways, and the processes by which some fixations of meanings become so conventionalized so as to be regarded as natural. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 25)

A discourse is the fixation of meaning in a particular domain (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 26). It is the structured totality resulting from articulatory practices that establish a relation among signs, modifying their identity in the process. When signs in their differential positions are articulated within a discourse, they are called *moments*; in contrast, signs not discursively articulated are called *elements*. (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105)

Moments are nodes in the web of meanings, which acquire their meaning from their relationship to other signs in the web. Every discourse is formed by the partial fixation of meaning around certain *nodal points* (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112). A nodal point is a privileged sign from which the other signs acquire their meanings. As an example, in medical discourse, 'the body' forms a nodal point from which signs such as 'symptoms', 'tissue', and 'scalpel' acquire their meanings by being related to 'the body' in particular ways. 'Democracy' is a nodal point in (some) political discourses, and in nationalist discourse it is 'the people'. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 26)

Since the specific meaning of a discursive nodal point is derived from their position in a certain discourse, they are in themselves empty, for instance the sign 'body' in medical discourse. Therefore 'body' is both a nodal point within a specific discourse as well as an element. Elements that are particularly open for different meaning ascriptions are called *floating signifiers*. So while nodal points are points of crystallization within a specific discourse, floating signifiers are signs that different discourses struggle to define in their own way. In the case of medical discourse, the nodal point 'body' is also a floating signifier since it is subject to alternative definitions within other discourses.

(Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 28–29) The sign ‘Europe’ has also been called a floating signifier (Diez 1999, 2002).

In discourse theory, the reproduction and transformation of meaning are understood as political acts, be it in language or in other forms of action. Politics is defined broadly as the manner in which the social world is constituted in ways that exclude other ways. Politics is the struggle over who has the power to define the way society is organized, and therefore it is also a struggle over whose meanings are accepted as the ‘right’ meanings.

The aphorism “One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” points to the fact that descriptions are not neutral, but rather can represent the phenomenon from different angles and points of view and are therefore attempts to ascribe meaning in differing and sometimes mutually excluding ways.

Every descriptive statement is essentially informed by a certain perspective and certain interests, bound to the socio-cultural position of a social actor (Habscheid 2009: 82). Floating signifiers are the particular junctions in which different actors and different discourses try to promote their own interpretations. ‘Democracy’ and ‘freedom’ could be such ‘hot’ and contested concepts. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36) ‘Europe’ represents another such contested concept (Diez 2002).

Since a fixation of signs in a certain way typically excludes all other possible meanings the signs could have, a discourse is effectively a reduction of possibilities. It is an attempt to create a unified system of meaning by fixing the signs in their mutual relationships (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 27). Like signs themselves, discourses are defined by what they are not. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, what is excluded from the discourse is called the *field of discursivity* (1985: 111). The field of discursivity of a given discourse contains all the surplus meaning that was excluded from that discourse.

Sometimes, some representations of the world seem so natural that there appear to be no alternatives. Their seeming naturalness obscures the fact that they too are contingent

products of past discursive articulation, and could possibly be different. In discourse theory, those discourses that have established themselves as natural or common sense are called *objective* (Laclau 1990: 34, cited in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36). The meanings produced by such discourses are considered as facts of everyday life. As Berger and Luckmann (1966: 23) state about the reality of everyday life, “It is simply *there*, as self-evident and compelling facticity.” The authors refer to the process whereby the source of the social world in human action becomes forgotten as *reification*, which means that “[h]uman meanings are no longer understood as world-producing but being, in their turn, products of the ‘nature of things’” (ibid.: 89).

Objectivity can be understood as the process of reifying that which is contingent as essential and natural. Objectivity is the historical outcome of political struggle; it is a *sedimented* discourse that is not presently subject to being problematized in new articulations, but could become so in the future. The concept of a nation-state, which is also the object of this study, has often been described as something that is regarded as self-evident, natural and objective part of the world (Greenfeld 1992; Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2010)

In discourse theory, objectivity is equated with *ideology*. In the Marxist tradition (e.g. Althusser 1971), ideology is regarded as ‘false consciousness’ that distorts true social relations. Ideology in this view is therefore something that obscures truth, a position which has been criticized by Foucault (1979). This view implies that truth is attainable, and it is the specifically the analyst’s viewpoint that is objective and ‘scientific’, For Foucault, all knowledge is discursively constituted, and in his conception knowledge is intimately tied with power. Truth is not something that can be established extradiscursively – as Foucault (1981: 67) famously states, “There is no prediscursive providence disposing the world in our favor”. According to Foucault, it is through the effects of power that some claims (such as those made by science) attain the label of truth.

Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory adopts a position similar to Foucault that truth is unattainable, since all social relations, all perspectives and the idea of what is true is

discursively constructed. Ideology, defined as objectivity, is simply that which is seen as self-evident. Since there are at any given point in time large aspects of our social world that are taken for granted, on which the functioning of society is dependent, a society completely devoid of ideology would be inconceivable in Laclau's and Mouffe's terms (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 18).

One such ideology is nationalism: many authors, such as Greenfeld (1992), Billig (1995), Calhoun (1997) and Özkirimli (2010) have argued that the ideology of nationalism is not something to be relegated only to extremist and secessionist movements, but is instead a more fundamental part of how humans have given meaning to and thereby organized their social world in the last 200 years. They define nationalism as "style of thought" (Greenfeld 1992) or as a "discursive formation" (Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2010), which serves as a legitimation for the existence of nation-states.

The notion that nation-states are seen as self-evident and enduring part of the social world is also in line with the Social Identity Theory introduced in the previous section, according to which nation-state identities, like all social identities, tend to be enduring and not subject to frequent renegotiation. Although a distinction must hereby be introduced between the concept of nation(-state) and particular variations of it (nation-state identities), from the point of view of discourse theory both the general concept and particular variations originate from and partake in the same discourse of nationalism. According to Greenfeld (1992), the fundamental idea shared by all particular variations of nationalism is the idea of a "unique sovereign people", which in discourse theoretical terms can be defined as the *nodal point* of the nationalist discourse. A particular nation-state identity (e.g. Germany) may however have multiple different discourses which combine to form it. This is illustrated in figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Relationship between the general concept of nation(-state) and unique nation-state identities

The next section will introduce a model developed by Ole Wæver (2002, 2005), which is based on the post-structuralist discourse theory discussed in this section. This model provides a more detailed account on the interrelationship of the ideas of nation and state, and how the way this relationship is defined gives rise to different types of nation-state identities. The model also explains how these different kinds of nation-state identities are compatible with differing articulations of “Europe”.

2.5.1 Post-structuralist model of nation-state identity and Europe

The post-structuralist model of Wæver (2002, 2005) is a tool to analyze the relationships between the discourses of “nation” and “Europe”, developed for a discourse analytical approach to foreign policy analysis (see figure 2 below). In addition to Wæver, this model has been used by Bärenreuter (2002) to study the articulation of Swedish nation-state identity and its relationship to Europe in the Swedish daily press.




Figure 3. Theoretical model on the interaction between discursive constructions of nation-state identities and 'Europe' (adopted from Bärenreuter 2005: 304, based on Wæver 2002)

The model rests on the notion of layered structures, an idea based on the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). According to the model, some layers of discourse are “deeper” and more “sedimented” owing to their higher level of abstraction. The deeper levels of discourse can serve as a foundation for higher orders of discourse, which can stand in opposition to each other while still sharing codes on the level below. These deeper layers can be said to be *objective* to varying degrees (Laclau 1990: 34, cited in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36).

In Wæver’s model, discourses on the nation-state are treated as the bottom-most layer in relation to discourses on Europe, which means that discourses on the nation-state have a higher degree of sedimentation or objectivity than discourses on Europe. The discourses on Europe, on the other hand, have a more recent origin, due to which they are less sedimented and more subject to contestation. Europe can be seen as a “contested concept” (Diez 2002), which is given meaning more or less based on the more fundamental idea of the nation-state.

Wæver conceptualizes the differences between various discourses of the nation-state in terms of basic constellations of the concepts of *state* and *nation*. The question is posed: "What is the idea of the state, what is the idea of the nation, and how are the two tied together?" (Wæver 2002: 33) According to Wæver, the differences in the possible discursive articulations of the relationship between the nation and state can be divided into the ideal types of *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation*, which originate with Heinrich Meinecke (1911). In a *Kulturnation*, the state and the nation are regarded as separate, with Germany as the paradigmatic example; in a *Staatsnation*, the concepts of the state and nation are fused in a civic conception of nationhood, France as a prototype. *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation* are therefore ideal types of nation-state identities.

Discourses on nation-state identity reflecting a *Staatsnation*-type understanding will focus on political notions that the state is said to stand for, on common moral concepts (*Wertvorstellungen*), state institutions, and a shared vision of political consciousness. A

Kulturnation-type nation-state identity, on the other hand, will focus on ethnicity or culture as the decisive criteria for belonging to a nation. However, it should be remembered that these two concepts serve as ideal types and that in discourses on national identity, elements of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* are frequently combined. (Bärenreuter 2005: 195)

Wæver points out that at this level of the model, not only the use of discursive elements of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* should be considered, but also the discursive construction of the state's relation to both other states and international organizations (external dimension) as well as the "state idea as projected 'backwards' onto its constituency" (internal dimension) (Wæver 2002: 36). The external dimension of the state consists of the state's relations to other countries and international organizations. For instance, it is a question of whether a state's foreign policy characterized by a "raison d'état logic" and "power politics" or rather considered as a "moral enterprise leading to, for example, peacekeeping and support for development policies" (ibid.: 36). The state's internal dimension consists in its relation to its constituency. Wæver names three examples that imply very different ways of discursively constructing the relation between the state and its constituency: The welfare state, the socialist state and the liberal-capitalist state (ibid.: 36).

In order to show how these basic characteristics of the discursive construction of national identities influence discourses on Europe, one has to move further up in the model. At layer 2 we find the "relational position of the state/nation vis-à-vis Europe" (Wæver 2002: 37). At the second layer of analysis, attention should be paid to how "Europe" is constructed at a general level (as opposed to discourses on day-to-day politics) and how this construction fits with the respective concepts of state/nation. Questions that help to grasp the general presentation of Europe include the following: "Is Europe an arena for intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states? Is Europe a market ungoverned by state intervention? Is Europe integrating around a Western core? Is Europe all European?" (ibid.: 38).

Wæver (2002: 38) points out that for discourses on Europe to be successful, they must be constructed in a way in which they are perceived as being in accordance with the basic state-nation constellation at layer 1. This is similar to the concept of *resonance* in the social psychological account of Marcussen and Roscher (2002). If the discursive construction of Europe is in conflict with the various national understandings of state and nation, there is a fairly strong likelihood that these European narratives will be rejected, in which case pro-European discourses, in order to be successful, have to assure that this supposed threat is not “true” and that accession to the EU is thus not contradictory to (cultural) national self-understanding (Bärenreuter 2005: 197).

Lastly, on a third analytical layer, Wæver locates “the more specific European policies pursued by specific groups of actors, often political parties, thereby adding more specificity to the very general level of abstraction of level 2” (Wæver 2002: 38). It is on this layer that most day-to-day discourses are located. According to Wæver, changes on the third layer are the most minor ones and represent the type of change which can be observed in everyday political debates when politicians change their line of argumentation concerning a particular political issue. Changes on the second layer, on the other hand, already require a more profound change in the discursive structure and presuppose actors that try to reformulate the discursive connections between the basic definition of state/nation and Europe (ibid.: 38). Wæver points out however that although the three discursive layers are distinguished analytically, this does not imply that three distinct discourses can be found. “Rather, each discourse on Europe comprises – or articulates itself around – all three levels simultaneously” (ibid.: 33). In Bärenreuter's view, the focus can however be different depending on the text analyzed (Bärenreuter 2005: 197).

According to Wæver (2002: 38), the most resistant to change are discourses located on the first layer, as the fundamental conceptions of state and nation tend to have a long history, only change gradually, and are often heavily laden with emotion. This is of course in line with the assertion of Social Identity Theory made in section 2.4.2 that nation-state identities, because they are embedded in political culture and institutions,

are less likely to be subjected to renegotiation. It is also in line with approaches to nationalism which see it as an all-pervading ideology that renders the idea of nation-state as a self-evident reality. Diez (2002: 15) argues however that Wæver generally overestimates the continuity of the nation-state concept, as it too is continually reconstructed through discursive practice.

Diez (2002: 14) also points out that the emphasis that Wæver and other theorists of the Copenhagen school of foreign policy analysis lay on the nation-state concept as the fundamental organizing principle of discourses on Europe is insofar misplaced that there can be other discourses at play, such as that of the economy. This issue was already hinted at in figure 1 in the last section, where particular nation-state identities were pictured as being formed at the intersection of both the more universal discourse of nationalism as well as other discourses that might be different in the case of each nation-state. This is an important point to keep in mind. While the general focus of the analysis can be on the concepts of nation and state, it should also be observed how they configure in other discourses to articulate a nation-state identity at a particular point in history.

The next section will give a specific account of how the German nation-state identity has been articulated over time, in terms of its state and nation components, and in terms of its relationship to Europe. This historical outline is mostly based on the accounts of Wæver (2005), Marcussen and Roscher (2002) and Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002), as well as other authors. This account provides a historical context for the analysis of chapter 5.

2.5.2 Articulation of German nation-state identity from late 19th century to early 21st century

According to Wæver (2005), the German concept of nation-state is characterized by the separation between the state and the nation. At a time when the ideology and discourse of nationalism was gaining a foothold in Europe, the experience of Germany was characterized by the fact that it was not a unified state, in contrast to important

neighbors such as France. Because of this, Germany had to found its nationhood on the existence of a community bound by language and culture instead of on the existence of a state. (Wæver 2005: 46)

According to Brubaker (1992: 1), since the development of national feeling preceded the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally conceived politically nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community, and as an irreducible particular *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The German Romantics like Herder did not even conceive of the importance of the state: their focus was more on the nation as an ethno-cultural phenomenon. For a while statehood was not even aspired to, but the current state of affairs was idealized as it allowed for the cultivation of a deeper, truer nation. (Wæver 2005: 46)

It was later in the wake of Napoleonic wars that the necessity of state was seen. The German idea of the state was by itself shaped by romanticism and German idealism. According to Wæver, German idealism involved the thinking of “strong concepts”: therefore, the state that was thought of was characterized by power. In the definition of the historian Heinrich von Treitschke, “the nature of the state is first power, then secondly power, and thirdly again power.” This concept of a power state is a German creation: more abstract, more absolute and more defined by power than elsewhere. (Wæver 2005: 46–47)

The German nation-state identity underwent a complete overhaul after World War II. The form this reconstruction took is summed up by the novelist Thomas Mann: “We do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany”. This became the mantra of West German elites in the post WWII Germany and was generally shared by the public opinion (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 340). To be a “good German” even today means to be a “good European” and to wholeheartedly support European integration; to be a “good European German” also means to have overcome the country’s militarist and nationalist past and to have learned the right lessons from history (Risse & Engelmann-

Martin 2002: 287).

According to Wæver (2005: 47), after WWII the concept of the power state was problematized; negated, but not forgotten. This manifested itself in a constitutional system that counteracted any concentration of power and by tying Germany to international organizations, mainly the EU. At the same time, in the wake of the Nazi regime, the nation was just as problematic a concept as the state. The solution was to adopt the identity of the *Holocaust nation*, as the only responsible way to being German was now to fight nationalism, war and power politics. First and foremost, the re-emergence of a strong and exalted German state had to be prevented. (ibid.: 48)

After 1945 the newly founded CDU, with Konrad Adenauer in its lead, embraced European unification as an alternative to the nationalism of the past. Christianity, democracy and social market economy became the three pillars onto which a collective European identity was based, sharply distinguished from the past. Germany's Nazi past was seen as Europe's "Other". Supporting European integration was a means of integrating Germany into the West and overcoming the Nazi legacy (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 340–341). The postwar Germany had also embraced federalism as its own administrative model and with it a new identity: German citizens would refer to their country as "Federal Republic" (*Bundesrepublik*) more often than they would call it "Germany" (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 33–34)

Throughout the early 1950s there was no elite consensus on German post-war identity, however: different conclusions were drawn from the legacy of WWII. From the 1960s onwards a federalist consensus prevailed. Political elites embraced the modern Western view of Europe, with Germany's past and Communism as Europe's "Other". (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 342)

German unification did not result in reconsideration of the European orientation (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 308). Even though the reunification can be said to have "normalized" Germany and reinstated its national sovereignty, it was still the elite consensus to sacrifice actual sovereignty in order to further European integration and to

prevent Germany from becoming isolated (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 63).

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, like his French colleague Jacques Delors, was largely in favor of European integration and saw it natural to extend the German federalist model to the European level (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 34). The political elite shared the consensus of dropping the D-Mark in favor of the euro, even if the majority of the public was against it (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 62).

For the German citizens, the D-Mark was more than just an economic instrument: it was a national symbol (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 64). According to Pisany-Ferry the D-Mark was an emblem of national pride, much like the football team and the export industry, and acted as a substitute for a national flag that the Germans could not, owing to their history, make into symbol of the nation. Pisany-Ferry states that the decision to accept that the *Mark* would in essence be shared with others was a meaningful decision, since this is what it meant if the euro was introduced (Pisany-Ferry 2011: 34).

Chancellor Kohl succeeded in framing the question about the Euro as *the* symbol of European integration and its adoption as an existential question between more Europe or a return to nationalism. Even those who opposed the EMU did not dare to touch the German consensus on European integration, but their criticism took the form of asking for a delay or demanding that the convergence criteria be strictly applied. To the extent that there was debate on the Euro, it was framed in terms of German Europeanness versus Deutsche Mark patriotism. Supporters of the EMU tried to emphasize that the Euro would be equal in strength and stability to the D-Mark, whereas critics doubted this could be possible. The insistence on the convergence criteria was to reassure the German public of the stability of the single currency, mainly because the hyperinflation prior to World War II still lingered in its collective memory. (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 308–312)

According to Wæver, post-unification Germany is an emerging battle about the nature of the state. There have been two types of arguments in the German political discourse for the continuing negation of the power state. One line of argument, represented by

pacifist Greens and Social Democrats, is that the power state must be avoided for moral reasons, because the danger of it leading to power politics, nationalism, and wars. Another argument from the Center-Right of the political spectrum also takes the anti-state position, but is based more historical and geographical grounds. According to this line of argument, should a balance of power pattern re-emerge in Europe, Germany would be in a losing position for being in the center. Both lines of argument, although their reasoning is different, end up at the same conclusion: Germany must strive for a different Europe (beyond the nation-state, not characterized by a balance of power) and a different Germany (not a power state). (Wæver 2005: 55)

Nonetheless, there is also a third line of argumentation that challenges the anti-state position of the former two. According to this position, a nation-state has to have space for maneuvering politically and a political-military profile, because that is the nature of the nation-state. Because Germany was now unified, it had to reclaim its position as a 'normal' nation-state. On the whole, the key word in the debates has been 'normality'. This normalization has been articulated on a more philosophical level by a strand of thinkers who are called neostatists. Their aim is to rehabilitate the state, and break the negation surrounding the power state. (Wæver 2005: 56–57)

Although the elite consensus concerning a "European Germany" has largely remained untouched up to the 21st century, the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) is said to have embodied the neostatist position in defending Germany's right to have its own way and its own national interests and by initially raising concerns regarding the continuity in German policy towards the European Union (Wæver 2005: 57). The changes on the whole have however been at the level of style and rhetoric and not so much in content. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 344). According to Wæver (2005: 57), as of 2004, the German government was still far from adopting the old power state logic, even if isolated statements from chancellors and opinion could lead one to conclude that neostatism was the new direction. However in Wæver's (2005: 57–58) view the public discourse suggests that the leading elite in years of the 21st century was still behind the idea of an anti-power state: Germany did have own views and interests, but these were viewed through the lens of the European vision. Any solution for

Germany was European.

German Europeanness does contain unique national elements. Europe's "other" is not another part of the world, but both Germany's and Europe's past of militarism and balance of power. This new Europe is therefore seen in the first place as a stable peace order in an almost Kantian vein, combining cooperation with external partners with liberal democracy internally. The German vision of European order is also characterized by the German domestic model of cooperative federalism: the "United States of Europe" are not seen as a unitary state with a strong central government, but as a distinctively federalist order. (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 314–315).

According to Wæver (2005: 42), Europe and the EU are essential for the central narration of what Germany is and where it is heading, and should the integration project collapse, the meaning of "Germany" would have to be radically rearticulated. The financial crisis in Europe therefore not only has the future and identity of the "project Europe" at stake, but also presents a turning point for the formulation of Germany's identity and position in Europe.

The figure below displays different articulations of Germany's nation-state identity in different periods of time. The basic ideas of German state and nation are formulated as "state is power" and "nation is culture". The different articulations of nation-state identity are based on either affirming or suppressing these basic components, denoted by the +/- signs on the second row. Each of these couplings also entails different conceptualizations of Europe. The articulations of the Merkel era (2005 – today) are yet to be studied. The present study will however contribute to an understanding of the euro crisis as a turning point in how Germany's identity is understood.




Figure 4. Different articulations of German nation-state identity (adopted from Wæver 2005)

3 EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES

This chapter introduces the types of texts analyzed in this study: editorials and commentaries. The aim is to provide an overview of these text types in terms of their function and structure, which will provide an understanding of these texts as particular kinds of communicative acts with a certain status in the constellation of communicative acts within a society. This will better allow to both justify the choice of material in this study as well as to contextualize the findings. We will first look at the general category of media texts, its subcategory journalistic texts and how these can be classified into several text types (genres) according to both the communicative functions they realize and other criteria. Then we will investigate the functions and characteristics of editorials and commentaries.

3.1 Journalistic texts and text functions

Editorials and commentaries are a genre of journalistic texts, which themselves are a subcategory of media texts (Burger 2005: 64). Media texts in general intend to engage their audience, convey information and produce reactions in their audiences (Briggs & Cobley 2002). Media texts and especially journalistic texts play a significant role in both formulating and shaping political opinion (Wittkämper 1992; Bucher & Straßner 1991; Le 2010) and acting as “fourth power” and a mediator between the state and the people (Stober 1992). According to Thompson (1995: 15), media wield symbolic power within society, which is interconnected with political power. Media texts are therefore also important loci for the manifestation of ideology and discourse (Van Dijk 1988; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995), also pertaining to the nation(-state) (e.g. Anderson 1983; Billig 1995; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010; Mihelj 2011) and Europe (e.g. Bärenreuter 2005; Olausson 2010).

According to Burger, journalistic texts can be categorized both in terms of their *structure* and *function* (2005: 207). Structurally journalistic texts can take both

monological and dialogical forms; interviews are an example of the latter. As functions Burger names the list of Brinker (2001): information, appeal, obligation, contact and declaration. Burger also introduces the text type typology of Lüger (1995), which is also based on communicative functions. According to this typology, journalistic texts typically fall into the following categories:

- Texts with a focus on information
- Texts with a focus on expressing opinion
- Texts with a call to action
- Texts with the aim of instructing
- Contact-oriented texts with the aim of gaining attention

This typology can be seen as an inventory of ideal types based on and corresponding to text functions. Burger groups information-oriented texts with the communicative function of informing and both texts with an opinion orientation and texts with the instruction orientation under the appeal function (2005: 209), henceforth called informative and appellative texts. Burger does not consider all the text classes as relevant for categorizing journalistic texts; for instance, contact-oriented texts and texts calling to action do not stand out for him as independent text classes within the journalistic sphere (2005: 209). Burger finally narrows down his selection of informative and appellative text classes.

Located below text types in the order of specificity are genres. A genre can be defined as a routinized communicative action within a society (Günthner & Knoblauch 1995) or as “standardized models” of texts (Burger 2005: 208). According to Brinker (2010: 125), genres are conventional models for complex linguistic actions, which can be described as typical combinations of contextual (situational), communicative-functional and structural (grammatical and thematical) characteristics.

Burger lists the following journalistic genres: news message, report, coverage, editorial, commentary and interview. As per Brinker’s (2010) definition, all these genres have

specific defining characteristics and predominantly manifest one or more of the communicative functions. In addition to the communicative functions, Burger (2005) differentiates genres according to the following criteria:

- The type of thematic unfolding (narrative, descriptive, argumentative).
- The breadth of internal details, i.e. to what extent the text answers the questions *what, where, who, when* etc.
- Intertextual text history: how did the text come to be and is there a specific individual author?
- Synchronic intertextuality: is the text referring to other texts in the newspaper?
- The perspective from which the text is written, and whether it is that of the author or someone else's.
- The presence of the author in the text, the role (s)he takes and the type of situation in which it is taken.

In accordance with these criteria, Burger distinguishes a simple news message from a report (both informative texts), and both from a coverage, which has characteristics of a both informative and an appellative text due to the strong perspective of the journalist (Burger 2005: 211). On the other end of the spectrum Burger places commentaries, which are characterized by a strong emphasis on the appellative function.

Burger's typology does not include editorials, but as we shall see, they have many features in common with the commentary. Before discussing the definition of a commentary as given by Burger, let us first have a look at the characteristics and functions of an editorial.

3.2 Editorial

Research on the history and functions of the editorial is very limited (Lagonikos 2005). The existing research has been summarized well by Lagonikos (2005). Accounts of the

structure and function of the editorial have been formulated by MacDougall (1973), Stonecipher (1979) as well as Van Dijk (1996). Their accounts will be presented here briefly.

