



VAASAN YLIOPISTO

ARI SALMINEN

(Editor)

Ethical Governance

A Citizen Perspective

VAASAN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA

TUTKIMUKSIA 294
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 39

VAASA 2010

Julkaisija Vaasan yliopisto	Julkaisuajankohta Joulukuu 2010	
Tekijä(t) Ari Salminen (toim.)	Julkaisun tyyppi Artikkelikokoelma	
	Julkaisusarjan nimi, osan numero Vaasan yliopiston julkaisuja. Tutkimuksia, 294	
Yhteystiedot Vaasan yliopisto Filosofinen tiedekunta Julkisjohtamisen yksikkö PL 700 65101 Vaasa	ISBN 978-952-476-328-8	
	ISSN 0788-6667, 1799-0793	
	Sivumäärä 145	Kieli englanti
Julkaisun nimike Eettinen hallinto: kansalaisen näkökulma		
Tiivistelmä Teoksessa tarkastellaan eettistä hallintoa kansalaisen näkökulmasta. Mikä on kansalaisen rooli, kun määritellään eettistä hallintoa? Hallinnon etiikkaa on tutkittu paljon, mutta kansalaisnäkökulma on toistaiseksi jäänyt harvinaisemmaksi. Pohjimmiltaan julkinen hallinto on kansalaisia varten ja siksi kansalaisten panos on keskeistä sekä eettisen perustan määrittelyssä että eettisyyden kehittämisessä. Teos antaa eväitä kansalaisten, poliitikkojen ja virkamiesten käymälle eettiselle keskustelulle. Kirja tarkastelee eettisen hallinnon kysymyksiä, ongelmia ja haasteita teoreettisen ja empiirisen lähestymistavan avulla. Kirja jakautuu kolmeen teema-alueeseen ja seitsemään kappaleeseen. Ensimmäinen teema-alue käsittelee eettistä hallintoa hallintotieteellisen teorian ja tutkimuskeskustelun sekä vertailevan tutkimusotteen valossa. Toinen teema tarkastelee kansalaisen ja hallinnon suhdetta ja sen empiiristä arviota. Kohteina ovat hoivaetiikka, luottamus ja integriteetin loukkaukset sekä reilu yhteiskunta ja poliittinen osallistuminen. Osa näistä teemoista nojaa vuoden 2008 kansalaiskyselyyn ja vuoden 2009 nuorisokyselyyn. Teoksen kolmas teema syventyy eettisesti hyvän hallinnon yhteen vaikeimpaan kysymykseen eli korruptioon. Teos on osa tieteellistä tutkimushanketta ”Kansalaiset ensin? Eettinen hallinto kansalaisten arvioimana”, jota rahoittaa Suomen Akatemia vuosina 2008–2010.		
Asiasanat Hallinnon etiikka, kansalainen, eettisyyden kehittäminen		

Publisher Vaasan yliopisto	Date of publication December 2010	
Author(s) Ari Salminen (editor)	Type of publication Selection of articles	
	Name and number of series Proceedings of the University of Vaasa. Research Papers, 294	
Contact information University of Vaasa Faculty of Philosophy Public Management P.O.Box 700 FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland	ISBN 978-952-476-328-8	
	ISSN 0788-6667, 1799-0793	
	Number of pages 145	Language English
Title of publication Ethical Governance: A Citizen Perspective		
Abstract <p>In this book ethical governance is studied from the citizens' point of view. What is the role for the citizen in defining ethical governance? There has been a lot of research on Administrative Ethics, but taking the citizen perspective has been rare. Ultimately the administration is for the citizens and therefore the citizen input is central in defining the ethical basis as well as in developing ethics.</p> <p>The chapters of the book give material for a dialogue on ethics among citizens, political decision makers and those working in public sector organizations.</p> <p>The book explores the questions, problems and challenges of ethical governance through a theoretical and empirical approach. It is divided into three thematic parts and seven chapters.</p> <p>In the first part of the book ethical governance is studied from the point of view of public administration theory and research as well as of the comparative approach. The second theme discusses the relationship between citizens and the administration and deals also with its empirical evaluation. The explored subjects are care ethics, trust and integrity violations in addition to fair society and political participation. The topics discussed here are based on the 2008 Citizen Survey and the 2009 Youth Survey. The third part of the book gives insight into one of the most crucial questions in ethical governance, mainly corruption.</p> <p>This book is part of the research project "Citizens First? Ethical Governance in Terms of Citizens" financed by the Academy of Finland in the years 2008-2010.</p>		
Keywords Ethical governance, citizen, development of ethics		

Preface

What is the role of the citizens in defining ethical governance? Can this perspective be measured and quantified as well as studied from a theoretical angle? In short, can it be studied in a meaningful and objective manner?

The purpose of the book is to increase awareness of ethical issues in the framework of ethical governance. How to engage active citizens in a public debate on ethics? More discussion on ethics is encouraged among citizens, political decision makers and those working in public sector organizations. Hopefully this book provides some ideas for the discussion.

The information contained in this book can be used in improving the ethics of public organizations, preparing legislative proposals, and codifying ethical standards for the government and municipalities.

What is citizen perspective?

In the context of governing, the citizen perspective typically covers three main topics: values, participation and responsiveness. First, as far as democratic governance is concerned, ethical values in society are discussed. Secondly, an important sign of the citizens' role in society is the availability and the use of channels for citizen participation. Thirdly, a fundamental requisite for citizens is that the wishes of the citizens are being listened to.

Administrative ethics has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest and research in the last decades (e.g. Bruce 2001; Cooper 2006; Frederickson & Ghere 2005; Menzel 2005, 2007; Lawton & Doig 2006). Ethical governance forms a central part of the debate on administrative ethics.

Ethics can be understood as a set of moral principles. They can be identified at individual, organizational and societal levels. Ethics, also defined as moral philosophy, is a strongly theoretical world of values and morals on the one hand, and on the other hand, administration is a world of decisions and actions with an orientation towards the practical. To simplify the above said: ethics searches for right and wrong while the administration must get the job done (Cooper 2001).

The citizen perspective is to some amount neglected in the discourse on administrative ethics. The views of citizens seem to be missing – even if administration is

VIII

for them and not vice versa. As a rule citizens' views are needed, if ethical governance is to develop.

Citizens expect clearly and understandably explained decisions, done transparently and in the "spirit of public service". This results that public managers need ethical sensitivity as well as standards to behave in a responsible manner (Cooper 2006; Menzel 2001). Civil servants have the obligation to distribute resources fairly and to openly and transparently justify their choices and decisions. Studies of public administration from the citizens' point of view could thus open up new venues for getting this important perspective to the table.

Politicians and public servants inform people on compulsory matters whenever necessary. There are several government channels that enable the citizens to address their concerns. In addition public debate in the media and in other forms of communication is open for citizens. Sometimes the communication is directly with the politicians and bureaucrats, when as citizens they are being heard. The highest level of influence of the citizens is realized in a situation where not only they are being listened to, but also contribute to the decision making.

The nature of morality is understood through ethical judgments. In most western countries citizens value equal opportunities, equal treatment, equality before the law, and the same services for the entire population. When it comes to ethical governance, both the integrity of the political system and good administration are emphasized.

Citizens have a basic constitutional right to express their opinions as they have views on rules and norms they want to share with the community. Active communication between the government and the citizens is needed. Are the perceptions of citizens on ethically good governance taken into consideration by the political decision makers? Politicians and public sector office holders should be carefully informed whether the citizens' assessments of the quality of public services, administrative procedures and principles of the political system are positive or negative.

The findings of the research project "Citizens First? Ethical Governance in Terms of Citizens" indicate that both Finnish adults as well as young people appreciate public services and the fair and just treatment of citizens. There are signs of distrust in politicians as well as of alienation from politics and the democratic decision making process. The citizens are not very assured about the trustworthiness of politicians or their promises. However, strong confidence is rooted in institutions and services. According to the Finnish respondents administrative corruption is controlled, even though old boy networks distort the image of the adminis-

tration. For citizens, the most important ethical values are justice, honesty, equality and reliability. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a; Lähdesmäki 2010)

Coherence and plan of the book

Some of the previously discussed topics in addition to new topics are discussed in this book. The coherence of the ethical themes brings to light specific interpretations about the citizen perspective on the ethicality of public administration and governing. The first part of the book explores the theory and the methodology of studying ethical governance. The following part provides insights into such themes as care ethics, citizen-focused ethical governance and ethical governance based on youth attitudes and expectations. The final part of the book deals with corruption: the control mechanisms for corruption and corruption as an ill-defined phenomenon.

The first two chapters offer perspectives into theoretical and methodological issues of ethics and ethical governance. The following three chapters provide insights into such themes as care ethics, trust and integrity violations, as well as a fair society and political participation. The two remaining chapters discuss the problem of corruption.

The book is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter concentrates on a theoretical analysis of ethics. The chapter essentially deals with the underlying theory of how to understand and study ethics management and the author, Esa Hyyryläinen, seeks to link the concepts of ethics and integrity to public administration and management research. One of the author's arguments is that research on the subject is in some way always linked to the different strands of normative ethics.

What kind of methodology best suits the research problems of public sector ethics? Chapter 2 is limited to one methodological tradition, the comparative method. It provides a short methodological introduction to the approach as Ari Salminen and Olli-Pekka Viinamäki discuss the choices linked to the comparative approach in the study of administrative ethics. The contextual and single case; two or multiple case; and full-range comparisons are described.

In Chapter 3 Tommi Lehtonen discusses care ethics from the citizen's viewpoint with a theoretical and an emancipatory research interest. Is caring the most important concept in ethics and what is genuine caring? Lehtonen focuses on the questions of why and how the gap between administrative reality and the citizens' expectations on good governance should be narrowed.

The empirical contribution of Chapter 4 deals with trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administration. Is ethical governance based on trust, and is this trust threatened by the unethical behavior of public officials? The analysis of Ari Salminen and Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka asks how citizens view trust and corruptive behavior. Citizens' opinions and conceptions of trust and unethical actions are further analyzed through background factors such as gender, working history and the level of education.

What are the opinions, attitudes and beliefs of society, politics and political participation of Finnish youth? In Chapter 5 Kirsi Lähdesmäki analyses youth opinions on the challenges faced by the Finnish society and on political participation. The specific ethical themes chosen for a closer analysis are the concept of a fair society and the challenges of political participation.

An essential part of ethical governance is combating corruption. Finland spent the first years of the new millennium at the top of the rankings of the least corrupted countries, but currently political financing scandals are riddling Finnish political life. Does this mean that democracy and through it the political control of the public sector are weakening? In Chapter 6 Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka, Ari Salminen and Olli-Pekka Viinamäki discuss the control of corruption in the Finnish system. They specify their analysis to the existing control mechanisms.

The final chapter of the book concentrates on corruption and governance. In his presentation Amr G. E. Sabet underlines that corruption is a complex, ill-structured and wicked ethical problem. His argument is that in the search for tools and mechanisms to fight corruption, socio-historical conditions and governing practices should be taken into consideration. Sabet's suggestions on new strategies for combating corruption include collective measures such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and collective sanctions.

Acknowledgements

This book is meant for an international audience. The research team in Vaasa University was established because of – and also inspired by – a scientific interest in Administrative Ethics. The scientific outcomes of the project include published monographs and research reports, articles in peer-reviewed international and national journals, master and doctoral theses in Public Management along with course material for teaching administrative ethics.

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for the referee statement. As the editor I would warmly like to thank my colleagues for their scientific

ic contribution to this study. My special thanks belong to Anni Juvani who helped me edit the book. I am also grateful to my colleagues – in foreign and in Finnish universities – who have provided valuable support in the course of this project.

Ari Salminen

The contributors of the book

All authors are working at University of Vaasa in the academic field of administrative sciences.

Esa Hyyryläinen, PhD, is Professor of Comparative Public Management. His research interests are comparative methods, public management reforms and contractual governance.

Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka, PhD, is post doc researcher in Public Management. Her research interests are ethical governance, professional ethics and local service administration. Ikola-Norrbacka's current interest is ethical management in local government.

Tommi Lehtonen, PhD, is University Lecturer in Philosophy. His current research interests are values and ethics of governance, philosophy of religious language and philosophical questions related to comparative research.

Kirsi Lähdesmäki, PhD, is University Lecturer in Public Management. Her research interests are public management reforms, public entrepreneurship and public sector leadership. Currently Kirsi Lähdesmäki's research is focused on the youth perspectives on ethical governance and fair society.

Amr G. E. Sabet, PhD, docent, is University Lecturer in Comparative Government. His research interests are Middle East and Islamic politics, comparative governance and international relations.

Ari Salminen, PhD, is Professor of Public Management. His research interests are theory of public management and administration, public sector ethics and comparative methods. He is the director of *Citizens First? Ethical Governance in terms of Citizens*, a project funded by the Academy of Finland.

Olli-Pekka Viinamäki, PhD, is University Lecturer in Public Management. His research interests are European governance, administrative ethics and organizational values and comparative methods.

Contents

1	APPROACHING ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH FROM A CITIZEN VIEW Esa Hyyryläinen	
	Introduction.....	1
	Linking ethics and integrity within a citizen view.....	2
	Descriptive relativism as the basis of the study of ethics and integrity in public administration and management research.....	4
	Ethical theories and ethics management.....	8
	Conclusions.....	13
2	THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH Ari Salminen & Olli-Pekka Viinamäki	
	Introduction.....	15
	Comparison and ethics.....	17
	From contextual to comparisons of a single case / phenomenon.....	19
	Comparisons of two or multiple cases / phenomena	21
	Full-range comparisons.....	23
	Conclusions.....	25
3	ETHICAL GOVERNANCE FROM A CITIZEN'S POINT OF VIEW: A CARE-ETHICAL APPROACH Tommi Lehtonen	
	Introduction.....	28
	A citizen's point of view.....	29
	Ethical governance.....	31
	Care ethics and the welfare of citizens	33
	Empathy as a virtue of civil servants	35
	Citizens' expectations of governance	38
	Conclusions.....	41
4	TRUST AND INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS IN FINNISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE VIEWS OF CITIZENS Ari Salminen & Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka	
	Introduction.....	42
	The research focus and the empirical contribution of the citizen survey.....	44

	Trust in organizations and institutions	47
	Gender, working history and education as background factors	50
	Integrity violations.....	51
	Bribes, theft and fraud	53
	Old boy networks and nepotism	55
	Linkages in business life	56
	Bad and careless treatment of citizens.....	57
	Background variables in focus	58
	Conclusions	59
	Appendix	61
5	FAIR SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS PARTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE VIEWS OF FINNISH YOUTH	
	Kirsi Lähdesmäki	
	Introduction	63
	Central concepts	64
	Modernizing welfare society	65
	Youth perspectives on a fair society.....	66
	Responsibilities of the society	67
	Social problems evaluated by the youth.....	68
	Change in societal values	69
	Possibilities of participation and attitudes towards politics and politicians.....	70
	Participation profiles	73
	Conclusions	74
6	PROMOTING, PREVENTING AND WATCHDOGGING: REINFORCING CITIZENS' ROLE IN THE CONTROL OF CORRUPTION	
	Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka, Ari Salminen & Olli-Pekka Viinamäki	
	Introduction	76
	The focus.....	77
	Benefits of good administration	78
	Integrity of civil servants.....	81
	Key anti-corruption acts	84
	The role of ombudsman and chancellor	85
	Financial and performance audit	87
	Conclusions	88
7	WICKEDNESS, GOVERNANCE AND COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS: CAN CORRUPTION BE TAMED?	
	Amr G. E. Sabet	
	Introduction	91
	Corruption as collective guilt	92

The wickedness of corruption	94
State capture and globalization	97
On corruption, path dependency and bribery: the contagion of illegitimacy	100
Path dependency and change: Kurt Lewin revisited.....	103
Collective responsibility, collective punishment, and modified vendetta.....	105
Sanctions, deterrence and interdependency	107
Conclusion	110
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 113

1 APPROACHING ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH FROM A CITIZEN VIEW

Esa Hyyryläinen

Introduction

Like other contributions in this volume, this chapter aims at exploring and strengthening a citizen view to public administration and management. A citizen view underlines that the government is for the people, and therefore it should listen to its citizens, provide citizens with access to all levels of government, and also create possibilities for the active participation for its citizens. Some years ago all this was integrated into a model of good governance. It all existed long before that, and basically it is clear and straightforward. Nevertheless, when we shift focus to ethics and integrity as objects of studies, the picture gets more complicated. The principles of good governance are relatively clear but it is not as clear how good governance should be interpreted in terms of ethics and integrity? We are not even sure whether seeing it in terms of ethics would be different from seeing it in terms of integrity. A citizen view to administration and management of ethics is still to come. In this sense the contribution of the current volume is tentative.

The emphasis of this chapter is on the available approaches for the study of ethics and integrity within public administration and management research. The main idea of this chapter is to discuss general possibilities to approach ethics and integrity in public administration and management research. It aims at clarifying, and, to some extent, even criticizing choices researchers have to make in order to proceed with their research. In the sense of approach there is actually no consensus about what we are talking about when we are talking about ethics and integrity.

The first step of this chapter is to discuss what there is to understand about ethics and integrity from a citizen view. The second step is to find out objectivist and relativist assumptions about ethics and integrity, and also to argue for relativism as the basis of research. Because we are always linked to what public managers as practitioners do in organizations, the third step is to discuss how we can approach ethics in organizations theoretically. This discussion aims at showing how assumptions about human behavior lead to certain types of understanding of ethics and integrity.

Linking ethics and integrity within a citizen view

Adoption of a citizen view has strong ethical relevance. Putting the needs and views of citizens in the middle of public administration and management activities requires that administration and citizenry will be effectively linked together. Citizens ought to have access to all levels of government, and citizens ought to be listened at all levels of government. This is the fundament for ethical public administration and management from a citizen view. So, what does this mean in the study of ethics and integrity?

Though ‘integrity’ is currently being frequently used as the main concept instead of ‘ethics’, it can only be understood in relation to ‘ethics’. Therefore it is logical to begin with ethics. The role of ethics is to provide us with guidelines for taking the ‘right route’. We can call this the positive notion of ethics given that it defines what kind of behavior should be favored. In the context of administrative and management ethics, which is the main interest of this chapter, the right route would mean trying to do everything we can to benefit citizens’ welfare and taking responsibility for our actions as managers. From a citizen view taking the right route would also mean that citizens should be put in the middle of all activities.

Ethics also has the role of stopping us from taking the ‘wrong route’, for instance from taking bribes or appointing close relatives to management positions instead of more qualified candidates. Accordingly, this can be called a negative notion of ethics since it defines what kind of behavior should be avoided. Bribery and nepotism are good examples of things public officials should always try to avoid. From a citizen view they should actually try to avoid everything which denies citizens access to government.

Positive and negative notions of ethics are closely linked to normative ethics, which is giving guidelines for behavior. The basis of these notions lies in morality and in making a distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ in human behavior. It is fascinating, and also most relevant for the purpose of this chapter, that everyone would probably not make that distinction in the same way. We are generally not always sure what is ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, and even more importantly we are not sure what makes something morally right or wrong. Metaethics is the field of ethics which is interested in the nature and methodology of our moral judgments. It tries to provide answers to these problems. (Gensler 2006: 4–5; Mizzoni 2010: 3; af Ursin 2007: 124.)

In this chapter the emphasis will be on normative ethics. By definition normative, the dimension of ‘ought to’ is unavoidable in all normative ethics. From a citizen view it is also an extremely significant feature of ethics. In practice, normative

ethics has two main levels. Normative theory is interested in general moral principles. ‘We ought to avoid lying’ is an example of this kind of principle. It is valid and applicable in all situations, even if we cannot avoid lying all the time. In contrast, applied (normative) ethics is focused on more specific questions. Having in mind that we are essentially interested in ethics in public administration and management, this level of normative ethics is the most important for us. In the end we look at ethics to find answers to ethical questions, which are typical to this distinctive field of action. Adoption of a citizen view is definitely among those questions in public administration and management. (Gensler 2006: 5.)