The editorial is usually located in the same position every day, clearly distinguished from the other sections of the newspaper, which has an important symbolic function in separating the editorial from more purely informative articles (Fowler 1991: 208). The editorial is the place within a newspaper where the ideology of the newspaper is clarified, re-established and reasserted in relation to troublesome events, and where the paper speaks in the most direct manner to its readership, presenting its perception of reality in the form it deems most suitable for the readers (Le 2010: 17). Through editorials, newspapers use their "expert voices" to interpret news but at the same time implicitly construct reality from a particular world-view (Jaworski-Galasinski 2002: 643). Editorial writers decide what events and issues are important and how they should be interpreted (Hulteng 1973)

According to van Dijk (1996: 2), editorials "play a role in the formation and change of public opinion, in setting the political agenda, and in influencing social debate, decision making and other forms of social and political action." Van Dijk (ibid.: 15) ascribes editorials to a larger class of opinion discourse. Hulteng (1973: 13) states that the purpose of the editorial is often to stimulate readers into action, but in an implicit way, and to provide "benchmarks" for the readers in order to test thinking against and shape conclusions about events and what they mean.

According to Rystrom (1983), the editorial writer's position within a newspaper is more prestigious than that of a normal journalist. Hulteng (1973) characterizes the editorial writer as "a combination of philosopher, historian, advocate and educator". Hulteng (1973) points out however that the editorial writer does not have complete freedom in what (s)he chooses to write, but is to a certain extent under pressure to follow the newspaper's policy, decided by the newspaper's editorial boards.

However, the editorial of today may have less power than it used to, according to Seymour-Ure (1991: 43): Compared to the editorial of the past, which was “the definitive corporate statement of a paper’s opinions, the editorial today is less special owing to the increasing personalization of the press. This means that editorials are often signed, as is the case with the editorials of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* used in this study.

Additionally, newspapers include analyses in more sections of their newspapers, and as a result the editorial pages are competing with news sections, which means that one single editorial voice is slowly becoming less powerful than when the opinion article first appeared in newspapers (Lagonikos 2005: 23). Commentaries, discussed below, can be seen a section that shares many characteristics with the editorial, as we shall see.

There are several accounts of the structure of an editorial. Here, three will be presented. According to Stonecipher (1979: 40), an editorial is like an essay, in that it consists of an *introduction*, a *body* and a *conclusion*, where these parts do not have to appear in the order every time like in an essay. MacDougall (1973: 60), on the other hand, delineates the editorial into a *subject* or *news peg*, *the reaction* and *the reasons*. According to Van Dijk (1996: 2), a modern editorial has the following parts: 1) *Summary of the event*; 2) *evaluation of the event* (especially of actions and actors, in terms of good and bad, right and wrong, involving the opinions, values and underlying ideologies of the newspaper), and 3) *pragmatic conclusion* as a recommendation, advice or warning (answering the question “What’s next?”). These models are all presented in table 1 below.

Table 1. Structural theories of editorials (reproduced from Lagonikos 2005: 27)

MacDougall 1973	Stonecipher 1979	Van Dijk 1996
Subject / News Peg	Introduction	Summary
The Reactions	Body	Evaluation
The Reasons	Conclusion	Pragmatic Conclusion

Taking Van Dijk’s model as a basis as the most recent of these models, we can see that each section realizes a different textual function in terms of the functions listed in the

last section. The *summary* serves the informative function, and *evaluation* and *pragmatic conclusion* both serve the appellative function, as per Burger (2005). Using Burger's questions for determining the characteristics genre, we can come to the following types of answers based on everything that has been said so far:

Table 2. Characteristics of an editorial

Main communicative function	Appellative
Type of thematic unfolding	Descriptive-argumentative
The breadth of internal details	Answers to <i>what, where, who, when</i> included in the summary of the event, which form the basis of an evaluation
Intertextual text history	Based on the stance of the editorial board of a newspaper on an issue, has an author but can be unsigned
Synchronic intertextuality	The literature is not clear on whether an editorial can refer to other texts in the newspaper
Perspective of the text	Reflects the policy of the whole newspaper
Presence and role of the author in the text	The author does not refer to himself, but might refer to the newspaper as a "we"

Now we have come to a better understanding of what constitutes an editorial. Understood as a communicative act, it has the primary function of taking an evaluative stance on a current issue, while bringing forth arguments to back up this stance. Because of this and because of the position an editorial has in the larger universe of

texts – the status and the prestige the editorial section of especially a large newspaper is attributed with – it is a political communicative act due to its none too insignificant role in the negotiation of meaning within society.

3.3 Commentary

The function of commentaries is very similar to that of editorials. They are opinion articles which have the function of putting forth certain preferred perspectives about the world (Lavid, Arús & Moratón 2012). According to Wang (2008: 170), the purpose of commentaries is to offer the readers a perspective on important public matters, delivered in a distinctive and sometimes authoritative voice. Commentaries are typically written by academics, journalists and other experienced native language writers (Wang 2007: 3) and exert an important influence on political opinion-formation, both on the everyday reader and on the institutional and/or elite members of a society (Van Dijk 1998).

According to Burger (2005: 215), a commentary has the following characteristics:

- it is a “dependent” text type acting as complement to a report, the information of which is assumed to be known
- it carries its author’s name
- a subjective viewpoint expressed in a commentary is not only tolerated but demanded, even if it often concurs with the official line of the newspaper
- there is a prevalent use of evaluating language, not bound to a specific part of the text, and these evaluations are often emotionally loaded
- Accordingly, the language is expressive with a wide use of metaphors, idioms etc.
- The evaluations are supported by an argumentative text structure, and the argumentation can turn out into an exhortation (although it is not a rule), whereby it is directed not so much at the reader as to politicians and institutions.

From this list we can see that the commentary shares many features with the editorial: subjective viewpoint and an evaluative style supported by argumentation. The exhortation, which according to Burger is not a necessary feature of the genre, is similar to the pragmatic conclusion at the end of an editorial according to Van Dijk's (1996) model. The main differences between the two genres are that the commentary is dependent on an accompanying report and carries its author's name, whereas an editorial is an independent piece of writing and can be unsigned.

Most importantly, however, both of these text types are consciously participating in and shaping public political discourse and can therefore be considered as important expressions of and contributions to the official discourse – both in the sense of discussion as well as in the sense used in this study – on any given topic. This is also the reason why they have been chosen as the material of this study.

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4 DISCOURSE LINGUISTICS

The model introduced here comes from German *Diskurslinguistik* (discourse linguistics, DL) that uses a thoroughly linguistic methodology (as opposed to an interdisciplinary approach in some other forms of discourse analysis) in order to study discourses as they appear across a large number of texts. DL has concerned itself with applying Foucault's ideas of discourse within a linguistic framework (Warnke 2007). While it is understood that discourse encompasses necessarily more than language, and that linguistic discourse analysis is therefore a sub-field for interdisciplinary discourse analysis, there have been attempts to specify discourse as a linguistic object and to provide a set of tools for grasping as much of discourse by linguistic means as possible (e.g. Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a).

Within DL, discourse is understood as the collective socially stratifying and action-shaping knowledge of specific cultures and collectives (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011b: 8). According to Gardt (2007: 30), discourses are social stocks of knowledge surrounding a particular topic which are expressed in different kinds of statements and texts, are shared by social groups of varying sizes, reflect as well as influence the attitudes of the groups to this topic and thereby shape social reality as regards this topic.

DL utilizes a broad set of tools based on established linguistic concepts. Warnke and Spitzmüller (2011a, 2011b) have systematized these tools into what they call the DIMEAN model (German acronym for 'discourse multi-level analysis'). This model will be presented in the following.

4.1 DIMEAN model

The DIMEAN model is a methodological framework for linguistically oriented discourse analysis. The model consists of three basic layers:

- intratextual layer (texts)
- agent layer (actors)
- transtextual layer (knowledge, discourse)

Any discourse analysis starts at the level of individual texts, understood broadly as “all communicates, notwithstanding modality or mediality, if they are perceived as being concluded and autonomous to a significant degree” (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 91). Texts are the material manifestation of discourse, and therefore textual analysis is the entrance point into the actual matter of discourse analysis, which is the *transtextual layer*. Between the textual and the transtextual layer, the DIMEAN model posits the *agent layer*. This layer mediates between the two other layers, and consists of actors, i.e. people and social groups engaged in discourse, attempting to make their voice and put forward their definition of social reality.

The intratextual, agent and transtextual layer can themselves be further subdivided in a way that provides tools and perspectives for textual analysis. For instance, the intratextual layer is sub-divided into *word-oriented* analysis, *proposition-oriented* analysis and *text-oriented* analysis. These can be further divided into the analysis of keywords, stigmatized words and ad hoc formations on the word level; syntactic configuration (e.g. active vs. passive voice), rhetorical figures and tropes (especially metaphors), presuppositions, implicatures and speech acts on the proposition level; and text type, text strategies, topic development as well as metaphorical and lexical fields on the text level. (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 83–85)

The agent layer includes the analysis of the *roles of interaction*, i.e. the *authors* and *anticipated addressees* of the texts. Warnke and Spitzmüller emphasize the point that the interest here lies specifically in the *roles*, or the *discursively constructed personae*. In structuralist and post-structuralist terms, it is the *subject positions* rather than the actual individuals behind the texts that are of interest (see Chandler 2002: 180–181; Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 14–15). Warnke and Spitzmüller name several examples for how roles or subject positions are constituted within a text. They include self-

attributions of certain social groups, claims of expertise or authority (e.g. academic titles in signatures of letters sent to the editor), or the creation of a specific *habitus* such as that of a responsible citizen. Roles of interaction can also be constructed by referring to social groups that are addressed or explicitly not addressed. What also need to be considered are extrinsic attributions, such as expert quotes, critique on third parties, and so on. The key question is always how actors can be positioned or how they position themselves in the discourse under study. (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 85–86)

The transtextual layer, the layer of the actual discourse, is discovered at the end of the analysis of multiple texts. Discovering the transtextual layer amounts to extrapolating from the cumulative findings of the previous stages. Just as the meaning of words and sentences is ultimately determined by their context, discourse can similarly be understood as context in the broadest sense (Busse 2007). Discourse is the ultimate determinant for what counts as meaningful statements (cf. Foucault 1972). In DL, the transtextual layer is equated to knowledge: it is that which counts as true from the point of view of specific social groups in a certain domain of life. Warnke and Spitzmüller (2011a: 87) name the following phenomena as elements of the transtextual layer:

- 1) *Intertextuality* and *intermediality*
- 2) *Schemata*, i.e. collective cognitive routines that organize scenes (*frames*) or procedures (*scripts*)
- 3) *Discourse-semantic ground figures* (Busse 1997), prime figures of thought used to categorize and organized reality (e.g. ‘us’ and ‘them’)
- 4) *Topoi* (culturally rooted preconceptions)
- 5) *Metapragmatic evaluation* (ascriptions of value to linguistic and non-linguistic action, e.g. ‘talking posh’, ‘acting polite’)
- 6) *Signals for historicity* (the use of ‘old’ language as well as references to historicity, such as ‘globalese’, ‘anachronistic wording’)
- 7) *Ideologies* as sets of values and beliefs and *mentalities* as that which social groups ‘feel’, ‘want’ or ‘wish’
- 8) *The context of general debates* to which the discourse relates.

Some of the features on the above list involve their own sets of methods (such as frame analysis and topoi). However, since this is the level of discourse itself, it is possible to depart here from the DIMEAN model and apply the model outlined in 2.5.1 on this layer. This model amounts to analyzing the articulations of the concepts “nation”, “state”, “Europe”, “EU” and their mutual relationships.

To summarize, concrete discourse analysis starts at the most basic layer (texts) and from there “ascends” upwards to the more complex issues until the level of discourse is reached (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 82). Only elements that systematically appear on the lower layers and run through the corpus can be extrapolated as discursive knowledge on the transtextual layer.

The DIMEAN model as a whole is very detailed. In their own words, Warnke and Spitzmüller have proposed the DIMEAN model as a collection and systematization of what *can* be done in a linguistic discourse analysis rather than what *must* be done (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 86). The model is meant as an analytical toolbox, the application of which is determined by the research goal. The following section will outline the analytical approach used within this study, which is based on the DIMEAN model.

4.2 Application of the DIMEAN model: Keywords and semantic roles

This study focuses mainly on the *intratextual layer* for the discovery of discursive articulations, i.e. how the signs “Germany”, “Germans”, “German”, “EU” and “Europe” are defined. The focus is therefore on keywords, defined in the broad sense as words indexing the (German) nation and state. For the purpose of analysis, it is first worth making an inventory of the types of words that are typical indices for the discourse of nationalism that constructs nation-state identity. This inventory will be constructed on

the basis of previous studies that have examined the presence of nationalist discourse in the media. An analogous inventory can also be created for “Europe”.

Another important analytic tool that will be used consists in *semantic roles*. The concept of semantic roles is based on the theory of Fillmore (1971), but a similar concept of *participant roles* appears also in M.A.K. Halliday’s (1985) systemic functional grammar. While grammatical roles such as Subject and Object and grammatical cases (nominative, genitive, accusative etc.) pertain to the syntactic function of a word, semantic roles attempt to map the function of a word in terms of its meaning in the sentence, to some extent (but not completely) independent of the grammatical role of the word. This approach allows to analyze propositional content on a level that is at once abstract but also highly relevant in terms of shedding light on the way that phenomena are represented. The list of semantic roles used in this study is based on the work of both Halliday (1985) and von Polenz (2008). Although Halliday represents the tradition of systemic functional grammar while von Polenz aligns himself with valence grammar, their approaches overlap so that their approaches may be combined into a comprehensive analytical toolkit.

4.2.1 Keywords indexing nation-state and Europe

For the purpose of building an inventory of relevant word categories, some of the most important studies concerning the discourse of nationalism, also named “banal nationalism” by the pioneer of these types of studies, Michael Billig (1995), were reviewed. Billig’s study focused on his native Britain; later studies have focused both on Britain and its regions (Brookes 1999; Bishop & Jaworski 2003; Rosie, McInnes, Condor, Petersoo & Kennedy 2004; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010), on Greece (Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos & Armenakis 1999; Madianou 2002), Turkey (Yumul & Özkirimli 2000), Taiwan and South Korea (Chung 2000), China (Guo, Cheong & Chen 2007) as well as Slovenia and the US (Mihelj 2011). The studies have found that the following linguistic elements may act as indices of the nationalist discourse:

- National name (e.g. Germany) or capital city
- References to “country”, “nation”, “the people” or origin (e.g. “German” as an adjective)
- References to the state, its organs and politicians
- 3rd person plural (“we”)
- Deictic words (“here”, “there” etc.)

The above list of word categories can be used as a basis of locating keywords that provide an entry point into analyzing discursive articulations pertaining to the nation and state. A few specifying remarks still have to be made concerning the nature of some of these keywords. In the case of personal pronouns, deictic words and definite articles, the context is of great importance. When attempting to establish a link between the use of these words and a nationalist discourse, the whole context in which the words are used needs to be taken into account. For instance, the study of Rosie, McInnes, Condor, Petersoo & Kennedy (2004) found that in the case of the UK, the “we” in Scottish newspaper most often indexed the Scottish nation rather than the whole UK

In the above list a distinction has been made between words indexing the state organs (i.e. government) and words referring to the nation or the country. Billig (1995) as well as Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2009) have however shown that both the country name as well as the capital name can be used in a metonymic fashion to denote the government, whereby they can – and frequently do – occupy the position of a grammatical subject in a sentence.

The same principles and categories applied to analyzing the nationalist discourse can also be applied to analyzing “European” discourse. The EU or Europe is an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of a larger scope than the nation-state, and there have been studies analyzing the discursive construction of this European community and how it interacts with the discursive construction of the national community in the media and in political speeches (e.g. Bärenreuter 2005; Olausson 2010; Krizsán 2011). These studies have typically focused on the analysis of the first person plural and its referents.

This study also takes the first person plural into account, while also analyzing the usage and referents of the words *EU*, *Europe*, and other EU and Europe related words.

4.2.2 Predicate classes and semantic roles

Almost all sentences consist of a propositional content and an action content (von Polenz 2008: 101). In terms of Halliday's (1985) functional grammar, language can be said to have an ideational metafunction, which corresponds to von Polenz's propositional content, as well as an interpersonal metafunction, which corresponds to the action content. The propositional content or ideational metafunction concerns statements about reality. The most important element of a proposition is the *predication*, because the predicate determines what can be said. The predicate is most often a verb, although the predicate can also be realized through an adjective or a noun (von Polenz 2008: 105). In systemic functional grammar, the predicate on the level of the ideational metafunction is called the *process*.

The semantic role of any noun, adjective or adverb is determined by two factors: 1) its position in relation to the predicate and 2) the nature of the predicate itself. Because the list of semantic roles drawn upon in this study stems from both von Polenz (2008) and Halliday (1985), the predicate typologies of both authors will also be presented. Von Polenz proposes five categories or classes of predicates:

- Action predicates: denote either individual or continuous type of action by an actor of some sort.
- Process predicates: denote events and happenings which take place without agency. Also included are events of perception, cognition and affect.
- Status predicates: denote alterable physical and psychological states of living beings, objects or abstract concepts.
- Quality predicates: denote unalterable states and qualities of living beings, objects or abstract concepts. These are expressed through predicative nouns, verbs and adjectives.

- Genus predicates: denote the ascription of an object to a class, expressed solely through predicative nouns.

In Halliday's (1985) systemic functional grammar verbs are categorized in terms of several kinds of processes:

- Material processes (doing): doing (action), happening (event)
- Behavioral (behaving)
- Mental (sensing): seeing (perception), feeling (affection), thinking (cognition)
- Verbal (saying)
- Relational (being): attributing, identifying
- Existential (existing)

Table 3 shows how these process types can be mapped onto the predicate classes of von Polenz (2008).

Table 3. Comparison of predicates classes and process types

Predicate classes (Von Polenz 2008)	Process Types (Halliday 1985)
Action predicates	Material, Behavioral & Verbal processes
Process predicates	Material & Mental processes
Status predicates	Relational processes, Existential processes
Genus predicates	Relational processes

From this comparison it is evident that for von Polenz, the term *process* denotes a subclass of predicates which stand for events and “happenings” which do not involve intentional agency, while for Halliday the term process encompasses all types of predicates, which are divided into various subcategories. With von Polenz, the term process also stands for mental processes of perceiving, thinking and feeling, which Halliday puts under mental processes. Henceforth the terms *action* and *process* will be

utilized in the sense given by von Polenz, with the Hallidayan definitions being employed when needed to explain semantic roles specific to Halliday's theory.

Semantic roles pertain to the roles that nouns denoting living beings, objects and abstract concepts take in combination with verbs of different predicate classes. What follows is the list of semantic roles used within this study with their explanations. Unless otherwise indicated, the names and the definitions of the roles have been adopted from von Polenz (2008). The roles and their definitions have in part been complemented with participant roles from Halliday's (1985) systemic functional grammar.

In addition to semantic roles, a number of *circumstantial elements* from Halliday (1985) have been adopted. While some of these circumstantial elements find their equivalents in von Polenz's list of semantic roles, there is an important enough distinction between them and the participant roles in Halliday's systemic functional grammar. In Halliday's words, the participant roles are typically directly involved with the action or process indicated by the verb (1985: 131), whereas circumstantial processes – as their name indicates – reflect the circumstances in which the actions and processes take place, specifying and modifying the action or process in question. Typically these are expressed through either a preposition or an adverb.

Table 4. List of semantic roles

Semantic Role	Description	Example
Agent	A person or entity who initiates an action, whether of a temporally delimited or a continuous type, excluding cognitive processes of thinking, feeling and perceiving (see Experiencer)	"Mark built a house".
Sayer	Agent of a verbal action (from Halliday 1985)	"She told us to go home."
Patient	An entity or object that is the target of action, being done to. See also Counteragent, Affected Object, Range.	"We must protect <i>the children</i> ".
Experiencer	The Experiencer is a person or entity that experiences a mental process or state. The Hallidayan definition of a person or entity who is thinking, feeling or perceiving will be used. The object of thinking, feeling or perceiving is called the Phenomenon in Halliday's systemic functional grammar.	"I felt it was the right thing to do", "She thinks she is right", "We saw them coming".
Counteragent	A conscious entity that is the target of an interactive action (e.g. verbs of giving, telling, inviting). The difference from the Patient role consists in the interactive nature of the implied relationship.	"He invited <i>me</i> to the party"

Table 4. List of semantic roles (continued)

Range	From Halliday (1985), Range specifies the range or scope of the action or process.	“Sing a <i>song</i> ”, “Play <i>tennis</i> ”
Beneficiary / Maleficiary	Person or entity who is benefitted or harmed by an action, respectively	“She built a house for <i>her children</i> ”
Affected Object	A person, entity or object that is influenced by an action or process. Von Polenz draws no clear distinction between this role and the Patient , but the interpretation utilized here will be that with Affected Object the action will result in some implicitly or explicitly expressed change of state. See also Result .	“The people voted <i>him</i> president”, “ <i>He</i> became the chairman”
Result	Also called Effected Object, denoting a person or object that is the result of an action or a process	“He has become a completely different <i>person</i> ”

Table 4. List of semantic roles (continued)

Carrier	<p>Not a distinct role according to von Polenz (with the exception of the Possessor below), but can be defined as the subject of quality and status predicates. For Halliday, these <i>relational processes</i> and Carrier is the subject thereof in the <i>attributive mode</i> (Halliday 1985: 112). These processes can be subdivided into intensive, circumstantial and possessive types.</p>	
/ intensive	<p>intensive processes are predicative clauses ‘x is a’, where <i>x</i> is the Carrier and <i>a</i> a qualitative attribute, expressed by an adjective</p>	<p>“Sarah is wise”</p>
/ circumstantial	<p>Circumstantial processes have the form ‘x is at a’, where <i>a</i> is a spatial or temporal attribute.</p>	<p>“The queen was at the <i>parlour</i>”</p>
/ possessive (Possessor)	<p>A possessive process has the form ‘x has a’, where <i>x</i> can indicate either a possessor or a thing possessed. Also called the Possessor by von Polenz.</p>	<p>“<i>Peter</i> has a piano”, “The piano belongs to Peter”</p>

Table 4. List of semantic roles (continued)

Identified/ Identifier	In Hallidayan functional grammar, the Identifier/Identified are categories in the identifying mode of relational processes, where one entity is used to identify another. This mode corresponds to the genus predicate of von Polenz. Like the Carrier, it can be subdivided on the basis of three process types.	
/ intensive	In the intensive process 'x is a', x is the Identified and a the Identifier (a noun).	"Tom is / plays the leader"
/ circumstantial	In the circumstantial process (x is at a), a is temporal noun.	"Tomorrow is the tenth"
/ possessive	In possessive processes (x has a), the Identified can be either a thing possessed or its possessor. The difference to the Possessor is that the noun in the role of Identifier is used to identify another noun (the Identified), whereas in the case of Possessor the noun that is possessed is an attribute of the former.	"Peter owns a piano", "The piano is Peter's"

Table 5. List of circumstantial elements

Circumstantial element	Description	Example
Locative	Specifies the location of an action or process.	“I live in <i>the USA</i> ”
Goal	A place to which an action or process is directed	“He moved to <i>Chicago</i> ”
Source	A place from which an action or process originates.	“The storm came from <i>the south</i> ”
Instrument	A person, object or action which is used as means to an end in an action or process. The name of this circumstantial element comes from von Polenz; with Halliday it is called Means .	“They were shot with <i>rifles</i> ”
Quality	Characterizes the process in any kind of variable that makes sense, typically expressed by an adverb or an adverbial group.	“They were singing <i>merrily</i> ”
Comparison	Typically expressed by a prepositional phrase (like, unlike) or an adverbial group of similarity or difference.	“I was like <i>a new man</i> ”

Table 5. List of circumstantial elements (continued)

Reason	The reason for which an action or process takes place, e.g.	“She was discriminated <i>because of her gender</i> ”
Purpose	The purpose for which an action or process takes place	“They went out <i>for shopping</i> ”
Behalf	The entity on whose behalf an action or process takes place. To be distinguished from the Beneficiary in that the Beneficiary can and often does occur without a preposition, whereas the Behalf is always accompanied by a preposition.	“I’m writing <i>on behalf of my sister</i> ”
Comitative	A person with whom the Agent performs an action.	“I went there <i>with my friend</i> ”.
Additive	Represents the process as two instances, whereby both entities share the same participant function.	“Fred <i>and Tom</i> both came to visit”.
Matter	An object or entity that some other thing concerns,	“This does not concern <i>you</i> ”, “They talked about the <i>weather</i> ”

The above lists of semantic roles and circumstantial elements constitute an analytical toolkit with which texts can be approached. Firstly, they provide a useful means of categorization which allows to quantitatively trace patterns in how certain words appear in texts (as a doer, sayer, experiencer, object etc.). Secondly, they are also a helpful tool for qualitatively analyzing propositional content, even in ways which go beyond the level of an individual clause and touch upon cohesion and argumentative structure. The next chapter presents the results of analyzing the texts from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* with the help of semantic roles.

5 DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION OF GERMAN NATION-STATE IDENTITY AND EUROPE IN EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES OF THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG

This section presents the results of the analysis of the material. At the focal point of the analysis are selected keywords, which are analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The keywords selected were those related to the German nation-state, its leaders, institutions and citizens. A range of Europe and EU related keywords was also selected.

In the quantitative phase of the analysis, the frequencies of important keywords pertaining to the research question have been counted. The next step was to categorize these keywords according to the semantic roles they occupy in their textual context. Along with the relative frequencies of the keywords, this kind of data already reveals something about how the keywords are being articulated in the corpus: the frequency points to the relative importance of the keyword in question, while the classification scheme based on semantic roles tells something very general about the semantic positioning of that keyword. For instance, if a keyword most frequently occupies the Agent position, we can deduce that it is assigned a very “active” role in the corpus. On the other hand, should a keyword appear most often in the Patient role, we could say that its role in the corpus is more passive, since the role carries the sense of “being done to”.

The next step in the analysis is qualitative, taking the keywords in their full context. This includes not only taking the semantic role into account, but also investigating the type of verbs, collocations, attributes, modifiers and other linguistic information which goes into the *articulation* of the concept behind a particular keyword in its specific context. The adjective *deutsch* (German) and its collocations deserve special attention, as they will indicate the concepts and qualities associated with “Germanness”. The semantic roles and circumstantial elements of words other than the selected keywords will also be utilized as an aid to the analysis when necessary. It is also important to analyze the elements that create cohesion across clauses and sentences, as this is key to

articulations that may be merely implied. Other factors to take into account are connotation (in case of synonyms), modifying attributes, modality, metaphorical expressions, implicature, presuppositions and argumentative structure. Keywords and their appearance are therefore treated as gateways from which a deeper investigation can proceed, revealing lexical oppositional lines on the level of the text and finally more fundamental patterns of discursive articulation on the level of the whole corpus.

The qualitative section of the analysis is based on themes that have emerged from thus analyzing the keywords in their context. These themes have been found to be partially overlapping due to the interlocking quality in the articulation of certain keywords. At the end of each section, the articulations discovered in that section will be recapitulated to provide a brief overview before moving on to the next section. While some themes might occasionally be repeated across sections, overall the aim is to progressively weave descriptions of interlocking threads of discourse which in the end will be put together to form a complete picture of discursive patterns.

5.1 Quantitative Analysis of Keywords

The quantitative phase of the analysis focuses on mapping out the frequencies of the selected keywords from the categories *Germany* and *Europe*, assigning them semantic roles and observing the trends that emerge. The keywords from both categories will be discussed in separate sections. Deictic words will also be discussed.

5.1.1 German keywords

Figure 4 presents the most common keywords related to Germany in a semantic map. The keywords have been encoded as per their relationship to the concepts of *nation-state*, *state* and *nation*. The relationships between the concepts has been marked as either synonymic (e.g. *Deutschland* vs. *Bundesrepublik*), metonymic (e.g. *Berlin* vs. *Bundesregierung* vs. *Deutschland*), historical (*Deutschland* vs. *D-Mark* or qualitative (*Deutschland* vs. the adjective *deutsch*).

The words *Deutschland* and *Bundesrepublik* can both be taken to denote the nation-state as a whole. The category *state* encompasses words related to state organs and politicians (“the elite”), although the country name can also be used to denote the government. The capital name *Berlin* also bears a metonymic relationship to the government.

The category *nation* encompasses the nouns *Deutsche* and words denoting the people or citizens. Although the word *Deutsche* can be used to refer to the “common people” and citizens distinct from the government, it can also include those in the “elite”: the scope of the referent depends on the given context. The adjective *deutsch* refers to qualities relating to nation or state.




Figure 5. Semantic map of German keywords

The following tables will give a detailed account of the keywords used, including the three most frequent semantic roles occupied by any given keyword. The categorization of the keywords into these tables follows roughly the categories in figure 4.

Table 6. German nation-state and capital

Word	<i>n</i>	Semantic roles (<i>n</i> / %)		
		<i>Primary</i>	<i>Secondary</i>	<i>Tertiary</i>
Germany (<i>Deutschland</i>)	70	Agent (29 / 41 %)	Locative (18 / 25 %)	Counteragent (8 / 11 %)
Federal Republic (<i>Federalrepublik</i>)	3	Agent (1 / 33 %)	Locative (1 / 33 %)	Possessor (1 / 33 %)
Berlin	13	Agent (5 / 38 %)	Locative (4 / 31 %)	Experiencer (2 / 15 %)

From Table 6 it can be seen that the term *Deutschland* is clearly preferred over the rather more formal *Bundesrepublik*. As can be seen, in the case of *Deutschland*, the Agent role clearly predominates, followed by the Locative circumstantial element and the Counteragent. The same also applies to the capital name *Berlin*. From this we can already conclude that these two keywords are in an active position; in other words, their role in a sentence is most often that of a “doer”. This confirms the general observation of previous studies that country names frequently occupy the position of a subject in a sentence and can act as a metonymic index for the government.

One important point about the Agent position is that it does not always mean the action is free, so to speak, as sometimes the action is modified by a modal verb or an adverb, thereby adding an element of volition, possibility, obligation, permissibility or necessity. Take the following sentences for example: “Germany *can* and *must* do its part”¹, “Why *must* Germany assume liability for Greece’s debts?”², “That is why

¹ *Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010

² *In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010

Germany *must* now pay for Greece”³. In the corpus we find the modality of necessity most often tied to Agent processes involving Germany and making payments.

That the capital is also often in the Agent role confirms another common trend in political and newspaper discourse, which takes the capital name as a metonymic index of a country’s government. The Locative is the second most popular position for both *Deutschland* and *Berlin*. Here we find an indication of the double articulation possible for country names: as states, they are both actors as well as bounded territories in which actions and processes take place, although in the case of *Berlin*, the Locative also holds the sense of being the place where the government is located (“the leaders in Berlin and Paris”⁴). The Experiencer role indicates thinking, feeling and perceiving and is the tertiary role for Berlin.

The Counteragent role again signifies being a conscious partner in an interaction, towards which some action is directed. In the international arena, states are seen as participating in mutual interactions as conscious agents, even if, as in the case of the Agent role, this action is often mediated by the state leadership. However, like with the Agent position, a country can be a participant of interaction where the state is only indirectly involved, such as “Germany is criticized for its export surplus”⁵.

³ *Griechische Wette*. FAZ April 25th 2010

⁴ *Ein Debakel*. FAZ June 6th 2010

⁵ *Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010

Table 7. German politicians and institutions

<i>Word</i>	<i>n</i>	Semantic Roles (<i>n</i> / %)		
		<i>Primary</i>	<i>Secondary</i>	<i>Tertiary</i>
Angela Merkel (<i>Frau Merkel, (Bundes)kanzlerin</i>)	58	Agent (27 / 47 %)	Sayer (21 / 44 %)	Counteragent (6 / 12 %)
/ Swabian housewife (<i>schwäbische Hausfrau</i>)	2	Agent (1 / 50 %)	Possessor (1 / 50 %)	
/ Iron Chancellor (<i>eiserne Kanzlerin</i>)	1	Identified (1 / 100 %)		
Federal government (<i>Bundesregierung</i>)	20	Agent (10 / 50 %)	Counteragent (2 / 10 %)	
Helmut Kohl	10	Agent (6 / 60 %)	Sayer (2 / 20 %)	Experiencer (2 / 20 %)
Parliament (<i>Bundestag</i>)	9	Locative (8 / 88 %)	Agent (1 / 12 %)	
Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble	8	Agent (6 / 75 %)	Counteragent (1 / 12,5 %)	Comitative (1 / 12,5 %)
Gerhard Schröder	1	Sayer (1 / 100 %)		
Helmut Schmidt	1	Agent (1 / 100 %)		
Federal Council (<i>Bundesrat</i>)	1	Locative (1 / 100 %)		
D-Mark	9	Patient (4 / 44 %)	Comparison (2 / 22 %)	
Constitutional Court (<i>Bundesverfassungsgericht</i>)	7	Agent (5 / 71 %)	Counteragent (2 / 29 %)	
German politicians (<i>deutsche Politiker</i>)	5	Agent (2 / 40 %)	Counteragent (2 / 40 %)	Experiencer (1 / 20 %)
German politics (<i>deutsche Politik</i>)	1	Counteragent (1 / 100 %)		

Table 7 shows the list of words related to German politicians and institutions. Angela Merkel is by far the most frequently named German politician. She is also twice referred to as *schwäbische Hausfrau* (*Swabian housewife*). *Schwäbisch* is an adjectival rendering of the term *Schwabe*, which occurs in the corpus 2 times, refers to the

inhabitants of southeastern Germany, known for their thriftiness. Once she is referred to as *eiserne Kanzlerin* (Iron Chancellor), which is an allusion to the famous German Chancellor in the 19th century, Otto von Bismarck.

It is also worth taking note of the occurrence of *Helmut Kohl* and *Gerhard Schröder*, the former Federal Chancellors of Germany. Kohl appears 10 times and Schröder once. The D-Mark, Germany's former currency, also appears 10 times. The fact that they are mentioned indicates the presence of a historical perspective in some parts of the corpus.

As for semantic roles, with all the politicians and political organs except the *Bundestag* (parliament) and the *Bundesrat* (federal council) we can see a clear preference for the Agent role. With *Merkel* the *Bundesregierung*, *Bundesverfassungsgericht* and the general noun *deutsche Politiker* the Agent role is predominant. For Merkel, a significant part of her actions are *verbal*, amounting almost to half of them, as signified by the secondary role Sayer. This is because as a leading politician and Germany's head of state, her statements are often quoted in the media. *Bundesregierung*, *Bundesverfassungsgericht* and *deutsche Politiker* all have a secondary preference for the Counteragent role. Politicians or state organs are therefore most often depicted as "doers" and secondly as partners in an interaction.

The Locative role predominating for the parliament and for the Federal Council (which however occurs only once in the whole corpus) can be explained by the fact that these are often conceptualized not only as active organs, but as places where debates, discussions etc. take place.

Table 8. German citizens

Word	n	Semantic Roles (n / %)		
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Germans (<i>Deutsche</i>)	21	Experiencer (11 / 52 %)	Agent (6 / 29 %)	Counteragent (5 / 24 %)
Swabians (<i>Schwaben</i>)	2	Identifier (2 / 100 %)		
Citizens (<i>Bürger</i>)	6	Experiencer (3 / 50 %)	Counteragent (3 / 50%)	
People (<i>Volk</i>)	3	Counteragent (2 / 66 %)	Agent (1 / 33 %)	
(German) Population (<i>Bevölkerung</i>)	4	Agent (1 / 25 %)	Experiencer (1 / 25 %)	Carrier (1 / 25 %)
(German) Voters (<i>Wähler</i>)	3	Agent (2 / 66 %)	Counteragent (1 / 33 %)	
The public (<i>Öffentlichkeit</i>)	2	Experiencer (2 / 100 %)		

Table 8 shows keywords relating to the German people with their various designations as either *Deutsche*, *Bürger*, *Wähler*, *Volk* or *Bevölkerung*. Even though the term *Schwabe* appears in this list, in the corpus it is however not used to refer to Germans in general, but merely to a certain type of attitude towards money.

For these words there is a preference for the position of Experiencer (34 %), followed by those of Counteragent (27 %) and Agent (24 %). For both *Deutsche* and *Bürger*, the Experiencer role covers approximately half of all the instances. *Deutsche* are also fairly often occupying the Agent and Counteragent roles. In their aspect as voters (*Wähler*) and as a mass noun *Bevölkerung* the citizens of Germany have a proportional preference for the Agent role. The overall trend for the Experiencer and Counteragent role would indicate that the role of the German citizens and population is articulated more in terms

of thinking, feeling and perceiving and being an interaction, and less as a doer, in contrast to the government. However, since the word *Deutsche* can in some contexts refer to the whole nation, including the government, it is not a surprise that this word has a secondary preference for the Agent role.

5.1.2 Europe and EU related keywords

Figure 5 below is a semantic map of selected keywords relating to Europe and the EU. These relationships are slightly different than for Germany. First of all, Europe is a continent and not a state. The EU can be seen as an attempt to institutionalize the idea of Europe, but the denotative scope of the word “Europe” still as of now extends beyond the limits of the term “EU”. *Southern Europe* which is also mentioned in the corpus is a part of Europe in the geographic sense, but also has cultural connotations.

The Commission is the executive organ of the EU, and Brussels is both the capital of EU as well as the Commission headquarters. *Brussels* is a same kind of metonymic index for the EU and the Commission as *Berlin* is for Germany. In the corpus, synonymous expressions used for the Commission are *EU-Behörde* (EU agency) and *Brüsseler Behörde* (Brussels agency).

The *Monetary Union* is a part of EU, both in the geographic and legal sense. The near synonym *Eurozone* has more geographical connotations. *Euro states* are also member states of the EU but not necessarily vice versa.




Figure 6. Semantic map of Europe and EU related keywords

Table 9. Europe and EU related keywords

<i>Word</i>	<i>n</i>	Semantic Roles (<i>n</i> / %)		
		<i>Primary</i>	<i>Secondary</i>	<i>Tertiary</i>
EU	60	Agent (23 / 38 %)	Locative (11 / 18 %)	Possessor (8 / 15 %)
EU- Kommission	30	Agent (15 / 50 %)	Carrier (3 / 10 %)	Experiencer (3 / 10 %)
EU agency (<i>EU-Behörde</i>)	4	Agent (3 / 75 %)	Patient (1 / 25 %)	
Brussels (<i>Brüssel</i>)	8	Locative (5 / 71 %)	Agent (1 / 14 %)	Source (1 / 14 %)
Brussels agency (<i>Brüsseler Behörde</i>)	1	Agent (1 / 100 %)		
José Manuel Barroso	7	Sayer (4 / 60 %)	Possessor (2 / 40 %)	Experiencer (1 / 14 %)
Europe (<i>Europa</i>)	54	Locative (12 / 22 %)	Beneficiary (10 / 19 %)	Possessor (7 / 13 %)
Southern Europe (<i>Südeuropa</i>)	3	Agent (1 / 33 %)	Locative (1 / 33 %)	Beneficiary (1 / 33 %)
Europeans (<i>Europäer</i>)	14	Agent (3 / 21 %)	Identified/Identifier (3 / 21 %)	Patient (2 / 14 %)
Monetary Union (<i>Währungs- union</i>)	71	Possessor (16 / 23 %)	Patient (10 / 14 %)	Affected Object (9 / 13 %)
Euro zone (<i>Euro-Zone /- Raum</i>)	12	Locative (6 / 50 %)	Carrier (2 / 17 %)	Beneficiary (2 / 17 %)
Euro	61	Patient (31 / 51 %)	Carrier (7 / 11 %)	Identified (6 / 10 %)

Table 10. Member states

Word	n	Semantic Roles (n / %)		
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Member states (<i>Mitglied-</i> <i>staaten</i>)	16	Experiencer (5 / 31 %)	Patient (3 / 19 %)	Carrier (3 / 19 %),
EU states / countries (<i>EU-</i> <i>Staaten/-</i> <i>Länder</i>)	6	Patient (4 / 66 %)	Agent (1 / 17 %)	Experiencer (1 / 17 %)
European states / countries (<i>Europäische</i> <i>Staaten /</i> <i>Länder</i>)	3	Agent (3 / 100 %)		
Euro states / countries (<i>Euro-Staaten/-</i> <i>Länder</i>)	15	Agent (4 / 27 %)	Patient (2 / 13 %)	Carrier (2 / 13 %)

The above tables show the frequencies of words related to the EU and Europe. The EU and its executive organ, the EU Commission (also the referent of the words *EU-Behörde*, “EU agency,” and *Brüsseler Behörde*, “the Brussels agency”) are predominantly occupying the Agent role, which means that they have an active role in the corpus. The Locative is also a common role for the EU, which can signify that something resides or takes place either within the organization or the area of the EU.

For the EU, the Possessor role is the third most common role, and for the EU Commission the Carrier is the second most common role. The Possessor role of the EU is typically realized through constructs such as “Crisis of the EU”, “The core of the EU” or “the essence of the EU”. In the case of the Commission, the Carrier role is realized through expressions like “the Commission is too weak to...” or “is the Commission [...] really ready...” The Commission also has the Experiencer as the third most frequent semantic role, which means that in some instances it is represented as a cognitive entity that thinks, feels and perceives (e.g. “The longing of Commission after a greener and more social Europe”⁶). For the president of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, the Sayer role is most predominant, which means that he is portrayed as giving statements rather than acting directly.

It is worth noting that the words EU or EU Commission rarely enter the Counteragent position in the corpus: the only exception is the expression “erosion of trust in the EU”. The Counteragent role is hidden in some of the collocations of the adjective *Brüsseler*, such as *sich Brüsseler Einmischungen in die Haushaltspolitik verbitten* (refuse interventions from Brussels in budgetary policy) or *sich gegen Brüsseler Vorschläge wehren* (oppose proposal from Brussels). All this indicates that the EU is seen less as an interaction partner and more as something that either acts, is acted upon or things happen to, which are indicated by the Patient and Affected Object roles. This is in contrast to *Deutschland*, out of whose occurrences the Counteragent role accounts for 10 %. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to *Berlin*, *Brüssel* is less something that acts (Agent) than a location where something is or takes place (Locative).

What of *Europe*? It is most typically portrayed as a location where actions and processes take place (Locative). The second most popular role is however the Beneficiary, which means that Europe is often also represented as being the recipient of benefit or harm. This role manifests in expressions such as „In the name of Europe“⁷,

⁶ *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010

⁷ *Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010

“Whoever wants to bring Europe forward“⁸, “a sacrifice for Europe”⁹, “there would be no benefit to Europe”¹⁰. The tertiary role Possessor is often manifested in expressions such as “the future of Europe) (n = 3) or “the realities of Europe” (n = 2).

Note that Southern Europe (*Südeuropa*) is also mentioned separately. This is due to the fact that most of the crisis countries were from Southern Europe, and they can thus be referred to collectively, such as in the phrase “South Europe has lived well out of low interest rates.”¹¹

Out of this list, by far the most frequent word is *Währungsunion* (Monetary Union). Its preferred semantic roles are Possessor, Patient, Affected Object and Identifier. The frequency of the Possessor and Identifier roles means that it is often discussed in relation to its attributes (e.g. “principles of the Monetary Union”, “implications of the Monetary Union”, “character of the Monetary Union” or the quite common “fathers of the Monetary Union) or as identifying something else, the most common example being “member state of the Monetary Union”. The Patient and Affected Object roles again imply that the Monetary Union is frequently the target or object of actions and happenings, the most common being “protecting the Monetary Union” or “failure of the Monetary Union”.

The euro is also a frequently occurring word in the corpus. The Patient role is by far the most common. The euro appears as a subject with verbs that denote failure or loss of value (*scheitern* = 5, *sinken* = 1), as something that is in danger (*bedrohen* = 1, *gefährden* = 1) and therefore needs to be rescued or defended (*retten* = 4, *verteidigen* = 1) or stabilized (*stabilisieren* = 2). Very often the trust in the euro is at stake (n = 6).

The Carrier and Identified roles again point towards the fact that the euro’s attributes are frequently under discussion or it is compared to something, e.g. “the destiny of the euro”, “the future of the euro”, “the euro is a political/supranational project”, “the euro

⁸ *Die politische Währungsunion*. FAZ July 1st 2010

⁹ *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010

¹⁰ *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010

¹¹ *Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 2nd 2010

is not the same as the D-Mark”. Some of the adjective attributes associated with the euro are “weak”, “strong” and “healthy”.

The member states are referred to either as such or as EU states / countries or – as EMU members – as euro states / countries, and also with the more inclusive terms “European states / countries”. They are on the whole found both in the active Agent role as well as in the passive Patient role. This is because they are often portrayed as having responsibility (e.g. “Far too long have the European states been practicing reality-denying policies”) being the target of measures and influences (e.g. “The EU states’ room for action would be reduced through a stricter Stability Pact”). The word *euro states* is however also found in a more active role, and for the word *member states* the Experiencer role dominates, most often with the verbs of volition, acceptance and expectation.

5.1.3 Deictic expressions

This section lists the use of personal and spatial deixis in the corpus. These kinds of expressions are not frequently used. The following table shows the frequencies, whether the pronoun or adverbial is used in direct or indirect speech (such as quotations) and what the referent is.

Table 11. Deictic expressions

Deictic expression	Frequency	Direct / Indirect speech	Referent (n)
<i>Wir</i> (we)	1	Indirect	EU
<i>Unser</i> (our)	3	Direct	EMU states (1), European citizens (1), Germans (1)
<i>Hier</i> (here)	3	Direct	Germany

As the table shows, the only time the third person plural appears as such is in indirect speech. This is a statement by the Commission president Barroso: “We will defend the euro, whatever it takes”. The referent in this case is the EU. The possessive 3rd person plural appears three times, each time in direct speech. In all these cases it is connected to money: “If the euro is our destiny”, “the money of all of us”, “our old currency”. With only the last example is the referent Germans. The adverbial *here*, whenever it is used in a spatial sense, refers to Germany, once also as a part of the expression *hierzulande* (over here).

5.2 Qualitative analysis of keywords

This section consists of the qualitative analysis of the keywords in their context. This section is divided into eight subsections based on various themes that emerged during the analysis. As will be evident, some of these themes will be partially overlapping, and some of the textual examples or parts thereof will be analyzed more than once in order to bring different perspectives into focus.

In the textual examples that are given, semantic roles and circumstantial elements will be featured as a subscript label attached to the word in questions. These labels will however be applied only to the words which are deemed necessary for any analysis that will follow, which always includes important keywords (*Germany, Merkel* etc.), but other non-keywords may be thus labeled if useful from the perspective of the analysis.

5.2.1 Germany as an economically strong country

In the corpus, we often find Germany articulated together with matters having to do with economy and finances. This happens through the use of specific qualifiers with the country name *Deutschland* and through collocations appearing with the adjective attribute *deutsch*. The first two excerpts are from the article *Im Schuldensumpf* (FAZ June 26th 2010) and are meant to illustrate these phenomena.

- (1) Die Schuldner_[Agent] werfen den Exporteuren_[Counteragent] vor, sie mit Lieferungen ins Defizitverderben geführt zu haben. Dabei sind die Ungleichgewichte entstanden, weil einige Länder über Jahre hinweg mehr importiert als exportiert haben, weshalb deren Auslandsverschuldung hoch ist. Doch was folgt daraus? Sollen jetzt Überschüsse bekämpft werden? Jedenfalls steht Deutschland_[Carrier] am Pranger_[Attribute], zusammen mit China und Japan_[Comitative]. Doch niemand_[Agent] hat Amerikaner_[Counteragent] dazu gezwungen, chinesische Konsumartikel zu kaufen, und keiner_[Agent] nötigt Franzosen_[Counteragent], deutsche Autos zu fahren. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 26th 2010)

The first thing to notice is that there is an opposition created between “debt makers” and “exporters” by means of the polarity of the semantic roles of Agent (“debt makers”) and Counteragent (exporters), where the former blame the latter for their deficit. The rhetorical questions “What follows from this [imbalance between exporters and importers]? Should surpluses now be fought?” and the sentence following them, starting with the conjunction *jedenfalls* (in any case) and assigning Germany the position of being the target of blame (stand in the pillory), locates Germany in the camp of the exporters, together with China and Japan, who are in the Comitative role. The last sentence creates another Agent – Counteragent opposition, where the occupant of the Agent role is in both instances “no one” and the verbs in questions are variations of the verb “to force”. This sentence puts into question whether it is the exporters who are to blame for the imbalances. Germany’s role as an exporter is further elaborated on in the next excerpt, which is a continuation of the same text:

- (2) Dass vierzig Prozent der deutschen Produktion ausgeführt werden, ist keine Planerfüllung einer Bundesexportbehörde_[Agent], sondern Resultat freier Marktkräfte_[Carrier]. Über den deutschen Erfolg im Welthandel bestimmen unzählige Entscheidungen von Verbrauchern_[Agent], Unternehmern_[Agent] und Arbeitnehmern_[Agent]. Neben der Qualität deutscher Produkte_[Additive] entscheidet darüber auch die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit_[Agent]. Moderate Lohnabschlüsse_[Agent] tragen zur Exportkraft Deutschlands_[Beneficiary] bei. Wenn Frankreich_[Agent] höhere Löhne im Hochlohnland Deutschland_[Locative] fordert, zielt das vor allem auf höhere Kosten für die Konkurrenz. Doch damit stiege lediglich die Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland_[Locative], für Europa_[Beneficiary] wäre nichts gewonnen. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 26th 2010)

First we need to notice the multiple instances of the adjective *deutsch*, used in connection with the words *Produktion*, *Erfolg* and *Produkte*. Germany is also collocated with the words *Exportkraft* (“export strength”) and *Hochlohnland* (“high-salary country”). These collocations of course already invoke the strong image related to economy and industry.

The first sentence identifies the high proportion of German products being exported not with the “fulfilment of the plans of a federal export agency”, but as the result of “free market forces”. “Federal export agency” is in the Agent role due to the nominalized verb (*Planerfüllung*, “fulfilment of plans”) it accompanies, while “free market forces” takes the role of a Possessor. A contrast is created between the conscious agency of the former and the less directed nature of the latter. The next sentence enumerates the actual agents that comprise these forces. The next sentences then involves many abstract nouns as Agents – the quality of German products, competitive prices and moderate salary agreements – which together contribute to German export strength. The implication is therefore that German success is not a state-driven affair, but is a result of several market-oriented factors.

The second last sentence then features France in the Agent position, demanding higher salaries in Germany, for which the text insinuates the motive of competition. Although Germany is here in the Locative role, it can be also interpreted as another Agent – Counteragent opposition, since the meaning is the same as “demanding *from* Germany that it raise its salaries”. The use of the classifier *Hochlohnland Deutschland* would seem to indicate that from the point of view of the text, the salaries in Germany perceived to be are already high, and raising them in accordance with France’s demands would lead to no benefits for Europe as a whole. The notion articulated here is therefore that Germany is a strong export-oriented economy, the opposite of “debt maker” and that it is sometimes criticized for this. In the same text, this strong export economy is also referred to as *Wirtschaftsmodell Deutschland* (German economic model), which

allegedly causes upset. This same idea is also expressed in another text, where Germany is portrayed as receiving criticism both for its export surplus.¹²

This can be compared with the following excerpt, where an opposition is created between Germany and so-called “soft currency countries”, and the latter are claimed to blame Germany for using the euro to gain economic dominance in Europe:

- (3) Während sich die Deutschen_[Experiencer] fragen, warum sie_[Agent] für die Schulden der Griechen_[Beneficiary] haften sollen, können viele Italiener, Spanier und Franzosen_[Experiencer] nicht verstehen, warum die EU_[Agent] nicht einfach neue Milliarden nach Athen überweist. [...]. Mit der kollektiven Erfahrung zweier Währungsreformen sehen die Deutschen_[Experiencer] im versuchten Bruch des Maastrichter Vertrags (er verbietet den Eintritt eines Euro-Landes für die Schulden eines anderen) eine Gefahr für die Stabilität der Währung.