Integrity as an issue is primarily linked to individual persons and their actions. Most often in public administration and management research we are interested in integrity of public officials as individuals. Nevertheless, integrity should be seen from a wider perspective. As Kasulis (2002: 55) says, “a person of integrity is not simply an individual, but an individual-in-relation”. Kasulis (ibid.) continues to state that “the individual’s character as a person of integrity reveals itself fully in relation to others”. Grant (2008: 2) goes even further claiming that “the person of integrity is one who can be trusted to do the right thing even at some cost to himself”.

Kasulis’s statement is a good argument for a citizen view to integrity. Any individual working for the government cannot be a person of integrity without the will and conviction “to do the right thing even at some cost to himself”. Integrity helps to integrate individual persons to larger systems. Solomon (1999) articulates this in the following fashion:

“Integrity is not itself a virtue so much as it is a synthesis of virtues, working together to form a coherent whole. This is what we call, in the moral sense, character. The word integrity means “wholeness”, wholeness of virtue, wholeness as a person, wholeness in the sense of being an integral part of something larger than a person – the community, the corporation, society, humanity, the cosmos. Integrity thus suggests a holistic view of ourselves”.

Another proof of integrity being a broader concern in the government is the existence of an integrity system. We can say that a system with international, national and organizational elements exists to safeguard our integrity. Probably the best known presentation of the (national) integrity system is the Greek temple model of Transparency International. According to TI the integrity system in question is composed of the principles, institutions and actors, which are linked to the ad-

vancement of integrity, transparency and accountability in a society¹. It is fundamental that integrity connects to transparency, which is probably the major problem area in government and public administration in terms of a citizen view.

Menzel (2007: 5) also highlights the role of organizations in the advancement of integrity:

“Integrity is often used to describe a person who is of sound moral character. When applied to an organization, integrity refers to an environment characterized as wholesome and one in which respect for others transcends self-serving interests. Building an organization of integrity involves cultivating and balancing a range of competencies and virtues that improve judgment in making decisions.”

A key aspect of this description is probably “in which respect for others transcends self-serving interests”. It also serves as a link to a citizen view on ethics in organizations.

‘Ethics’ and ‘integrity’ have been linked to alternative strategies for ethics management in organizations; that is to say to compliance and integrity strategies (e.g. Paine 1994; Maesschalck 2004). Whereas compliance strategy emphasizes external control of public officials, integrity strategy highlights self-control exercised by individual public officials as persons of integrity. Integrity strategy emerged about the same time as ethics management was needed to balance the NPM-induced change in public sector values due to large and ambitious reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Compliance strategy is older, and it was dominant before the NPM-era.

It is important to notice that these NPM-reforms also affected the position of citizens. They were often seen as customers or even consumers instead of citizens. This has had a significant effect on ethics as well. To put it short, instead of classical administrative ethics it also adopted models from the private sector, where integrity strategy was first in use.

Descriptive relativism as the basis of the study of ethics and integrity in public administration and management research

How then to study ethics and integrity in public administration and management research? All social sciences can be broadly divided into two approaches. Objec-

¹ See <http://www.transparency.org/>.

tivists see some form of measurement of ethics and integrity possible (for example Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka and Lähdesmäki in this volume). They see the world as “a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures”. Relativists see world as something which “is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality”. Whereas objectivists usually try to explain and predict the real world through regularities and causal relationships, relativists try to ‘understand’ the world. Where objectivists claim that everything we do is shaped by our situation, relativists have a tendency to treat us as free-willed human beings. And while objectivists most often aim at testing existing theories as systematically as possible using surveys, questionnaires, tests and all kind of standardized research instruments, relativists emphasize “the analysis of the subjective accounts which one generates by ‘getting inside’ situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life using diaries, biographies and journalistic records, among other things”. (Burrell and Morgan 1985: 4–6².)

In terms of ethics and integrity, it is significant that relativists claim that “people’s ideas of what is right or wrong vary according to their society, culture or individual inclinations“ and “what we call ethics is merely the total sum of these cultural and individual opinions” (Rowson 2006: 39). The main and opposite idea to this, basically the idea of objectivism, is then to believe that “there are objective truths about what is right or wrong that apply to all people all times” (ibid: 38).

Francis Snare (1992: 113–114) wants to make it clear that saying something that is relative states very little about what the writer had in mind. His example is the phrase “morality is relative”. This could actually mean anything without specifications. As possible specifications Snare provides the following list: morality can be relative to individuals, to cultures, to one’s specific circumstances or ‘situation’, to one’s beliefs, to one’s commitments, to the beliefs of the culture one is in, to the stage of socio-economic development, to the interests of the ruling class, and so on.

Snare goes on to present a definition of descriptive relativism – which does not make claims about what ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ means in reality, but only about beliefs of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Descriptive relativism “merely claims, as a matter of empirical fact, that beliefs about moral matters differ”. When people say that morality is relative to the individual, “they are only making the descriptive relativist

² Burrell and Morgan’s term ‘subjectivism’ is changed here to ‘relativism’, which is more suitable for the purpose of this contribution. These two terms are not synonymous in all respects but we assume that here they would be.

claim that, in fact, different individuals have different moral beliefs”. When people say that morality is relative to “cultures or societies, they only mean to claim that differing moral beliefs are found in different cultures”. (Ibid: 114.)

As a mild form of relativism descriptive relativism has been the most widely held view for public administration and management research for at least two reasons. Firstly, it emphasizes that peoples and cultures are different, and therefore you cannot assume that your ‘truth’ would automatically be theirs too. When people are following ethics according to their understanding and try to be persons of integrity in that sense, they will notice that other people might have different grounds for integrity. These differences constitute a practical concern in organizations. Secondly, compared to the strong versions of relativism, descriptive relativism allows aiming at theory-building. Although it is not meaningful to aim at achieving grand theories, there is still room for trying to do more than local theories. This has been essential for the continuing development of public administration and management research. This distinction between objectivism and relativism leads to two different ways to see ethics and integrity (Table 1).

Table 1. Scheme for analyzing assumptions about the nature of ethics and integrity

	Objectivism	Relativism
What are ethics and integrity? (ontology)	Ethics and integrity are something real, concrete, and independent of individuals and their cultures	Ethics and integrity are created by individual perceptions within a culture
How can we study ethics and integrity? (epistemology)	Ethics and integrity can be studied by collecting and analyzing facts about human behavior	Ethics and integrity can be studied through individuals’ culturally distinctive perceptions about the reasons and the consequences of their behavior
What are the relations of ethics and integrity to a given situation? (human nature)	A given situation delineates what is understood as ethics and integrity	A given situation matters only as an individual perception of it within a culture
Is it possible to make broad generalizations about ethics and integrity in behavior? (methodology)	Broad generalizations are possible	Since perception is individual/cultural, broad generalizations are not possible

At this point we have to ask what kind of variation actually exists in the morality of individuals. This is a rather complicated question. Taking bribes is a good measure for the issue at hand. Basically every public official throughout the world lives according to rules and regulations which clearly state that you should not take bribes. Basically citizens in every culture are also against bribery. In practice, there is a lot of variation between cultures as well as between individuals within those cultures. Bribes are taken, and they are given in all cultures. Somewhat paradoxically the problem seems to be severe where the assumed trust between government and citizen is highest. That has been the case in Finland.

On the epistemological level the question is about the possibility for studying ethics and integrity. Turning to individuals is the only choice within relativism. We have to ask individuals how they see the reasons and consequences of their behavior. We have to ask citizens what they think about bribery and other forms of corruption (see Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka and Lähdesmäki in this volume). We also have to assume that individuals are different in that sense: they have different personalities and different cultural views about the world (see Sabet in this volume). The main assumption in objectivism would be that individuals are quite similar. It assumes that culture does not matter that much.

On the level of assumptions about human nature, an understanding of the situation is the central theme. In objectivism ethics and integrity are closely connected to a given situation. Ethicality is seen as delineated by the situation, and the objectivist interpretation emphasizes determinism in that sense. Then ethics and integrity are automatically concerned with some form of adaptation. In relativism, the situation also matters, but in addition to that there is the individual perception of the situation, which is strongly affected by cultural factors. Relativist interpretation emphasizes voluntarism. Ethics and integrity are closely connected to the free will of individuals following their own aspirations.

On the level of methodology objectivism is biased to emphasize similarities, which are the basis of broad generalizations. Within objectivism, it is natural to say something general about ethics and integrity, as natural as it is about any other investigated phenomena. Relativism, on the other hand, denies this possibility. Since ethics and integrity are closely linked to the perception of individuals, broad generalizations are not possible. Relativism is biased to emphasize differences in general and in the study of ethics and integrity. Often this is described in terms of cultural differences, which are at the core of the logic and arguments of relativism.

How then do objectivism and relativism show in actual public administration and management research? Both approaches can naturally be found, but von Maravić

(2008) has observed a tendency towards a small selection of actually used research methods and/or techniques. Descriptive hypotheses, small- and medium-N case analysis, single-country/single-shot research designs, and document analysis were widely used, whereas predictive hypotheses, comparative research designs, interviews and observations were rarely used. The generality of large-N research across cases as well as the specificity of in-depth analysis were largely missing. Von Maravić went on to state that “research is, from this perspective, not as “general and specific” as it could be and as some authors would like to see the social sciences” (ibid: 19). His interpretation is a rather critical one. A more positive interpretation would claim that most research conducted in the field falls into category of descriptive relativism, and there is no problem in that.

Ethical theories and ethics management

The preceding section provided the basic setting for assessing the assumptions which lie beneath the surface of our ethical and unethical behavior. The main purpose of this section is to proceed into the actual theoretical approaches to the study of ethical behavior, which would be available for public administration and management scholars. There is a growing interest in ethics management within public administration and management community, internationally and in Finland (e.g. Moilanen & Salminen 2007, Salminen 2009, Ikola-Norrbacka 2010). Donald Menzel (2005: 29) is among the scholars who have contributed to the present growth of interest. He explicitly emphasizes the novelty of current ethics management approach:

“Thus ethics management is not a new enterprise; what is new is how we think about it. If we think about it as a systematic and conscious effort to promote organizational integrity, as Article IV of the American Society for Public Administration’s Code of Ethics declares, then there is such a thing as ethics management. If we think about it only as “control,” then it may be arguable to suggest that there can be anything approaching effective ethics management”.

In public administration and management ethics and integrity are linked to the behavior of individuals in public organizations. In order to understand behavior, we have to think why we do what we do. Initially we can think of three main reasons. Firstly, we do something because we think that it contributes to the fulfillment of the goals of our action. The most important goals are either personal or organizational. Some kind of ideal situation exists where organizational and personal goals match. Goals explain our behavior temporally forward, since an action makes sense in relation to something which is hoped to happen in the future. If there is a reward for a certain type of behavior, then it comes in the form of

fulfilling goals. Most of the time we just have to believe that we have chosen the right route to fulfill our goals, since certainty cannot be found.

Secondly, we do something because we are accustomed to doing so. We have a certain way of doing things. This habit explains our behavior temporally backwards. In order to understand what we do, we have to examine what we have done previously in similar occasions. We can assume that a certain type of conservatism prevails in the behavioral patterns one observes in public organizations and more generally in society.

Thirdly, we do something because something in the situation seems to require it. This requirement is often justified by referring to the needs of the organization or its environment. We try to adapt to these needs. Often nothing in the organization or its environment explicitly requires something to be done. We just have the sentiment that it would, and therefore we are more or less reacting or adapting to that. Autopoietic systems theory, a branch of complexity theory, even claims that organizations are self-maintaining an image of their relevant environment, which is used as the environment to adapt to (Morgan 2006: 243–246). Organizations are closed in that sense. Our sentiments relate temporally to the real time of events, even if we can say that it did not emerge by itself from nowhere. There is a background to be described for any sentiment, and in that background there are elements pointing backwards and forwards.

When we link these explanations to different strands of normative ethics – consequentialism, virtue theory and duty theory – we get three different models for approaching ethics and integrity. The essential features for consequence, virtue and duty approaches to ethics and integrity are described in Table 2.

The consequence approach is based on consequentialism as an ethical theory. It basically asks us to do that which has the best consequences (Gensler 2006: 138). In reality, consequentialism manifests itself as some form of utilitarianism. It does not matter what kind of good and best consequences we are actually thinking of. Virtue and duty approaches are examples of non-consequentialism, which do not take the consequences as their key feature. Something is seen as “bad” or “wrong” from the beginning.

Virtue approach follows the guidelines of virtue theory (virtue ethics). Ancient Greeks emphasized the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance and justice), later Christianity added three more (faith, hope and love) (ibid: 170; Salminen 2009: 9). All these are linked to the traits of a person. We can generally understand a virtue as a good habit or good practice that a person has or is following (cf. Gensler 2006: 170). What is essential for the distinction between ethics

and integrity, made earlier in this chapter, is that integrity can be seen as a virtue. As Kasulis (2002: 54) says, “In the case of persons, we have noted, integrity is usually considered a virtue. In whatever situation or relationship such people of integrity may find themselves, their self-identities are neither corrupted nor compromised.”

Table 2. Linking different types of ethical behavior to normative ethics

	Consequence approach to ethics and integrity	Virtue approach to ethics and integrity	Duty approach to ethics and integrity
Main general driver of behavior	Goals	Habits	Sentiments
Appropriate ethical theory	Consequentialism (utilitarian ethics)	Virtue Theory (virtue ethics)	Duty Theory (deontological ethics)
Suitable principle within ethical theory	“The greatest good for the greatest number of people” (John Stuart Mill)	“The virtues we get by first exercising them” (Aristotle)	“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Immanuel Kant)
Assumed developmental model	Hoped consequence → action → justification	Potential → repeated actions → formation of practice → moral character	Sentiment → action → consequence
Main measure for maintaining ethics and integrity in organizations	Setting organizational goals which contribute in maximizing the ‘well-being’ of individuals and their patrons	Supporting organizational practices which build the moral character of individuals	Emphasizing moral rules and ethical standards in organizations
Examples of suitable ethics management tools	Social accounting and other measures to support social responsibility of organizations, ethical training	Ethical reviews and rewards, ethical training	Values statements, codes of conduct, ethical training

Duty approach emphasizes duties as the core of ethics and integrity. It is based on duty theory (deontological ethics). A duty is something we are required to do (Mizzoni 2010: 105). It would also be possible to speak about one's responsibilities or obligations (ibid: 105). Duties are mainly interpreted as internally created pressures for individuals. It is their personal interpretation of what needs to be done and how it should be done. They have a connection to organizational needs, for example, but individuals are the link between those needs and actual action.

All that has been said above can be reduced to three ethical principles. With its link to utilitarianism, the consequence approach is following John Stuart Mill's "the greatest good for the greatest number"-principle (Mill & Bentham 1987: 234). The most important goals are those which give the most good to the most people. With its link to virtue theory, the virtue approach emphasizes an individual's virtues. Habits are the origin and the motor of virtues. Aristotle's "the virtues we get by first exercising them" captures the essence of this line of thought brilliantly (Aristotle 2009: 23). Virtues are developed when we practice them. The main figure of duty theory is Immanuel Kant. Also the main principle has here been adopted from Kant. His famous categorical imperative states that "act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 2005: 97).

All three theoretical approaches have adopted a certain developmental model, an assumption of the development towards higher levels of ethicality. The developmental model for the consequence approach has the hoped-for consequences as the starting point, which leads to a certain type of action, which is then justified in relation to what was aspired for. There is a slight tendency to assume that the ends would justify the means. The developmental model for the virtue approach starts with what is potential in individuals (Mizzoni 2010: 27–29). The potential becomes actual when certain good habits are repeated. The final phase is the emergence of moral character. The developmental model for duty approach starts from the sentiment, which can be understood as intention (ibid: 104–105). Action then follows and is guided by that sentiment. It eventually leads to certain consequences, which are assessed in relation to the original sentiments. Learning and re-focusing become possible in this way.

The three theoretical approaches have different views on ethics management, i.e. the management perspective on ethics and integrity in organizations. For the consequence approach the main task of management is to provide organizational goals which contribute to maximizing the well-being of individuals and their patrons. The emphasis is on those management practices and functions which have the closest links to organizational goals. In reality, strategic management is

strongly emphasized. This being the main function of the upper ladders of organizational hierarchy, this theoretical approach emphasizes the ethical role of top management in organizations.

The virtue approach comes to a different conclusion. Supporting organizational practices is the main ethics management concern of this theoretical approach. Repeated practices or habits build up the moral character of individuals. Thus the emphasis is not so much on the top management level with strategic concerns as with the role of managers responsible for tactical and operational decisions in organizations. The question is about the role of management at the shop floor level, closest to staff members.

Duty approach emphasizes the role of moral rules and ethical standards in ethics management. It also puts the emphasis on the top management level, which has the authority to make decisions. Moral rules and ethical standards are the “benchmarks” for ethical behavior. Individuals can compare their behavior to rules and standards, and find out whether they are doing the “right” or the “wrong” things. Rules and standards also show the free space individuals have in their personal decisions. Moral rules and ethical standards help us to find the proper way to act in our organizational roles. Their existence also affects management. Basically, in the best possible situation, the management does not have to intervene in the activities of the staff as closely as it would without these rules and standards.

Social accounting and other measures which support the social responsibility of organizations are good examples of suitable ethical management tools within the consequence approach. Ethical reviews and rewards, which contribute to building up the moral character of individuals, are suitable tools for the virtue approach. In the same way, values statements and codes of conduct are suitable tools within the duty approach. All of the three theoretical approaches justify and require ethical training. Since they emphasize different issues and provide distinctive arguments for this emphasis, their requirements for ethical training are different. For example whereas the duty approach concentrates on providing knowledge about moral rules and ethical standards for the staff, it would be logical to assume that the consequence approach would concentrate first on those people who have the most significant role in setting organizational goals. Likewise it is possible to assume that the virtue approach would concentrate first on the persons who are most engaged in the creation of good organizational practices.

Conclusions

This chapter grew out of the need to explicate the possibilities for a public administration and management approach to ethics and integrity within a citizen view. Author also wanted to point out that objectivist approach has alternatives. We should ask ourselves whether the study of ethics and integrity is primarily about observing behavior, or more about finding out how people actually see their world as the basis of ethics and integrity? We should also ask what kind of methodological and theoretical consequences different approaches bring with them?

The first phase of the chapter dealt with the key concepts of ‘ethics’ and ‘integrity’. Albeit ‘integrity’ has somewhat taken over from ‘ethics’ in various researchers’ contributions, it does not say that much in itself. Therefore, maintaining a link to ‘ethics’ is indispensable.

The second phase of the chapter was based on views on the features of objectivism and relativism. Starting from a general distinction at four levels – ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology – the description proceeded to open up the actual features of ethics and integrity in relation to public administration and management research. Through this process it was possible to describe different ways of understanding what ethics and integrity are, and how they can be approached in public administration and management research. This phase ended with the recognition of descriptive relativism as the most suitable stance for public administration and management research.

The goal of the next phase was to open up the theoretical approaches in interpreting ethics and integrity in public administration and management. The discussion began with recognizing three broad explanations for action in organizations, fulfillment of goals, habits, and sentiments about the necessities of the situation. These three broad explanations were then linked to three main strands of normative ethics, goals to consequentialism, habits to virtue theory, and sentiments to duty theory. In this way it was possible to describe three theoretical approaches available in public administration and management research, consequence, virtue and duty approaches respectively. During the course of description these three theoretical approaches were elucidated from broad general issues towards more specific ethics management issues.

Ethics and integrity cannot be studied in public administration and management without a concern for how they are understood in philosophy, since it is the source of the key ethical theories. All ethics and integrity research in public administration and management is in one way or another linked to the different strands of normative ethics. However, study of public administration and man-

agement is part of social sciences. Researchers always consider the possibilities for studying ethics and integrity empirically. Therefore when we make use of what philosophers have said about normative ethics, we combine that to its specific objectivist or relativist approaches to phenomena that we are interested in. Theoretical and methodological concerns arise simultaneously. Currently there are “blind spots” in both areas. The state of public administration and management research on ethics and integrity is both theoretically and methodically far from being mature.

What is also far from being mature is the study of ethics and integrity in public administration and management from a citizen view. Seeing the government from a citizen view is basically not a complicated task. It just means that the government should listen to its citizens, provide citizens easy access to all levels of government, and create possibilities for active citizens to take part in e.g. decision-making, wherever this is possible. Seeing this as an ethical challenge of public administration and management, and as a concern of public administration and management research, the whole picture gets more complicated. It is far from clear what all this would require. For instance, it is unclear how older ethics-based approach and newer integrity-based approach see this challenge. This contribution has tried to open up this question.