Ganz anders die Wahrnehmung in ehemaligen Weichwährungsländern_[Locative]: Dort wird unterstellt, die Deutschen_[Agent] wollten sich durch den Euro die wirtschaftliche Vorherrschaft in Europa sichern. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

In this text we find multiple collective nouns – Germans, Greeks, French, Spaniards and Italians – occupying the Experiencer position, which correlates with thinking, feeling and perceiving. This is seen in the verbs *sich fragen* (ask themselves), *nicht verstehen können* (cannot understand), *in den Augen der* (in the eyes of), *sehen* (to see) and *unterstellen* (accuse of having a motive). The clause structure gives rise to an oppositional line between Germans and “others” by way of the adversative conjunction *während* (whereas) in the first sentence and the similar adversative adverb *ganz anders* in the beginning of the second paragraph. What is contrasted here is attitudes towards money and currency stability, i.e. whether or not the EU should transfer funds to Greece (denoted by the capital name “Athens”), and whether there is a concern for the stability of the currency.

¹² *Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010

By way of the parallel clause structure between the first sentences of the first and second paragraph, the “others” become identified as “former soft currency countries”, and owing to the oppositional line Germany itself becomes identified as a “strong currency country”. The “soft currency countries” are the Locative role in a clause where the process has been nominalized (*Wahrnehmung*, perception) and the subject or the Experiencer has therefore been faded. In the following clause, which is an elaboration of this “perception”, the Agent of the verb *unterstellen* (to accuse) has again been faded. The origin of both the “perceiving” and the “accusing” is therefore diffuse. The Germans however appear as a distinct actor, where the target of the accusation is their volition of “wanting to secure economic dominance through the euro”. FAZ claims this debate to be fueled by power interests, and it is explained in the following excerpt:

- (4) Hierbei geht es nicht um die Frage_[Matter1], ob die Griechen weiter ungestraft über ihre Verhältnisse leben dürfen, sondern um die Realisierung_[Matter2] des französischen Traums von einer „Europäischen Wirtschaftsregierung“, mit der_[Instrument] die wettbewerbsstarke deutsche Industrie_[Patient] eingefangen werden soll. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

The debate mentioned here refers to the accusation directed towards Germans of wanting to secure economic rulership in Europe. These power interests are defined as being not about “whether Greeks can continue to live above their means unpunished”, but about “the realization of the French dream of a European economic government” (Matter₂). This economic government becomes the Instrument in a relative clause, which has the purpose of curbing the competitive German industry. This French idea of an economic government is expressed and criticized elsewhere in the corpus as opposite to what the German view is^{13,14}, and it is related to the idea of France demanding higher wages in Germany which we saw in excerpt 2.

¹³ *Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ April 21st 2010

¹⁴ *Debakel*. FAZ June 6th 2010

In the last few excerpts we have therefore seen German economic power defined in contrast to countries, especially France, who are claimed to envy it. In the next excerpt Germany is also identified as an economically strong country, albeit in a complementary rather than a contrastive role to France:

- (5) Deutschland_[Carrier] trägt in dieser Situation eine besondere Verantwortung_[Attribute]. Das liegt wiederum nicht nur daran, dass Berlin_[Agent] – aufgrund der deutschen Wirtschaftskraft_[Reason] – einen besonders hohen Anteil zu tragen hätte, wenn Länder der Währungsunion herausgehauen werden müssten. Deutschland_[Identified, Agent] war, zusammen mit Frankreich_[Comitative], der Motor der Wirtschaft- und Währungsunion_[Identifier] und hat ihr einen Stabilitätspakt verordnet, dem seither viele Mitgliedsstaaten nicht genügen konnten (nicht zu vergessen: auch Deutschland_[Agent] hat das mehrfach nicht geschafft). (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010)

Here we find Germany (Carrier) attributed with carrying a special responsibility (Attribute). The reason for Germany's special responsibility is attributed to the German economic power (Reason), due to which *Berlin* (in the Agent position as a placeholder for Germany's seat of decision-making) would have an especially large role to play in the case that countries would have to be excluded from the Monetary Union.

The next sentence features Germany in the position of Identified, where the Identifier is the noun "Motor of the Monetary Union". This metaphor also expresses the idea of Germany as an economically powerful country. Here France is also not positioned contrastively with Germany, but as sharing the role of the "motor" through the Comitative.

This excerpt also highlights the fact that the Growth and Stability Pact is of German origin and that many member states have not been able to live up to it, but that not even Germany could adhere to it at all times. The implication is that the responsibility Germany is attributed with is therefore not only due to the country's economic strength, but also to the fact of being the main architect of the Stability Pact.

5.2.2 Germany as the “pay master”

Germany is also often articulated in the position of being a *net contributor* or *pay master*, not only in the crisis but beyond. This role is also sometimes described as something that Germany or the Germans are not pleased with.

- (6) Wer die Auktion griechischer Staatsanleihen durch Überweisungen aus Brüssel_[Source1] oder Frankfurt_[Source2] ablösen will, der lädt zu weiteren Spekulationen gegen den Euro ein, der überschätzt die Finanzkraft Deutschlands_[Possessor] und der riskiert das Scheitern der Währungsunion. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

In this excerpt, *Brussels* and *Frankfurt* are used in a metonymic fashion for the EU and the German *Bundesbank* respectively. The text makes the claim that whoever wants to redeem the auction of Greek government bonds through transfers from either the EU or from the Bundesbank (i.e. Germany), will overestimate the financial strength of Germany and risk the failure of the Monetary Union. The implication is therefore that neither is Germany able to pay for everything nor is it necessarily desirable. The next excerpt makes this claim more explicitly:

- (7) Deutschland_[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land_[Role] kann und muss seinen Beitrag leisten. Aber alle Lasten des Zusammenhalts kann es_[Agent] nicht stemmen, dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

Germany is here in the Agent position with the verb “make a contribution” (*Beitrag leisten*). This verb is however modified with the modal verbs *kann* and *muss*, which denote ability and necessity respectively. These modality expressions are linked to the identification of Germany as a “well-off country” in the Role position, although this link is not necessary: the sentence would function well without the identifying *als* construct. In its current form, the sentence carries the implicit meaning of “because Germany is a well-off country, it can and must make its contribution”. Both the ability

and the obligation of making a contribution follow from the identity as a well-off country. The next clause is an extension, however, which restricts the scope of this contribution: Germany cannot bear all the burden, because it runs out of strength. This latter idea is expressed in the following excerpt:

- (8) Denn der Euro scheitert sicher, wenn aus der Währungsunion eine Haftungsgemeinschaft und Transferunion würde, die_[Range] selbst Deutschland_[Agent] nicht bezahlen könnte. (*Im Sumpf*. FAZ April 21st 2010)

Here the articulation is not as explicit as in the preceding examples. Like before, Germany is in the position of an Agent, with the verb *bezahlen* (to pay). The verb takes the words “liability community” and “transfer union” as its Range. These close synonyms denote the concept of a monetary union where financial burdens, including debts, are shared by all the members. It is this kind of monetary union that “even Germany would be unable to pay”.

The word “even” has a special importance here, because it carries a similar idea as the preceding excerpt in a condensed form: Germany is able to make a big financial contribution, but even Germany cannot pay for everything. The following excerpt from a later part of the corpus also expresses the idea of Germany as a net contributor and the country’s ambivalent stance towards this role:

- (9) Seit Jahrzehnten zahlt Deutschland_[Agent] mehr ein, als es_[Beneficiary] aus den diversen Beihilfetöpfen ausgezahlt bekommt – mal bereitwillig, mal murrend_[Manner]. (*Die politische Währungsunion*. FAZ September 1st 2010)

In the first clause Germany in the Agent role with the verb *einzahlen* (to pay, make a contribution) and in the second clause it takes the role of the Beneficiary (*ausgezahlt bekommen*, to be paid something). The relationship between these clauses is comparative, whereby the contributions are described as exceeding the amount of

payments received. This sentence is modified by the adverbials of manner *mal bereitwillig*, *mal murrend* (sometimes willingly, sometimes grudgingly). This is an insofar untypical expression for the corpus in that it portrays a country undergoing an affective experience, whereas usually it is the people who are described as feeling subjects (e.g. *Deutsche, Bürger*: see the next excerpt for an example of this).

In the context of the crisis, the reason for Germany having to pay is because of Greece's and others' reckless accumulation of debt (*Schuldenmacherei*), and it is often questioned why Germany would have to do this. Germany is also identified as *Zahlmeister*¹⁵ (pay master) *Geberland* (contributing country)¹⁶ or *Einzahler* (contributor)¹⁷, or otherwise linked in the Agent position with the verbs *haften* (to assume liability)¹⁸ and *zahlen* (to pay)¹⁹, always with modal verb *soll* denoting obligation.

While the use of the terms *Einzahler*, *Geberland* and especially *Zahlmeister* all carry a more or less negative connotation, not to mention the more subtle negative connotation attached to the modal verb *soll* in connection with verbs denoting payment, nowhere is dissatisfaction with the net contributor role expressed so strongly as in the following two excerpts:

- (10) Apropos Nettozahler_[Matter]: Es gibt nicht viele andere Themen, bei denen die Empörungsbereitschaft der Deutschen_[Experiencer] so hoch ist. Und es war der zum Populismus neigende Kanzler Schröder_[Sayer], der gegen das "Verbraten" deutscher *Gelder*_[Patient] in Brüssel polemisierte. Deutsche Politik und Öffentlichkeit_[Counteragent] lassen sich nur noch mäßig von dem Argument beeindrucken, das "Schmierer" der europäischen Milieus – die Fortsetzung der alten Zahlmeisterrolle – diene auch künftig deutschen (Export-)Interessen._[Beneficiary] (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

¹⁵ *In Haftung*, FAZ May 7th 2010

¹⁶ *In Haftung*, FAZ May 7th 2010

¹⁷ *Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010

¹⁸ *In Haftung*, FAZ May 7th 2010

¹⁹ *Griechische Wette*, April 25th 2010

- (11) Die übliche Methode, Risse und sich auftuende Abgründe in der EU_[Locative] mit deutschem Geld_[Instrument] zuzuschütten, ist nunmehr, da es um den Bankrott ganzer Staaten und das Aufeinanderprallen von Kulturen geht, jedoch an ihre Grenzen gelangt. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In the first sentence of excerpt 9 we find the word *Nettozahler* (net contributor) as the Matter, signaled by the word *apropos* (Speaking of which, on the subject of). The double colon makes it clear that what follows is an elaboration. The next sentence features *Deutsche* as Experiencer with a nominalized adjective signifying the quality of being ready to anger, *Empörungsbereitschaft*. What causes them to anger is the fact of being a net contributor: the word “theme” (Matter) is linked to “net contributor” (Reason) by means of the colon.

The former Chancellor Schröder appears here in the Sayer role, who is described as having highlighted Germany’s net contributor role in a polemical way. We also see the use of two metaphoric expressions related to money, which are both placed in quotation marks: “roasting” and “lubricating”. The verb “roasting” evokes the image of a wasteful use of money, at least from some perspective; the verb “lubricate”, on the other hand, is another word for bribing. This “lubricating”, as a nominalized process in an Agent role, is here equated in a supplementary clause with the continuation of Germany’s *alte Zahlmeisterrolle* (old pay master role) also in the Agent role. This role would (allegedly, indicated by the subjunctive mode) serve German (export) interests (*deutsche (Export-)Interessen*).

It is this equation of Germany playing the pay master and in turn getting a boost for its exports that is described as being no longer convincing for “German politics and public life” (*deutsche Politik und Öffentlichkeit*). These are in the position of Counteragent and the object of the verb *beeindrucken* (to impress). Making this kind of distinction between “politics” and “public” is typical for the corpus, and we will meet variations of this as we go on. It can be argued that this is a way to “split” a country into state and the

nation, the “elite” and the people, and to emphasize their alignment, like in this case. This is because the country name *Deutschland* can have connotations which refer only to the government, but here the text is zooming into the country, highlighting its layers and emphasizing their uniform view.

In excerpt 10 Germany does not appear as an Agent in a nominalized form; rather, German agency is hidden in the adjective *deutsch*, collocated with the word *Geld* (money) and in the role of an Instrument. The use of this “instrument” to “stitch the cracks and gaping rifts in the EU” becomes identified as a “common method” and is given the circumstantial attribute of “being at its limits”. The same ideas are thereby expressed as in previous excerpts: although Germany is well capable of taking on the pay master role and has done so in the past, there are limits to that role.

5.2.3 D-Mark and the stability promise of the euro

This section demonstrates that the stability of the euro is articulated as the core German interest in the corpus. The wish for the currency’s stability and strength is based on the exceptional strength of the former German currency, the D-Mark, which for Germans was a national symbol. Giving up the D-Mark in favor of the euro was therefore seen as a sacrifice of a sort:

- (12) In den Augen der meisten Deutschen_[Experiencer] wurde mit dem Abschied_[Instrument] von der identitätsstiftenden D-Mark_[Patient] ein Opfer für Europa_[Beneficiary] gebracht. Mit der kollektiven Erfahrung zweier Währungsreformen_[Reason] sehen die Deutschen_[Experiencer] im versuchten Bruch des Maastrichter Vertrags (er verbietet den Eintritt eines Euro-Landes für die Schulden eines anderen) eine Gefahr_[Phenomenon] für die Stabilität der Währung. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

In the first sentence we see the noun *Deutsche* twice in the Experiencer position, seeing the departure from the D-Mark as a sacrifice for Europe. Important is also the adjective attribute “identity-fostering” given to the D-Mark, because it emphasizes the importance that the D-Mark had for the Germans. In the second sentence *Deutsche* is also in the

Experiencer position with the perceiving verb *to see* as well. The object of this seeing (Phenomenon) is “danger for the stability of the currency“, contained in “the attempted breach of the Maastricht Treaty”, which in parentheses is explained as forbidding that euro countries step in for each other’s liabilities. The departure from the D-Mark and its strength is the subject of the next excerpt as well.

- (13) Schliesslich ist den Deutschen_[Counteragent] der Abschied von der bewährten D-Mark_[Patient] mit dem Gegenteil_[Instrument] der von Merkel_[Sayer] gebetsmühlenartig wiederholten Rettungsfloskel schmackhaft gemacht worden. Kein Euro-Land_[Agent] darf für die Schulden eines anderen haften, steht in den EU-Verträgen. Nur dadurch_[Reason] werde der Euro_[Affected Object] so stark_[Attribute] wie die D-Mark_[Comparison], versprochen die Väter_[Sayer] der Währungsunion. (*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

Here the citizens are in the first two instances occupying the Counteragent position: being convinced and having the departure from the D-Mark made “palatable” to them. Like in the last excerpt where the departure from the D-Mark was the subject matter, here it is again modified by an adjective, this time *bewährt* (reliable).

The third sentence states that giving up the D-Mark was made palatable to the Germans with the “opposite of Merkel’s prayer-wheel-like repeated rescue clichés”. The fourth sentence elaborates on what this opposite is: no euro country is allowed to step in for another’s debt, according to the treaties. The fifth sentence expands on this by saying that only this way the euro (Affected Object) would become as strong (Attribute) as the D-Mark (Comparison), as promised by the “fathers of the monetary union” (Sayer). Based on the context, the citizens can be interpreted as occupying a hidden Counteragent position here as the recipient of the “fathers” verbal action.

This excerpt therefore explains that the D-Mark was given up in exchange for a “stability promise” that would ensure that the euro would become equally strong. This stability promise and the notion of it being broken in the crisis is a subject matter touched upon elsewhere in the corpus as well:

- (14) So sollen natürlich die Parteien im Bundestag zur Zustimmung zu den Notkrediten für das überschuldete Griechenland gebracht und die widerwilligen Deutschen_[Counteragent] besänftigt werden. Denn die_[Experiencer] sehen das einst gegebene Stabilitätsversprechen in puncto Euro dahingehen und fühlen sich zur europäischen Solidarität regelrecht erpresst. (*Brandsätze*. FAZ May 4th 2010)

In the above excerpt the Germans, which in this context refers to the citizens as opposed to the political elite, are occupying first the Counteragent position (being appeased) and then the Experiencer position (seeing the stability promise of the euro being broken and feeling themselves being blackmailed to European solidarity). In the first sentence as well, because the Germans are described as “unwilling”, there is an additional quality to how they are positioned: in essence, they are first portrayed as feeling unwillingness (Experiencer), due to which they are being appeased (Counteragent).

In excerpt 14 we saw a reference to the anonymous “fathers of the Monetary Union” who are behind the stability promise, and they make their appearance elsewhere in the corpus as well as the ones who were responsible for creating the stability pact.^{20, 21}

The next two excerpts from the text *Der politische Stabilitätspakt* however elaborate on the reasoning and the nature of the Stability Pact from a different perspective.

- (15) Die Währungsverfassung für den Euro enthält ein Stabilitätsversprechen, das_[Agent] vor allem die deutschen Ängste_[Counteragent] vor der Einheitswährung beruhigen sollte. (*Der politische Stabilitätspakt*. FAZ July 3rd 2010)

This excerpt states that the purpose of the stability promise is to appease the German fears of the common currency. Note that “German fears” is synonymous to “fears of Germans”, which is simply a way of expressing an affective process by means of an

²⁰ *Nicht mal ein Feigenblatt*. FAZ May 5th 2010

²¹ *Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion*. FAZ October 31st 2010

attributive expression. Here the “German fears” are in the Counteragent role, but the process of fearing itself is an instance of the Experiencer role. The positioning is therefore similar as in excerpt 12, where Germans were portrayed as “seeing a danger for the stability of the currency”, seeing a danger being almost equal to fear.

The remainder of the text explains the meaning of the stability promise as making money “unpolitical” by means of “unalterable rules” that guarantee the independence of fiscal policy from political interventions and by preventing the member states from accumulating debt on each other’s costs. This idea of “unpoliticization” of money is itself explained as being based on the German idea of *Ordnungspolitik*. In a roundabout way, the stability promise that was meant to appease German fears is therefore itself articulated as being based on German ideas, even if they are elsewhere attributed to the anonymous “fathers of the Monetary Union”. These German ideas behind the stability pact and the whole Monetary Union are the subject of the next section.

5.2.4 The German EMU and culturalization of divergences

That the Monetary Union is fashioned after German ideas was already hinted at in excerpt 4, where Germany was identified as the motor of the Monetary Union and as the country that attached the Stability Pact to it. In the same excerpt it was also said that many member states have not been able to adhere to it, at times not even Germany.

In this section we will have a look at how the Monetary Union is articulated as German-inspired in its conception, and how Germany is therefore also attributed the role of imposing adherence to the rules of the Pact in an EMU that is portrayed as being highly economically divergent. The German view is contrasted against these other views, and the divergences depicted as having cultural origins (compare with excerpt 3 in 5.2.1).

The first excerpt elaborates on this German architecture of the Monetary Union and how it was originally experienced as a “dictate” by some other countries in the EMU:

- (16) Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion_[Result] ist nach deutschen Vorgaben_[Quality] konstruiert worden, bis hin zur Verfassung der Europäischen Zentralbank mit Sitz in Frankfurt. Das_[Phenomenon] wurde schon damals als „Diktat“_[Role1] empfunden, aber als unumgänglicher Preis_[Role2] bezahlt in der Hoffnung, im Zuge der Vergemeinschaftung könnten die Stabilitätskriterien aufgeweicht werden. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010*)

Here we see the direct statement that the monetary union (Result) was built in accordance with German specifications (Circumstantial element of Quality). The excerpt also makes it clear that this was not looked upon entirely favorably: It was felt to be a “dictate”, although the text does not reveal by whom, since the Experiencer has been faded out due to the passive voice. One can assume that the hidden Experiencer are other countries in the Monetary Union. Parallel to being referred to as a “dictate, the German specifications are also described as a “necessary price to pay” which could be loosened in the course of further communitization. This refers to the idea that they were meant to bring about certain economic convergence. The German conditions and specifications are further highlighted in the next excerpt, which is a continuation of the text:

- (17) Der Balanceakt_[Agent], den Frau Merkel_[Agent] derzeit unternimmt, läuft darauf hinaus_[Purpose], den Euro_[Patient] und die Eurozone_[Patient] als Kern der EU_[Role] zu stabilisieren und gleichzeitig die deutschen Bedingungen_[Result] zu aktualisieren, also der Stabilitätspakt der Lage anzupassen. Die deutschen Vorgaben_[Carrier] gelten weiterhin, es darf künftig in der Währungsunion keine Trittbrettfahrer mehr geben. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010*)

Merkel is found here in the Agent position in a subordinate qualifying clause for the noun “balancing act”. This balancing act has the goal of “stabilizing the euro as the core of the EU (Role)” and at the same time “bringing it up to par with German conditions (Result)”. Furthermore, the German specifications are said to “still to apply”. Although there is no connecting conjunction between this sentence and the last (“no free riders are

allowed anymore”), the last sentence can be understood as an elaboration of what these specifications mean.

It is mentioned many times in the corpus that the requirements of the Stability Pact are so strict that not even Germany has managed to uphold them, and in fact softened them at one point in time, together with France.^{22,23,24} The requirements are nonetheless articulated as something that separates “the wheat from the chaff”, so to speak, and on which the German position in the crisis stands, like the following excerpt from still the same text shows:

- (18) Ob das realistisch ist, ob Länder_[Agent], die_[Possessor] in Währungs- und Finanzdingen eine andere Einstellung_[Attribute1] und dazu noch eine weniger kompetitive Wirtschaftsstruktur_[Attribute2] haben, dabei mithalten können, ist eine offene Frage. Dass die deutsche Position_[Phenomenon] von Ländern_[Experiencer], für die Griechenland pars pro toto steht, neuerlich als „Diktat“_[Role] empfunden werden muss, ist verständlich. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010)

Here we have first of all the noun “countries”, which in a qualifying embedded clause is assigned with the attributes of having a different attitude towards currency and financial matters as well as possessing a less competitive economic structure. These countries are the Agent of another clause with the predicate “to keep up”. This verb takes the preposition *bei*, and the deictic preposition *dabei* refers to the aforementioned German specifications, which allow no free riders. Whether the said countries can keep up with the German specifications is said to be “an open question”.

In the next sentence we also have the noun “countries”, this time in the Experiencer position in a passive subordinate clause. The noun is qualified by the non-restricted clause “which Greeks represent”. These countries (Experiencer) are said to perceive the

²² *Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010

²³ *Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg*. FAZ May 13th 2010

²⁴ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 20th 2010

German position (Phenomenon) as a dictate (Role). This German position can be understood to refer to the aforementioned specifications, according to which there shall be no free riders within the Monetary Union. The fact that the aforementioned countries may experience Germany's position as a dictate is said to be "understandable".

Based on the analysis and the context it is not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that the "countries with a different attitude and a less competitive economic structure" are to a large extent co-extensive, even if not entirely identical with the "countries which Greece represents". These countries could be the countries that are most hit by the crisis, which were mostly located in Southern Europe, but they could also be the "soft currency countries" referred to in excerpt 3 (5.2.1). These two possibilities are of course not mutually exclusive. Just like in excerpt 3, though, what we see here in excerpt 18 is an instance of "othering": German views are given more strength by contrasting them against other views, of countries that perceive them as a "dictate".

In the next excerpts we will have a further look at the requirements of the Monetary Union, how Germany is described as enforcing them, and how the requirements thereby become implicitly or explicitly linked with "Germanness":

- (19) Vielleicht ist die Reaktion auf die Politik der Bundesregierung_[Reason] so heftig ausgefallen, weil die Implikationen der Währungsunion endlich klargeworden sind: stabile Staatsfinanzen und eine liberale Wirtschaftspolitik, hohe Produktivität und eine wettbewerbsfähige Wirtschaft. Das sind Anforderungen, die große Disziplin erfordern. Aber wenn der Euro_[Identified] unser Schicksal_[Identifier] ist, dann darf man damit nicht Schändungen treiben. Und muss nicht ständig über das Fehlen einer Transferunion klagen. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

Here the Federal Government is in the role of a Reason (cause), or to be more precise, its politics. The text states that this reaction is perhaps because the implications of the Monetary Union have become clear. The implications are listed as stable finances, liberal economic policy, high productivity and competitive economy. The next sentence

elaborates by identifying this list of implications as “requirements that demand great discipline.”

The fourth sentence then extends the meaning of the said requirements and presents the justification behind them: “if the euro is our destiny, it must not be desecrated” and “one should not complain about the lack of a transfer union.” The first sentence is a metaphoric expression designating that something is spoiled as to make it lose its value. The “our” here is an example of personal deixis with a slightly unclear referent, but it can be taken to refer to all those countries sharing the euro: it is the shared destiny of all the euro countries, not just Germans. What links these sentences to the requirements is the conjunction *aber* (but), which highlights the necessity of the requirements from another point of view. Desecrating the euro and wishing for a transfer union can be taken as antithesis to the spirit of the requirements.

This excerpt like excerpt 19 and excerpt 3 (see 5.2.1) also demonstrates the trend of “othering”: German views, attitudes and values are articulated by contrasting them to opposing views and attitudes. In this excerpt the “other” has been faded from view and what we see is only a reaction to the politics of the federal government. It is precisely this reaction which is used to highlight the requirements of the Monetary Union, and because it was caused by the federal government, it can of course be inferred that their policy, i.e. the policy of Germany, is in line with these requirements. The next excerpt shows how Germany – but not only Germany – is articulated as having the duty to “protect the European monetary union from harm”:

- (20) Deutschland_[Agent] wird sich seiner Verantwortung stellen, hat die Kanzlerin_[Sayer] gesagt. Das ist richtig so. Aber zu dieser Verantwortung – und das geht nicht nur Deutschland_[Matter] an – gehört auch die Pflicht, die Europäische Währungsunion_[Patient] vor Schaden zu bewahren. Viel zu lange haben europäische Staaten_[Agent] eine die Wirklichkeit verdrängende Politik betrieben, die aus einer theoretischen Möglichkeit eine reale Gefahr hat werden lassen: erst die Erosion des Vertrauens in die gemeinsame Währung und dann die Erosion des Vertrauens in die EU. (*Brandsätze*. FAZ May 4th 2010)

Here the Chancellor is making a statement (Sayer) on behalf of Germany, stating that Germany will face up to its responsibility, which in this case means making its contribution towards helping Greece. The text reminds that this responsibility includes the duty to protect the monetary union from harm. The European states are then depicted as the responsible Agents, who through their “reality-denying policies have turned a theoretical possibility into a real danger”, which is the erosion of trust in the euro and the erosion of trust in the EU.

The cause for the crisis is often articulated as partly resulting from large economic divergences and attitudes towards state finances, which excerpts 18 and 19 also imply. In the text *Vor einer Existenzkrise*²⁵, for example, it is mentioned that the EU has overextended itself through deepening integration, because the differences between the member states have become too great, “to the point of cultural alienation”. As excerpt 19 shows, the discussion around economic divergence dovetails with articulations of divergences in mentality, which then gets translated to as having cultural origins. The next excerpt demonstrates this:

- (21) Sowohl die Entstehungsgeschichte des Desasters als auch die Lösungsvorschläge zu seiner Überwindung offenbaren, wie groß die Unterschiede in der kulturellen Prägung der Völker Europas sind, wie unterschiedlich die Völker_[Agent/Experiencer] und ihre Eliten_[Agent/Experiencer] denken und handeln. Der Euro_[Agent] hat, wie man sieht, die Griechen_[Affected Object] nicht zu Deutschen_[Result] umerzogen und die Deutschen_[Affected Object] noch nicht ganz zu Griechen_[Result]. Schuldenbremse hier und Staatsbetrug da kann man nicht wirklich als Zeichen der Konvergenz ausgeben. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In this excerpt we can again witness the distinction between the nation (*Völker*, people) and what can be thought of as the state or government (*Eliten*). Noteworthy is that the people are portrayed as primary and the elites are described as *their* elites: this is

²⁵ FAZ April 27th 2010

perhaps due to the fact that the cultural differences between the people are the subject of the preceding clause. Both *people* and *elites* are theoretically occupying both the Experiencer (thinking) and Agent (acting) roles, although the order of these predicates when compared with the order of the nouns may suggest that *thinking* pertains more to the people, whereas *acting* pertains more to the elites, although both predicates might also be as relating to both of the nouns. This interpretation would also confirm a common trend in the corpus that the nations (people or citizens) tend to be portrayed as Experiencers, whereas the governments and politicians tend to be portrayed as Agents.

In the second sentence we find a juxtaposition of “Germans” and “Greeks”, which serves as an illustration of the cultural differences just mentioned. The Agent of this sentence is however the euro, which according to the text “has apparently not turned Greeks to Germans or Germans not quite to Greeks.” In the last sentence this comparison is elaborated on with the use of deictic expressions “here” and “there”. The word “debt brake” is associated with “here” (Germany) and the word “state fraud” with “there” (Greece). The implication that can be drawn from these two sentences is that the Germans and Greeks are in some way polar opposites of each other.

This excerpt shows that the issues of economic convergence, which in the previous excerpt were put in terms of some countries “not keeping up”, are in essence attributed to cultural differences. These differences are both explicitly mentioned, but the cultural explanation also comes out in the use of the words denoting the people as well as the names of individual nations, instead of countries or states – Germans and Greeks.

In the text *Bis alle Schwaben sind* (Until everyone is a Swabian) the vast differences in the attitudes, mentalities and economic strength of the countries within the EU are also highlighted. This is already hinted at in the title, which implies that not everyone is a Swabian, i.e. not everybody possesses the thrifty and disciplined attitude of a stereotypical inhabitant of Southeastern Germany. Similar to the text *Vor einer Existenzkrise*²⁶, the text states that the “EU pays now for its ambition to undertake giant

²⁶ FAZ April 27th 2010

integration steps like the Monetary Union, although the necessary preconditions were not there”. By the lack of preconditions the text means “differences in not only economic strength, but also in mentalities and cultures.” These differences are then referred to as a “colorful European mix”, as the following excerpt shows:

- (22) Diese europäisch-bunte Mischung_[Counteragent] will die Kanzlerin_[Agent] mittel- bis langfristig auf eine Linie zwingen – auf die der schwäbischen Hausfrau. Denn nur mit Sparsamkeit und Disziplin ließe sich das Feuer endgültig löschen. [...] Die EU_[Patient] brauchte, wenn der Euro dauerhaft gerettet werden soll, tatsächlich eine gänzlich "neue Stabilitätskultur". Die EU-Mitglieder_[Agent] dürften nicht länger über ihre Verhältnisse leben. (*Bis alle Schwaben sind.* FAZ May 20th 2010)

Here the Chancellor is again occupying the Agent position, with the verb *auf eine Linie zwingen*. This is modified by the modal verb *wollen*, which means that she is being attributed with a motive. This motive is to “force the colorful European mix on the line of a Swabian housewife”. The rest of the excerpt elaborates on what this line means: the means to “extinguish the fire” is “thriftiness and discipline”; “if the euro is to be permanently saved, the EU truly needs a whole ‘new culture of stability’”. The main verb in all these sentences is in the subjunctive mood, which indicates either indirect speech, or distancing from the content of the speech, or both.

Much like in excerpt 17, we see Merkel in the position of bringing stability to the EMU and the EU, by imposing her Swabian-like policy on other, less disciplined countries within it. The implication that because not everyone is a Swabian, Merkel has to enforce a “culture of stability”, which means that the EU countries no longer live above their means. Referring to Merkel as a Swabian housewife is not unique to this text, but takes place elsewhere in the corpus as well, where she is described as “not the worst kind of specter that could befall Europe.”²⁷

²⁷ *Im Namen Europas.* FAZ May 7th 2010

So far these examples have shown us that the rules and architecture of the euro/EMU are articulated as something German-inspired. These rules imply certain requirements (stable finances, liberal economic policy, high productivity and competitive economy), which demand discipline to fulfill. It has also been made clear that not everyone in the EU or the EMU possesses this type of discipline in order to avoid “living above their means”. The Chancellor is therefore described as bringing about necessary stability by enforcing “Swabian-like” policies.

In excerpts 17 and 19 it was stated that both Germany’s previous influence on the architecture of EMU as well as Merkel’s actions to enforce the German specifications of the EMU were perceived as a “dictate” by some member states. The conflict is also sometimes portrayed as taking place specifically between Germany and France, the largest member-states of the EU, over the view of what “model” Europe should follow. In excerpt 3 (5.2.1), it was claimed that the former “soft currency countries”, including France, would accuse Germans of “wanting to secure economic rulership in Europe through the euro.” In excerpt 4, it was also insinuated that the French idea of “European economic government” has the goal of curbing the “competitive German industry”. The next excerpt further elaborates on this conflict:

- (23) Alle Beteuerungen von Gemeinsamkeit hier oder da können nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass es zwischen Paris_[Experiencer] und Berlin_[Experiencer] einen tiefgehenden Dissens gibt, wie die Euro-Krise zu bekämpfen sei. Dabei ist der Streit, ob es dazu einer "Wirtschaftsregierung" der 16 Euro-Staaten bedürfte (das ist die französische Vorstellung) oder ob bessere Koordination und mehr Disziplin unter den 27 EU-Staaten der richtige Weg sei (was Frau Merkel_[Agent] will), nur die Oberfläche des Problems. Im Grunde geht es darum, in welche Richtung sich die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion_[Affected Object] entwickeln, welchem "Modell" Europa_[Agent] künftig folgen soll. Frau Merkel_[Counteragent] wird – natürlich nicht von offizieller Seite, sondern durch gezielt gestreute Informationen - in Paris vorgeworfen, sie wolle "une Europe germanique", ein nach dem deutschen Bild geformtes Europa. (*Ein Debakel*. FAZ June 6th 2010)

In the first sentence, the capital names *Paris* and *Berlin* are used metonymically to denote the respective governments. They are in the Experiencer position due to the cognitive-affective word *Dissens* (dissent) that is said to exist between them. Their respective positions, “economic government” and “better coordination and discipline” are identified as the “French idea” and “what Merkel wants” respectively, which gives the German position a more personalized flavor. The deeper problem is however identified as dealing with the direction to which the Monetary Union should develop and what “model” Europe should follow. In the fourth sentence Merkel is in the Counteragent position, being accused in Paris of wanting a “Europe modelled after German ideas”. While this text in question does not take sides as to which side is correct, this excerpt merely serves to demonstrate how the conflict is shown to manifest on the official level, while on the level of discourse, as shown by other texts in the corpus, FAZ leans towards the view that the German view is indeed more correct one.

At this point a counterexample should be named, however, that in some ways confirms the existence of an opposite trend. While in the above text no sides were taken, Germany’s right to dictate what form the Monetary Union or Europe should take is challenged in FAZ as well. The almost unspoken assumption behind that notion is likening the euro to the D-Mark, an idea that is mentioned in passing only once.²⁸ The next excerpt demonstrates how this assumption and Germany’s “dictatorship” over the euro is challenged:

- (24) Was bei dieser Reform herauskommt, wird nicht in jedem Fall den deutschen Lehrbüchern über Ordnungspolitik entsprechen. Der Euro_[Identified] ist nun einmal, wie die gesamte EU_[Comparison], ein supranationales Projekt_[Identifier]. Da sind Kompromisse zwischen Staaten und Mentalitäten zu schließen. Man kann eine Gemeinschaftswährung_[Patient] nicht als Diktat_[Role] eines Mitgliedslandes_[Possessor] betreiben, da haben sich Politiker und Volk_[Experiencer] in Deutschland_[Locative] lange etwas vorgemacht. Der Euro_[Identified] war nie das Gleiche_[Identifier] wie die D-Mark_[Comparison], was übrigens nicht nur von Nachteil sein muss: Die Inflation, vor der die Deutschen_[Experiencer] so große Angst haben, war mit dem Euro_[Instrument] bisher niedriger als mit unserer alten Währung_[Comparison]. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)

²⁸*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In the first two sentences we see something that can be interpreted as a concession: first it is admitted that “Whatever the results of these reforms, it will surely not correspond to German textbook ideals of *Ordnungspolitik*.” In terms of semantic roles, it is an Identified – Identifier structure. The next sentence, which has an identical structure, can be seen an elaboration of the statement: the euro as well as the EU are identified as a supranational project. The concessionary nature of this latter statement is evident from the expression *nun einmal*, which can be translated as “it just happens to be the case that...”. The next sentences further clarify what it means that the euro is a supranational project: compromises between states and mentalities have to be made, and a common currency cannot be managed as a dictate of one member-state. The “politicians and people in Germany” are in the position of an Experiencer, described as having fooled themselves. Overall, these two sentences are a type of counter-articulation to the idea expressed in the previous excerpt, in which Germany/Merkel has to impose a “culture of stability” on the “colorful European mix”. Here we can also see an interesting distinction being made once again between the political elite and the people, perhaps with the aim of emphasizing their uniform attitude.

The fifth sentence can be seen as further elaboration on what the politicians and people in Germany have been fooling themselves about: that the euro is the same as the D-Mark. This sentence makes the claim that this was never the case. The second last sentence states that the non-sameness of the euro and the D-Mark is not only a bad thing, and the last sentence elaborates on this: the inflation of which the Germans (Experiencer) have been so afraid was so far lower with the euro than “with our old currency”. The last sentence is therefore in a way parallel to the fifth sentence, in that both feature the D-Mark in the position of Comparison, but in the last sentence it is referred to in a way that has more emotional connotations, as “our old currency”. This is a clear ‘national we’, by which the author identifies himself with the Germans.

This kind of concession can be seen as an exception that confirms a rule. It is a type of counter-articulation which takes up an unspoken assumption and subjects it to re-

negotiation. Thereby it confirms the existence of certain positions or assumptions, which may have been either explicitly or tacitly articulated in other texts within the corpus and outside of it.

5.2.5 Transfer union, citizens and sovereignty

So far we have been discussing the German-inspired ideas behind the Monetary Union, and how Germany is portrayed as enforcing these ideas during the crisis, based on the German concern for currency stability and likening the euro to the old D-Mark. The requirements for the Monetary Union introduced in the previous excerpts – discipline, no free riders, no living above one's means – are statements about what the Monetary Union ideally should be, and these requirements are enshrined in the Treaties as well, as has been frequently pointed out.

On the flip side of this there is what the Monetary Union is in danger of becoming: a *transfer union*. This has also already been alluded to in 5.2.2 in excerpts 6 and 8, where the euro was said to fail if the Monetary Union becomes a transfer union. Elsewhere in the corpus as well, for example in the texts *Euro als Weichwährung*²⁹ and *die Währungsunion am Scheideweg*³⁰, it is stated that a transfer union will lead to a failure of the Monetary Union and the euro having no future due to an erosion of trust in the common currency.

Such statements of course betray a concern for the stability of the currency and the concomitant fear of inflation, which has also been identified as a typically German fear (excerpts 15 and 23). Often it is the perspective of the citizens that is evoked, either of the Germans or European citizens as a whole. The trust in the euro that is at stake is portrayed as hanging from their willingness to pay for other countries' debts via money transfers:

²⁹ FAZ May 10th 2010

³⁰ FAZ May 13th 2010

- (25) Umso wichtiger ist, dass sich in den Köpfen der Bürger_[Experiencer] nicht der Eindruck verfestigt, eine ehemals stabile Währungsunion_[Affected Object] solle schrittweise zu einer Haftungsgemeinschaft und Transferunion_[Result] umgebaut werden. [...] Solange die Deutschen_[Experiencer] oder andere Einzahler_[Additive] nicht bereit sind, über die bestehenden Kohäsionfonds hinaus für die EU_[Beneficiary] zu zahlen, verbietet sich jeder Finanzausgleich, weil man sonst das Vertrauen in den Euro zerstört. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)

Here the noun *Bürger* (citizens) is in the Experiencer position (in this case, having an impression of something), which as we have seen is typical for nouns referring to *citizens* or *nations* (e.g. *Germans*) in the corpus. It is unclear however whether this refers to German citizens or European citizens more generally. The text states that what they should not have the impression of is that a “formerly stable Monetary Union (Affected Object) is being transformed into a liability community and a transfer union (Result).

In the last sentence we find *Germans* identified as *a contributor* by means of the *other contributors* being in the Additive role. They are again in the Experiencer position (being ready, which can also be translated as being willing). In the sentence a causal connection is established between their lack of readiness to contribute to the EU beyond the cohesion funds, the possibility of there being financial transfers, and loss of trust in the euro. It must be noted that the perspective is on the *people* throughout and on their *willingness* to pay, rather than on the state’s *ability* to pay (cf. 5.2.1). These two perspectives can be however highlighted within the same text, as the next excerpt shows:

- (26) Deutschland_[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land kann und muss seinen Beitrag leisten. Aber alle Lasten der Zusammenhalts kann es_[Agent] nicht stemmen, dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. Gerade weil die Einigung Europas kostbar ist, dürfen seine Bürger_[Experiencer], auch die Deutschen, nicht das Gefühl haben, sie würden überfordert. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

The first sentence we already encountered in excerpt 7. It expresses the notion of Germany not having the *ability* to carry all the burden in the financial sense. The second sentence, however, touches on the notion of *willingness*, where the citizens, both Europeans in general as well as the Germans, are again in the Experiencer position, where they “must not have the feeling of being overwhelmed”, for the reason that the “unification of Europe is precious”.

Similarly, the text *Von der Währungsunion in die Transferunion* states that although Chancellor Kohl understood the euro as a preliminary step towards a political union and although there might be good reasons for a political union, the attempt to reach a political union through the backdoor of a transfer union will put the existence of the Monetary Union at risk.³¹ The reason for this is that doing so would risk inviting the refusal of the citizens:

- (27) Denn hierbei riskiert man die Verweigerung der Bürger_[Experiencer]. Wer diesen Weg in die Transferunion_[Goal] geht, der zerstört das Vertrauen in den Euro_[Patient], zumindest dort, wo gespart und für die EU_[Beneficiary] gezahlt wird. (*Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion*. FAZ October 31st 2010)

Given the context of the discussion, which is Europe instead of Germany, the “citizens” here refer to European citizens in general. The citizens are in the Experiencer position (refusal), as is typical. The argumentation here is similar to the previous excerpt: when there is no willingness present for a transfer union, then trust in the euro will be destroyed. The text adds a qualifier: “at least there where it is saved and paid for the EU takes place”. This deictic expression “there” can be taken to refer to countries; “saving and paying for the EU”, on the other hand, is the concept of a *net contributor* expressed in terms of verbs. The text can therefore be taken to say that it at least the trust of net contributors that will be at stake should the Monetary Union become a transfer union.

³¹ FAZ October 31st 2010

Again the perspective is on the citizens, not on countries, since it is the willingness of citizens at risk.

So far we have seen examples of argumentation where references to the citizens are vague, in that they can be taken to refer to European citizens, but then the scope of the referent is narrowed down to encompass “citizens of net contributor countries”, among which Germany is also counted. This pattern is also exhibited in the following passage:

- (28) Sollte das der Einstieg in eine hemmungslose Transferunion_[Goal] sein, wird sie bald an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Denn die Bereitschaft, die Last für andere mitzutragen, ist innerhalb Europas_[Locative] ungleich geringer als innerhalb Deutschlands_[Locative]. Das ist keine deutsche Besonderheit. Viele mögen den Euro, schon weil er das lästige Umtauschen im Urlaub erspart. Aber man frage die Niederländer_[Counteragent], ob sie_[Experiencer] bereit sind, die griechischen Schulden zu begleichen. Oder man frage die Franzosen_[Counteragent], wie groß ihr_[Experiencer] Mitleid für überschuldete spanische Bauherren ist. Nicht wenn es um Hilfen in begrenztem Umfang geht, aber riesige Summen mit einem Federstrich zu übereignen, das werden auch die begeisterungsfähigsten Europäer_[Experiencer] auf Dauer nicht akzeptieren. Wer Europa_[Beneficiary] voranbringen und den Euro_[Range] behalten will, darf das Projekt nicht überlasten. Zu einem gesunden Euro_[Identified] gehört auch ein gesundes Maß an Eigeninteresse_[Identifier].
(*Die politische Währungsunion*. FAZ July 1st 2010)

Similarly to the previous excerpt, the transfer union is something that is entered (Goal), but it is also the Agent of a subordinate clause, “coming to soon face its limits”. The conjunction *denn* (because) introduces the reason why: “the willingness to bear the burden of others is even lower in Europe than in Germany”. This lack of willingness is identified as not a “German specialty”. The adjective “willing” has been substantivized and is part of a circumstantial attributive clause, where the circumstantial attribute (i.e. Locative) is both Europe and Germany. Willingness is a mental state and would therefore afford an Experiencer, but here we find only “willingness” without a distinct experiencing subject, diffused within the “containers” of “Europe” and “Germany”.

However, the following sentences make clear that it is the citizens that are the experiencing subjects: this can be inferred from the down-to-earth example of being able to avoid exchanging currency while on holiday. The next sentence gets more specific: the Dutch, the French, the Greeks and the Spaniards are mentioned. In two rhetorical questions, it is asked whether the Dutch and the French (Counteragents) would be willing (Experiencers) to compensate for the debts of the Greeks and Spaniards, respectively. This is in fact a juxtaposition of two net contributor nations against two debt-ridden, net receiver nations. The pattern is therefore the same as in the previous examples: the question is about the willingness of European citizens “to carry the burden for others”, but especially the willingness of net contributors.

The next sentence qualifies what has been said before: limited aid is not a problem, but it is “granting enormous sums with the stroke of a pen” that “will not be accepted by even the most enthusiastic Europeans”. The claim is therefore similar than the one made in the previous passage about a transfer union risking the refusal of the (European) citizens: in both cases, Europeans are in the Experiencer position. The text then goes on to say that in order to “bring Europe forward” and “keep the euro”, the “project [of the European Monetary Union and the EU] should not be overburdened.” “Overburdened” can be taken to refer to money transfers that “risk the willingness of the citizens” and therefore analogous to “destroying trust in the euro”. The last sentence supports this conclusion, as it identifies a “healthy euro” with a “healthy amount of self-interest”: on part of all Europeans and not just Germans.

It is not only a question of the failure of the monetary union or the willingness of the citizens, however. The question of the transfer union is intimately tied to considerations about the nature of the whole EU, concerning which the Constitutional Court of Germany is portrayed as the final arbiter:

- (29) Solange es keinen europäischen Bundesstaat_[Existential] gibt, bleibt glücklicherweise der Kommission_[Counteragent] der Griff in die deutsche Steuerkasse verwehrt. Darüber wacht das Bundesverfassungsgericht_[Agent], dessen Lissabon-Urteil nicht von nationalstaatlichem Denken, sondern von Sorge über die Demokratiedefizite im Verbund von Staaten geprägt ist. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

In this example, the Commission is denied access to German money as long as there is no European federal state. Concerning this state of affairs, the Constitutional Court is given the final say over what the EU is and what this entails, based on its Lisbon verdict concerning the nature of the EU. This verdict is appealed to elsewhere in the corpus as well. In the text *Normales Deutschland* we find the following statement:

- (30) Nicht neu ist zudem die Festlegung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts_[Agent], die EU_[Identified] sei kein Bundesstaat_[Identifier1], sondern ein Verbund souveräner Staaten_[Identifier2]; sie stammt aus den frühen neunziger Jahren. Im vergangenen Jahr hat das Gericht_[Sayer] nur noch einmal festgestellt, dass die EU_[Affected Object] seitdem kein Bundesstaat_[Result] geworden sei [...]. Man könnte hinzufügen: Und deswegen gibt es auch keine Transferunion_[Existential], dafür aber ein paar rote Linien, was den Fortgang der Integration betrifft. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

Here we find the decrees of the constitutional court paraphrased, in which the EU is denied to be a federal state, neither in the early 1990s nor in 2009. Another text states that the “Constitutional Court has made clear many times that it cannot accept a creeping state-formation of Europe, which would be tantamount to the undemocratization of the German nation-state”³² In a yet another example, it is said that “the Monetary Union is not a state but an association of sovereign states, which have merely handed over their monetary policy to the ECB”³³. In all these examples, the federal nature of the EU or the EMU is explicitly denied by appeal to a verdict of the Constitutional Court, and both are being attributed the form of a more loose association of sovereign states. All the preceding examples, taken together, establish the following types of logical connections, which are at the same time discursive articulations:

³² *Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010

³³ *Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion*. FAZ October 31st 2010

- 1) Transfer union → refusal of the citizens → no trust in the euro by the citizens → the euro will be soft currency = the euro will have no future = the Monetary Union will fail
- 2) The Constitutional Court declares that
 - EU ≠ federal state, but instead
 - EU = association of sovereign states, hence
 - EU / EMU ≠ transfer union, because transfer union = undemocratization of the German nation-state

These could also be combined and elaborated in the following way:

EU = association of sovereign states, hence EU / EMU ≠ transfer union, because transfer union = non-sovereign states = undemocratization of the German nation-state → refusal of the citizens

5.2.6 German interests and the government

In the preceding three sections we have looked at the relationship between Germany, Germans, the euro and the Monetary Union. We found that the stability of the euro is close to German interests. This is to a great part justified by the importance the D-Mark had for the German national identity, on one hand, and by the German-inspired architecture of the Monetary Union itself, on the other hand. The from a German point of view undesirable alternative to the Monetary Union, a “transfer union”, is undesirable not just because of the threat it poses to the common currency’s stability, but also due to the unwillingness of the citizens – in Germany and elsewhere – and the loss of sovereignty a transfer union would entail.

In this section we will look at how the German government’s actions are framed against the background of what the FAZ defines as German interests. Merkel’s activity in stabilizing the euro and imposing a “culture of stability” was already discussed in section 5.2.4 (excerpt 21), due to it being relevant to how the Monetary Union’s “Germanness” was articulated. Here the emphasis is slightly different, as what is of

interest is how the FAZ frames these actions and opens a conflict between the government and the citizens when the government's actions are not in line with German interests from the FAZ's point of view.

- (31) In der Euro-Gruppe kämpft die Bundesregierung_[Agent] zwar allein, aber sie_[Carrier] ist in einer starken Position_[Attribute/Locative]. Denn ohne Beteiligung Deutschlands_[Agent] fällt am Kapitalmarkt jedes Rettungspaket für Griechenland durch. Wenn Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel_[Agent] standhaft bleibt und eine Finanzhilfe für die Griechen nur über den Währungsfonds zulässt, kann sie_[Agent] den Euro retten. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

Here the federal government, Germany and Merkel all occupy the Agent position. The predicates assigned to each are *kämpfen* (to fight), *sich beteiligen* (nominalized as *Beteiligung*, to participate) and *standhaft bleiben* (keep firm). The verbs assigned to the government and Merkel both have to do with battle, sometimes used metaphorically in the context of negotiations. The fight here is about whether a bail-out package should be given to the Greeks in which the member states participate. Germany's participation in the second sentence is linked to the government's and Merkel's actions, as without its participation every rescue package is said to fail. This is also the meaning of the "strong position" (Locative/circumstantial attribute) attributed to the government in a subordinate clause. In the final sentence, by means of the conjunction *wenn* (if), Merkel is attributed a major role in that it is her action (of keeping firm), as the head of the government, that will determine whether the euro will be saved. The government and Merkel are therefore implied as acting on behalf of Germany in a way that is beneficial for the euro.