We do not have that long tradition to include ethical theories to public administration and management research conducted within available social sciences approaches. This contribution has tried to speak for descriptive relativism as a promising social science approach to ethics and integrity. It has obvious advantages in relation to strong versions of objectivism and relativism. This contribution has also tried to propose how ethical theories could be linked to public administration and management theories in a productive way. This is indispensable for any venture to proceed with this type of research. It is also the basis to build a citizen view on.

2 THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH¹

Ari Salminen and Olli-Pekka Viinamäki

Introduction

Policy-makers, practitioners and academics increasingly favor comparative findings, and multinational as well as multicultural research endeavors. As far as the use of comparison in administrative ethics is concerned, a large number of ethical issues have been under examination. The comparison effort covers several issues, such as cultural differences, moral systems, civil rights and societal justice, good governance, commonly shared values, ethical public management, and the ethical training of public servants (see e.g. Frederickson & Ghere 2005; Cooper 2001).

Moreover, the chapters of the book present an analysis of administrative ethics from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. The conceptual and theoretical chapters of Hyyryläinen, Lehtonen, and Sabet are mainly interpretations and they are based on the literature on moral philosophy as well as administrative management and ethics. The empirical studies of Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka and that of Lähdesmäki contribute to the quantitative approach with survey research as the data-gathering tool. This suggests that different methodological strategies exist for exploring ethics in public management: the comparative method as a combined or a mixed method is valid for both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

As Øyen (1990) states, the nature of all social research is more or less comparative; phenomena are always understood in relation to other phenomena. Furthermore, comparison is often defined as the systematic examination of the differences and similarities of theories, models, and phenomena.

Comparison is presented here as one methodological approach in administrative ethics research. The study of public administration, including administrative ethics, requires comparison in order to discover cross-national generalizations, rules and regularities, and other specific features. Given the growing prominence of comparative ethics research, this chapter examines the claims made for such re-

¹ This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 2006 European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) conference in Milan.

search in order to foster a more explicit and critical understanding of the goals of comparative research, the interest of knowledge, and the practical contributions.

One goal of comparison is the systematic examination of the differences and similarities of theories, models, and phenomena. In the history of public administration research, the comparative doctrine deals with at least two main areas of study. The first is ideographic comparisons, with Max Weber as a historical representative. In Weberian comparisons, unique cases and situations are emphasized. He concentrates on building ideal types which are connected to historically unique events. The ideal types are compared to each other, with empirical findings and observations. The second field of study involves nomothetic comparisons, with Fred W. Riggs, Ferrel Heady, and Dwight Waldo as representatives. In this area, a quantitative comparative approach, with invariance and causations, is considered valuable. For Riggs, the endeavors are to generalize comparisons, for empirical and for ecological (social and physical environment) causations. (Riggs 1962; Gant 1979.)

In current public administration research, the ventures of comparative knowledge and analyses are needed. There are various reasons why comparative public administration is back in. First of all, comparativists can present a kaleidoscope of administrative actions and structures, models, and regularities, but nevertheless can also highlight the uniformity within and among states. (Jreisat 2005.)

The comparative method contributes to the development of administrative theory and improves its applications as well as the development of administrative practices, such as good governance and corporate social responsibility. Studies employing the comparative perspective promote an understanding of pervasive global reforms and characteristics. It opens the door to a transition from traditional ethnocentric perspectives to a global scope that integrates knowledge from various places and cultures. Globalization, as well as multinational cooperative actors, such as the European Union, the OECD, or the United Nations evidently increase the need for comparative facts and knowledge. Administrative knowledge, generated through the comparative method, serves practitioners and expands their horizons of choice and consideration for adoption. (Jreisat 2005; Landman 2005; Heady 2001.)

Considering the above, what is special for comparative administrative ethics and what are the contributions of comparative settings in explaining and understanding ethical topics?

One of the fundamental rules is that comparison implies comparability. There should be enough similarity to examine difference and enough difference to ex-

amine similarity. Most similar systems mean maximal similarity on the system level, such as the value system or culture of a country. Most different systems are a relevant viewpoint when the internal features of the system are examined, such as individual behavior, identity or shared values in an administrative system.

A comparativist needs certain concepts and correspondence between concepts because without abstraction and intellectual construction, there are no common denominators between the various objects submitted to comparison. In brief, the concept is an abstract idea, in that it considers only certain characteristics of the objects. It is also a general idea, in that it extends the considered characteristics to all objects of the same class. Linguistic correspondence facilitates the interpretation and understanding of the meanings of the selected concepts. Two other points are the correspondence of measurements and samplings. Can we maintain a high quality of responses in each case and do we receive answers with the same rate? (Cf. e.g. Osborn 2004; Dogan & Pelassy 1984.)

Comparison and ethics

Several possible approaches to conduct a comparison exist, for instance Landman's (2005), Keränen's (2001), Pickvance's (2001), and Peters' (1988) contributions (see also Salminen 1999). Landman distinguishes three strategies of comparative research, including comparing many countries, comparing a few countries, and single-country studies. Keränen describes two alternatives for comparative politics; the comparative and cross-cultural (or ethnographic) research as methodological approaches. Pickvance's presentation concerns four varieties for comparative analysis, as well as Peters' four dimensions, such as cross-national, cross-time, cross-level, and cross-policy comparisons.

We wish to describe the comparative approach of administrative ethics by discussing some of the comparative alternatives open to the comparativist in the ethical context and citizen-oriented studies, as described in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Comparative approaches to administrative ethics

Our argument is that whatever theories, concepts, units of analysis, or research methods one adopts in comparative research, the analytical results and interpretations, as well as research procedures are dependent on the comparative approach selected in the study.

Firstly, a closer look at three methodological approaches is taken in this chapter (Figure 1). Because the focus of the chapter rests on methodological orientation, the contents of administrative ethics are not inclusively specified.

Secondly, we concentrate on suggestions for a comparativist. In a comparative situation, a researcher may need a clarification of how to proceed in the comparative process, and what principles and applications might be taken into account. Our focus here is neither to present the precise use or steps of a comparative method in the research of ethics nor to be concerned with the meaningful concepts used in comparative administrative ethics.

The following three sections of the chapter describe the comparative approaches and discuss the methodological arguments provided by each approach. The second section combines the contextual and single case comparisons into administrative ethics. Then, the focus is primarily on ethical culture, history, and contexts. The third section of the chapter deals with comparisons of two or multiple cases in the area of administrative ethics. The focus is on the systematic similarities and differences of the ethical issues compared. The fourth section consists of

full-range comparisons in administrative ethics. A main point is a systematic explanation of universal ethical issues. The concluding section presents a short summary of the suggestions for a comparativist.

From contextual to comparisons of a single case / phenomenon²

The first comparative approach consists of two types of ethical comparison, namely contextual and a single case / phenomenon comparison. Typical for contextual comparisons are analyses of the ethical climate and contexts, and descriptions of historical events and backgrounds. Based mainly on 'local' conceptions, the focus of contextual comparisons is on the local meanings of ethics. Perceptions underline country- and case-based orientation. This kind of comparative approach is discussed in the following contributions (e.g. Salminen 2006; Mulgan 2005; Svensson & Wood 2004; De Vries 2002).

Alongside cultural differences, a diversified use of concepts and definitions may dispute systematic and analytic comparisons. As is often noted, the particular ethical concept seems to be too diffuse for meaningful comparative study and brings to light the general causes of social phenomena. And, the application of our 'own', ethnocentric, and national-bounded concepts and configurations can be quite misleading.

Conclusions should be limited to the specific features of a single country or a respective phenomenon. Most conceptualization is thus socially constructed. Occasionally contextual comparisons are criticized on their loose comparative settings in analyzing and describing historical and contextual matters. One might consider whether this approach is at all comparative – Derlien (1992) for instance, calls it a comparable, instead of comparative, study.

Through comparability, the local perspective means that ethical values and moral codes are interlinked with nation-states, and their cultures and traditions (cf. Rutgers 2004). How is this applied to a country-case and a specific ethical issue? Let us take corruption as an example. Finland is one of the least corrupted countries in the world, but why? What are the reasons for this and are those less-corrupted elements meaningful for the development work of other countries? In most cases, different 'local' factors give the basis for explanation.

² As is commonly known, case study itself is also a method in social science research.

Less corruption in Finland is explained by saying that the society is still rather equal. No big differences between social classes exist. The country has a legalistic tradition in her administration, a strong system of the Chancellor of Justice and Ombudsman, including other legal infrastructure to fight corruption, maladministration and mismanagement in an efficient way. The national ethical bodies for improving ethical behavior are founded in different fields of society (health, education, sciences). A good level of status and salaries for public servants are secured by the state and local communities. (Cf. Tiihonen 2003: 108–111.)

Perhaps the contribution of a contextual comparative setting limits the analysis of comparable issues and ethical conceptualizations. It can be used for creating a proper ethical context for the phenomena to be analyzed.

Much the same is a single case/phenomenon comparison. The focus of this approach is the contribution of thematic and model-creating comparisons. A single case/phenomenon comparison is ideographic in nature. Widely known is how Max Weber applied ideal types in his historical comparisons of reality. Ideal types were compared both to each other and to the empirical findings, and as result of the process, new hypotheses were also created. In single case studies, the empirical case, an ethical issue is compared to a heuristic or normative theoretical framework and reflected to the ideal types. The approach concentrates, above all, on the details of a phenomenon and, after that, makes generalizations and reflections possible, which are more theoretical than empirical.

Most single case comparisons are qualitative case-studies but quantitative approaches are also possible. For example, in Canada the Institute for Citizen Centred Service (ICCS) conducts a time-series survey which demonstrates and measure customer satisfaction with services provided by governments across Canada (first of the “Citizens First” surveys was conducted in 1998). This kind of single case time-series survey facilitates governments to benchmark against other jurisdictions, track progress over time and help to identify priorities for improvement.

Causality may also contribute to this approach, but not in the strictest sense. Because no single determinative factor exists, the development of the ethical issue under consideration is not universal or unitary. For instance, based on the public service ethics of a single case, explanations are more historical than empirical. The formal ethical regulations in the Constitution or in the other legislation of a single country cannot be used as a causal explanation for the respective notions of another country.

Comparisons of a single case/phenomenon, heuristic analogies and guessing are among the most appropriate techniques used. By guessing and using analogies,

ethical issues are not explained but give room for generalizations of a sort. For a comparativist, they have special value. Through guessing, the core ethical culture of one country is more easily compared to another country-case close to it.

Finland is a country between east and west. What does this mean in terms of guessing and using analogies in comparative ethics, and especially comparing citizenship or citizens' status and functions in a single case/country? The history of every single nation is to be understood by commonly shared social values, traditions, and political structures. The features of legalism and welfare development remain strange for a comparativist unless the peculiar historical position of Finnish society is not familiar. Finnish administrative and governing culture is to be understood historically through the Russian tradition, as well as the Swedish or Scandinavian traditions. Legalism comes from the Russian period in the 19th century; the ethical values of equality and compassion of the welfare state come from the Nordic political experience.

The contribution of this comparative approach is that it offers comparisons of historical phenomena (e.g. interpretations of corruption or non-corruption, growth and development of citizenship, or citizens' perceptions on appreciated values) in the framework of social development which, at best, reveals the social meanings of the phenomena explored. This sort of comparison contributes to the estimation of the differences of similar cases (e.g. the interchange and influence of administrative cultures between neighboring countries).

Comparisons of two or multiple cases / phenomena

The previous approach emphasizes model-creation and theory-driven comparisons. In the current approach, the focus is more on comparative settings and aims, and the characteristics of the things being compared. It has many advantages in comparative administrative ethics.

If the starting point for comparison rests on exploring most different cases, the analysis tends to concentrate on similarities. Differences in content are most obvious if different cultures, ethical contexts, or concepts are involved (see e.g. Maor 2004; Kakabadse, Korac-Kakabadse & Kouzmin 2003; Jackson & Artola 1997). Differences also come from the selection of empirical cases. For example, a comparativist may strive towards looking for similarities in the most divergent countries, such as Finland and China. Difficulties in comparison then dwell from the fact that there is no shared framework for interpretation inherent in the objects of research for the comparativist to rely upon; as a basis for comparison some 'meta' framework has to be used (cf. Rutgers 2004: 154).

On the other hand, a comparativist can look for differences and explain them in contexts that are roughly similar. For example, Nordic public administration is quite similar from citizens' point of view. Then, comparativist focuses on outward and latent differences in citizens' perceptions, behaviors, and experiences. This, the most similar systems design, is typical of comparative studies that identify a particular outcome or process that is to be explained (Landman 2005: 32–33). Then, in ethics, one might consider, for example, transitions to democratic values, features of corruptive behavior, patterns of ethical behavior of diverse companies dealing with different branches, or organizational values applied in public service organizations.

The chosen strategy is related to the 'technical' selection of variables and number of cases. For instance, if differences dominate, the number of cases tends to increase and the applicable variables decrease. Vice versa, when the number of cases decreases, the number of applied variables increases. Moreover, an increase in the number of applied variables in most settings reduces the number of analyzed cases. A comparativist cannot find and apply ethical concepts as common dominators between the objects submitted for comparison. Much of doing research is that the comparativist tries to become familiar with the conceptual frameworks in which ethical phenomena exist.

Methodologically, special attention is paid to commensurability in this approach. This means that there should be at least one factor or variable in which the meaning remains unchanged from case to case (Dogan & Pelassy 1984: 20, cf. also Viinamäki 2004). For example, does the concept of lawfulness or ethical behavior apply equally in all cases? Under what terms can we compare corruption in Russia and Finland and is corruption as a concept precise enough? Furthermore, what conditions should be regarded comparing Finland and the other Nordic countries which have a rather similar society and administration?

However, comparison is a balance between culturally related concepts/meanings and generalizations/universal labeled concepts (Sartori 1985: 246). The limitation of the former is usually related to a low applicability with country comparisons while the latter's is a low capability to describe the essential ethical features of each case. The crux of the problem is not specifying identical, or even similar concepts, but equivalent ones so that their comparison is meaningful (Dogan & Pelassy 1984; Landman 2005).

Another issue is to pursue functional or structural equivalence (Heady 2001). Functional equivalence means that the comparison is based on the analysis of organizations performing a similar function. For example, a comparativist might

consider the surveillance of codes of conduct or actions of ombudsmen in two countries.

In structural equivalence, the comparativist may focus on the tasks implemented under the same organizational structure, for instance, the differences that can be found in parliamentary control over civil servants in four European countries. In other words, structures such as state, ethical behavior of civil servants, and democratic principles are often omnipresent, but exist in varying degrees and are responsible for determining ethical outcomes (cf. Landman 2005: 44).

Maintaining comparability becomes more demanding when the number of cases grows, because the variation in meaning increases. For example, even in similar countries, corruption or integrity is understood differently. Typical solutions to maintaining a decent level of comparability are to describe and interpret all the cases with the same precision and raise all the same issues, and to gather research material by using the same principle and specificity in each case.

This comparative approach evidently adds the element of systematical and analytical analysis to the comparison of similarities and differences. Whether the research methods are qualitative or quantitative, a rather low number of selected cases and variables reduces the possibility of causal explanations. Because of commensurability, two or multiple case comparisons produce in-depth conclusions, a sharper definition of the elements to be investigated, and the best practices for administration and management.

Full-range comparisons

The third approach is referred to here as full-range comparison. The primary interest in full-range comparisons is to apply nomothetic reasoning and seek deductions and explain causations and the terms for generalizations. Typical for this approach is the use of quantitative and statistical methods and surveys. Comparisons involve a wide range of countries or cases in order to decrease randomness and misinterpretations (see e.g. Ahonen, Hyyryläinen & Salminen 2006). Comparisons are variable-oriented and test the (in)variances and correlations of the phenomena. A comparativist can pursue indexes which set a wide framework and a measured order of compared items, such as corruption indexes.

In full-range comparisons, the focus rests mainly on explaining cultures. One of the best known is Hofstede's (1991) typologies on Asia-pacific, North-American, and European cultural features, as well as Riggs' terms of societies' developmental stages. Findings of such research are often conveyed in terms of the impact of

culture on ethical variables, beliefs, and behavior. Another is to attempt to typify and present typologies on management cultures, styles, and features of maladministration, corruption, corporate governance, unethical behavior, or global ethics (see e.g. Frederickson & Ghore 2005; Garofalo 2003; Plant 2001). Active research attempts are carried out in business ethics and the discussion of corporate social responsibility.

In the area of comprehensive and world-wide inclusive comparative reports and research, what we call here full-range comparisons, both international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been important players. The United Nations, OECD, the World Bank and IMF have updated lists and data of the principles of good governance, codes of conduct, and other recommendations and guidelines on principles and moral codes for developed and developing countries. They have made increasingly large amounts of data available to comparativists.

However, Lawton, Macaulay and Paliduskaite (2009) fairly critically note that the comparative work that has been done tends to focus on multiple regression analyses of large secondary databases where the focus tends to be easily measurable outputs such as health or employment indicators. In the field of administrative sciences, one exception is the work of van de Walle, van Roosbroek and Bouckaert (2008) that carried out a large scale comparative analysis of trust. Moreover, outward criticism is presented against the use of non-comparable or low-quality sampling frames, differing procedures for selecting the sample, the oversampling of certain groups and under-sampling of others, and the varying and non-response rates (Osborn 2004: 271).

Another side here is the ‘transportation’ of culturally related ideas, concepts, as well as developmental suggestions globally. As Jreisat (2005: 239) remarks, behind this we find a basic premise that functional patterns of administration are determinable and transferable from one system to another. Defining common patterns of administration from multicultural experiences would improve applicability and temper the archaic institutional ethnicities. Moreover, if comparativists decide to apply their own concepts as a yardsticks, they often run the risk of reducing and deforming what a phenomenon means in its social context and culture, and thereby excluding a lot of information (Rutgers 2004: 156).

Although we have ‘globalized concepts’, such as good governance or codes of conduct, they cannot be simply stipulated as proof for the existence of universal concepts. This should be taken into account in surveys and explanations. They always have to be integrated into the conceptual web of some specific language and no language is universal in the sense that it can accommodate all possible

meanings expressed in human language (Rutgers 2004: 153). Yet, most problems tend to be empirical (Przeworski & Teune 1970a: 555) and “equivalence is a matter of inference, not of direct observations” (Przeworski & Teune 1970b: 117–118).

As Jreisat (2005: 237) remarks, an important attribute for a comparativist is a certain flexibility in balancing the conceptual and practical concerns of the field as well as adaptability in the face of contextual variations on the ground. Secondly, the dichotomous nature of variables (positivist) often means a loss of information. The dichotomies virtually help to eliminate the possibility of analyzing everything but the limited phenomena than can be defined in terms of the existence or inexistence of a quality.

The contribution of this comparative approach relates to publicity, in other words, for the use of public argumentation and discussions. For instance Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report gains a lot of attention in the media. It also creates globalized concepts, despite the difficulties, and is involved in the creation of platforms for other approaches of comparative research. In addition, its main advantages include statistical control to rule out rival explanations, extensive coverage of explored cases, and the ability to make strong inferences (cf. also Landman 2005: 26).

Conclusions

In this chapter we have presented comparison as one of the methodological alternatives in the context of administrative ethics and taking citizens into account in the selection of comparative approach. Additionally, this reminds us of the fact that a comparative method is not valid for studying all ethical issues. Comparisons are frequently empirical, but ethical issues are not always measurable. Socially constructed concepts function well in the theory of administrative ethics, although concepts are not exclusively operationalized for the needs of comparative research.

Comparison in administrative ethics is, for the most part, a question of choosing a methodological standpoint, discerning the topic of research, and selecting the research setting.

Our suggestions are based on three approaches. As methodological variations, they are not compensatory, but complementary, to each other. In comparative administrative ethics explanations also vary. We are convinced that each approach presents a unique point of view on topics of administrative ethics. It fol-

lows that the results and interpretations of a single study are highly linked to the selected comparative approach.

As indicated earlier, the research design in comparative administrative ethics corresponds to the general requirements of social research. Therefore, we conclude our presentation by asking how these comparative approaches are connected to the basic goals of research, interest of knowledge, and the practical contributions. The main conclusions are described in Table 1.

Table 1. Methodological choices for a comparativist

	Contextual or a single case / phenomenon comparisons	Two or multiple cases / phenomena comparisons	Full-range comparisons
Goals	(Historical) descriptions and comprehensive assessment of the current situation	Different or similar systems	Cause and effect -explanations and generalizations
Interest of knowledge	Unique development, complexity	Qualitative interpretations, emphasis on divergences	Systematic explanations, emphasis on convergences
Practical contribution	Accurate and realistic 'local' experience	Best practices, development administration	Benchmarking, criteria for global and good governance

As Table 1 summarizes, comparativists must first choose their specific task: is it to achieve a precise description, reveal the similarities or differences of two or more cases, or to seek causations? Secondly, a comparativist deals with objects of inquiry. Is it a unique development, the divergences of phenomena, or a search for convergences? Thirdly, does the comparative study contribute to and serve the practitioners whether they are improving local practices, enhancing the exchange of best practices, or creating comprehensive and generalized criteria?

The target of context and a single case / phenomenon comparisons is limited to the unique changes in administrative ethics in a single country-case. The strength of the analysis is in accurate, historical and down-to-earth descriptions. A lot of

useful information can be gathered from the local ethical customs and procedures in order to generate new concepts to apply in contexts beyond the original study.

Two or multiple comparisons emphasize divergent interpretations of the ethics of countries or administrative systems. It allows for intensive historical and cultural examinations of cases not possible in studies with a large sample of countries. Concentration and in-depth understanding of the cases give room for exporting ethical codes, good citizenship, and good governance practices from one country to another and beyond the immediate scope of the countries included in the analysis. A detailed description helps to avoid ‘conceptual stretching’ and the mentality of ‘anything goes’ in administrative ethics research since they rely on the specialist knowledge of a few cases.

Large survey-based empirical comparisons quantitatively explain the similarities and differences between the countries and the country-groups, as well as give arguments for suggestions of global governance and citizens positions. The extensive coverage of countries allows for stronger inferences and the elimination of possible sources of spuriousness, since given ethical relationships can be demonstrated to exist with a greater degree of certainty.

3 ETHICAL GOVERNANCE FROM A CITIZEN'S POINT OF VIEW: A CARE-ETHICAL APPROACH

Tommi Lehtonen

Introduction

What are the characteristics and requirements of good governance? While discussing this issue, scholars of public administration, sociology and ethics have wanted to consider the citizens' view of good governance. The questions that have aroused scholars' interest in the topic include the following: What do citizens consider to be the central characteristics of good governance? In what ways do their expectations of governance differ from the authorities' view of good governance? How do citizens view their role in society in terms of rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis one another and the state?

An extensive survey conducted by Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka in 2008 explored Finnish citizens' views on ethical questions and problems related to public administration. The survey in question is further explored by the aforementioned authors in the following chapter. Most of the respondents considered that paying taxes was a primary characteristic of a good citizen; respect for the law and the appreciation of real and honest work were other often-mentioned characteristics of a good citizen (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a: 30). One might consider that these results reconfirm the traditional view of North Europeans as the exponents of the law-abiding and well-ordered bourgeois way of life. However, the significance of the results lies deeper than merely repeating this controversial, if not ridiculous, stereotype.

Based on the survey, citizens' views on the values of good governance dovetail with Finnish civil servants' views on the values of the body of civil servants (ibid: 132). To a great extent, citizens and civil servants value the same things, such as equality, integrity, and responsibility. Yet despite the broad value consensus, citizens' wishes and their views of administrative reality often diverge from each other. Public administration is often, even stereotypically, blamed for its slowness, officialism, and inflexibility. The constancy of the divergence between citizens' wishes and the administrative reality in many countries, Finland included, is one reason why good governance has become a popular research theme internationally in administrative studies in the last decades.

This chapter aims at presenting an explanation and related ethical theory of how we could and why we should narrow the gap between administrative reality and

citizens' expectations on good governance. This consideration and its accompanying proposed solution are essentially based on the so-called care-ethical approach. In this approach, the basic task of ethics is considered to be caring for individuals. However, this chapter defends and develops the idea that the scope of caring, in the genuine care-ethical sense, can and must be extended to communities and public affairs. Thus, the ethics of care can be formulated so that it avoids a sharp split between the public and private (Held 2006: 21).

This chapter also aims to bring clarity and sophistication to the study of ethical governance in general. The sophistication takes place through the analysis, explanation, and enrichment of the central concepts of this subject area. These are important research tasks; they contribute to the future research of ethical governance by helping us sharpen the research problems and questions. They also help us avoid the worst pitfalls of studying this subject area. Thus, the research interest in this chapter can be characterized both as theoretical and emancipatory.

A citizen's point of view

It is necessary to begin our study by defining the concept of the citizen's point of view. Such a point of view has two major meanings in the context of public administration. First, it denotes the needs and interests of citizens that they themselves consider to be important in the handling of administrative matters. Second, the citizen's point of view can denote the legislators' or civil servants' view of the benefit to citizens. Obviously, these two meanings are not necessarily the same.

Since antiquity, the paternalistic tradition of public administration has emphasized that the wise and just ruler or lawgiver knows or should know what is best for his subjects or citizens. This ruler does not necessarily need to be a sovereign monarch; it can also be a collective government, even a democratically chosen one. Plato's idea of philosopher-rulers as set down in his *Republic* is probably the best-known classical example of the idea of an expert governance.

Since the rise of contract thinking in the seventeenth century, Plato's view has widely been deemed to be paternalistic and authoritarian. The view that there is an administrative instance who knows better than the people themselves what is good for them is considered to restrict the freedoms and responsibilities of people toward what is in their best interest. However, it is subject to discussion whether

this view does full justice to Plato's idea of a republic and to his criticisms of democracy.¹

According to contract thinking, legitimate social life consists of voluntary agreements constructed by autonomous individuals on the basis of a rational utility calculation. Based on such a calculation, social stability and security are supposed to be among the benefits that surpass and compensate for the disadvantages caused to individuals by the voluntary limitation of their freedom. However, citizens must submit to this limitation along with their mutual social contract. Thus, for social stability and security, private interest and public interest are supposed to meet and amalgamate.

The idea of the social contract goes back to Thomas Hobbes, but is most notably embodied in our time in the work of John Rawls. In a contractarian approach, it might be appealing to interpret the citizen's point of view as the citizen's own will and choice, not as the legislator's view of the benefit to citizens. However, this issue is controversial, as will be seen in the following parts of this chapter.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was another founder of contractarian thinking. His central concept of political theory is the general will (*volonté générale*). The fundamental claim for general will is that the members of a political community share a public or general interest which should be put before private interests. When the members put the general good first, they are following the general will of their community. In *The Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau produced a comprehensive theory of the legitimacy of the state and of government, revolving around the general will.

According to Rousseau (1997: 60), there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all (*volonté de tout*) and the general will. The latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is in a sense a sum of particular wills. Not so surprisingly, Rousseau considered that the people do not always decide in a way that coincides with the common good. He attributed such failures mainly to factors such as social inequality and a low sense of communality. The lawgiver, by designing good social institutions and instilling a sense of collective purpose and virtue, is meant to help overcome this. Based on this view, one might claim that Rousseau's general will dovetails with the citizen's point of view when understood as the legislator's view of the benefit to citizens. Accordingly, Rousseau's view of society may be de-

¹ On understanding Plato's *Republic*, see Santas (2010).

scribed as paternalistic rather than liberal. He seems to assume that the lawgiver tries (or should try) to maintain the ideals of joint responsibility and an inclusive society that tries to take care of everyone. Thus, the state as advocated by Rousseau seeks to safeguard the well-being of citizens.

One might suppose that the care ethical approach reactivates the accusation of paternalism that was directed against the classical ideas of the state and its governance, such as those presented by Plato or Rousseau (Cf. Held 2006: 76–77). However, this supposition is based on the false premise that the ethics of care essentially assumes that the one caring knows better what is good for the one being cared for than him or her. This study aims to alleviate this concern by defending the view that genuine caring listens to and takes into account what individuals (i.e., citizens) say and wish.

Ethical governance

Another central concept to this discussion is ethical governance. In brief, ethical governance denotes administrative measures, procedures and policies that fulfill criteria required for the ethically good or acceptable handling of public affairs, such as in public administration, public health care, education, and social security. In the context of public administration, ethically good or acceptable behavior is often defined in terms of justice, fairness, equality, and integrity. Thus, ethical governance is a normative expression and not a purely descriptive one. The concept of ethical governance also implies a value assessment and is thus value-laden. It is precisely because of this value-laden property that different organizations in both the public and private sectors often use the terms ethical governance and ethical management as labels or advertisement slogans for their marketing purposes—for example, in the labor market, or to gain economic or political benefit. However, people can always ask of governance whether it really is ethically good.

The use of the adjective ‘ethical’ does not guarantee, of course, the true ethical goodness (i.e., justice, fairness, equality, integrity) of governance. Thus, the term ‘ethical governance’ should be used for actual systems of governance only when the appraisal is based on a critical and unbiased evaluation of their goals and means. Such evaluation requires invoking normative premises (i.e., commands and prohibitions) such as ‘Governance should be equal and impartial’, ‘Civil servants ought to keep their promises and be true to their word’, and ‘Authorities should take good care of public affairs’.

Thus, ethical governance, as a normative notion, denotes the characteristics or virtues of ethically good civil servants. At the same time, it denotes the criteria based on which the ethical quality of governance is assessed. These criteria involve, for example, the integrity, equality, and justness of civil servants and of their administrative activity.

The ethical quality of governance can be good or bad. In the former case, it is said that governance is ethical or conforms to ethical requirements. In the latter case, it is said that governance is unethical or breaks ethical standards. One common way of explaining these characterizations is to say that in good governance civil servants and authorities follow the ethical and other norms, commands and prohibitions they are obligated to follow in their actions. Bad governance violates these norms. In this explanation, the ethicality of governance is expressed in terms of rule-following. Thus, the concept of governance ethicality involves an evaluative aspect that is often conceptualized as obedience to rules. However, the care-ethical approach introduces another way to conceptualize the ethicality of governance. According to this approach, good governance cares for its citizens and their welfare and takes good care of administrative matters related to the citizens.

We can also differentiate between the minimalist concept and the maximalist concept of ethical governance. The minimalist concept involves the minimum requirements for ethically acceptable governance, whereas the maximalist concept aims at enriching our understanding of what ethically good and high quality governance involves or could involve.

The minimalist concept of ethical governance states absolute prohibitions that public authorities and civil servants are forbidden to violate in all circumstances. They include prohibitions of all forms of corruption (e.g., bribery, graft, and nepotism), extortion and coercion, deception, theft, and discrimination (see the next chapter, where Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka address trust and integrity violations, and Chapter 5, where Sabet focuses on the problems of corruption). The maximal concept of ethical governance additionally invokes positive commands, such as 'Be fair and impartial', 'Safeguard the well-being of citizens', and 'Take good care of the administrative tasks entrusted to you'. Furthermore, the maximalist concept specifies positive characteristics of a good authority or civil servant, such as diligence, kindness, patience, and humaneness. It is only a short step from the maximalist concept of ethical governance to a care-ethical citizen's point of view of ethical governance, as genuine caring goes beyond basic duties and an ethical minimum (Held 2006: 71). On the other hand, care is one of the basic moral values, perhaps even the most basic one, and as a value care designates what many public and private practices ought to involve. As was characterized

above, the focus of the ethics of care is attendance to the needs of people for whom we are responsible. Taking responsibility for public affairs and serving citizens are what civil servants ought to do.

Care ethics and the welfare of citizens

It is helpful to compare the ethics of care with other major ethical traditions. Care ethics is typically regarded as the ethics of relationships more than of individual obligations and virtues (Slote 2007: 85). On one hand, this view makes sense because caring is basically a two-place relation between the one caring and the cared for. On the other hand, this characterization of care ethics is insufficient because all ethics is about relations – relations between people, and between people and animals, plants and the whole planet. However, if we add that care ethics is about the relations of caring, the characterization is more apt. Thus, according to the ethics of care, caring relations have primary ethical value. (Held 2006: 19.)

In brief, care ethics considers acts as right or wrong, depending on whether they exhibit a caring or uncaring attitude or motivation on the part of the agent (Slote 2007: 21). Thus, care ethics sets experiential and motivation-based criteria on the goodness or badness of an action. However, an act can be caring and motivated by caring even if the cared for does not recognize this to be the case. Thus, the experience of the cared for is relevant in the evaluation of the ethical quality of an act, but it is not the sole criterion of the moral goodness of an act. The key criterion is the empathy of the one caring. Yet, to be a caring person requires more than the right motives or dispositions. It requires the ability to engage in the practice of care, and the actual exercise of this ability. (Held 2006: 51)

The tradition of the ethics of care is the only ethical tradition first articulated and defended in the twentieth century. Other well-known ethical traditions are utilitarianism, Kantian deontological ethics, contractarianism, and virtue ethics. Care ethics is often counted as a form of sentimentalism because of the crucial and basic role they give to feeling, especially empathy. Thus, the ethics of care values emotion rather than rejecting it. (Held 2006: 10.) Most other ethical traditions, except for virtue ethics, can be counted as forms of rationalism. Thus, they emphasize the rational basis of ethics. Despite its sentimentalism, care ethics can treat morality as genuinely normative, even while denying that moral judgments are either based on reason or rationally binding (Slote 2007: 106–108). Accordingly, the ethics of care calls into question the universalistic and abstract rules of the dominant ethical theories, since it is said that the ethics of care is based on the universal need and experience of being cared for (Held 2006: 132–133).

Another feature specific to the ethics of care is relation-centeredness. The ethics of care conceptualizes persons as deeply affected by, and involved in, relations with others. Thus, care ethicists can say that persons are at least partly constituted by their social ties. (Held 2006: 46; Noddings 2003: 3.) In a similar way, one might say that civil servants are constituted, in their role as officials, by their ties to citizens.

Contractarian theory has been characterized previously in this chapter. The utilitarian theory and tradition say that actions ought to be judged to be ethically good or bad depending on the consequences they will have on all who will be affected. According to the utilitarian maxim, we are to bring about “the greatest happiness” or utility or satisfaction of preferences for all concerned. Deontological ethics says that actions are ethically right or wrong depending on whether they are in accord with one’s ethical duties. According to deontological ethics, we are to rely on reason to understand the implications of the ethical demand (or the categorical imperative) and we are to act in accordance with the rational will, not our feelings. Virtue ethics focuses on discovering which character traits are most important for living an ethically good life. Thus, virtue ethics emphasizes the character of the moral agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking.

The ethics of care, first formulated by Noddings, began as a critique of the prevailing ethical traditions which are regarded as rationalistic, masculine and dogmatic. Thus, care ethics is distinctly feminine. However, it is important to notice that feminine does not mean female or that it is a woman’s job to care. Thus, care ethics in no way excludes men from taking an active part in caring for their families, fellows and community. It is also good to notice that feminist philosophers disagree on the beneficence of the ethics of care (see Held 2006: 94–95). Some blame the ethics of care for maintaining the traditional view of women as primary caregivers. However, this view is misconceived and thus unnecessary, as will be explained here.

In brief, advocates of care ethics see caring as the ethical ideal. Working from a particular view of human nature, care ethics advocates recommend that we focus our attention on our concrete relationships. They also recommend that we attend to the concrete needs of those who are close to us. Thus, caring is directed toward the welfare, protection, or enhancement of the cared for. (Noddings 2003: 23–24.) According to the ethics of care, an acceptably or decently caring individual has a fully developed emphatic concern for others. Thus, if someone cares only about her own wellbeing or happiness, she is clearly not a morally decent person, even if she is perfectly rational. Caring can even require a willingness to make sacrifi-

ces in one's own welfare for the sake of others. (Slote 2007: 116.) Sacrifice should be understood here in a wide sense. For example, it is a (very) small sacrifice when a civil servant interrupts his or her coffee break to serve a client.

It is a psychological truism that parents feel tied to their children in ways that they do not feel tied to strangers. Thus, it is no wonder that the paradigmatic examples of care ethics are related to taking care of children or other family members. However, nothing in principle prevents the cared for from being people other than family members. Moreover, nothing prevents the cared for from being citizens and the one caring from being a civil servant. To act as the one caring can be understood simply as acting with special regard for a particular person in a concrete situation. Thus, by defining special regard loosely enough, but with reference to at least minimum empathy, authorities and civil servants can be said to act as the one caring in relation to citizens who are the cared for.

Empathy as a virtue of civil servants

Why is empathy needed on the part of civil servants? To answer this question, we must first clarify the concept of empathy. In brief, empathy means identifying with the problems or situations of someone and understanding his or her thoughts and condition. This is something that civil servants can be expected to be able to do to a relevant extent.

Empathy is often strengthened through perceptual and temporal immediacy, and thus through face-to-face communication (Slote 2007: 28). In view of this, it may be problematic that authorities are contacted more and more via the Internet, anonymously and without in-person meetings. The use of the Internet can thus diminish empathy related to the relationships between authorities and citizens. This is noteworthy because also in the context of public administration, the central criteria for genuine caring is that the one cared for is met as a subject, – not merely as an object to be manipulated or as a data source. Such objectification may easily take place on the Internet, probably more easily than in face-to-face contact. Thus, the ethics of care dovetails well with Kant's categorical imperative that asks us to treat people always as ends in themselves, never as mere means.

At the beginning of this chapter, a Finnish study was mentioned in which citizens' views of the characteristics of a good citizen were canvassed. Relating to the general requirements of humanness and moral reciprocity, citizens should also care for civil servants in accordance with the Kantian maxim that forbids us to use anyone as a mere means, and that exhorts us to treat all people as ends in themselves. Thus, for example, we should follow the requirements of politeness and

consideration towards all people, including authorities and civil servants. These requirements include truthful communication and basic courtesies such as saying hello, please, thank you, and goodbye.

Possible risks related to an emphatic public administration include the exploitation and manipulation of authorities and the misunderstanding of civil servants' benevolence. For example, someone may try to cheat the welfare benefits system by invoking pity or empathy in authorities. However, compliance with laws and rules in decision making protects, at least to some extent, civil servants from such attempts. On the other hand, a customer may misunderstand the caring intentions and considerations of an authority and may think that the civil servant with whom he is dealing is bureaucratic, intrusive, and greedy for power. This happens, for example, in social administration where authorities have to make difficult child custody decisions. However, the risks of exploitation, manipulation, and misunderstanding always exist, and thus they are not special risks inherent in an emphatic public administration. Rather, an emphatic approach may help to find new and better solutions to those problems.

In paradigmatic cases it is said that with care ethics to live an ethical life is to care for those with whom we have close relationships (Mizzoni 2010: 128–129). Thus, we should take into consideration what possible influence our actions and choices may have on our closest ones. However, we have many case- and situation-specific roles in which different people stand in various more or less close relationships to us. Such relationships exist between student and teacher, buyer and seller, and civil servant and citizen, to name but a few. In addition, multiple roles may come into play at the same time for a single person. For example, the role of parent or spouse is almost always supposed to bear some relevance to people in that role even when they are primarily acting in another role, such as in the role of a worker or a friend. The closeness of a relationship is often determined in terms of family ties or law, but again it is considered to be our moral obligation to care, in some sense, about all people. Thus, the closeness between people is not necessarily a spatio-temporal, genetic or legal concept, but caring (i.e., empathy and mutual respect) can embrace both spatially and temporally distant people, such as people living in distant countries, or future generations. Accordingly, sustainable development that takes into consideration future generations is also a concern of care ethics.

The starting points of care ethics are in near relationships and family relations, particularly in the relationships between parents and children and between spouses. The citizen's point of view widens this circle of bond and commitment to the relationship between citizens and civil servants and other authorities. Therefore,

political and social life benefit from rethinking in the light of the ethics of care. However, Noddings (2003: xvi) claims that our moral relations with people we have never met cannot be subsumed under an ethics of care. Rather, they must be understood in terms of such general notions as justice and rights (ibid: xvi; cf. Slote 2007: 2). In contrast to this view, we have every reason to think that we have the capacity to develop substantial empathy and concern for people we do not know (Slote 2007: 94). We have even more reason to think that civil servants should have the capacity to develop substantial empathy and concern for their fellow citizens (understood broadly, this would include immigrants and asylum seekers, for example). In fact, there is wide agreement that the ethics of care should not be limited to the private and personal, but must be extended to the public and communal (Held 2006: 100, 130–131, 134).