The next excerpt also deals with negotiations. Note that at this point the European leaders had agreed to prepare an assistance package for Greece, in cooperation with the IMF as per German wishes. They however also announced that the assistance would only be an *ultima ratio* and would be given at very punitive rates. This is reflected in the title of the article, *Hilfe und Strafe* (Help and punishment)

- (32) Das Rettungspaket für Griechenland ist geschnürt. Die Lösung_[Possessor] trägt eine deutsche Handschrift_[Attribute], die Grenzen für Hilfen sind eng und die Hürden hoch. In den Verhandlungen mit den anderen Regierungschefs hat Bundeskanzlerin Merkel_[Agent] geschickt die engen Spielräume als Druckmittel eingesetzt, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht_[Agent] in der Schicksalsfrage der gemeinsamen Währung gesetzt hat. Mit ihrer harten Verhandlungsführung_[Instrument] hat sie den EU-Partnern_[Counteragent] mehr abverlangt, als möglich schien. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)

Here we see three keywords: Angela Merkel, Germany and the adjective *deutsch* (German). Let us begin with the adjective attribute. It modifies the noun *Handschrift*, signature, carried by the rescue package for the Greeks. The sentence is in passive voice (“the bail-out package was tied”), but the “German signature” metaphorically attributes Germany the role of an Agent or a Causer. What this means is elaborated on in the next sentence: “the limits for aid are narrow and the thresholds high.”

Merkel is again occupying the position of an Agent. The action she participates in is also again that of negotiation, where she (Agent) by using the tight leeway given by the Constitutional Court (another Agent) demanded from the EU-partners (Counteragent) more than seemed possible. The ultimate Agent can be seen to be the Constitutional Court that sets the parameters of what could be negotiated, and Merkel is simply using these limits as a “means of pressure”. Merkel is also identified as a skillful and tough negotiator. The text continues as follows:

- (33) Dies ist keine neue Linie Deutschlands_[Possessor], seine Ziele_[Range] in Europa zu vertreten - und antieuropäisch ist es auch nicht. Indem Frau Merkel_[Agent] den französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy überzeugt hat, den Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) im Euro-Raum helfen zu lassen, hält sie_[Agent] zudem in der Tradition ihrer Vorgänger den deutsch-französischen Motor der europäischen Integration am Laufen. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)

This fact of being a demanding and skilled negotiator is the referent of the demonstrative pronoun *dies* in the next sentence, which states “This is not a new way for Germany to defend its interests in Europe— nor is it anti-European”. In this way, Merkel’s action becomes equated with Germany defending its interests in Europe (Identifier), which is also not anti-European (Attribute).

In the last sentence Merkel is still acting as an Agent, this time convincing the French president Sarkozy (Counteragent) that he allows the IMF to help in the euro area. Just like Merkel’s negotiation results are equated with Germany defending its interests in the previous sentence, here Merkel convincing Sarkozy is equated as “keeping the German-French motor of the European integration running in the tradition of her predecessors”, the latter being of course the former German Chancellors such as Schröder, Kohl and Adenauer. The cohesive element establishing this link is in this case the conjunction *indem* (by... doing something).

There is in fact an additional link, if only an implied one, between this last sentence and the previous one about anti-Europeanness, which is established by the word *zudem* (furthermore). It means that not only is Germany defending its interests in Europe new nor anti-European, Merkel is also in some way upholding the spirit of her pro-European predecessors.

So far we have seen the Chancellor’s and the government’s actions being aligned with German interests as interpreted by the FAZ, which means adhering to the no bail-out clause and to the integrity of the stability criteria This changes however when the financial assistance package is finally activated on April 21st, including bilateral credits.

There is a shift in how Merkel and other governmental actors are framed. When before they were depicted as fighting to defend Germany’s interests, now they are portrayed as trying to justify their actions in the eyes of the citizens. In most of these cases the governmental actors are occupying Agent position, or more precisely that of a Sayer. In the text *Griechische Wette*, for instance, we find the following passage:

- (34) Bundeskanzlerin Merkel_[Agent] gibt sich alle Mühe, die so gut wie beschlossene Milliardenüberweisung an Athen nicht als Bruch der gemeinsamen Verträge_[Role1] und verbotene Finanzhilfe_[Role2] erscheinen zu lassen. (*Griechische Wette*. FAZ April 25th 2010)

Merkel is here portrayed as trying to hide the fact that the bilateral credit could be thought of as breaking the treaties (Role 1) and as “forbidden financial aid” (Role 2). Merkel is therefore portrayed as acting in ways which goes against what is deemed acceptable from the point of view of the FAZ.

Often the FAZ reminds about Merkel’s and other German politicians’ accountability to the voters and to the Constitutional Court. It is for example stated that “Because Merkel did not manage to keep the billions for the Greeks out of the campaign in Nordrhein-Westphalen, could many a voter make their choice with their eyes on the dear money”³⁴ In another text that Merkel has “not only the German voters sitting on her neck, but she also has to take the position of the Constitutional Court into account.”³⁵

The text *In Haftung*³⁶ also states that if Merkel turns the Monetary Union into a transfer union, the Germans will lose their trust in the euro, and that this will pose a risk not just for the euro but also for Merkel’s chancellorship. It therefore exemplifies the same kind of argumentation as in 6.2.5: if a transfer union takes place, the citizens will lose their trust in the euro and it will possibly fail. The only difference here is that Merkel, by her Agent role, is held directly accountable should that state of affairs come to pass. It is affirmed that she is accountable to the citizens, who would possibly not re-elect her, and the loss of trust in the euro by the citizens is framed as posing as much of a risk for her own chancellorship as for the future of the euro.

³⁴ *Griechische Wette*. FAZ 25th April, 2010

³⁵ *Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ 27th April 2010

³⁶ FAZ May 7th 2010

There is one instance in the corpus where the reminder about democratic accountability is made on a more general level, but still pertaining to Germany. In the text with the title *Der Albtraum*³⁷ (Nightmare), the automatic fashion in which civil servants of the Commission make decisions is compared to German politicians, who have to justify themselves before their constituency and should “look the truth in the eyes” if they wish to be re-elected.³⁸

Sometimes we find the opposition built between the Chancellor as Sayer and the German citizens as Counteragents. The Chancellor’s speech or explanations are attributed the purpose of trying to either appease or convince the citizens. The next two excerpts shed light on this:

- (35) In ihrer Regierungserklärung hat die Bundeskanzlerin_[Sayer] – das war das Berliner Vorspiel zu den Athener Krawallen – eine Sprache gewählt, die zwischen Vorwärtsverteidigung und Untergangstremolo schwankte: Europa_[Carrier] am Scheideweg_[Attribute]; es geht um Deutschlands_[Possessor] Zukunft. So sollen natürlich die Parteien_[Counteragent] im Bundestag_[Locative] zur Zustimmung zu den Notkrediten für das überschuldete Griechenland gebracht und die widerwilligen Deutschen_[Counteragent] besänftigt werden. (*Brandsätze*. FAZ May 5th 2010)
- (36) Warum soll Deutschland_[Agent] für die Schulden Griechenlands haften? Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel_[Sayer] versucht das so zu erklären: Es gebe zur Rettung der Griechen keine Alternative, es gehe um die Stabilität des Euro, nur mit einem harten Sparprogramm könnten die Hellenen das Vertrauen der Märkte wiedergewinnen. Die Beschwörung der Zukunft Europas mag im Bundestag und Bundesrat Gehör finden, wenn der Finanzminister ermächtigt wird, für fremde Staatsschulden zu bürgen. Aber die allermeisten Bürger_[Counteragent] überzeugt das nicht. (*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In both excerpts the content of Merkel’s justifications is paraphrased as well. In the first excerpt it is an appeal to Europe’s and Germany’s future; in the second excerpt it is about the lack of alternatives, the stability of the euro and the importance of a harsh

³⁷ FAZ April 23rd 2010

³⁸ *Der Albtraum*. FAZ April 23rd 2010

savings program for the Greeks. This content is given in the subjunctive mode, which indicates both indirect speech as well as distancing from what is said. In the second last sentence of the second excerpt we find the nominalized construct “appeal to the future of Europe”, which is a label given to the justifications that were enumerated in the preceding sentence. It is in the Agent position, but the true Agent – or Sayer – is Merkel. It is this appeal that is portrayed as being perhaps convincing for the majority of parliament, but not to most citizens (Counteragent).

In an interesting parallel to the equation presented in excerpts 32 and 33, where Merkel’s tough negotiation style was equated with Germany advocating its goals in Europe, Merkel is in the text *In Haftung* portrayed as having failed Germany:

- (37) Angela Merkel_[Agent] hat dem Druck der europäischen Partner_[Counteragent] nachgegeben. Von der eisernen Kanzlerin_[Affected Object] ist nichts_[Result] geblieben. (*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In this example, Merkel giving up to the pressure of the European partners is equated to “nothing remaining from the Iron Chancellor”. This is of course a historical allusion to the 19th century German chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was a notably stern and tough leader. It therefore signifies that Merkel is no longer the hard and demanding negotiator who she was in excerpt 30.

Excerpts 32 and 33 show that Merkel typically justifies her actions in terms of the overarching logic of saving the euro and the European unification. Many times she is quoted as saying “If the euro fails, Europe will fail”, the word Europe being a placeholder for the whole project of the European unification^{39,40} For the FAZ there is however an inherent contradiction between her words and actions, since for the FAZ saving the euro and Europe would necessitate adhering to the treaties. Nowhere is this contradiction more clearly pointed out as in the text *Im Namen Europas*. The text

³⁹ *Im Dienst der Politik*. FAZ April 13th 2010

⁴⁰ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ April 20th 2010

describes Merkel as a bad European by her own definition, which she is quoted as putting forth:

- (38) Angela Merkel_[Identified] ist eine schlechte Europäerin_[Identifizier] – wenn man der von ihr selbst aufgestellten Definition des guten Europäers folgt_[Identifizier]. Der, so sagte sie am Mittwoch abermals im Deutschen Bundestag, zeichne sich unter anderem dadurch aus, dass er_[Agent] die europäischen Verträge achte. Die werden derzeit aber auch von der deutschen Regierung_[Agent] gebogen und ignoriert wie selten zuvor, selbstredend nur zum höchsten aller Zwecke: nicht allein zur Rettung_[Purpose1] Griechenlands, sondern auch zur Bewahrung_[Purpose2] der Währungsunion und überhaupt der europäischen Einigung. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

In Merkel's words, a good European is a one that adheres to the European treaties, but as the text points out, these treaties are now being ignored by the German government itself. The expression *selbstredend nur zum höchsten aller Zwecke* indicates that although the government justifies its actions with a high purpose – rescuing Greece and saving the Monetary Union as well as the European unification – the FAZ does not take this justification seriously. For the FAZ, then, ends do not justify the means.

Somewhat paradoxically though, a tightening of the stability pact is also sometimes depicted as something that would put the willingness of the citizens at risk, like in the texts *Zwangsvvertiefungs* and *Bis alle Schwaben sind*:

- (39) Eines ist allerdings auch klar: Die Handlungsspielräume der EU-Staaten_[Maleficiary] würden durch einen "gehärteten" Stabilitätspakt_[Agent] noch einmal reduziert. Dagegen wird es Widerstand geben, und das Gefühl von Fremdbestimmung wird auch in der Bevölkerung_[Experiencer] zunehmen. [...] Frau Merkel_[Sayer] sagte in Aachen, wenn der Euro scheitere, dann scheitere die Idee der europäischen Einigung. Werden ihr die Wähler_[Experiencer] glauben? (*Zwangsvvertiefung*. FAZ May 14th 2010)

The first sentence states that the freedom of action of EU states would be reduced by a stricter stability pact. The next sentence then claims that “there will be resistance against it and the feeling of being directed from outside will grow within the population”. The word *population* is again in the Experiencer role, and the referent of this word is most likely *European* population, since the preceding sentence referred to EU states. Merkel is in the role of a Sayer, who is quoted as saying “when the euro fails, the idea of European unification will fail”. The citizens, this time defined by the context as specifically German citizens in their aspect as voters, are in the Experiencer role (although since there is an implied interaction here, it could also be interpreted as the Counteragent role), and the text asks whether they would believe her. This at once highlights her democratic accountability and the fact that any action that leads to loss of national sovereignty is bound to invite the unwillingness of the citizens. A similar idea of Merkel’s wishes for deepening regulation as potentially causing resistance among European citizens and thereby making the future of the integration an open question (“The project of European integration is truly at a crossroads) is also expressed in the text *Bis alle Schwaben sind*.

So far only some of the possible examples of this theme of the government being held accountable have been covered. While all of them will not be discussed here, one more example will be given of another perspective.

- (40) Natürlich ist es bitter, dass Deutschland_[Agent] jetzt Kredite an andere Euro-Staaten_[Beneficiary] geben muss, um die Währung beisammen zu halten_[Purpose]. Aber die Kanzlerin_[Sayer] hat es nicht geschafft, dem Volk_[Counteragent] in klarer und verständlicher Sprache darzulegen, dass sie_[Agent] letztlich keine andere Wahl hatte. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)

In this excerpt too, Germany’s action (giving credits to other euro states to keep the currency together) is attributed to the Chancellor, in that she is put in the position of having to explain that “she had no other choice”. The fact of giving credits is described as bitter, in a tone of an admission signified by the adverb of manner *natürlich* (of

course). According to the text, the Chancellor (Sayer) has not managed to explain to the people (Counteragent) “in a clear and understandable language” that she had no choice.

In the continuation of the text, we see *Germans* twice in the Agent position, first as having “tied their destiny with the other nations in Europe”. This tying together of destinies is explained as being equivalent to a lack of “classical sovereignty”, which “does not exist anymore even for the largest member-state”.

- (41) Die Wahrheit ist, dass die Deutschen_[Agent] ihr Schicksal, und zwar nicht nur in der Währungspolitik, schon seit sehr langer Zeit mit dem der anderen Nationen in Europa verknüpft haben. [...] Klassische Souveränität, verstanden als nationale Handlungsfreiheit, gibt es in einem Verbund, der von der Währung bis zur Grenzkontrolle fast alles teilt, auch für den größten Mitgliedstaat_[Maleficiary] nicht mehr. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)

In the second example below (42) there is a slight shift in the extension of the word *Deutsche*. Whereas in 36 it referred to the German nation as a whole, in 37 it again refers in a more restricted sense to the citizens, in contrast to politicians. This shift is due to the use of the word *Bevölkerung* in the first sentence, which focuses the perspective on the people. The word *Bevölkerung* is in the typical Experiencer position, whereas *Deutsche* is again in the Agent position, in their aspect as voters. *Deutsche* is also the referent of the personal pronoun *sie* in the third sentence, where the role is Experiencer, regretting the choice of politicians they have made; the same applies to the word *Bürger* in the subordinate clause, where the events of the crisis are portrayed as fueling the imagination of citizens concerning a more isolated existence for Germany as a “big Switzerland”.

- (42) Offenbar hat die Euro-Krise das der Bevölkerung_[Experiencer] zum ersten Mal richtig bewusstgemacht. Drei Generationen lang haben die Deutschen_[Agent] solche Politiker gewählt, die sich für einen weitgehenden Kompetenztransfer nach Brüssel eingesetzt haben. Das scheinen sie_[Experiencer] jetzt zu bereuen, denn die jüngsten Ereignisse haben offenbar bei vielen Bürgern_[Experiencer] die Vorstellung genährt, man könne

behaglicher als eine Art große Schweiz leben: mit eigener Währung und starken Exporten, aber sonst zurückgezogen von den Zumutungen Europas und der Globalisierung. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)

While these passages demonstrate some trends concerning semantic roles, they also highlight another side of the democratic accountability that has been alluded to: it is the citizens who have chosen to vote for pro-European politicians in the past, even though they now, prompted by the crisis, seem to regret it.

5.2.7 Renegotiation of Germany's pro-European identity

In excerpt 31 we saw the statement that Germany pursuing its goals in Europe is, to paraphrase, “nothing new nor anti-European.”⁴¹ A continuity was also established between Merkel and her predecessor by framing her actions as “keeping the German-French motor of European integration running.” Such statements must always been seen as a part of a larger conversation and negotiation about what it means to be “European”, and also what it means to be Germany in Europe. The renegotiation of this definition takes place in many places in the corpus, but especially in the text *Normales Deutschland*. Only two direct excerpts will be given, while the rest of the text will be summarized, since the whole text contributes to the same theme.

- (43) In die Haltung der Bundesregierung_[Experiencer1] und, ganz allgemein, der deutschen Öffentlichkeit_[Experiencer2] in Sachen Griechenland, Euro und Währungsunion ist vielfach eine dramatische Wende in der deutschen Europapolitik_[Matter] hineingelegt worden. Und ein kühler, eng an deutschen Interessen orientierter Pragmatismus_[Patient] der Kanzlerin Merkel wurde der herzentrwärmeren Europaliebe des früheren Kanzlers Kohl_[Comparison] gegenübergestellt, der_[Experiencer] sogar bereit war, die D-Mark_[Patient] herzugeben als Zeichen_[Role] der Versöhnung von deutscher Einheit und europäische Einigung. Der Vorwurf, der heute gegen "Berlin"_[Counteragent] erhoben wird, lautet: Deutschland_[Experiencer] denke nicht mehr europäisch_[Quality], sondern, eben, deutsch_[Quality]. ES_[Affected Object] sei ein "normales" Land_[Result] geworden. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

⁴¹ *Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010

The text describes "a manifold dramatic change in attitude" of the federal government and the German public "concerning German European policy in matters pertaining to Greece, euro and the Monetary Union." This differentiation between the government and the public is similar to the distinction between the state or the politicians and the people, which has now been encountered many times in the corpus. By naming these actors the text ensures that the "whole" of the country is covered in the change of orientation, which would not be the case if it simply said "there has been a dramatic change in Germany's European policy": because the country name can often be used to denote just the government, this could be interpreted as merely the government changing its policy, and the attitudes of the people would not enter the picture.

There is a contrast created between Merkel's "cold pragmatism which is tightly bound to German interests" and former chancellor Kohl's "heart-warming love for Europe". The latter is exemplified by the fact that Kohl (Agent) was willing to give up the D-Mark as a kind of a symbolic act of reconciliation between the unified Germany and European unification: recall that in excerpt 12 this act was described as "the Germans' sacrifice for Europe"⁴²

In the end of this excerpt we see the capital name *Berlin* being used as a metonymic index for the German government in the Counteragent position, being accused of the fact that Germany does not think in a "European way" anymore but rather in a "German way". This is a rare instance where the country name is found in the Experiencer position, but the referent can be taken to be the same as with the capital name *Berlin*: the government.

The verbs are in the subjunctive mode, which indicates indirect speech. The use of quotation marks around the capital name could signal that the author wants to make the use of this metonymic convention marked (as opposed to unmarked). The reason could be the distinction opened up in the opening sentence between the government and the

⁴² *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th.2010

general public, whereby the change of mind from thinking in a European way to more German way was implied not to pertain only to the government (= “Berlin” \approx state), but to the public as well (\approx the nation). The last sentence puts the accusation in another way: Germany is also accused of becoming a “normal” country. The word “normal” in quotation marks could again indicate distancing or indirect speech. This interpretation is lent credence by the use of subjunctive in both this and the preceding sentence.

“Normal” in this context is equal to “thinking in a German way”, as opposed to a “European way”. It is thereby implied that being a normal country means being primarily concerned with self-interest. This accusation has its roots in Germany’s heretofore pro-European attitude. As the title of this text gives away, this issue of Germany’s “normality” is central to it. It mentions how Germany due to its past can never be as normal as other “middle powers”, but how its Atlantic partners (presumably the USA) has been urging it to give up its “historically motivated self-restraint” instead of being “normal” and clinging to an idealistic vision of neutrality, which is likened to behaving like a “big Switzerland”.

The text then claims that such “normality” is often regarded in the EU as “renationalization”, but makes the point that the former pro-European chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Kohl also advocated German interests, since it was Kohl who established the stability rules of the Monetary Union. The text therefore challenges the interpretation that “normal” equals to self-interested, which equals non-European by proposing that Schmidt and Kohl, the most pro-European of recent German Chancellors, did also advocate German interests. The same articulation is therefore achieved as in excerpt 31, where Merkel defending German interests was framed as “nothing new nor anti-European”.⁴³

The text then claims that “to insist on the adherence to the treaties is neither divisive nor un-European”, and “neither it is egoistic to insist on a stable currency as the core of the union of Europeans“. In terms of semantic roles, “divisive”, “un-European” and “egoistic” are all attributes of the phrase “insistence on the adherence to the treaties”.

⁴³ *Hilfe und Strafe*. March 26th 2010

Adherence to the treaties and the stability of the euro assured thereby was defined as the core German interest in sections 5.2.3 to 5.2.5. This statement can be seen as an attempt to reconcile “self-interest” and “Europeanness”, asserting that they are not contradictory. The next excerpts conclude the text:

- (44) Es stimmt: Die öffentliche Meinung_[Affected Object] in Deutschland hat sich dem allgemeinen Meinungsfeld_[Result] angeglichen: Europapolitik ist nichts Selbstverständliches mehr, sondern steht unter Begründungszwang. Die veränderte Stimmung hatte schon Kohl_[Experiencer] am Ende seiner Kanzlerschaft zu spüren bekommen. Jene, welche die Europapolitik früherer Bundesregierungen romantisieren, übersehen zweierlei: Geschichte steht nicht still. Das Deutschland_[Identified] der sechzehn Bundesländer ist nicht mehr das vor der Wiedervereinigung_[Identifier]. Seine Bevölkerung_[Identified] ist (fast) so normal_[Attribute1] oder selbstbezogen_[Attribute2] oder europanörglerisch_[Attribute3] wie jede andere auch. Und die EU_[Identified] der 27 Mitgliedsländer ist nicht mehr die Gemeinschaft der Sechs_[Identifier]. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

In this excerpt we find several important statements: that the “public opinion in Germany” has become more like the “general field of opinion”, which means that “European policy is no longer self-explanatory, but needs to be justified anew.” The general field of opinion referred to here is likely the common public opinion in Europe. This change is something that even Kohl (Experiencer) got to feel towards the end of his chancellorship, so it is not portrayed as something sudden, but rather as something that has been in the works for a longer period of time. The reason for the need of re-justification is that neither Germany nor the EU are the same as they used to be, i.e. “history does not stand still”. In the case of Germany, this is elaborated by reference to its population: it is “(almost) as normal or self-interested or suspicious of Europe as any other population”. The public opinion in the first sentence and the need for re-justification, then, can be understood as pertaining especially to the citizens. Like in the first sentence of the whole text (excerpt 39 above), the change in attitude is therefore explained concerning not just the higher echelons of the state, but as having a broad base in the general public.

- (45) Auch für die große Union gilt das Prinzip der Solidarität, es ist das Wesen jedweder Gemeinschaft. Deutschland_[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land kann und muss seinen Beitrag leisten. Aber alle Lasten der Zusammenhalts kann es_[Agent] nicht stemmen, dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. Gerade weil die Einigung Europas_[Carrier] kostbar_[Attribute] ist, dürfen seine Bürger_[Experiencer], auch die Deutschen, nicht das Gefühl haben, sie würden überfordert. Ist das antieuropäisch? Und dennoch werden die Deutschen_[Experiencer] damit leben müssen: Ganz normal_[Attribute] sein sollen sie_[Carrier] nicht. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

Parts of excerpt 45 have already been encountered and analyzed before. What is of interest here are the last two sentences. The text asks the rhetorical question whether it is anti-European to want to protect the people from feeling overwhelmed. This overwhelm or unwillingness to carry other countries' financial burdens has been discussed already in section 5.2.5, and it was also mentioned in excerpt 14, where the German citizens were described as being “blackmailed to European solidarity”.

The text then makes the conclusion that the Germans will nonetheless have to accept that they shouldn't be quite “normal”. The Germans are here again in the Experiencer position (literally *damit leben müssen, dass...* = accept the reality of). The subtext that can be read off this proposition is that they are always expected to be “more European than others” in some way.

The Germans are referred to as “model Europeans” and “in love with Europe” in the text *Im Namen Europas*⁴⁴ as well, where the theme of the “project Europe” needing new justification is also touched upon. The following two excerpts are from this text. The first excerpt starts off from a remark that the stabilization of the Monetary Union and the EU will only succeed “if the Greeks and all other Europeans, who now allegedly have no other choice but to give them aid, will know the purpose of their sacrifice that goes far beyond that which they have so far been asked to do in the name of Europe”:

⁴⁴ FAZ May 7th 2010

- (46) Das wird schon im Falle der bisherigen Mustereuropäer, der Deutschen_[Matter], zwingend notwendig. Für Deutschland_[Beneficiary] war nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg "Europa" der Königsweg zurück zu Frieden, Freiheit, Wohlstand und Ansehen. Dem alten Europa_[Counteragent], das am Mittwoch im Pfalzbau zu Ludwigshafen in Gestalt von mehreren hundert grauhaarigen Häuptern aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Geistlichkeit zusammensass, um den grossen alten Europäer Kohl zu feiern, musste die Kanzlerin_[Sayer] nicht lange erklären, warum sie_[Agent] sich zur Hilfe für Griechenland durchrang. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

Germans are identified as "model Europeans": even for them, a rejustification is in order. Germans are referred to as model Europeans because of the meaning "Europe" had for the country, explained in the second sentence: the royal road to peace, freedom, welfare and recognition after World War II. "Europe" is in quotation marks because it is consciously used to refer to something other than the mere continent, to the ideal embodied in the project of European integration. The expression "old Europe" as Counteragent refers to the generation of Germans which still remembers World War II and the subsequent embarking on the "royal road" referred to in the second sentence, who celebrated Chancellor Kohl. He himself is identified as a "great old European", who in excerpt 40 was described as having sacrificed the D-Mark as a symbol of reconciliation between the re-united Germany and Europe. Chancellor Merkel is in the position of Sayer, portrayed as having to justify her actions, which in the case of the "old Europe" is not deemed necessary. The text continues:

- (47) Im Falle des neuen, jungen Europas_[Matter] aber muss sie_[Sayer] es, auch hier im europaverliebten Deutschland_[Locative]. Es sind Generationen herangewachsen, für die das, wofür Kohl und seine Weggefährten kämpften und arbeiteten, eine Selbstverständlichkeit ist. Die Nachgeborenen mussten keine Toten mehr aus zerbombten Häusern heraustragen. Europa_[Identified] ist – so kann aus einem historisch unerhörten Erfolg ein Fluch werden – für sie keine Frage von Krieg und Frieden_[Identifier] mehr. Für sie muss das Projekt Europa neu begründet werden. Ob dafür die Reisefreiheit, der Wegfall der Gebühren beim Geldwechseln und der Hinweis auf den Exportüberschuss reichen, für den Deutschland_[Counteragent] von seinen Nachbarn kritisiert wird wie insgesamt für seine angeblich verbissene preussisch-schwäbische Art? (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

As a counterpoint to “old Europe”, here we find the expression “new, young Europe”. For them Merkel needs to explain her actions, the text states, also “here in Europe-infatuated Germany” (note the deictic expression *here* which establishes Germany as a point of reference). For these generations, the work of Kohl and his contemporaries is a “self-evident fact” and for them, Europe is no longer a question of war and peace, and therefore for them the project Europe must be justified anew. A reference is then made to the typical justifications: loss of money exchange between euro countries and export surplus (cf. excerpt 10 in 5.2.2, where it was hinted that Germany’s “pay master role” had been formerly justified due to the benefits gained for exports). The export surplus is also named as something Germany is criticized for, along with its “Swabian-Prussian attitude” (cf. 5.2.1).