Relationships between civil servants and citizens are not necessarily distant in the sense that those relationships lack empathy. Rather, they are concrete personal or semi-personal relationships because citizens and civil servants can have, at least in a minimal sense, symmetric and reciprocal relationships to each other.

Noddings' view that care ethics should be limited to near relations is understandable in-so-far as the concept of care ethics involves the assumption that a relationship of affection between the one caring and the cared for is essential. However, there is no necessary reason why a care-ethical approach should require such strong emotional backing. Caring can be based on a much weaker emotional or attitudinal footing than on attachment, such as empathy (Slote 2007: 13–16).

Genuine caring requires empathy, respect and consideration towards other people – primarily toward our nearest ones but also toward all other people. However, caring does not necessarily require a feeling of personal attachment or deep affection for another person. Similarly, the actions of civil servants require empathy, respect and consideration toward others, but they do not require feelings of attachment. In fact, it is advantageous for civil servants to maintain a certain psychological distance between themselves and the affairs and people with whom they deal. The work of a civil servant could become psychologically very stressful and draining if civil servants were required to have a deep affection for the persons they meet in their work role. Thus, to maintain their objectivity and protect their mental well-being, caring must not become a matter of deep affection for civil servants. However, it should be a matter of healthy empathy, commitment and patience.

It is relevant to distinguish between caring for and caring about (Noddings 2003: xv, 18). Caring for is a direct attempt to respond to the needs of one who is cared for. Thus, it is the activity of taking care of someone. Caring about is more me-

diate, principled and general. Noddings (2002; 2003: xvi) suggests that caring about someone may be thought of as the motivational foundation for justice. Caring about, as a sense of justice, can thus be seen as a prerequisite for the conditions under which caring for can flourish. An ethics of caring also says that institutions and laws, as well as social customs and practices, are just if they reflect empathically caring motivation on the part of those responsible for originating and maintaining them.

However, caring about is empty if it does not become concrete in a caring relation. Thus, those who care about justice must keep in mind that the objective is to ensure that caring actually occurs. To put it differently, although there can be care without justice, there can be no justice without care (Held 2006: 134). Thus, justice requires care, and justice should not be confined to the public realm, but must be extended to and realized in our near relations.

When we take care of someone, we often also care about him or her. When we care about a social or global problem such as world hunger, we will probably be willing to do something about it. (Held 2006: 30.) Thus, caring for and caring about are not distinct forms of caring; they interrelate with each other. One could also say that caring about forms a link between administrative justice and administrative caring, which essentially is caring about the fair and efficient treatment of citizens and their administrative matters – the treatment that accords to the spirit of law, not only to the letter of law. (Cf. Held 2006: 17.)

Citizens' expectations of governance

Fictional literature includes many accounts of bad governance. One of the most famous is Franz Kafka's *Castle*, in which the civil servants' approach and attitudes to their clients and their administrative matters is formal and bureaucratic, even cagey and demoralized. Instead of a bureaucratic or demoralized attitude, citizens are likely to prefer to be handled with care when they deal with administration and representatives of administrative authorities. Citizens in general prefer an approach in which authorities listen to them, take efficient care of their issues and problems without delay, and appreciate them as individuals (Salminen & Ikkola-Norrbacka 2009a: 151–156, 164).

However, at least some citizens may hope that authorities would deal with their administrative cases as bureaucrats or advocates in a good and efficient way, but anonymously, and not be too personally interested in their clients. Thus, people do not necessarily want a civil servant to adopt the role of a parent or a friend in relation to their clients. Hence, in matters of public administration, caring does

not often or necessarily require a strong personal parent–child or friend relationship between citizens and civil servants. However, administrative caring requires an empathic relationship in the sense that civil servants should try to place themselves in the position of their clients. The best-known formulation of this idea is the golden rule: Treat others as you would like to be treated. By following this maxim, authorities should be able to manage taking care of their administrative duties. However, some care ethics theorists emphasize that care ethics is not based on rule-following and does not aim toward a principled system of caring (Noddings 2003: 11). Rather, care ethics invokes a spontaneous or innate ability to care for others. In fact, there is much evidence of the innate ability or readiness of humans to care for others (Slote 2007: 13–16). In different persons, the ability to care is stronger or weaker. However, a caring attitude can be learned, just as Aristotle thought virtues can be taught and learned. In view of this, one might ask whether the education of future civil servants should involve studies in what might be called ‘empathy in work.’

Consequentialism is an ethical doctrine that holds that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences. The most famous version of consequentialism is act utilitarianism, which is often criticized because it is dangerous to compromise the rights of individuals in the name of the common good. However, a care ethicist can have even more reason than a consequentialist to hold on to deontology, and thus to obligations and moral ideals such as justice, equality, and fairness. This is because, in principle, caring can be unselectively directed to any person, instead of only to the nearest ones or those who need or are eligible for it most (Slote 2007: 43). Thus, the ethics of care needs moral principles to direct care to those who need it most.

No one can take care of everyone. Therefore we need separation criteria to choose for whom we should primarily show care. For example, parents should primarily take care of their own children, although they should not neglect others’ children. Similarly, a civil servant should primarily take care of her clients and, if necessary, the clients of her colleagues.

Care ethics does not exclude other theoretical points of view on ethical issues. However, as we have seen, care ethics focuses on caring, which brings at least a light psychological color or tone to ethics. Yet in many administrative matters good handling does not require that authorities have any particular emotional attitude. Especially in abstract and formal issues, such as banking, legal, tax and notary matters, caring is manifested by the correctness and efficiency of service, not necessarily in explicit expressions of feelings and emotions. Even in the case of child care, the criteria or requirements for physical care can be present without

referring to the emotional relationship between the child and the one caring. On the other hand, in many situations, the criteria for caring are essentially experiential and psychological. For example, the psychological and emotional care of children necessarily involves explicit expressions of feelings and emotions, while in administrative caring, such explicit expressions are usually not included. Again, in some administrative matters, it may be good, even relevant, for civil servants to show empathetic feelings and express joy or regret for their clients. Lifeless, machine-like civil servants are not the modern ideal, although in many people's minds objectivity and correctness are the most important traits for civil servants.²

In many cases, we can evaluate the psychological experience of caring empirically by observing people's behavior. If people—children or adults—feel they are respected and cared for, they can relax and show relief. They can even seem as if a burden has been taken away from them.

In light of the aforesaid, it should be clear that this chapter recommends a care-ethical approach that is not tuned or oriented heavily toward the emotional. The idea is to avoid the psychologization of citizens' problems. Civil servants can avoid this relatively easily by actively asking in each case what the concrete administrative advantage would be from a citizen's point of view.

According to citizens, then, what is the right way to deal with them? Should it be formal and distant, or concrete and caring? One might expect that the answers depend not only on personal differences, but also on the matters at stake. Traditionally, for example, it has been thought that in matters of health, sickness, and imprisonment, emotional caring is often what citizens hope for themselves in addition to concrete physical care such as medical care. However, caring as a basic attitude of governance and administration is not restricted to the most personal matters. Instead, in less personal administrative matters such as permissions and taxation, a citizen still hopes that the civil servant who deals with his or her case will take care of it carefully, efficiently and considerately. A less personal administrative matter can become personally burdensome if it becomes difficult to deal with or slow to resolve. It is obligatory that civil servants not consider their clients' affairs or cases as harmful tasks or as opportunities to cause harm or gain some economic or psychological advantage. It is absolutely wrong on the part of

² According to Salminen's study (2006), the Finnish members of parliament considered empathy to be a more viable characteristic of civil servants than objectivity, impartiality, or formality (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a: 130).

civil servants to try to gain satisfaction, self-assertion, or economic benefit from one's bureaucratic powers.

Conclusions

The citizen's point of view on the ethicality of governance can be focused differently depending on the moral background theory applied. According to universal moral principles in theories such as utilitarianism and deontological ethics, governance is good and civil servants act ethically in so far as they follow the rules of positive law and the universal moral rules of justice and benevolence. In the ethics of care the idea of morality is more related to personal relationships and empathy-based care.

Traditionally, women have been expected to do most of the caring. This division of labor by gender is said to exploit women by extracting unpaid care labor from them and by making women less able than men to engage in paid work. In public life and in public administration, an ethical-care approach transcends this kind of division of labor. Instead, applying the ethics of care in public life means an approach or focus of ethical attitude and conduct that is gender-neutral. (Cf. Held 2006: 16.)

The value of care should not be limited to the household or family. Rather, care should also be recognized as a political and social value. (Held 2006: 38.) In fact, it is advisable that civil servants see their work and their working environment in light of the metaphor of a household. Accordingly, the problems and cases of their clients—the citizens—should be viewed as certain kinds of household issues, and in dealing with them the citizens' points of view and benefits should be of decisive importance. Thus, in public administration justice and the assurance of right must be given priority, although the humane considerations of care should not be absent. (Held 2006: 17.)

By adopting caring orientations and empathy as the major values of civil servants, and by ensuring that civil servants can put a caring attitude into practice in their work, the gap between administrative reality and the citizens' expectations for good governance can be narrowed. Education in empathy alone may be an insufficient measure for achieving the desired results, but it is an important start.

4 TRUST AND INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS IN FINNISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE VIEWS OF CITIZENS¹

Ari Salminen and Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka

Introduction

What does the ethical ideal of a democratic society look like and what are its core ethical values from a citizen's point of view? Are they justice, openness and trust? What constitutes an ethical administration and can integrity, responsibility and accountability be found among the leading values of good governance? A conceptual clarification and some specific answers in regards to these questions were already given by Tommi Lehtonen in the previous chapter: the ethics of caring can be perceived as a part of good governance.

The following presentation, empirical for the most part, brings to the analysis two ethical issues that were raised in a recent citizen survey. Trust and integrity are the cornerstones of a democratic, open society. Good governance and transparency should be studied by observing the citizens' influence, particularly when the citizen's perspective is often neglected in empirical research on administrative ethics. This chapter deals with trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administration from the citizens' viewpoint. We survey how ordinary citizens judge (significance valued) trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administration.

Administrative ethics and integrity violations have been the subject of considerable scholarly study and research (e.g. Frederickson & Ghere 2005; Cooper 2006; Lawton & Doig 2006; Sampford et al. 2007; Menzel 2007; Huberts, Maesschalck & Jurkiewicz 2008; Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2010; Ikola-Norrbacka 2010). Basically trust is a trait of deserving confidence. Trustworthiness is a moral value. Are there clear explanations in the previous research on how trust is related to unethical actions? What causes the loss of trust, low trust or distrust? (see more, Christensen & Lægheid 2002, 2005; Kim, Helgesen & Ahn 2002; Bouckaert & Van de Walle 2003; Heintzman & Marson 2005; Menzel 2005; Warren 2006;

¹ The original version of this presentation was published in *Halduskultuur* 2009. The revised version is printed here.

Chang & Chu 2006; Van de Walle, van Roosbroek & Bouckaert 2008; Six & Huberts 2008.)

Citizens' trust in public institutions is a complex and multidimensional issue. Warren (2006: 164) refers to Jeremy Bentham's classic statement according to which every good political institution is a system of distrust, because politicians have authority and the temptation to abuse it. That is why we can ask: Are politicians and public sector leaders trustworthy? One single factor explaining the trust does not exist. Those who are involved in politics might think more of their own welfare than the welfare of citizens. Secondly, a high level of trust in one institution tends to extend to other institutions. Thirdly, in general terms, corruption decreases trust in institutions.

As Six and Huberts (2008: 65–69) stress, trust is an attribute of the trustor, and trustworthiness is an attribute of the trustee. In our analysis, citizens as trustors evaluate trust in three types of Finnish institutions and organizations. From the trustees' viewpoint, citizens judge the level of integrity by giving their assessment of the frequency of integrity violations in the Finnish politico-administrative system. Trustworthiness is studied in relation to serious and other forms of corruption. The concept of trust covers both politicians and public authorities.

Integrity violations belong to the debate of political and administrative trust. Corruptive phenomena erode citizens' trust in the administrative and political systems, and there are numerous debates about officials' and politicians' independence from external linkages. Indiscreet behavior by those who govern may damage public confidence (Isaksson 1997: 10; Fawcett & Wardman 2008: 123, 136).

In chapter six our contribution to integrity violations – together with Viinamäki – deals with the control mechanisms of corruption in Finland. Also Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996: 207) discuss the question of controlling corruption and go on to state that reducing corruption requires more corruption controls. The focus on citizen assessment is one important tool in controlling corruption. In Table 1, a limited country ranking of corruption is presented. True or not, in a comparative setting, Finland is still in a good position. But when analyzing the views of citizens, this ranking list is partly beyond the questions we pose here.

Part of this is exactly what we are trying to do in this presentation. Trust in different types of institutions and organizations, and different forms of corruption are described. In the Finnish survey data, citizens express their views, opinions, attitudes and expectations towards trust and integrity violations (see also the next chapter by Lähdesmäki). However, comparative settings of explaining trust in different countries (Kim, Helgesen & Ahn 2002) and common explanations of

distrust in the public sector (Van de Walle, van Roosbroek & Bouckaert 2008) are not included in this analysis. The question of different forms of corruption and the question of trust have been handled for example in Richter and Burke (2007).

Table 1. Country rankings in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): Finland among neighboring and some other countries.

Year and rank	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Country	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank
CANADA	12	14	14	9	9	8	6
CHINA	71	78	70	72	72	79	78
ESTONIA	31	27	24	28	27	27	26
FINLAND	1	2	1	1	5	6	4
FRANCE	22	18	18	19	23	24	25
GERMANY	15	16	16	16	14	14	15
NORWAY	8	8	6	9	14	11	10
RUSSIA	90	126	121	143	147	146	154
SWEDEN	6	6	6	4	1	3	4
USA	17	17	20	20	18	19	22

The research focus and the empirical contribution of the citizen survey

Two core ethical issues are examined, namely trust and integrity violations. Although trust is clarified in Finland through academic research and governmental reports, there are a limited number of research reports which relate trust to unethical actions in parallel. The interconnection between trust and corruption is rarely studied as far as it concerns citizens' views. As far as it concerns our focus, we share the opinion of Van de Walle (2008: 215–216), that the relationship between trust and integrity violations is complicated rather than simple. Do perceptions of trust determine the views of integrity violations or vice versa?

According to our considerations, a fresh approach to the issue of integrity is how ordinary citizens view trust and corruptive behavior in Finnish public administration. As a reflection of the hardening ethical climate of the Finnish society, politi-

cians and leading public employees are no more safe from public debate and severe criticism. A few ethical issues are taken under closer examination here, and the presentation is structured with the help of Figure 1.




Figure 1. Chosen issues for ethical analysis

The subjects of the questions represent both sustaining and violating integrity. Basically trust is a part of maintaining integrity. According to our questionnaire, other issues of integrity, such as good administration, accountability, responsibility and openness, are not included in this analysis. Trust was estimated through 19 governmental and non-governmental Finnish institutions and organizations (for details, see Figure 2). On the contrary, integrity violations are described through seven different forms (for details, see Figure 3).

More accurately, two questions are posed here. The first is how Finnish citizens estimate the trustworthiness of the above-mentioned organizations and institutions to be. Issues of trust are examined through trust in public sector organizations, trust in social institutions and trust in public and private corporations. The second question is how frequently the above-mentioned integrity violations take place in the estimations of Finnish citizens. A detailed list of questions is presented in the Appendix to the chapter. In addition to these two questions, we analyze three socio-demographic variables, namely gender, working history and level of education. We try to find differences in opinions between the different respondent groups.

The chapter continues the methodological discussion on the relevance of survey-based research in administrative ethics. By collecting citizens' opinions, attitudes

and expectations about the chosen ethical issues, we expect that the current presentation will provide the grounds to both consider and develop ‘citizen-focused’ ethical governance.

For gathering opinions, attitudes and expectations (as we did), the survey technique is an accurate tool in administrative ethics, when the purpose is to reach a wider population (see e.g. Bossaert & Demmke 2005; Salminen 2006; Demmke et al. 2007; Moilanen & Salminen 2007; Van de Walle 2008). The evidence of this research is based on the empirical data from a national citizen survey implemented at the University of Vaasa. The survey forms part of the large research program “Citizens first? Ethical Government in Terms of Citizens”² realized at the University of Vaasa. The three-year program was awarded funding by the Academy of Finland. The questionnaire consists of three main themes: citizens’ assessment of:

1. ethics of public services, such as guaranteeing public services, ethical values of services and the future of public services
2. good administration, such as administrative principles, accountability and the realization of virtues
3. ethics of the political system, such as democracy, openness and transparency and change of ethics in society.

The questionnaire form is twelve pages in length. Altogether, it covers 18 question groups and 128 statements and assessments of the ethical themes. Each of the three themes has one open-ended question. Three additional open-ended questions were included at the end of the form. Through these questions, a lot of personal stories were collected from the respondents. The written material consists of approximately 300 pages.

The questionnaire was sent in March and re-sent in April 2008. The survey was sent to 5000 Finnish citizens, aged 25–65. The sample was chosen to represent Finland in miniature. The survey-sample was received from a Finnish public agency, the Population Register Centre. All the questions are multiple-choice. The multiple-choice questions were executed in Likert’s scale to secure the statistical runs. The answers were recorded in the statistics program SPSS.

The careful selection of the respondents raises the validity of the results of our study. What also speaks for their validity is the relatively high response rate. Al-

² For more information visit <http://www.uvasa.fi/eettinenhallinto/english/>.

though incentives were not used, the response rate rose to 40.4 %. More than 2000 carefully completed questionnaire forms were returned.

Trust in organizations and institutions

The first issue in our chapter is trust, which can be regarded as one of the leading ethical values in the Nordic countries. If trust is lost in the public realm, a great deal is lost and the whole political and administrative system appears in a different light.

Trust is studied through different dimensions: trust between individuals, trust towards the activity of professionals, trust inside and within organizations, trust between organizations, trust in politicians, or trust inside the community (Lawton & Doig 2006: 16–17). When talking about trust, it is good to remember that it is a question of citizens' emotions, beliefs, opinions and experiences shaped through many processes. Some of the opinions are already formulated as youngsters through the process of socialization. We agree with Christensen and Læg Reid (2005: 487) who state that when a citizen strongly trusts one organization, he/she is likely to trust other public sector organizations.

All distrust is not harmful. A certain amount of distrust is healthy and functional: it is needed to maintain the level of administrative accountability. The optimal level of trust depends on the development of political and administrative culture. A certain level of trust may be high in one but low in another country. (Van de Walle, van Roosbroek & Bouckaert 2008: 52; see also Hofstede 1980.) There is no single or unambiguous explanation why some organizations seem to be trustworthy and others do not. It is a question of personal experience, of the experience of the circle of acquaintances, of images and of the history and base of the trustor. (Van de Walle 2008: 224–225.)

Lewis and Gilman (2005: 21) state that public sector ethics is different from private sector ethics because the citizens' trust keeps democracy effective – or at least alive. Strict ethical standards are included in public trust. The OECD report (2000) underlines that public service also means public trust. Citizens assume that they will get impartial service, and when the service level means impartial and trustworthy services, trust in public administration increases. Public trust is an essential factor when talking about the successes and losses of organizations. Trust is a question of an organization's reputation. Institutionalized trust is more important to the society than personal, informal trust which can be connected to old boy networks, political patronage or even criminal mafia (Harisalo & Stenvall 2001; Harford 2006).

Why do research on institutions and organizations? Citizens have much more connections with administrative institutions and organizations than with political, representative institutions and organizations. Experiences from administrative actions have a direct connection to thoughts about the political system on the whole. (Rothstein 2005: 108–109.)

In Figure 2, the citizens' estimation of the trustworthiness of 19 Finnish public institutions and organizations are presented in three different categories. To us, the results are not exceptionally surprising. Compared to previous surveys of other countries (Listhaug 1984: 114; Warren 2006: 165), the figure indicates that the police (police officers), the legal system (judges) and the education system (teachers, professors) and also the military (military officers) are highly ranked. The results of Harisalo and Stenvall (2001) are similar to our results: police and military at the top, and media and science in third and fourth place in Finland. In the World Values profile study (Borg et al. 2007), it turns out that from 1981 to 2005, public trust in the police and military has increased. We share the opinion that as long as citizens trust in public institutions, the whole of society works better.

Our survey indicates that citizens trust strongly in such public sector organizations and social institutions as the police, universities and polytechnics, elementary and comprehensive schools, the military and hospitals and health centers. Surprisingly among public corporations, The Finnish lottery monopoly also belongs to the top five.

In the personal (individual) stories of the questionnaire, the majority of criticism concentrated on the social insurance institution, the health care system and labour force bureaus. Even so, all these institutions and organizations enjoy moderate public trust. The percentage shares of 'quite or very trustworthy' are several times higher than the shares of 'not very or not at all trustworthy' (Appendix). Because most of these institutions and organizations represent branches of the administration, the figures in fact give a broader conception of trust in the Finnish politico-administrative system.

Trust in public and private corporations strongly depends on the individual organization. As private corporations, Fortum and Sonera did not enjoy trust, but Finnair and Itella did. Trade unions and the central organizations of employers did not enjoy as much trust as traditional public organizations and institutions. If the value "3" is considered as the turning point for "trust" (≥ 3) and "less trust" (≤ 3), the average of each group is clearly higher than 3, and only two private corporations remain under the mean value.




Figure 2. Trust in Finnish public organizations and institutions: the views of citizens

Moreover, one question of the six statements of democracy in our survey dealt with trust in Finnish politicians. The following statement was set: Local politicians are more reliable than politicians at the national level. More than 30 percent agreed with the statement and less than 30 percent disagreed. In that specific question, the difference was not remarkable. The majority of respondents were more or less neutral. They did not agree or disagree.

When asking about trust in institutions and organizations, we are basically interested in the trustworthiness of the whole political system. We should keep in mind that our survey was carried out at a time when exceptional unclarity occurred in Finnish political life. For instance, the private lives of the prime minister and foreign minister were continually discussed in the media. The limits of their privacy were tested. Investigative journalism was left aside, and public debates became more or less sensational. The prime minister felt that his privacy was infringed upon, and the case was taken to court. The foreign minister lost his political confidence, and was forced to resign and leave the Government after an intense public debate.

In our questionnaire forms, several comments were made on these issues. We suspect that those incidents might have had an influence on citizens' attitudes in our survey. Due to the time of the implementation of the survey, the impact of views of the citizens is more short- than long-term.

Gender, working history and education as background factors

Is it possible to explain the reactions of respondents by different variables? Some tentative findings are worth highlighting. As mentioned earlier, the data was processed through three background variables: gender, working history and level of education. We have calculated the percentage shares of statements for each group. We report here the differences we consider to be worth mentioning because the result strikes us as remarkable or surprising.

First, if the gender of the respondents is considered, women express higher trust in the majority of the asked institutions and organizations: health care, the military and the Finnish lottery monopoly were more trusted by men than women.

Secondly, if the working history of the respondents is considered, three main groups are identified: those whose working history is 1) in the public sector, 2) in the private sector, 3) both in the public and private sectors. Working history as a background variable gives a couple of significant differences between groups. Those who have worked in the private sector clearly expressed highest trust in the

military and the Finnish lottery monopoly in comparison with the other two groups. Generally however, those working in the public sector had the highest levels of trust towards the organizations and institutions included in the survey. One reason may be that with a long working history in the public sector, you are familiar with how the system works and you feel sympathy to the whole sector, not only to your own subdivision.

Thirdly, the level of education brings out a couple of opposing views between respondents. It became evident that respondents with more education had significantly more trust in courts than respondents with less education. In contrast, respondents with less education felt more confidence in the majority of the Finnish public and private corporations.³ The less educated also clearly trusted trade unions and central organizations of employers more than respondents with more education.

Integrity violations

Integrity violations can vary from corruption to unethical social behavior in the working environment (corruption is analyzed further in the fifth chapter of this book). Integrity violations are divided to cover corruption, fraud and theft of organizational resources, conflicts of interest, the abuse and manipulation of information, discriminatory treatment and the waste of organizational resources (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Kolthoff, Huberts & Heuvel 2007: 408–409; OECD 2007; see also chapter seven of this book and Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbara 2001 on corruption in different contexts and cultures).

Connected to trust, another issue deals with particular unethical actions, as described in Figure 3 (see also Appendix). Two fundamental types of integrity violations are described here. Bribes, theft and fraud belong to the serious forms of corruption, and the remaining integrity violations are typical forms of maladministration, bad governance, etc. The grouping is basically the same as used by Vartola and af Ursin (1987: 239) in their research report. We also wanted to avoid the strong normative stress. But even if the other integrity violations are not considered to be as grave as the serious forms of corruption (for example bribery), it

³ Despite the background variable under study, the least drastic opinions (the lowest standard deviations) were found in the universities and polytechnics and elementary and comprehensive schools and the most drastic opinions (highest standard deviations) were almost regularly found in the church and trade unions.

does not mean that they are acceptable features of a politico-administrative system.

Integrity violations challenge the functioning of democracy. It is clear that citizens' views concerning corruption are one of the main assessment tools when estimating its breadth and injuriousness. Corruption always has a national character and defining corruption is always tied to a certain place and a certain time (Isaksson 1997: 16). A more profound theoretical analysis on the subject can be found in chapter seven, in which Amr G. E. Sabet explores corruption as a wicked problem.

The scientific discussion of corruption and integrity violations deals with the causes, expressions and controlling of the phenomenon. Special challenges include how to measure the immeasurable in a reliable way and what kind of knowledge about the phenomenon is available. Researchers have not succeeded in finding an unambiguous scientific definition for integrity violations or corruption and neither has one unambiguous explanation or theory concerning the causes of corruption been found. However, the scientific discussion concerning the subject has been extensive in Europe and the United States in the 21st century. (See for example Rose-Ackerman 1999; Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra 2001; Galtung 2006; Huberts, Lasthuizen & Peeters 2006; de Graaf 2007; de Graaf & Huberts 2008; Huberts, Maesschalck & Jurkiewicz 2008.)

Different corruptive or unethical actions have occurred in Finnish public administration since 2000. Among public officials⁴ and individual public servants, cases of unethical behavior have dealt with bribery and fraud, misuse of public office, doubts of discrimination such as sexual harassment, complaints of mismanagement and lack of control. The cases have occurred at universities, local government, third-sector organizations, state government and public sector companies. In most cases, public servants were suspected of unethical actions, but were not sentenced for any crimes. However, the discussion of the different corruption cases has been lively in newspapers and other media. As described earlier (Table 1), Finland has fallen from the top to the fourth position in the 2010 Transparency International CPI-index.

In Figure 3, the main finding is that the judgment of citizens is not very harsh. In the eyes of citizens, the serious forms of corruption are found much more seldom

⁴ As a term, 'public officials' refers here to the whole of the 'politico-administrative system', which includes both national and local 'politicians' and 'public authorities'.

than the other types of integrity violations. Besides, the differences between the types of integrity violations are relatively big.




Figure 3. Forms of integrity violations: the views of citizens

Bribes, theft and fraud

To an ordinary citizen, the term corruption is mainly connected to more serious forms of wrongdoing, such as bribery. The OECD report (2007) specifies the main elements of bribery as: 1) offering, paying or promising, 2) financial or some other kind of advantage, 3) direct or indirect, promised or paid to official, family member, organization or company, 4) undue, 5) purpose to offend against a law, and 6) obtaining or retaining business.

In the 2007 ministerial report, Finnish public officials considered bribery to be the most serious form of integrity violation. Making decisions without appropriate preparation and sitting on data/information, unnecessarily delaying issues, scheming in appointments of the office, and the unwillingness to regenerate were mentioned at the top of the list of the most unethical procedures. Bribery is in a league

of its own; the other actions mentioned can be found more in the category of administrative corruption. Civil servants express that they relatively regularly or occasionally meet unethical behavior and corruption-related issues in their daily work. Forms of grand corruption, such as bribery, were rare. (Ministry of Finance 2007: 39–40, 56, 78.)

What is the state of affairs like in the eyes of citizens? We start by asking whether there is a bribery problem in Finnish public administration. According to our survey data, the closer figures of bribes are as follows: 47 % of respondents considered that taking or giving bribes occurs very or rather seldom and 16 % rather or very frequently. The relatively high percentage of bribery occurring occasionally (37 %) is rather alarming. Besides, altogether 16 % estimate that bribery occurs rather or very frequently. When compared with the opposing alternatives, the focus of the responses is still in the alternatives of very or rather seldom.

How do theft and fraud differ from bribery? Theft, peculation, and fraud involve the taking or conversion of money or other property or items which are valuable. It concerns an individual who has access to them through position or employment, but is not entitled to them. In the cases of embezzlement and theft, the person entrusted takes the property. Fraud consists of the use of false or misleading information to bluff the property's owner to relinquish the property voluntarily. In legal definitions, theft means taking property or cash, but in other definitions, it also covers other immaterial values such as the stealing of information. (Langseth 2007: 11.)

The real situation seems to be better than in the estimates about bribery. In the survey data, 59 % of the respondents judged that theft occurs very or rather seldom and only 9 % rather or very frequently. In the case of fraud, the figures were 56 % and 12 % respectively. The majority of citizens estimate that theft and peculation occur either very little or quite little. It is a little surprising that bribery was estimated to be more common than theft or fraud. Fraud is estimated to be more common than theft and peculation. Still about one third of citizens estimate that theft and fraud exist occasionally.

In the above-mentioned integrity violation cases, such as bribery, theft and fraud, the state of affairs is generally positive in Finnish public administration. But it does differ from one administrative branch to another. According to the annual Science Barometer in Finland, citizens' trust in science and scientific institutions has remained comparatively high from year to year. However, the general picture is not totally clean anymore. For example, from 2000 to 2007, there have been a couple of cases of heavy integrity violation in the university sector. These cases were widely discussed in the Finnish media. In higher education institutions, the

evidence was obtained of receiving bribes, tax fraud and misuse of public office. This has led to trials, and a few of the accused were sentenced to prison and/or to paying remarkable financial compensation. Some other individual persons from the higher education sector were also accused; the cases were processed legally, were publicized and got a lot of publicity, but the claims were completely dropped in court. However, the individuals were stigmatized as ‘baddies’ in the eyes of society.

Old boy networks and nepotism

The other group of integrity violations starts with old boy networks and nepotism. Old boy networks are structures which affect society, indirectly or directly, in decision-making. Nepotism does not relate to the self-interests of an official directly, but to the interests of someone near him or her, such as a family member, a member of a political party, a tribe member, or a member of the same religious group. Favoritism is based on several things, such as race, religion, geographical factors, political affiliation or personal and organizational relationships (clubs, associations). Favoritism also has another side, namely the discrimination of certain groups. (Langseth 2007: 13.)

The question of old boy networks has been widely discussed in Finland. Our survey confirms the importance of the issue in public debate. According to the results of our survey, 8 % of the respondents estimated that old boy networks exist very or rather seldom and 60 % estimated rather or very frequently. The corresponding percentages from nepotism were 14 and 49 (see Appendix). It seems like citizens feel the old boy networks to be the most influential form of corruption in Finland. Comments and stories in the open-ended questions support this conclusion. Ethically it is very serious that 60 % of Finnish citizens think that old boy networks affect the society either rather or very frequently. Correspondingly, the figures of nepotism are also rather critical. Compared with the figures of bribes, the emphasis on responses is the opposite: responses are emphasized in the alternatives of rather and very frequently compared with the opposite alternatives.

In Finland the old boy networks seem to be a bigger problem than expected – when looking at the official reports on offences (Korruptiotilannekuva 2008: 2). In the old boy networks, the services are not paid with money. Therefore the interdependence in these networks is different due to strong personal and informal linkages. If old boy networks and nepotism are a real and serious problem, what explains this?

We have a couple of assumptions. Perhaps the Finnish elite is more and more accustomed to cooperating through old boy networks. But one might doubt whether the networks fit in the other administrative structures and practices at the central and local levels. Because of the political favoritism which is widely spread in nominations to public office, citizens' attitudes towards nepotism and old boy networks are extremely negative.

Linkages in business life

Corruption commonly refers to acts that rest with public sector officials. The act can involve a transaction with a private sector actor, but the definition still concentrates on the public sector officials rather than the companies who pay the bribes. (O'Higgins 2006: 236.) Public trust in public officials is among the important indicators of good governance. An excessive amount of linkages makes the public sector function more unreliably even if the public officials did not act against public interest when dealing with business life. The existence of these linkages is often a sign to citizens that there must be some dishonest business going on and that the old boy networks are working again.

In the eyes of the citizens, 13 % of respondents estimated that the excessive linkages occur rather or very seldom and 44 % estimated occurrence rather or very frequently. This result is not ethically flattering to politicians and public authorities. The recent events in Finland concerning the financing of election campaigns from external sources have undoubtedly increased citizens' suspicions on the linkages in business life.

Another important issue in Finnish public discussion has been the linkages in business life, as a form of financing state and local elections. In Finland, the external financing of elections is regulated by a special law. The purpose of the Act on the disclosure of election financing from 2000 was to increase the transparency of election financing in order to clarify the possible personal interests of the candidates. The Act proved to be open to interpretation and gave room to a sort of covert behavior. Those who financed the leading candidates of the elections tried to support them anonymously and through special corporate arrangements. After that the public mess was ready.

The law contained no sanctions for those who did not make a declaration for external financing that exceeded 1700 euros, since publicity was considered to be an adequate control mechanism. In the end, the actions were not morally approved of by the public and particularly the spirit of the law was broken by those who accepted the financial support without being open about it. Later, the names of do-

nors were revealed and the donated sums of money turned out to be rather remarkable. The political parties in Government had received most of the financial support. The 'hidden' interplay between politicians and businessmen resulted in political consequences. The legitimacy of the political system was endangered, and the leading political parties gathered immediately in political negotiations concerning election financing and the need for refining the rules of the game. Short-term measures for improving the previously ill-defined clauses in legislation were taken, and the Act in question required renewal.

The legislation has been amended since the scandal broke. The purpose is to make election funding more open and to take into account the recommendations of the GRECO (2003; 2009). The public should have enough information about the party and election financing to be able to estimate the intensity of the linkages between politicians and business life.

Bad and careless treatment of citizens

As the last form of integrity violation, we will shortly discuss the bad and careless treatment of citizens. This discussion is related to the concept of the ethics of care analyzed by Tommi Lehtonen in the previous chapter. In the questionnaire form, the type of unethical treatment was not specified. With the term 'unethical treatment' we mean quite wide-ranging actions, including maladministration and mismanagement. The term maladministration is very broad and includes delaying issues; incorrect actions or failure to take any action; failure to follow the procedure; failure to give information; misleading or inaccurate statements; inadequate consultation; and broken promises. Mismanagement is a form of maladministration. (Caiden 1991: 111.)

The corruption-related cases investigated by the Finnish Ombudsman usually deal with delayed issues, insulting the principle of equality, negligence, improper justifications of decisions, lack of publicity, lack of hearing of the parties involved, discrimination, undelivered public notices, insufficient advice, and partiality. The investigations are based on the citizens' announcements. The names of the complainants are not usually published, which increases the probability of denunciation. The amount of complaints has increased since 2003. The issues are categorized as maladministration or the like. (Annual Reports of the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 2000–2006; chapter six of this book by Ikola-Norrbacka, Salminen & Viinamäki.)

Statistically, citizens' estimations of public officials' bad and careless treatment of citizens are the following: Most of the citizens surveyed (48 %) feel that uneth-

ical treatment occurs occasionally or once in a while. One-fourth of the respondents shared the opinion that unethical treatment takes place either rather or very frequently (26 %) or very or rather seldom (25 %). Numerous comments were expressed by citizens through the open-ended question of the questionnaire. However, comparing the estimates to the amount of complaints and the expressions in the open-ended questions, the estimates seem to be rather positive.

Concerning the unethical behavior of politicians, a few themes rose above the rest. Citizens criticize politicians of the tendency to search for private gain instead of promoting the public interest: they are sometimes seen as being greedy. Politicians are seen as guilty of forgetting the concerns of citizens and preferring to concentrate on their own affairs and party politics. Citizens also ask whether politicians speak truthfully, when promises made before elections are forgotten during the electoral period. If the private life of a politician is considered immoral, it is strongly condemned by citizens.

Background variables in focus

If a closer look is taken at the background variables of the respondents (gender, working history, and level of education), three more conclusions are evident. We calculated the percentage shares of statements for each groups and report only the differences we find remarkable or surprising.

First of all, women in general estimate the corruptive behaviors included in the survey to be more common than men. Only the linkages in business life and unethical treatment of citizens received more critical assessments by men than by women. But as far as old boy networks are concerned, the gender of the respondent does not constitute a divisive factor. Even if women have so far remained on the outside of such networks, they do not express a higher mistrust than men. If both trust and unethical actions are considered, differences can be found between the genders. Women trust in public institutions and organizations more than men, but they still estimate corruptive behavior to be more common in the society than men. This finding is opposite to what we expected.

Secondly, there are dramatic differences in the estimations of bribery, theft and fraud between the respondents of different education levels. The less educated respondents had opinions twice as negative as the more educated. Only in the issue of old boy networks the respondents with more education estimated the question more negatively than those with less education. The attitudes were near to each other in the question of excessive linkages.

Thirdly, if the working history of the respondents is considered, a statistical difference exists. Those who have worked in both sectors estimate that all forms of unethical actions occur more frequently than those who worked in the public or private sector only.

Conclusions

In the framework of administrative ethics, the main purpose of our chapter was to analyze citizen-focused ethical governance. Our research focused on the questions of trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administration – analyzed through the eyes of citizens.

Summarizing the previous discussion, it is obvious that in the Finnish case public administration works rationally enough in the ethical sense. But how do we solve the relationship between trust and different forms of integrity violations? As Hyyryläinen emphasized, the study of ethics in public administration from a citizen perspective is far from mature but some answers are still available.

Our analysis of Finnish public administration was limited to these two research questions: 1) how trustworthy Finnish citizens estimate the public organizations, social institutions and public and private corporations to be; and 2) how frequently the different forms of integrity violation actions take place in the citizens' estimation.

While citizens express their opinions, attitudes and expectations of trust and integrity violations, one may ask, how much it really matters. What might be the consequences of citizens' views of the public trust and integrity of the Government? Do these figures give any evidence to develop 'citizen-focused' ethical governance?

We are convinced that the findings of such large-scale citizen surveys as ours should be taken into consideration by the Finnish political elite and the leading reform drivers in the Finnish government. Plenty of evidence is at hand, but before that, more specific statistical analysis is required on the attitudes of citizens towards government and on the interdependence of trust, accountability and openness. The respondents of the survey had a strong motivation to answer and had a particular interest to influence political and administrative decision making. The citizens might often be heard but not listened to by those in power.

There are four main findings based on our analysis. First, ethical governance is based on trust. Among citizens, trust is a kind of general confidence in politicians

and public authorities. Trust means both increasing trustworthiness and decreasing distrust. As shown in Figure 1, the trust felt towards the institutions and organizations was rather high. If organizations and institutions are no longer reliable, general trust gradually decreases. Ethical governance is based on model examples given by politicians and public authorities. If unethical cases increase in a society, citizens' confidence in public officials staggers.

Secondly, Finnish public organizations and institutions have so far enjoyed the confidence of ordinary citizens. According to our analysis trustworthiness seems to be relatively high. Estimations of integrity violations were rather moderate. The overall situation can be considered very good, but the basically positive judgment of citizens varies from one form of integrity violation to another. Is trust threatened by unethical behavior?

Thirdly, the citizens estimate that corruption forms such as old boy networks, nepotism and excessive linkages in business life occur quite frequently. According to citizens' considerations, the serious forms of corruption play a relatively minor role in the public realm (see Figure 3). At least temporarily, political scandals explain the decreasing figures in trust in politicians and public servants. In spite of citizens' attitudes and predispositions towards the government and services, without necessarily any real personal experience, the respondents strongly appeal for a reform, e.g. against ethically dysfunctional old boy networks and nepotism.