We therefore find the same type of argumentation here as in the text *Normales Deutschland*: European policy is not a taken-for-granted matter anymore, especially from the point of view of the population. In this text the division between the population and the elite is even stronger, because the Chancellor is portrayed as having to justify actions to it that are not really in line with German interests from the point of view of FAZ (cf. 5.2.6). The division into “old” and “young Europe” is furthermore a similar kind of division as “Germany before reunification” and “Germany of the 16 states”: these divisions imply a change of conditions that has taken place, especially as far as the population is concerned, and therefore the old orientation has to be examined anew.

5.2.8 EU, Europe and Germany

This section deals with the depiction of the EU and its relationship to Germany, as well as the depiction of Europe. We will start with discussing the EU as a collective actor, i.e. as a combination of its member states’ governments. Whenever their actions are described in the corpus, it is not typically in a favorable light:

- (48) Mit einem flüchtigen Blick auf die Kosten haben die Staatschefs der EU_[Agent] beschlossen, den Griechen müsse geholfen werden, angeblich lauiere in deren Schuld eine systematisches Risiko für den Euro-Raum. [...] Nur wer_[Agent] die griechische Staatsschuld zur Systemfrage erhebt, muss jetzt helfen. Wer_[Identified/Sayer] hingegen fragt, ob auch für Griechenland ein Austritt aus der Währungsunion besser wäre, muss kein schlechter Europäer_[Identifier] sein. (*Im Sumpf*. FAZ April 21st 2010)

This excerpt has the EU heads of state as the Agent, deciding to help Greece on the grounds of, as the text states, an “alleged systematic risk”. The text then states that only the one who frames the Greek debt as a systemic question must help, but the one who asks whether Greece should exit the EMU “is not necessarily a bad European”. This excerpt therefore constitutes another negotiation of what it means to be “European” (cf. 5.2.7): to help or no to help?

The EU leaders’ actions in the crisis are portrayed as incompetent elsewhere in the corpus as well⁴⁵. In the following excerpt their collective action is referred to as *EU-Politik* (EU politics):

- (49) In der Brüsseler Krisennacht hat man den Euro_[Maleficiary] seines besten vorbeugenden Schutzes, des Beistandsverbots und der unabhängigen Notenbank, beraubt – in dem vagen Versprechen, bald einen härteren Mechanismus zu ersinnen, der für Haushaltsvernunft sorgen werde. Doch deuten die fortgesetzten Attacken auf die "Spekulanten" darauf hin, dass die EU-Politik_[Agent] dieses Versprechen weder erfüllen will noch kann, sondern ihr Heil lieber in einer übermäßigen Regulierung der Märkte suchen wird, um die disziplinierende Kraft der Marktpreise zu brechen. Darauf sollten die Bürger_[Experiencer] nicht hereinfließen. Am Ende ist der Spekulant doch ihr letzter Verbündeter im Kampf gegen ausufernde Staatsverschuldung. (*Der letzte Verbündete*. FAZ May 10th 2010)

The expression *Brüsseler Krisennacht* refers to the meetings of 7th–9th of May 2010, where the EU leaders decided to create the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Central Bank announced its intention to start buying the government bonds of crisis countries on the secondary market. In the first sentence the Agent has been faded

⁴⁵ *Der Euro als Weichwährung*. FAZ May 10th 2010

due to the passive construct, but the actors are the EU leaders, which in the second sentence are referred to with the abstract term *EU-Politik*. It is described as not fulfilling its promise of “a harder mechanism for budgetary control”, but instead “seeking its salvation in the excessive regulation of markets”. The citizens again make their appearance in the third sentence, defined as the European citizens by context and in the typical Experiencer position, and are advised to “not fall for this”, since “in the end the speculator is their last ally in the battle against escalating state debt”. A similar type of conflict is then opened up between the elite and the citizens as demonstrated in 5.2.6, but this time on the European level.

Neither is the EU as an institution generally portrayed in a favorable light. When it is depicted as an actor, i.e. found in the Agent position, its action is typically not expressed in positive terms, either in itself or in terms of its consequences. The following examples are meant to demonstrate this:

- (50) Wenn nun die EU_[Agent] von den Griechen inmitten der schweren Rezession verlangt, Ausgaben und Gehälter zu kürzen und Steuern zu erhöhen, droht eine Depression. (*Der Albtraum*. FAZ April 23rd)
- (51) Was wird, was kann die EU_[Agent] tun, wenn die den Griechen verordneten Einschnitte "politisch nicht durchsetzbar" sind? (*Der Blick nach vorn*. FAZ May 1st 2010)
- (52) So bleibt der Eindruck, dass alle den Gürtel enger zu schnallen haben, nur die EU_[Agent] nicht. (*Der Euro als Weichwährung*. May FAZ 10th 2010)
- (53) Mit Schulden geht die Europäische Union_[Agent] gegen Schulden vor. (*Der letzte Verbündete*. FAZ May 10th 2010)

In all these examples the action taken by the EU is portrayed as having either negative consequences (46), being negative in itself (48, 49) or having doubt cast on it as to its efficacy (47). It is noteworthy that these examples, like further examples along these lines, show that the EU is articulated as an organization and institution that is somewhat distinct from its member states. This is most obvious in excerpt 47: it creates an opposition between “all” and “the EU”, where “all” refers to the member states. In

practice, “the EU” often (but not always, as we will see) becomes coterminous with the Commission as its executive organ. The negative evaluation of the EU’s actions extends to the Commission and its president as well.

- (54) Das Preissignal für das höhere Risiko will die EU_[Experiencer] nicht hinnehmen. Da sich der Markt dem politischen Willen zum Einheitszins nicht beugen will, plant die EU-Kommission_[Agent] die Einführung gemeinschaftlicher Euro-Anleihen. Damit käme sie_[Agent] ihrem Ziel, aus der Währungsunion eine Haftungs- und Transferegemeinschaft zu machen, einen großen Schritt näher. Denn Euro-Anleihen machen aus nationalen Schulden eine Gemeinschaftsschuld. Weil sich dadurch die deutsche Bonität verschlechterte, stiegen hierzulande die Zinsen für Staat, Unternehmen und Privatleute. Die EU-Kommission_[Agent] fordert dies als Akt der Solidarität vom angeblichen Hauptnutznießer_[Counteragent] des Euro. [...] Von Solidarität ist nicht die Rede, wenn EU-Kommissionspräsident Barroso_[Sayer] den Deutschen_[Counteragent] vorwirft, sie seien naiv, wenn sie erwarteten, dass nach der Finanzhilfe für Griechenland der Stabilitätspakt verschärft werde. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 2nd 2010)

In the first two sentences the EU and the Commission are in the Experiencer and Agent role. In this example as well, the attitude (not accepting the price signal for higher risk) and plans (Euro bonds) of the EU and the EU-Commission are portrayed negatively as having the ultimate goal of a “transfer union” (cf. 5.2.5). The second sentence can be seen as an elaboration of the first one, which means that in this case the EU and the Commission are equated. The next sentences describe what the Euro bonds would mean for Germany: although the country is not directly mentioned, the words *deutsche Bonität* and *hierzulande* are indices. In the last sentence, the Commission is an Agent and Germany a Counteragent, referred to as “the alleged main benefiter of the euro”. In the last sentence the Commission president Barroso is in the role of a Sayer and Germans in the Counteragent role, where Barroso is accusing them of naivety. This time the word “Germans” likely refers not only to the German citizens, but to the Germans as a nation.

The preceding excerpt showed that the relationship between the Commission and Germans is portrayed rather antagonistically. Another example of this is the text *Wer*

den Euro rettet, which states that “As long as there is no European federal state, the Commission is denied access to the German tax money.”⁴⁶ The Commission is also blamed for being power hungry, as the next excerpts show:

- (55) Der Verdacht, es gehe der Kommission_[Agent] in Wirklichkeit ausschließlich um eine Mehrung der eigenen Kompetenzen, wird noch dadurch verstärkt, dass die EU-Behörde_[Agent] ihren Sparappell nicht mit der Bereitschaft verknüpft, auch schmerzhaft Einschnitte ins eigene Budget hinzunehmen. (*Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg*. FAZ May 13th 2010)
- (56) Es wäre naiv zu glauben, die Kommission_[Agent] agiere nur als unpolitischer Makler im Dienste solider Haushaltspolitik.[...]. Für den Portugiesen_[Experiencer] steht nicht die Budgetdisziplin im Mittelpunkt, sondern die Tatsache, dass die zwingend notwendige Verschärfung des Pakts einen Machtzuwachs für die Kommission_[Beneficiary] und ihn selbst_[Beneficiary] bedeuten kann. (*So unpolitisch wie möglich*. FAZ September 28th 2010)

In both examples, the clause where the Commission is the Agent is a subordinate clause in a sentence which deals with suspicion (50) or belief (51). They therefore more clearly express an evaluation on part of the FAZ concerning what the actions of the Commission or its president mean: increasing its own competences and power. In the first excerpt, this action is “not tying the calls for saving with the readiness to accept painful cuts in its own budget”; in the second excerpt, Barroso (“the Portuguese”) is attributed with equating the tightening of the Stability Pact with an increase in power for himself and the Commission.

The EU as a whole is many times portrayed as having overextended itself in the integration process. The crisis itself is depicted as an existential crisis, raising questions concerning the essence of the EU or Europe:

- (57) Die Griechenland-Krise zeigt unbarmherzig, dass sich die EU_[Agent] in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten übernommen hat. [...] Europa_[Patient] braucht, wenn die gegenwärtigen Schwierigkeiten – auf die eine oder andere Art –

⁴⁶ *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010

gelöst sind, eine wirkliche Reflexionspause. Es_[Experiencer] darf nicht nur darüber nachdenken, was aus ihm werden soll, es_[Experiencer] muss sich auch die Frage stellen, was aus ihm_[Affected Object] werden kann. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 2010)

The EU is in the Agent role, as an actor that has taken too big of a step in terms of integration. Similar articulations can also be found in three other texts in the corpus.^{47, 48.}
⁴⁹ In the above text, “Europe” is put in the Experiencer role, having to reflect on its future. “Europe” in this case, like in the text *Im Namen Europas*⁵⁰, can be understood as denoting the *idea* of Europe as an idealized collective that is the motivating principle behind the European integration. When Merkel is quoted as saying that “If the euro fails, Europe will fail”^{51, 52, 53} it refers specifically to the idea of European unification, of which the EU is manifestation. In the above excerpt, the further progress of European integration is called into question, and considerations of the idealized state toward which Europe *must* aspire are prompted to give way for considerations about the limits of this process. This idea is also reflected in the text *Im Namen Europas* when it poses the questions “What is the essence of the EU, what is its goal, its purpose? What is the extent of European identity and solidarity?”

We can also find statements in the corpus about what Europe should be: these are typically formulated only in economic terms. In bringing about these visions, the EU or the Commission is not attributed a very large role, even to the contrary:

(58) Was genau soll denn in der EU_[Locative] koordiniert werden? Die Sehnsucht der Kommission_[Experiencer] nach einer „grüneren“ oder „sozialeren“ Union hilft Europa_[Beneficiary] jedenfalls nicht, den Wachstumsrückstand gegenüber dem Rest der Welt aufzuholen. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

⁴⁷ *Zwangsvertiefung*. FAZ May 14th 2010

⁴⁸ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 7th 2010

⁴⁹ *Nur voran kann es gehen*. FAZ November 15th 2010

⁵⁰ FAZ May 7th 2010

⁵¹ *Im Dienst der Politik*. FAZ May 13rd 2010

⁵² *Zwangsvertiefung*. FAZ May 14th 2010

⁵³ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 7th 2010

“Europe” here again denotes something slightly more than the EU: the totality of the continent in distinction to “rest of the world”, including America and Asia. “The EU” in the first sentence in the Locative role refers to the EU as an organization encompassing the member states. The denotation is therefore slightly different than in excerpts 46 to 49. The Commission is in the Experiencer position with the nominalized verb “longing”, with a “greener and more social Union” as the Phenomenon. This “longing” is stated not to be beneficial for Europe in terms of economic growth. The notion of an economically strong Europe is articulated elsewhere in the corpus as well, especially in the text *Kratzer am europäischen Modell*:

- (59) Es gibt fast kein europäisches Land_[Existential] mehr, das_[Agent] sich nicht einer neuen Fiskaldisziplin unterwürfe, Übertreibungen des Sozialstaats korrigierte und sich an die demographische Entwicklung anzupassen versuchte. Griechenland ist nur das dramatischste Beispiel. [...] Über ihre Verhältnisse haben aber auch andere gelebt, die Weltfinanzkrise hat das offenbart. [...] Die europäischen Bürger_[Experiencer] beginnen einzusehen, dass sozialstaatliche Vor- und Fürsorge nicht unabhängig von der Wirtschaftsentwicklung wachsen kann. (*Kratzer am europäischen Modell*. FAZ August 7th 2010)

Here we see an existential clause with the noun “European country“, of which there is none “that would not submit to a new fiscal discipline...” Greece is named only as the most dramatic example of a situation where “others as well have lived beyond their means.” European citizens in their rather typical passive Experiencer role “begin to see that the support provided by a social state cannot grow independently of economic growth”. The end of the same text contains the following passage:

- (60) Wichtig ist, dass die europäischen Volkswirtschaften_[Carrier] auf Dauer wettbewerbsfähig_[Attribute] sind mit hoher Produktivität. [...] Ein Europa_[Identified], das_[Agent] sich einer Kultur wirtschaftlicher Stabilität verschriebe, wie es die Bundeskanzlerin_[Sayer] vorschlägt, wäre kein schwaches Europa_[Identifier1], sondern ein verlässlich starker Partner_[Identifier2]. Apropos stark: Die deutsche Exportwirtschaft brummt wieder. (*Kratzer am europäischen Modell*. FAZ August 7th 2010)

In the first sentence the European countries are referred to as *Volkswirtschaften* (economies), which emphasizes their economic aspect. They are Carrier with the attribute *wettbewerbsfähig* (competent), and their being competitive and having high productivity is stated to be important. This statement can also be seen as the mirror image of the statement that the cause of the crisis is EU member states living above their means.^{54, 55, 56}

The text then makes a shift from the perspective from the individual countries (or “economies”) to the perspective of “Europe”, that commits itself to a “culture of economic stability”, “as proposed by the Chancellor”. The qualities and actions of the individual states are thereby aggregated in the Agent “Europe”, in a similar way that the collective actions of individual team members can be attributed to the team. In the main clause, Europe is Identified, and the action described in the subordinate clause conditions the main clause, in that committing to a culture stability would mean that Europe “would not be a weak Europe, but a reliably strong partner”. The connection between a strong Europe and an economically strong Germany is then established with the last two sentences, which remind of the strength of the German export industry that is “booming again.”

The notion of a “culture of stability” is attributed here to the Chancellor (in the Sayer role), The Chancellor is also quoted as saying that Europe needs a “new culture of stability” in another text⁵⁷ (cf. 5.2.4), where she is portrayed as “forcing the colorful European mix to the line of the Swabian housewife”. In another text, it is said that “The chancellor Merkel is hopefully correct in saying that almost all EU-states had joined the consolidation course of Germany” and “The chancellor needs to put a lot of negotiation and persuasion skills into play for a goal worth fighting for: a stability culture in

⁵⁴ *Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010

⁵⁵ *Die Ursache der Krise*. FAZ May 19th 2010

⁵⁶ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 20th 2010

⁵⁷ *Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 20th 2010

Europe.⁵⁸ Taking this context into account, the implication made by the above excerpt would be that by following the German line, Europe will strong.

Text *Nur voran kann es gehen* (The only way is forward) from the latter part of the corpus contains a similar articulation of the European states' necessity to strive to make their economies more competent:

- (61) Es gibt, man kann es mögen oder nicht, nur die Option, weiter voranzugehen. Auf diesem Weg sind erste Marken gesetzt worden: Von den Märkten gepresst und politisch unter Druck gesetzt, haben sich alle europäischen Staaten_[Agent] zu einer Politik der Haushaltssanierung verpflichtet, verbunden mit Maßnahmen, die ihre Wirtschaft wettbewerbsfähiger machen sollen. (*Nur voran kann es gehen*. FAZ November 15th 2010)

The European states are in the Agent position, “having committed themselves to policies of budgetary overhauls and measures that should make their economies more competitive”. They are however not described as having made this commitment freely, but “under market and political pressure”. In the continuation of this text, Merkel's efforts to create a culture of stability is equated with Germany taking a leadership role in the crisis and beyond, whereby the EU and the member states are relegated to the role of either accepting or rejecting this leadership:

- (62) Bundeskanzlerin Merkel_[Counteragent] ist für ihre harte Position beim Aufspannen des Euro-Rettungsschirmes und für ihre Forderung nach härteren Sanktionsmechanismen in der EU_[Locative] kritisiert worden. In einigen Details musste sie_[Agent] nachgeben - so ist das nun einmal, wenn man mit 26 Partnern an einem Tisch sitzt -, aber was die Richtung angeht, hat sie_[Agent] sich durchgesetzt. Anders gesagt: Deutschland_[Agent] hat, nach harten Auseinandersetzungen mit dem engsten Partner Frankreich_[Comitative] und danach gemeinsam mit Paris_[Comitative], in dieser Krise der EU_[Identifier] die Führung übernommen. Dafür muss man sich nicht entschuldigen, denn diese Führung ergibt sich aus der Ankerfunktion, die Deutschland_[Possessor] für den Euro hat. Berlin_[Agent] hat

⁵⁸ *Allein in Brüssel*. FAZ October 27th 2010

damit in die Hand genommen, was die EU_[Agent] vor zehn Jahren schon einmal beschlossen hatte: zu einer der dynamischsten und wettbewerbsfähigsten Regionen in einer Welt zu werden, in der sich die wirtschaftlichen Gewichte gerade dramatisch verschieben. Wenn die EU_[Experiencer] und ihre Mitgliedstaaten diese Führungsrolle nicht nur ertragen, sondern akzeptieren sollen, muss Deutschland_[Agent] sich seinen Partnern_[Counteragent] gegenüber allerdings nicht nur fordernd, sondern auch kooperativ und solidarisch verhalten. (*Nur voran kann es gehen*. FAZ November 15th 2010)

First she is in the role of Counteragent, receiving criticism for her hardliner policy in the crisis. Then she is in the role of an Agent, having had to give in some details but having been able to assert herself “in terms of direction”. Then, by means of the expression *anders gesagt* (in other words), her actions are equated with Germany’s actions: the country has taken a leading role in the crisis of the EU. The text then states that “this is nothing to feel sorry about”, because the “leadership owes itself to Germany’s anchor function for the euro.”

In the next sentence, *Berlin* is again used for the German government in a metonymic fashion and in the Agent position, “seizing what the EU had decided 10 years earlier: to become one of the most dynamic and competitive regions in the world”. “The EU” is here denoting both the organization and the geographical area it encompasses. In the next sentence the EU is untypically in the Experiencer position, together with its member states, “tolerating and accepting [Germany’s] leadership role”. Because they are mentioned separately, a distinction is again drawn between the EU as an institution and the member states that belong to it. The condition for the said tolerance and acceptance is said to be that Germany act towards its partners “not only in a demanding but also in a solidary and cooperative way”. It is not clear whether the EU as an institution is also included among these partners. It however is clear that Germany is portrayed as being justified in holding a leadership role due to its economic strength, and Merkel’s actions are also framed as realizing what the goals the EU had set itself in terms of economic development.

5.3 Summary of discursive articulations on the transtextual layer

This section presents a summary of the findings on the transtextual layer of the DIMEAN model and in the framework of Waever's (2002) three-tier layered structure. The summary will start on the first layer of the model (nation-state concept), where the German nation-state identity as it is articulated within the FAZ is discussed as a whole. The concepts of nation and state will be discussed separately to the extent that the analysis has revealed their separate articulations. The relationship between the nation-state concept and "Europe" as well as the general presentation of the idea of Europe will then be discussed (second layer). On the third layer we then find the articulation of the concrete policies pursued by the national actors. Figure 2 below presents the results of this discussion in a graphical form, based on the figure by Bärenreuter (2005) presented in 2.5.1.

The German nation-state is articulated as an economically powerful country with strong exports. This articulation is achieved through collocations of the word *Deutschland* with words like *Wirtschaftsmodell*, collocations of the adjective *deutsch* with words denoting economic strength, export success etc. and also through contrast by comparing Germany to other, less economically strong countries and "debt accumulators", especially those in Southern Europe. In parallel fashion, Germany is also articulated as a "strong currency country" as opposed to "former soft currency countries". Germany is especially contrasted against France over the nature of what the Monetary Union should be like. Because of Germany's economic strength, it is also called the "motor of the Monetary Union", together with France, and is attributed with special responsibility for having set the Stability Pact to the Monetary Union.

Germany is also described as a well-off country that because of this often plays the role of the "pay master", i.e. net contributor. It is however stated that it cannot be expected to pay for everything, firstly due to limits in its strength and secondly due to the limits in the willingness of its citizens and politicians. Indeed, while the word *Deutschland* refers to the nation-state as a whole, whenever there is need to emphasize the uniformity of the elite and public, these are referred to as *deutsche Politik und Öffentlichkeit*,

Politiker und Volk in Deutschland or in related terms. This leads us to the articulation of *nation, state* and their relationship.

The national collective noun *Deutsche* can refer either to the nation as a whole or merely the citizens, distinct from the “elite”. In most cases it is found as referring to the people, synonymously to the words *Bürger, Volk* and *Bevölkerung*. All these words are most frequently found in the Experiencer position: thinking, feeling and perceiving. These words are more rarely found in the Agent position: action is mostly reserved for the state, not for the nation. The role of the people is therefore more passive than that of the state, unless their aspect of being voters is highlighted. The third most frequent role is that of the Counteragent, which is activated whenever the people are portrayed as recipients of the verbal action of the government and politicians.

As a people, the Germans are articulated as the “model Europeans” and having sacrificed their “reliable D-Mark” for the euro, in exchange for the promise of the common currency’s stability. They are attributed with a fear of inflation and, having gone through two currency reforms, a concern for the stability of the euro that is tacitly articulated as another version of the D-Mark. German views towards state finances are contrasted against other, less disciplined attitudes, especially in the so-called “soft currency countries” and countries that might have trouble to keep up with the German specifications of the Monetary Union, which allow “no free riders”. Germans and Greeks are articulated as polar opposites when it comes to finances: The reason for economic divergences is articulated as having a cultural basis, and a correspondence is established between national character and the economic and financial state of affairs of a nation-state. It can be said that the essence of “Germanness” is strongly articulated in connection to financial attitudes, and the “reliable” and “identity-giving” D-Mark can be taken as a symbol of this. This can therefore be taken as evidence of the discourse of *D-Mark nationalism* (see 2.5.2).

The state actors are denoted by the words *Bundesregierung*, variations of *Kanzlerin Merkel, deutsche Politik(er)* and *Bundestag*. Merkel and the government are most often in the Agent role, and Merkel also often appears in the Sayer role. The *Bundestag*,

however, is overwhelmingly found in the Locative role. The state and the government are articulated as having the duty to protect German interests, which are defined as ensuring the stability of the euro. The right way to ensure this stability is by adhering to the no bail-out clause of the Treaty of Maastricht as well as to the regulations of the Stability and Growth Pact. Advocating German interests is “nothing new nor anti-European”, since even the former pro-European Chancellors are said to have advocated them; for instance, Kohl’s government set up the rules of the Stability Pact. As the federal chancellor, Merkel is portrayed as the *primum motor* of the state, who has the role of either acting in the name of the state (Agent role) or making public statements explaining her policy line (Sayer role). Merkel is referred to both as the “Swabian housewife” and “Iron Chancellor”, which invoke the qualities of thriftiness, discipline and power politics.

Indeed, Germany defending its interests and its leadership role in the crisis and beyond is depicted as something that one should not feel sorry for. This role is justified by the conditions of the crisis, the changes that both the EU and Germany have undergone in the last decades, Germany’s anchor function for the euro and the goals of the EU itself to become a competitive region. Overall, the emphasis on German interests and “normality” (especially in the text *Normales Deutschland*) are reminiscent of the *neo-statist discourse* (see 2.5.2). Even if the importance of solidarity and cooperation is emphasized as well, the emphasis on German interests and leadership are an indication that the articulation of the external dimension of the state as *power state* is to some extent normalized.