Fourthly, if public officials' and politicians' excessive linkages in business life are becoming more common in society, we expect that this will sooner or later affect trust: first at the level of politicians and then at the level of public sector organizations and institutions. Openness and transparency as ethical values are threatened. Where is the dividing line that makes linkages excessive? Should it be defined through a fixed sum of money or through the level of citizens' trust in the politico-administrative system?

Appendix

The two selected questions of the Citizen Survey, 2008.

Q 7. How do you consider the trustworthiness of the following Finnish institutions and organizations?	not at all trust-worthy (%)	not very trust-worthy (%)	some-what trust-worthy (%)	quite trust-worthy (%)	very trust-worthy (%)	Total (%)
1. Courts (n=1980)	3.3	7.9	19.0	55.8	14.0	100
2. Hospitals and health centres (n=1991)	1.6	6.4	22.8	58.5	10.7	100
3. Public authorities of social services (n=1968)	3.8	14.8	36.6	40.6	4.2	100
4. Labour force bureaus/Job centres (n=1959)	4.4	13.1	35.2	42.1	5.2	100
5. KELA, Social Insurance Institution (n=1987)	4.1	12.4	26.9	47.2	9.4	100
6. Church (n=1962)	5.6	7.8	24.3	46.2	16.1	100
7. YLE, National broadcasting company (n=1972)	4.8	10.8	29.7	45.0	9.7	100
8. Military (n=1976)	1.6	3.9	19.1	50.2	25.2	100
9. Police (n=1992)	1.7	3.7	13.4	52.7	28.6	100
10. Elementary and comprehensive schools (n=1983)	0.5	2.2	17.7	61.8	17.9	100
11. Universities and polytechnics (n=1969)	0.5	1.8	15.9	63.6	18.3	100
12. Itella, Finnish post company (n=1988)	4.2	12.8	28.0	45.7	9.4	100
13. VR, Finnish national railways (n=1979)	2.4	13.8	36.0	42.0	5.8	100
14. Sonera, Telecommunication company (n=1965)	10.8	28.1	38.0	21.0	2.1	100
15. Fortum, Energy company (n=1942)	14.1	26.1	35.3	21.7	2.8	100
16. Veikkaus, Finnish lottery monopoly (n=1955)	2.6	6.8	26.1	47.0	17.5	100
17. Finnair, National airways (n=1971)	2.9	12.9	33.3	43.2	7.7	100
18. Trade unions (n=1975)	6.0	17.2	35.0	35.4	6.4	100
19. Central organizations of employers (n=1972)	7.0	19.3	41.5	28.5	3.7	100

Q 12. Please estimate the ethical level of the political system.	occurs very seldom (%)	occurs quite seldom (%)	occurs some (%)	occurs quite much (%)	occurs very much (%)	Total (%)
1. Taking or giving bribes (n=1980)	18.0	29.3	37.2	12.5	2.9	100
2. Theft (n=1974)	18.8	40.3	31.8	8.0	1.1	100
3. Fraud (n=1968)	16.8	38.6	32.7	9.9	1.9	100
4. Old boy networks (n=1979)	1.4	6.8	31.8	40.2	19.8	100
5. Nepotism (n=1974)	2.1	11.8	37.3	35.7	13.1	100
6. Bad and careless treatment of citizens (n=1973)	3.1	22.4	47.8	20.4	6.4	100
7. Excessive linkages in business life (n=1960)	2.2	11.3	41.8	32.3	12.3	100

5 FAIR SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS PARTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE VIEWS OF FINNISH YOUTH

Kirsi Lähdesmäki

Introduction

It can be stated that government is for the citizens, and thus it is relevant to ask their opinions on it. How do the people assess public services, principles of good governance and trust towards political decision makers and civil servants? (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a). What about young Finns, what kinds of opinions do they have on what an ethical government looks like? This chapter is based on the Youth Survey, the whole of which is reported in a separate study (Lähdesmäki 2010). The Youth Survey “Ethical Governance – Who cares?” forms a part of the research project on ethical government.

It is not typical to ask citizens how they feel about ethical government. However, it is very useful. Citizens are often more objective in estimating the trustworthiness and equality of the government. They have an interest in services of quality and also in the integrity of public officials. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a: 1–5.) Citizens’ opinions on good governance are usually collected amongst adult citizens. Nevertheless, also youth have beliefs and opinions about societal questions and it is very worthwhile to extend the picture of ethical governance by asking their perspectives.

The research material for the Youth Survey has been collected in six upper secondary schools in Finland in the spring of 2009. Most of the schools are situated in the area of Western Finland, in three municipalities of Ostrobothnia. Respondents were young people; most of them were from 16 to 18 years old. In total 1130 students filled out the questionnaire during their school day. The questionnaire gathered young citizens’ opinions and expectations on decent citizenship, ethical questions relating to society and matters of fair society, virtues of public authorities and politicians, and ethical challenges for the future. The answers were recorded in the statistics program SPSS.

In this chapter, a few themes of ethics are chosen for closer analysis. These themes are fair society and the challenges of political participation. It is relevant to consider more closely how young people assess the ethical challenges of socie-

ty as well as what kind of responsibilities, problems and changes they see. Additionally, I attempt to find out how they feel about political participation and politicians as ethical decision makers. Before analyzing the opinions and expectations of youth on ethical governance, short definitions are given to the theoretical concepts such as governance, good governance, values and ethics.

Central concepts

The term *governance* is widely used in connection with social sciences, economics and political science. Tiihonen (2004) regards governing and governance as processes of order which aim at bringing harmonization and stability to the world. In practical terms, governance is used mostly in the discourse of public sector reforms. The basic nature of governance is the coordination and governing of complex networks of many different participants. Governance is interaction with a politically determined framework for the coordination of activities to produce the best possible conditions for economic development, a good life for citizens, and national success.

Participation is a central element in governance. The idea of enhancing participation in government organizations is not new. It has been one of the vital themes in administrative reforms. Peters (2001) describes the idea of the participatory state as one of the governing models of the future. The participatory state assumes that public interest is served by encouraging citizens to claim the maximum involvement in policy and management decisions. Citizens are expected to have active roles as participants. They need to know what is taking place in the public sector. The requirement for effective citizenship and participation is a more open government with transparent processes. The transition from traditional governing towards new governance includes new kinds of networking practices. The new action model is based on the ideas of openness, discussion, and confession of broad mutual interests. The new governance model gives more responsibility to individuals, citizens and market actors. (Peters 2001.)

Good governance depends on the extent to which the government is perceived and accepted by the general citizenry to be legitimate, committed to improving general public welfare, and responsive to the needs of its citizenry. Also, the government has to be equitable in its conduct, favoring no special interests or groups. It is necessary that there are arrangements for political accountability and a voice for citizens, freedom of association and organization, and bureaucratic accountability. The government should also be able to promote the well-being of its citizens and provide efficient and effective public services. (Landell-Mills & Serageldin 1991.)

The challenges for good governance in the public sector are that public sector managers should adapt to the external environment and organizational changes, cope with the contradictory interests and expectations of different interest groups, and enhance the customers' satisfaction in public services (Van Wart 1996). Honesty, morality and efficiency should be focused on in public service. Ethical management and management by example could strengthen the ethical behavior of civil servants and help confirm citizens' trust in public organizations. (Menzel 2007.) Trust is an essential part of ethical governance. For citizens, trust means a general confidence in politicians and public authorities. Ethical governance is based on the model examples of politicians and public authorities. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009b.) According to Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka (2009a) the most important values of good governance from the citizens' viewpoint are justice, honesty, equality and reliability.

The term *ethics* describes a set of principles that provide a framework for conduct. Ethics represents the kind of action that is good and acceptable. (Lawton 1998: 16–17.) Ethical codes are aimed at maintaining high ethical standards in government service and increasing public confidence in the integrity of public officials and employees (Zimmerman 1982: 222). *Values* are principles that guide our judgment on what is good or proper. Values provide the normative control that guides decision making. They build the grounds for action and reflect conceptions of desirable or undesirable behavior. The discussion of values tells us what is important for the community. In public administration civil servants are guided by a certain ethical framework. The public interest is among the most important ethical guidelines for civil servants. It is essential that every public employee is aware of the values that form the basis for the ethics of his or her work. For the professional work of a civil servant the crucial values are, besides the traditional democratic values (serving the general interests, legality, impartiality, neutrality, integrity and transparency), also new public service values (service principle, effectiveness, and efficiency), human rights values and values concerning the environment. (Van Wart 1996; Viinamäki 2008: 111)

Modernizing welfare society

In the empirical study youth expressed their attitudes and beliefs towards the selected ethical questions about welfare society. Before that a few definitions are presented. Modern democratic societies are striving for equality between different societal groups. The Finnish welfare system has relied on a strong public sector and extensive welfare services. The extensive social security provides security

and the basic livelihood for the least advantaged. All citizens enjoy the benefits of a free education and a public health care system. (Kantola & Kautto 2002: 12.)

In welfare societies, the government is responsible for creating and sustaining economic and social welfare for its citizens. The normative foundation of the Nordic welfare model has been based on four specific elements which are large-scale public responsibility, social-political equality, full employment, and strong income redistribution. Publicly financed collective responsibility for welfare is still a very strongly rooted value in Finland. (Heikkilä 2005: 1.)

The role of the public sector is central in the maintenance and funding of services in a welfare society (Helander 2003: 290). For citizens, public services represent stability, proximity and quality (Ikola-Norrbacka & Salminen 2007: 62). The clamor for better and smaller governments has led many countries to implement significant public sector reforms. They consist of deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the objective of making them run better. Managerial changes have resulted in the use of market mechanisms. (Peters 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004: 8)

The modernization of the Finnish public sector has included strong efforts to promote marketization, to make the operations of government more efficient, to develop the management capabilities of higher civil servants, and to improve the economy and customer-orientation of public utilities and services. The rethinking of the roles, functions and responsibilities of the public sector has engendered new kinds of operation models through which public services are provided. (Salminen & Viinamäki 2001: 32–36; Lähdesmäki 2003: 167–168, 240–243.)

Youth perspectives on a fair society

The discussion of the individual citizen's growing responsibility for his or her own life has increased. Modernization has increased individualization and reflexivity as well as citizens' abilities to make educated choices about their own lives. Finnish citizens value the welfare state system and want to keep the public services as equal and as qualified as in the previous decades. They are quite critical towards a market orientation in service production. Public services are important for adult citizens. (Kallio 2010: 63–65, 90–98.) Also youth respect public services. Since childhood young Finns have been raised in a system which produced, for the most part, the welfare services they needed. They have also appropriated the idea of a decent citizen who pays taxes and takes care of his or her societal responsibilities. (Ollila 2008: 185; Lähdesmäki 2010: 26–30.) They seem to under-

stand that in order to receive services and benefits they are obligated to fulfill certain responsibilities in society.

According to previous youth surveys young Finns are rather conservative and have adopted the dominant societal values (Saarela 2004). Finnish youth focus on work ethics and enterprise, but at the same time are compassionate towards the disadvantaged (Ahonen 2000: 28). The welfare of other members of the society is important for youth, and they are also concerned about environmental matters. (See also Lähdesmäki 2010.) Young people's opinions on the ethical challenges of the welfare society are manifested in the Youth Survey, and these expectations are examined in the following parts of this chapter. In this study the ethical challenges of the welfare society are explored through questions on the responsibilities of the society, on social problems, and on future challenges of the society.

Responsibilities of the society

The youth evaluated the responsibilities of the society (see Figure 1). In the survey young Finnish people were asked how important it is that the society takes care of certain responsibilities. According to them the most important responsibility is guaranteeing welfare services. The youth argue that the society has to arrange adequate and free education and public health services for all citizens. They have interests in these services, having used them themselves. The provision of a peaceful as well as a stable environment is also important. Issues concerning the welfare of children and their own age group are also central to young people.

The results of the Youth Survey tell us that young people accept societal intervention in citizens' lives and they prefer that the society has a very broad responsibility of citizens' welfare. They expected that the society should set discharge limits for protecting the environment. Young women are more concerned about the underprivileged, asylum seekers and environmental matters than young men. Citizens' rights to equal welfare services are important for young people. However, decreasing disparities in incomes between citizens were least important for them.




Figure 1. The importance of society's responsibilities: the views of youth

Social problems evaluated by the youth

Young people's concerns about social problems were visible in the results of the study, as seen in Figure 2. Most expressed worry about the economic recession and alienation or social exclusion of young people. Also poverty, especially in families with children, and youth unemployment touched them. Many felt that individualism and self-seeking has become common; the sense of community and care for fellow citizens has been lost.

On one hand crimes and acts of violence and on the other hand racism and xenophobia were matters that especially girls were concerned about. Young people seemed to worry about many issues but the inequality between sexes was not at the top of the list. Gender equality is quite advanced in Finland, or at least the situation is better than in other countries. It is one of the things Finland is known for. Low voting rates distress a few youngsters. However, they value democracy and the ability to influence political decision making, but as citizens they do not have the experience of voting or participation due to their age.




Figure 2. Social problems: the views of youth

Change in societal values

Young people can sense change in societal values. In the current survey youth estimated the state of affairs and changes in society. It seemed that they believed in the societal safety net, a society where all citizens are taken care of and that equality still exists in public administration. For most of them it might be stating the obvious that the least advantaged people are taken care of by social institutions. In the Rawlsian view inequalities should not hurt those who are the least advantaged. Over sixty percent of young people agree with the idea of justice. Nevertheless, inequality between people might increase in the future with the society being divided into those who gain and those who lose. Respondents felt that social safety nets were needed for individuals who are not able to support themselves.

Respondents mostly agreed that the society has to take care of citizens' welfare. At the same time they felt that individuals cannot be allowed to abuse the system. Over thirty percent of the respondents believed that there are people who abuse welfare benefits.

The results show that there are some statements which are easy to agree or disagree with, and some which are more difficult to commit to. Difficult questions for youth seemed to be "disparities in incomes will increase", "unequal treatment of citizen is increasing" and "welfare benefits are abused". A half or even more than a half chose the alternative of "neither agree nor disagree" in these questions.




Figure 3. Ethical challenges of the society: the views of youth

Possibilities of participation and attitudes towards politics and politicians

Improving citizens' possibilities for participation and involvement has been one of the main focuses in the reform strategy of the Finnish government. In western democracies citizens' traditional political participation has shown a noteworthy reduction in recent decades (Paloheimo 2005: 126).

It is very useful for young people to develop social and human capital which in turn increases their readiness for political activity in the future. No simple pattern can be discerned, since young people are interested in different types of influence. (Laine & Dorff 2008.)

Citizen participation is a question of democracy. Citizens are most likely to participate in issues that concern them directly. However, there is always only a limited group of citizens who actively participate in common affairs. So when developing new forms of participation, there is a danger of including only those who already are participating. (Niemi 2008.) Brannan, John and Stoker (2006: 993) have presented a very good definition of active citizenship: "Active citizenship is about engaging people in decision-making processes, giving them a say in the planning and delivery of public services, and involving them in their communities, as a means to improve outcomes."

Active citizenship contains a notion of membership in a community, and the willingness and power to affect issues. An active citizen participates and seeks to influence the surrounding area, thus making it a better place to live. Active citizenship involves engaging people in decision making processes and giving them a say in the development of services. The notions of politeness, respectfulness and social capacity are important. Active citizenship invokes such core values as human rights and social responsibility; democracy, legality, and freedom as legal values; and tolerance and empathy as human values. (Cleaver & Nelson 2006.)

The Finnish Youth Research Network has carried out numerous surveys that have explored young Finns' opinions on different societal and political themes. It is clear that participation in all its forms has accumulated to an active, proficient minority (Niemi 2008; Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a). However, young people's views on politics do not seem to deviate significantly from the older citizens' perspectives.

Traditional forms of political participation and less conventional (informal) ones are not mutually exclusive, as politically active young people can combine them. Voting has retained its place as the prevalent form of political participation. (Paakkunainen 2007.) The youth committed themselves to the ethical challenges

of society and expressed their concern about social evils. Thus it can be concluded that political decision-making interests them. It is relevant to ask how the youth experienced political participation and what significance it has to them.

Public discussion on political participation has raised concerns about young peoples' lack of interest in political topics. It seems that youth are not attracted to traditional ways of participation. Vesikansa (2007: 196) argues that youth need support in finding ways to affect and participate as well as to understand the current forms of participation as relevant ways to exert influence over the societal issues that concern them. Young Finns need to feel that they are heard and that their involvement in decision making counts. It is important that the youth perspective is taken into consideration in decision making processes; the absence of it could become a cause of frustration and decrease the willingness to participate in the future.




Figure 4. Politics and participation: the views of youth

The results of the survey pertaining to the participation and ethical questions in politics are shown in Figure 4. It demonstrates that although young Finns are somewhat cynical towards politicians, they strongly agree that voting is an important way to influence matters concerning them. A very high percentage of the respondents, 81 %, agreed with this.

Respondents were very critical of politicians' campaign promises, as almost half of the respondents (48 %) disagreed with the statement "What is promised is also kept". Only 10 % of the young people answering the survey believed politicians to be honest. Lack of confidence towards politicians is alarming. However it is difficult to conclude where such mistrust arises from.

It is interesting to note that on the average citizens are very critical of and also disappointed with politicians. According to Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka (2009a) citizens have very low levels of trust in politicians and in their ability to keep promises.

Publicity is indispensable for politicians since it enables them to get their political messages into the public consciousness. However, young citizens felt that some of the politicians seemed to court the media with issues relating to their private lives. They are also inclined to think that politicians are more interested in votes rather than citizens' real life concerns.

Participants were quite sure that politicians were missing a very good sense of the youth perspective and that they had no concept of the needs of young people. Young Finns were also very critical of their possibilities to exert influence over social matters. This criticism might result from a lack of awareness of the different participation forms or from a real need for new channels of participation. Examples of the latter are the municipal youth councils which are meant for enhancing young people's involvement in politics.

Participation profiles

In addition to the analysis presented above, the youth perspectives were also looked through the Principal Component Analysis¹ in order to find the profiling elements of youth participation and politics. Fortunately, the whole picture does not seem so gloomy. Three different groups of youth could be identified on the

¹ Rotation Method = Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

basis of the survey². Their opinions classified these young Finns into the categories of 1) involved, 2) skeptical and 3) trustful.

The involved youth felt that they had enough possibilities for participation. They were also convinced that their will was heard. These young people had a positive impression of politicians; they believed that politicians cared about citizens, especially younger citizens' welfare and the future. They strongly disagreed with the idea of politicians as self-seeking opportunists.

The skeptical youth represented the opposite side. They thought that politicians were mainly canvassing for votes, without the appreciation of citizens' opinions. According to this group politicians were not responsive to the needs of younger citizens. Their conception of the honesty of politicians was not very strong.

The trustful youth believed that voting was the way to influence matters concerning them. They trusted politicians and expected them to keep their promises. Politicians, according to this group, were in the service of citizens. They expected politicians and public servants to behave ethically, honestly and efficiently.

Conclusions

Youth attitudes and expectations on ethical governance were gathered in the Youth Survey. The research focus was limited here to youth attitudes on ethical challenges faced by the society and on their perspectives on political participation. Some conclusions can be clearly formulated.

Young people strongly defend traditional welfare state values like justice and equality. They were very concerned about social issues and the welfare of fellow citizens. However, they preferred that the society shouldered responsibilities for the public services and the social security. The youth trusted social institutions and services but at the same time expressed concerns about growing class distinctions and increasing income disparities.

It would be fascinating to describe young people as ethical persons; however the data does not allow that as it does not tell us how ethically they behave. Instead

² The limiting value of the Initial Eigenvalue (the variances of the factors) was set to be over one. Communalities of variables varied 0,511–0,709 which are rather high, meaning that they measure principal components quite reliably. Both the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy (0,710) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity ($p < 0.0001$) are evidence that the correlation matrix is suitable for Principal Component Analysis.

the results show us how the youth see the world. Their opinions reflect on the one hand empathy towards fellow citizens and on the other hand loyalty towards society.

It was very interesting to compare young Finns attitudes to older generations' opinions and attitudes towards ethical themes (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a; the National Citizen Survey). The comparison showed that despite their age citizens were very committed to the idea of a welfare society with equal access to services and a fair treatment of its citizens.

According to the citizens' considerations voting was a privilege for citizens which enabled them to affect social issues. However, their interest in political participation was not very high. This loss of interest in participation might be connected with the distrust felt towards politicians or with the impression of the futility of political participation. In their chapter Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka express the worry that openness and transparency as ethical values are threatened.