Ultimately, though, the FAZ portrays the actorhood of the government being accountable to two instances: the Constitutional Court, which is the interpreter of the German national interest from the standpoint of the constitution, and the constituency, i.e. the voters. The Constitutional Court sets the framework within which Merkel can conduct external negotiations, and the perspective of the people is the ever present background against which every action which seemingly deviates from the generally defined “German interest” is judged. Especially important is the notion of the people “being overwhelmed” by having to take on the debt of other countries as taxpayers,

which does not apply only to German citizens but other European countries' peoples as well. This notion of being overwhelmed due to being forced to share fiscal responsibility can be of course seen as evidence of the nationalist discourse that emphasizes the sovereignty of the people and therefore control over resources, including financial ones. The nationalist discourse is ultimately behind the assertion that the EU / EMU is an association of sovereign states, and therefore a transfer union is out of question.

The citizens' point of view is indeed important: from the point of view of the FAZ, the government can either be aligned with this (as it is in *Normales Deutschland* and in texts prior to Merkel's decision to help Greece) or out of alignment (as it is in *Im Namen Europas*, for instance). Because of the references to the citizens as voters and the government's accountability to them, the internal dimension of the state can be defined as *liberal democracy*.

Because of the articulation of the state as a *power state*, the typical articulation of Germany's relationship to Europe also becomes questioned. The logic of the power state is generally incompatible with a pro-European conception of Germany, which is why the meaning of European vs. non-European is being renegotiated, especially in the texts *normales Deutschland* and *Im Namen Europas*. This is not the only reason for the renegotiation to take place, however: Both texts highlight that there has been a shift in attitude in the people over generations in regard to Germany's European policy. Although the value of the "idea of Europe" and its manifestation in the process of European integration and its importance for the post World War II Germany is not denied, there is a distinction made between "old Europe" as opposed to "new, young Europe"; the original EU of the six member states as opposed to today's EU of 27 members, as well as Germany before and after reunification. These distinctions that highlight the notion of generational change present a reason as to why Germany's European policy requires new justification, especially in the eyes of the citizens.

In the view of the FAZ, implicitly expressed, the logic of the power state allows for the effective realization of German interests: Maintaining the stability of the euro, which

due to the tacitly formulated equation Euro = D-Mark 2.0 is D-Mark nationalism transposed to the supranational level. Due to the meld of D-Mark nationalism in the nation concept and neo-statism in the state concept and the ensuring re-negotiation of the relationship between Germany and Europe, the idea of Europe is also articulated in a particular way. It is affirmed that the EU is an association of sovereign states instead of a federal state, an interpretation which has its basis in declarations of the Constitutional Court. Parallel to this, the EMU is articulated as not a state and therefore not a “transfer union”, defined as an arrangement where member states would be required to take liability for each other’s debts. The states instead have the responsibility to stop “living over their means”, to stabilize their finances and improve their economic competence. These are all qualities that the Monetary Union is said to require, which itself has a basis in German ideas. Germany is therefore attributed with a key role in re-enforcing the “German specifications” of the Monetary Union, establishing a “culture of stability” and thereby propelling Europe towards a future where it can effectively compete with the rest of the world. This is the third layer in Wæver’s model.

Neither the actions taken by the EU leaders as a collective nor those of the EU itself as an institution is given much credit, but they are rather seen as irresponsible and breaking the EU treaties. Although the EU frequently appears in the Agent role, both its and the Commission’s actions are often framed negatively. The Commission is also accused of having power interests. Its president José Manuel Barroso, when he appears, mostly makes statements that are framed negatively. The EU is described as having overextended itself in the integration process, due the differences between the member states being too great in the end, “to the point of cultural alienation”. The differences in mentalities and cultures are described as “realities of Europe”, which the crisis forces to face. The crisis presents an existential crisis for the EU and for “Europe”, which forces them to reflect on what can become of them. Ultimately, no other vision for Europe is formulated except for it to become a strong continent through economic discipline, a goal towards which Germany can lead it.




Figure 7. Discursive constructions of German nation-state identity and ‘Europe’ in the editorials and commentaries of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2010

6 CONCLUSIONS

Against the background of the concerns raised both in international and German press about a change in Germany's pro-European orientation during the euro crisis years, this study had as its aim to investigate whether and how this change was discursively articulated in one of Germany's largest newspapers, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. More precisely, the aim was to discover how the German nation-state identity, which up until the 21st century had been regarded as thoroughly pro-European, was articulated vis-à-vis Europe and the EU in the editorial and economic commentary pages of the FAZ during the first year of the crisis. The analysis utilized a model based on post-structuralist discourse theory, which was operationalized with the help of the methodological framework of German discourse linguistics. The concrete analysis focused on relevant keywords: "Germany", "Europe", "EU" and closely related keywords. These keywords were analyzed in terms of their semantic roles using both a quantitative and a qualitative approach.

The analysis revealed that "Germany", "Germans" and "German" were defined in terms of economic capability and attitudes, typically in relation to other nations within the EU. Germany and the Germans were also defined by their role as a net contributor of the EU. The country's former pro-European orientation was occasionally highlighted, especially when it was contrasted with the country's actions during the crisis. Here the study discovered that a change in Germany's nation-state identity and its relationship to Europe and the EU was indeed articulated: The former pro-European identity was contrasted with an identity that is characterized more by national interest and emphasizes the country's leadership role in the EU especially in economic matters, owing to its own economic strength. Befitting this formulation of the nation-state identity, Europe and the EU were also described less as a community bound by solidarity and more in economic terms and in ways which emphasize the member-states' responsibility and sovereignty.

Because the study focused on just one newspaper and on a period of one year, it has offered a merely cursory look, but in a way that can open avenues for further research.

A fruitful direction could be to analyze the articulation of the German nation-state identity across various German media pre- and post-crisis, in order to arrive at a more precise picture of whether and how a discursive change has taken place in various parts of the media landscape.

As a conservative and business-oriented newspaper, the viewpoints articulated by the FAZ can be taken as closer to the political right: Previous research has established its attitude towards European integration and the European institutions are generally more critical than the majority of the other German media. Whether its view of the relationship between Germany and Europe is something confined to its pages alone or whether its views are shared by other German media, the general public and political actors themselves, as revealed by their public statements, remains also a matter to be determined by further research.

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APPENDIX: Translations of the excerpts from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

- (1) The debt accumulators are blaming the exporters for leading them into deficit ruin. The imbalances have arisen because some countries have for years imported more than they have exported, which is why their foreign debt is large. But follows from that? Should surpluses be fought now? At any rate, Germany is standing in the pillory, along with China and Japan. But no one has forced Americans to buy Chinese consumption articles and no one forces the French to drive German cars. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 26th 2010)
- (2) That forty per cent of the German production are exported is not a result of the planning of a federal export agency, but rather of free market forces. German success in the global market is determined by countless decisions made by consumers, companies and employees. Both the quality of German products and competitive prices are a decisive factor. When France is demanding higher salaries in Germany that already has high salaries, the aim is to increase the costs for competition. But that would only result in higher unemployment in Germany, nothing would be won for Europe. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 26th 2010)
- (3) While Germans ask themselves, why they have to assume liability for the Greeks', many Italians, Spaniards and French cannot fathom why the EU does not simply transfer new billions of euros to Athens. [...] Having had the collective experience of two currency reforms, the Germans see a danger for the stability of the currency in the attempted breach of the Maastricht Treaty (it prohibits that euro countries from taking on each other's debts). This is entirely contrary to the perception in the former soft currency countries. It is claimed there that the Germans would want to secure economic dominance in Europe through the euro. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)
- (4) The issue here is not about whether the Greeks are allowed to continue to live above their means unpunished, but it is rather a question of the realization of the French dream of the "European economic government", with which the competitive German industry is meant to be curbed. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)
- (5) Germany carries a special responsibility in this situation. That is not only due to the fact that Berlin – thanks to the German economic power – would have an especially large share to assume in the case that countries would have to be thrown out of the Monetary Union. Germany was, together with France, the motor of the economic and monetary union and attached the stability pact to it, which since then could not be adhered to by many member states (not to forget: even Germany did not manage to do that many times). (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010)
- (6) Whoever wishes to redeem the auction of Greek government debt through transfers from Brussels and Frankfurt, invites further speculation against the euro, overestimates the financial power of Germany and risks the failure of the Monetary Union. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)

- (7) Germany as a well-off country can and must make its contribution. But it cannot carry all the burden of togetherness, for that it lacks strength. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (8) For the euro will surely fail, if the Monetary Union turns into a liability community and a transfer union, even German could not afford. (*Im Sumpf*. FAZ 21st April 2010)
- (9) Germany contributes more to the different help funds than it gets for decades – sometimes willingly, sometimes crudgingly. (*Die politische Währungsunion*. FAZ September 1st 2010)
- (10) Speaking of net contributors: there is no other issue that causes as much upset with the Germans. And it was the Chancellor Schröder with a populist bent who polemized against the “roasting” of German money in Brussels. German politics and public can only be moderately convinced by the argument that the “lubrication” of the European milie – the continuation of the old pay master role – would serve German (export) interests in the future as well. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (11) The regular method of stitching cracks and emerging chasms in the EU with German money has now reached its limits. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (12) In the eyes of most Germans, giving up the identity-providing D-Mark constituted a sacrifice for Europe. Having had the collective experience of two currency reforms, the Germans see a danger for the stability of the currency in the attempted breach of the Maastricht Treaty (it prohibits that euro countries from taking on each other’s debts). (*Wer den Euro rettet*. February 25th 2010)
- (13) After all, the departure from the reliable D-Mark was made palatable to the Germans with the opposite of Merkel’s endlessly repeated rescue platitudes. The treaties state that no euro country is allowed to take on another’s liabilities. It is the only way for the euro to become as strong as the D-Mark, as promised by the fathers of the Monetary Union. (*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (14) That is of course how the parties in the parliament are supposed to be made to agree to the emergency credits given to Greece and the reluctant Germans pacified. They see the once given stability promise concerning euro broken and feel themselves being blackmailed to European solidarity. (*Brandsätze*. May 4th 2010)
- (15) The currency constitution for the euro contains a stability promise, the foremost purpose of which is to appease the German fears for the common currency. (*Der politische Stabilitätspakt*. FAZ July 3rd 2010)
- (16) The economic and monetary union was built in accordance with German specifications, extending to the constituting rules of the European Central Bank located

in Frankfurt. That was already then felt to be a “dictate”, but paid as an unavoidable price in the hopes that in the course of communitarization the stability criteria could be softened. (*Der politische Stabilitätspakt*. FAZ July 3rd 2010)

(17) The balancing act currently undertaken by Merkel has the goal of stabilizing the euro and the euro zone as the core of the EU and simultaneously bring up to par with German conditions, in other words, adapting the Stability Pact to the situation. The German specifications still apply, no free riders are allowed in the Monetary Union in the future. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010)

(18) Whether that is realistic, whether countries that have a different attitudes concerning currency and financing and additionally a less competitive economic structures can keep up, is a open question. That the German position is now felt to be a dictate by countries that Greece represents is understandable. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 27th 2010)

(19) Perhaps the reaction on the politics of the federal government has been so dramatic because the implications of the Monetary Union have finally become clear: stable state finances and liberal economic policies, high productivity and a competitive economy. Those are requirements that demand a high amount of discipline. But when the euro is our destiny, it should not be desecrated. And must not constantly be complaining about the lack of a transfer union. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)

(20) Germany will face its responsibility, the chancellor said. That is rightfully so. But this responsibility – and this applies not only to Germany – includes the duty to protect the Monetary Union from harm. Much too long have European states practices reality denying policies which have turned a theoretical possibility into a real danger: first the erosion of the trust in euro and then the erosion of trust in the EU. (*Brandsätze*. FAZ May 4th 2010)

(21) Both the story behind the emergence of the disaster as well as the proposed solutions to overcome it betray how large the differences in the cultural characteristics of the peoples in Europe are and how differently the peoples and their elites think and act. The euro has not, as one can see, turned the Greeks into Germans or the Germans just yet into Greeks. Debt break here and state fraud there can really not be given as a sign of convergence. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

(22) The Chancellor wants to force this colorful European mix into line – to that of a Swabian housewife. For it only through thriftiness and discipline that the fire can finally be extinguished. [...] The EU would need, if the euro is to be permanently saved, a truly new “culture of stability”. The EU members would not be allowed to live beyond their means anymore. (*Bis alle Schwaben sind*. FAZ May 20th 2010)

- (23) All assurances of commonality here and there can not hide the fact that there is a deep dissent between Paris and Berlin on how the euro crisis should be fought. The fight over whether an “economic government” of the 16 euro states is needed (that is the French idea) or whether better coordination and discipline among the 27 EU states is the right way (what the Chancellor wants) is only the surface of the problem. The core issue concerns the direction to which the economic and monetary union should develop; the “model” that Europe should follow in the future. Merkel is – not officially, but through purposefully spread information – blamed in Paris for wanting “une Europe germanique”, a Europe fashioned after German image. (*Ein Debakel*. FAZ June 6th 2010)
- (24) Whatever comes out of this reform will in any case not correspond to German textbooks on Ordnungspolitik. The euro is after all, like the whole EU, a supranational project. There are compromises to be struck between states and mentalities. A common currency can not be managed as the dictate of one member state, the politicians and people in Germany have for long fooled themselves in this regard. The euro was never the same as the D-Mark, what incidentally is not only a bad thing: the inflation of which Germans are so afraid was so far lower with the euro than with our old currency. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)
- (25) It is all the more important that the citizens do not get stuck on the impression that the formerly stable monetary union is step by step being built into a transfer union. [...] As long as the Germans or other net contributors are not ready to pay for the EU above and beyond the cohesion funds, every kind of financial compensation is out of the question, because trust in the euro will otherwise be destroyed. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)
- (26) Germany as a well-off country can and must pay its part. But it cannot carry all the burden of togetherness, for that it runs out of strength. Precisely because the unification of Europe is precious, its citizens, the Germans included, are not allowed to feel overwhelmed. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (27) For here one risks the refusal of the citizens. Whoever takes this road to a transfer union, destroys the trust in the euro at least there where saving and paying for the EU takes place. (*Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion*. FAZ October 31st 2010)
- (28) Should that be the entry point into an uninhibited transfer union, it will soon come to face its limits. For the willingness to bear the burden of others is all the greater within Europe than it is within Germany. That is no German specialty. Many people like the euro because it saves the trouble of exchanging money on vacations. But ask the Dutch, whether they are ready to compensate for Greek debt. Or ask the French about how large their pity is for Spanish constructors with excessive debt. It is not about

aid in limited amounts, but when it comes to transferring gigantic sums with a stroke of the pen, that will not be accepted even by the most enthusiastic Europeans in the long term. Whoever wants to bring Europe forward and keep the euro should not overburden the project. Part of a healthy euro is also a healthy dose of self-interest. (*Die politische Währungsunion*. FAZ July 1st 2010)

- (29) As long as there is not European federal state, the Commission will luckily be denied access to the German tax funds. The Constitutional Court supervises over that. Its Lissabon verdict is not characterized by nationalistic thinking, but by a concern over democratic deficits in the association of states. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)
- (30) Neither is there anything new to the decree of the Constitutional Court, according to which the EU is not a federal state but an association of sovereign states; it stems from the 90s. In the past year the court declared once more that the EU has since then not become a federal state. [...] And one could add: that is why there is no transfer union either, but instead there are some red lines concerning further integration. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (31) The federal government is fighting in the euro group alone, but it is in a strong position. For without Germany's participation any rescue package will fail on the capital market. When chancellor Merkel stays firm and allows help for the Greeks only through the International Monetary Fund, she can save the euro. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)
- (32) The rescue package for Greece has been tied. The solution carries a German signature, the limits for the aid are narrow and the thresholds high. In negotiations with the other heads of state the chancellor Merkel skillfully utilized the tight leeway given by the Constitutional Court in the question over the fate of the euro as an instrument of pressure. With her tough negotiation style she demanded from the EU partners more than seemed possible. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)
- (33) This is not a new line for Germany to defend its interests in Europe – and neither is it anti-European. By convincing the French president Sarkozy to allow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help in the euro raum, Merkel is additionally keeping the German-French motor of integration running in the tradition of her predecessors. (*Hilfe und Strafe*. FAZ March 26th 2010)
- (34) Chancellor Merkel tries her best to make it appear as if the as good as decided upon billion transfer to Athen does not constitute a breach of the common treaties and a case of forbidden financial aid. (*Griechische Wette*. FAZ April 25th 2010)
- (35) In her governmental declaration the Chancellor – that was the prelude in Berlin to the riots in Athen – chose a language that balanced between frontal defence and doomsday tremolo: Europe at a crossroads; Germany's future is at stake. That is of course how the parties in the parliament will be made to agree to the emergency credits

and the reluctant Germans appeased.
(*Brandsätze*. FAZ May 5th 2010)

- (36) Why should Germany be liable for Greece debt? Federal chancellor Merkel tries to explain it as follows: there is no alternative to saving the Greeks, the stability of the euro is at stake, the Greeks can regain confidence of the markets only with a hard program of cuts and savings. Appealing to the future of Europe might find some resonance in the parliament and the federal council, when the minister of finance is authorized to stand bail for foreign sovereign debt. It will not convince the majority of the citizens, however. (*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (37) Angela Merkel has given in to the pressure of the European partners. Nothing remains of the Iron Chancellor.
(*In Haftung*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (38) Angela Merkel is a bad European – if you go by her own definition of a good European. As she repeated on Wednesday in the German parliament, a good European is characterized among other things by the fact that he adheres to the European treaties. They are however currently being bent and ignored by the German government like never before, self-evidently for the highest of purposes: not only for saving Greece, but also to protect the Monetary Union and the European unification on the whole. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (39) One thing is clear, however: the EU states' room for action would be further reduced by a "hardened" stability pact. There will be resistance against that and the feeling of being controlled from outside will rise among the population. [...] Merkel said in Aachen that if the euro fails, Europe will fail. Will the voters believe her?
(*Zwangsvertiefung*. FAZ May 14th 2010)
- (40) Of course it is bitter that Germany has to give credits to other euro states in order to keep the currency together. But the Chancellor has failed to explain to the people in a clear and understandable language that she had no other choice in the end.
(*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)
- (41) The truth is that the Germans have for a long time tied their destiny, and not only in currency politics, with the fate of other nations in Europe. [...] Classical sovereignty, understood as national freedom of action, does not exist in an association that shares almost everything from currency to border control. That applies to the largest member state as well. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)
- (42) Apparently the euro crisis is now making it really clear to the population for the first time. For three generations the Germans have voted for politicians who have advocated a comprehensive transfer of competences to Brussels. They seem to be regretting it now, for the recent events have apparently fed the idea in many of the citizens' heads that it would be comfortable to live as a type of a big Switzerland: with its own currency and strong exports, but otherwise isolated from the impositions of Europe and globalization. (*Die Krise durchstehen*. FAZ June 19th 2010)

- (43) The attitude of the federal government and in the German public in general in matters related to Greece, euro and Monetary Union has undergone a manifold dramatic shift in the German European policy. And the cool pragmatism of the Chancellor Merkel, tightly bound on German interests, has been contrasted with the heart-warming love for Europe of the former Chancellor Kohl, who was ready to even sacrifice the D-Mark as a sign of reconciliation between German unity and European unification. The accusation that gets thrown at “Berlin” today, goes like this: Germany is not thinking in a European way anymore, but in a German way. It has become a “normal” country. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (44) It is true: the public opinion in Germany has become more like the general field of opinion: European policy is nothing self-evident anymore, but is in need of justification. Already Kohl got to feel the changed atmosphere towards the end of his chancellorhood. Those who romanticize the European policy of former federal governments are overlooking two things: history does not stand still. The Germany of sixteen states is no longer the same as Germany before reunification. Its population is almost as normal or self-interested or suspicious of Europe as any other population. And the EU of the 27 member states is no longer the community of the six. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (45) The principle of solidarity applies to the large Union as well, it is the essence of any community. Germany as a well-off country can and must pay its part. But it cannot carry all the burden of togetherness, for that it runs out of strength. Precisely because the unification of Europe is precious, its citizens, the Germans included, are not allowed to feel overwhelmed. Is that anti-European? Still, the Germans have to live with the fact that they are not supposed to be quite normal. (*Normales Deutschland*. FAZ April 3rd 2010)
- (46) That will be urgently necessary in the case of the heretofore model Europeans, the Germans. “Europe” was for Germany the royal road back to peace, freedom, prosperity and recognition after World War II. To the old Europe, gathered last Wednesday in Pfalzbau zu Ludwighafen in the form of several gray-haired heads from politics, economics and spirituality, the Chancellor did not need to explain for long why she fought her way to help Greece. (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)
- (47) In the case of the new, young Europe, she must, however, here in the Europe-loving Germany as well. Generations have come forth for whom the things that Kohl and his compatriots fought and worked for are something self-evident. The later born generations did not have to carry any dead out from bombed houses. Europe, for them – so can a historically outstanding success become a curse – is not a question of war and peace anymore. For them the project *Europea* must be justified anew. One asks whether the freedom of travel, the lack of fees when exchanging money or pointing out of the export surplus, for which Germany is criticized, as well as for its Prussian-Swabian character, are enough for that? (*Im Namen Europas*. FAZ May 7th 2010)

- (48) With a fleeting look at the costs the heads of state of the EU have decided that the Greeks must be helped. Allegedly their debt hides a systematic risk for the euro zone. [...] Only those who turn the Greek state debt into a systematic risk must now help. On the other hand, whoever poses the question whether an exit from the Monetary Union would be a better option for the Greeks, is not necessarily a bad European. (*Im Sumpf*. FAZ April 21st 2010)
- (49) In the crisis night at Brussels the euro was robbed of its preventive means of protection, the bail-out prohibition and the independent central bank – with the vague promise that a harder mechanism would soon be conceived of, which would ensure budgetary discipline. The continuous attacks on “speculators” are however pointing towards the fact that the EU politics will not be able to fulfill this promise, but will rather seek its salvation in the excessive regulation of the markets in order to break the disciplinary power of market prices. The citizens should not fall for that. In the end, the speculator is their last ally in the battle against escalating state debt. (*Der letzte Verbündete*. FAZ May 10th 2010)
- (50) When the EU now demands from the Greeks in the middle of a strong recession to cut expenses and wages and raise taxes, it risks causing a depression. (*Der Albtraum*. FAZ April 23rd)
- (51) What will, what can the EU do, when the cuts prescribed to the Greeks are not “politically feasible”? (*Der Blick nach vorn*. FAZ May 1st 2010)
- (52) The impression remains thereof that everyone has to tighten their belts except the EU. (*Der Euro als Weichwährung*. May FAZ 10th 2010)
- (53) The European Union fights debt with debt. (*Der letzte Verbündete*. FAZ May 10th 2010)
- (54) The EU will not accept the price signal for the higher risk. Because the market will not bend under the political will for one interest rate, the EU Commission plans the introduction of common euro bonds. They would bring it closer to its goal of turning the Monetary Union into a liability and transfer community. For euro bonds would turn national debt into common debt. Because it would diminish the German credit rating, interest rates for state, companies and normal people would rise here. The EU Commission demands this as an act of solidarity from the main beneficiary of the euro. [...] Solidarity is not mentioned when the Commission president Barroso accuses the Germans of being naïve, if they think that the stability pact would be made stricter after aid has been given to Greece. (*Im Schuldensumpf*. FAZ June 2nd 2010)
- (55) The suspicion that the Commission is really most interested in increasing its competences is lent credence all the more by the fact that the EU agency does not combine its calls for cuts with the willingness to accept painful cuts into its own budget. (*Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg*. FAZ May 13th 2010)
- (56) It would be naïve to believe that the Commission would act only as an unpolitical agent in the service of solid budgetary policy. [...] For the Portuguese,

budgetary discipline is not the main point, but rather the fact that the urgently required tightening of the stability pact would mean increasing influence for him and the Commission. (*So unpolitisch wie möglich*. FAZ September 28th 2010)

- (57) The Greek crisis shows relentlessly that the EU has overextended itself in the past decades. [...] After the current difficulties have been overcome one way or another, Europe needs to take a true pause for reflection. It must not only consider what must become of it, but it must also ask itself, what can become of it. (*Vor einer Existenzkrise*. FAZ April 2010)
- (58) What exactly should be coordinated in the EU? The longing of the Commission for a “greener” or a “more social” union will not anyhow help Europe to catch up with the rest of the world in terms of growth. (*Wer den Euro rettet*. FAZ February 25th 2010)
- (59) Almost no European country remains that would not submit itself to a new fiscal discipline, correct excesses of the social state and the tried to adapt itself to demographic developments. Greece is only the most dramatic example of this. [...] Others too have lived beyond their means, the world financial crisis has revealed that. [...] The European citizens begin to see, that the services of the social state cannot grow independent of economic development. (*Kratzer am europäischen Modell*. FAZ August 7th 2010).
- (60) It is important that the European economies are consistently competitive and have high productivity. [...] A Europe that would commit itself to a culture of economic stability would not be a weak Europe, but a reliably strong partner. Speaking of which: German exports are booming again. (*Kratzer am europäischen Modell*. FAZ August 7th 2010)
- (61) There is, like it or not, only one option, and that is to keep going forward. The first signs have been set on this direction: put under pressure from the markets as well as political pressure, all the European states have committed to policies of budgetary stability, together with measures that are meant to make their economies more competitive. (*Nur voran kann es gehen*. FAZ November 15th 2010)
- (62) Federal chancellor Merkel was criticized for her tough position when the euro stabilization mechanisms were put into place and for her demands for harder sanction mechanisms in the EU. In some details she had to give in – that is how it is when you sit at the same table with 26 partners – but direction-wise she could assert her position. In other words: Germany has, with hard conflicts with the closest partner France and then together with Paris, taken over the lead in this crisis of the EU. That is nothing to apologize for, since this leadership results from the anchor function of Germany for the euro. Berlin has thus taken into its own hands what the EU decided to do already ten years ago: to become one of the most dynamic and competitive regions in a world where economic balances of power are currently in a dramatic shift. If the EU

and its member states are not only to tolerate but also accept this leadership role, Germany must act towards its partners not only in a demanding way, but also in a cooperative and solidary way. (*Nur voran kann es gehen.* FAZ November 15th 2010)