Citizen surveys have revealed the citizen perspective on good governance. Following also the ethical considerations of Tommi Lehtonen, the theme of ethical governance can be included in public sector reform strategies. The young people today are tomorrow's decision makers and governmental actors, thus their point of view should matter.

6 PROMOTING, PREVENTING AND WATCHDOGGING: REINFORCING CITIZENS' ROLE IN THE CONTROL OF CORRUPTION¹

Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka, Ari Salminen and Olli-Pekka Viinamäki

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is the control of corruption. Corruption is seen as a primary threat to open and transparent governance, sustainable economic development, the democratic process, and business practices. Corruption is a multi-faced phenomenon, linking multiple issues together such as abuse of entrusted power for private gains, low integrity, taking bribes, maladministration, fraud, and nepotism. The big question is how to prevent the increase of administrative corruption in a single country? How to get a grip on the control of corruption in a single-case study and how to properly identify the most important implications of corruption?

Comparative academic studies have focused on unethical behavior, maladministration and mismanagement in public sector organizations. Governments all over the world and international organizations have designed strategies to fight corruption. There are studies which concentrate on explaining the effects of corruption, elaborating upon the implications, forms, and types of corruption, and analyzing anti-corruption mechanisms and effective ways of minimizing harms and preventing corruption (e.g. Mauro 1995, 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Johnston 1999; Stohs & Brannick 1999; Levin & Satarov 2000; Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra 2001; Galtung 2006; Huberts, Lasthuizen & Peeters 2006; de Graaf 2007; de Graaf & Huberts 2008; Huberts, Maesschalck & Jurkiewicz 2008).

The proper diagnosis of the causes and logic behind corruption play an important role in combating it (Quah 1999; Maor 2004; Huberts et al. 2008). Huberts et al. (2006: 290) make clear the fact that researchers will never be able to reveal all corruption to the public. They compare corruption to an iceberg, in which only the tip can be seen and only known facts can be taken into consideration.

¹ The chapter is strongly revised version of the article Salminen, Viinamäki & Ikola-Norrbacka (2007).

One could also argue that studying the control of corruption makes little sense in a small, politically stable and homogenous Nordic country, such as Finland with 5.4 million inhabitants which consistently receives a high rating for relative freedom from corruption. In other words, what is the reason to study non-existing corruption? There are reasons to believe that the ‘gap’ between the state and the civic society has not become a big problem. However, we agree with Huberts et al. (2006) that the high ratings are also a question of reputation, and we might further ask whether a good reputation ‘feeds’ low corruption.

Corruption is a challenge to democracy and it is clear that citizens’ estimations of corruption are one of the main criteria for its wideness and harmfulness. Therefore, from the citizen perspective, control of corruption is always a significant question. The instruments of controlling corruption are both direct and indirect for citizens. At least in theory, the more direct the channels of influence are, the stronger the citizens’ role is in the control of corruption.

The focus

Control is here defined to refer mainly to mechanisms that both prevent administrative corruption directly and indirectly as well as strictly and less strictly. Thus control is used formally and informally or intentionally and unintentionally. In studying control of corruption, in principle two basic approaches are identified. As we see it, one might either concentrate on the ‘control system’ itself, which is more or less our target, or reduce the study to how or how well corruption is ‘controlled’. These approaches are interlinked, and they create linkages to low (or high) corruption as described in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Studying control of corruption

We try to find potential sources of low corruption and their linkages to the control system. These are more or less hypothetically described in this chapter. The sources are described through a single-case study which means that the ‘answers’, explanations come from local experience, backgrounds and historical events. Some of the sources are more ideographic, nation-bounded and socially constructed than the others, as shown in the previous chapter by Salminen and Viinamäki. In addition, the assumption of low corruption leads to the need to define the concept of corruption broadly whereas if corruption is expected to be high, a study would require a specified and narrow definition of it.

We follow Langseth’s (2006: 14–20) notion that different types of methods for gathering data on corruption are needed. Our analysis deals mainly with the factors that are associated with corruption or, to be more specific, with low corruption. Pre-existing surveys, previous research, annual reports and documents, and analyses of different institutions are used for describing the control of corruption in Finland. As Galtung (2006: 101) observes, it is difficult to develop indicators for a phenomenon like corruption, which is legally and morally condemned.

Whether describing the control system or presenting how corruption is controlled, the next five issues tend to be the most essential. The first issue is good administration which links the control to values, codes and principles which exist in order to prevent corruptive behavior. Integrity of civil servants is the second link between the control and an assumed low corruption. Thirdly we look at the legal framework concentrating on the Administrative Procedure Act and the Penal Code. The fourth issue is the role of the Ombudsman and the Chancellor which both present some ways of controlling corruption. The fifth issue is the audit which illustrates the control in terms of a structure of audit systems, and the financial side of combating corruption. The last section discusses our overall attempt to comprehend the control of corruption and some particularities of the Finnish system.

Benefits of good administration

It sounds reasonable that corruption increases if ethical guidelines and codes of conduct are not established, not clearly stated or if civil servants do not obey them. Good governance and good administration as concepts are loaded with ethical values and principles, such as trust, transparency, accountability, responsiveness and participation (see also chapters 4 and 5; Viinamäki 2009). They represent the opposite to corruption, and more particularly the opposition to misbehavior, mismanagement, and maladministration.

In what ways do these ethical values affect the process of controlling corruption and what impact do the values have on public sector and governance? To claim to be able to give straightforward answers to these kinds of questions might be misleading. Yet, we assume that codes and values of good administration play an essential role in fighting corruption, and they are harnessed to curbing corruption in various countries. At least codes and values may represent a sketch for the prevention of corruption and a set of wanted behavior in public service, even if codes and values seldom create direct and intentional criteria to punishing and condemnation.

Among the mentioned values, trust is and has been an essential part of responsible government and good administration in all Scandinavian countries. Trust in public authorities is rather high and it is seen as a cornerstone of a civic society. Public confidence in impartiality, objectivity, and lawfulness of the government and its institutions has remained strong in Finland. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a; Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2010.) However, the way in which the government obtains the public's trust is a sensitive issue. In addition, people's trust and confidence in the control of corruption is decreased if trust in the government in general is weak. (See also chapters 4 and 5 of this book.)

Harisalo and Stenvall (2001) have studied citizens' trust in the Finnish central government institutions, they surveyed two thousand Finnish citizens in 2001. Their research did not directly interlink trust and administrative corruption. Still, citizens criticized the professional ethics of public servants, which may lead to a decrease in the high level of confidence. Citizens ranked the military and the police as the most trusted organizations. The least trusted organizations were political institutions.

The guarantee of good governance is written down in the Finnish Constitution. The formal instructions for good local governance were written down in the beginning of 1990s (*Hyvä kunnallinen hallintotapa* 1993). The role of municipal values and codes is essential because two-thirds of the public service is provided by the 433.000 public employees in 341 municipalities. About four-fifths of the municipal employees work in health care, education, and social services. Occasionally the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities delivers circulars for the municipalities on good local governance. For example in 2005 a circular clarified the principles on how municipal officials should deal with private sector actors and implement co-funded projects.

Our inquiry in the five biggest Finnish cities revealed that values and codes have become more relevant than they were a decade ago. Violations of codes and values are usually handled by an internal control unit which is responsible for munic-

ipal auditing and performance evaluations. The municipalities are able to handle violations by themselves, and thus the need for a separate, national-level ethical committee seems to be sparse.

Comparative studies have shown that when violations of good administration are evident, political and government executives often respond by establishing anti-corruption mechanisms to uncover such behavior. These are ethical commissions, special prosecutors, independent councils, and investigative judges/authorities entrusted with extensive coercive powers (Maor 2004). Accounts of anti-corruption policies indicate a global increase in legal frameworks, rules and regulations, and internal control in a wide range of countries (Clark & Jos 2000). There are various reporting systems and some countries have special bodies to deal with unethical situations. Organized protection for whistleblowers is used in a few countries and there is also a confidential integrity counselor operating in six member states. (Moilanen & Salminen 2007: 43.) In Finland, there is no single body to investigate integrity violations or desecration of good administration. These kinds of cases are handled by the administrative courts, ombudsman, and media.

In addition to ethical bodies, ethical violations of good governance provide extra channels for citizens. Blowing the whistle is not the first instrument for fighting corruption. Normally it is among the last ones. To verify the facts that led to blowing the whistle, transparent and open government is required. And for many reasons (reputation, avoiding partisan conflicts) the complainant and the accused should be protected. Whistleblowing covers outside routine channels for citizens, such as ombudsman, investigations, and even going to the media.

Alternatively, the maintenance of diverse forms of citizen participation, independent and self-regulated media, a high level of education, public access to official documents, clear-cut roles of appealing institutions, and a possibility to present appeal with professional legal help, are all ways towards a lower level of corruption.

As awareness increases among citizens, it becomes easier to make complaints. Somehow it seems like the present day citizens have more courage to contact the appellate authority and question the decisions the authorities have made. This can also be seen in a wider context where citizens are not the subjects of administration but sovereign citizens who can influence things which concern them. Additionally there is, of course, a difference between controlling corruption and for example complaints made by citizens. Only a limited number of complaints lead to a criminal or organizational investigation. Still, citizen control system may create a forewarning mechanism for public service to follow the rules.

Integrity of civil servants

The above discussion on good administration produced a certain ethical framework for the public sector. It clarified the principles to which control can be proportioned. Along-side with this more or less general and indirect framework of codes, a cornerstone for the control system of corruption is integrity of the civil service. Integrity in office is an essential part in curbing corruption. Five conditions are mentioned here. We assume here that if civil servants as individuals 1) do not follow the requirements of the office, 2) lose the capacity to distinguish self from office, 3) feel lack of respect, 4) are unpaid, and 5) the management does not support integrity, then low corruption is heavily threatened in public organizations (cf. Dobel 1999).

Part of the roots of low corruption is grounded in the Finnish administrative culture which is based on the Russian and Scandinavian traditions. The legalistic tradition as well as lawyers and legal professions have dominated the public service and the Finnish political system. This legalistic tradition has influenced the legal infrastructures fighting maladministration and mismanagement (Tiihonen 2003: 107; Salminen & Temmes 1994; Torke 1989: 41.) Scandinavian tradition, with the emergence of the welfare state, emphasized the extensive state, including commonly shared values such as compassion and uniformity.

The current size of the public sector is relatively large in Finland, and therefore, the control of public integrity is a consequential task. The GNP share of public expenditure is more than 40 per cent; the amount of public servants in state government is more than 89 000 and more than 400 000 in municipalities. A career as a civil servant is open for all citizens in Finland and the civil servants are highly educated. Through education everyone has an opportunity to have a civil service career. Still, public sector organizations are able to decide detailed recruitment principles and pay their own salaries. Only collective agreements for civil servants set the limits.

Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) argue that low wages in the civil service causes corruption or at least, low salaries increase the probability of corruption. It is assumed that if public sector salaries correlate with the private sector and civil servants incomes are fair, there is no strong pressure for corruption. In Finland the wage level is, on average, high for both women and men, and thus a comparable salary level might correlate to a low level of corruption. A difference between the private and public sectors exists, but salaries in the state administration and in municipalities are comparable with private sector salary levels. Men's salaries are on an average higher than women's but women's salaries are moderate. The annual change in women's index of wage and salary earnings has been larger than

men's in the last few years. However there are signs income disparities are increasing between the rich and the poor.

The Finnish Constitution requires civil service and any exercise of public powers to be based on the law. For example, in the Constitution it is regulated that ministers have to announce their own liabilities which might harm their status in the council of the state. Corresponding regulations are given for the top civil servants and executives in the State Civil Service Act.

The Finnish legal norms of administrative corruption have remained unchanged for several decades. The legalistic tradition imposes that civil servants have the obligation to provide public argumentation for decisions, a correctional system, and accurate criminal investigation methods.

The civil service is strictly regulated in terms of disqualifications and conflict of interest which characterize direct control in performing public tasks. To prevent corruption and maladministration the public sector officials' secondary occupations are strictly defined. Public sector office holders are obligated to inform superiors about every connection concerning secondary occupations. Public servants should state their interests before their appointment to office. There are strict regulations of disqualifications especially related to civil servant work. This regulation aims to avert, in advance, nepotism, cronyism or patronage, all of which are kinds of corruption. As stated above, all of these norms and the whole idea of good governance are historic in the Finnish judicial culture. (Tiihonen 2003: 100–101.)

The old pillar of the Finnish civil service is the referendary or reporting system where the reporting official (civil servant) researches the matter under advisement, presents alternative proposals and suggests a final proposal to the decision makers. The long-established system has been seen to serve the prevention of abuse and corruptive behavior. (Tiihonen 2003: 109–110.) We might imagine that the potential corrupter has to do double work to realize the wanted plans: the corrupter has to convince both the decision maker and the referendary. More evident is that the obligation to provide public argumentation for decisions increases transparency and public trust in governance, and prevents partial and partisan decision-making.

Peer-pressure and peer-comparison affect the level of corruption and integrity in civil service (Holmes 1993: 165). In such a small civil servant community as Finland, this means that the threat of a ruined reputation usually leads to resignation from office. Public shame is strongly present in the Finnish civil service. When someone is caught red-handed for giving or taking bribes the social disgrace is

substantial. He/she is remembered only for wrongdoing, all the good achievements made before are swiped away and the possibility for better employment is closed. Additionally, because corruption cases are uncommon, they receive a lot of attention in the media and also court decisions might be hard-edged.

Loyalty in the Finnish civil service is vested in the so-called objective loyalty towards formal position and hierarchy. Loyalty is divided into subjective or personalized forms of loyalty, especially political loyalty, whereas objective loyalty remains despite changes in government or top civil servants. Most civil servants hold their position after parliamentary or local elections and changes are of minor significance in the top management of government agencies. Loyalty is emphasized in the formal and independent position of civil service and hierarchical statuses.

Value-led management has been introduced in government during the last decades. The results of two Finnish surveys give evidence from this case. The values guiding the daily work in the Finnish ministries and agencies (180 central government units) have been measured in 1999 (n=647) and 2007 (n=642) (Ministry of Finance 2000; Ministry of Finance 2007: 39–40, 56).

Both surveys show that the most appreciated values are trustworthiness, expertise, openness and independence. Citizens' estimations concerning public officials highlight the same values (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009a). Compared to the previous survey, especially efficiency and effectiveness are values that have decreased their importance. At the same time as modern control and integrity codes are introduced, old-fashioned noble principles are still present in the civil service. One description of this is given by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2005: 15–16). According to the report of the ministry, humbleness is seen to be a good quality of a public servant. Civil servants ought not to boast about their powers and positions. They should be prudent and be familiar with the affairs of the common people. Civil servants are assumed to be decent citizens themselves, which means having a stable and healthy lifestyle, Christian values and patriotism.

Additionally, the 2007 survey reveals that civil servants face certain corruption related issues. Civil servants stated that they relative regularly or occasionally met unethical behavior in their daily work such as lack of publicity and improper announcements, use of difficult official language, delaying issues, putting self-interest before public interest and making decision without appropriate preparation and referandy.

Despite the fact that civil servants in ministries face corruption related issues, it is emphasized in the survey that forms of grand corruption like taking bribes or gaining financial benefit for the office are still very rare.

Key anti-corruption acts

The status of anti-corruption codes and regulations as well as the control system, is to be interpreted by the legal administrative tradition of a single country. With the other Nordic countries, Finland belongs to the countries (tradition of Roman law system and unitary state), which have differentiated systems of public law (administrative law) and civil law (criminal law). Administrative law regulates aspects of civil service. The law of corruption of public services has been generally accorded a special section inside the criminal law.

Administrative matters are regulated by the Administrative Procedure Act which entered into force at the beginning of 2004. The basic legislative idea for the Act was to unite administrative principles, good administration, including public services in one law. The scope of its application is rather wide: from state and municipal authorities to public enterprises. Additionally, the State Civil Servants Act (1994) enriches these principles.

More than fighting corruption directly, the main idea of the Act is to promote good behavior in public organizations, to improve the relations between citizens and administration and to prevent maladministration in administrative practices.

Despite the general administrative purposes, the Act aims to minimize the harms of corruption in the following manners. Legal principles in the Act emphasize that an authority shall treat the customers of the administration on an equal basis and exercise its competence only for purposes that are acceptable under the law. The actions of the authority shall be impartial and proportionate to their objectives. They shall protect legitimate expectations as based on the legal system. Principles emphasize the appropriateness of service which includes appropriate services, organization of services, and that the authority can perform its tasks productively. The principle of advice means that authorities should provide the necessary advice free of charge, and within their competence, for taking care of administrative matters, as well as responding to the questions and queries about their service. Finally, good administration requires the use of proper, clear and comprehensible language.

Civil servants are under the control of the administrative discipline system. The Finnish system is in line with the EU member states. Disciplinary measures range

from written warnings to the termination of employment while legal sanctions include the punitive measures listed in the penal code.

In Finland, civil servants are subject to criminal law and they are in a special position in terms of the Finnish Penal Code. Concerning only civil servants, there is a group of acts which belong to maladministration or mismanagement and are separately criminalized as malfeasance, offence in office and have severe punishments, such as dismissal or admonition.

The Penal Code of Finland contains a chapter concerning offences in office. Below are wrongdoings listed in the Penal Code, and they are 1) acceptance of a bribe and aggravated acceptance of a bribe, 2) bribery violation, 3) acceptance of a bribe as a Member of Parliament, 4) breach and negligent breach of official secrecy, 5) abuse of public office and aggravated abuse of public office, and 6) violation of official duty and negligent violation of official duty.

How does the legislation work? Although some of the cases are totally missing from year to year, it seems that the total amount of corruption cases is increasing (according to The National Research Institute of Legal Policy). Annual comparison of the amount of cases is however fruitless and misleading, because the cases are long-lasting and they are concluded in trials in occasional years. The picture they present might be the tip of the iceberg. For instance Kaufmann (2004) argues that where the “rules of the game” have been captured well, frequently ignored manifestations of so-called “legal corruption” may be more prevalent than illegal forms, such as outright bribery, which are the usual focus of attention.

There are no guarantees that extensive legislation would decrease corruption. A high degree of observed corruption may, as such, reflect a high standard of ethics and a rigid application of rules rather than high degree of real misbehavior (van Hulten 2007).

The role of ombudsman and chancellor

The Ombudsman institution is a world-wide arrangement. It protects citizens against arbitrary authority and keeps the guard of the law on behalf of citizens (Rowat 1965). In the Finnish system the Ombudsman and the Chancellor are highly respected and represent long-standing institutions. Their role is different from administrative courts where public servants are accused and sentenced.

The Finnish institutions of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice represent legal regulation and supervision of legality. In

other words, these institutions present legal control efforts in terms of corruption and integrity in civil service.

To appeal, citizens can either institute action with the Parliamentary Ombudsman or the Chancellor of Justice. The overall aim of these institutions is to safeguard the rights of citizens. Approximately 60 persons are working in the office of Ombudsman and 40 in Chancellor's office. But what kind of role do they play in curbing corruption?

The formal duties (role to supervise) of the Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice are in many respects parallel with each other. The difference is that the Chancellor of Justice inspects the complaints concerning the actions of advocates and public legal aid councils. The chancellor has the duty to supervise the legality of government actions. The Chancellor is present in the sessions of the Council of State and he revises the cabinet documents before the weekly sessions.

The Ombudsman's duty is to ensure that public authorities and officials observe the law, constitutional and human rights, and that civil servants fulfill their duties according to good administration. The Ombudsman investigates the performance of authorities and officials on the basis of citizens' announcements. In the Ombudsman's investigations the names of complainants are not usually published which increases probability of denunciation. The amount of cases concerning legality has increased even 47 percents from the beginning of the century.

Both institutions investigate corruption related cases, but what is the precise content of control? Typical cases from in the beginning of 21st century referred to control of corruption handled by the Ombudsman are listed here from most general: delayed issues, negligence, insulting principle of equality, improper justifications of decisions, lack of publicity, lack of hearing of the parties involved, discrimination, undelivered public notices, insufficient advice and partiality.

Both institutions handle similar cases, such as delayed issues, lack of hearing of the parties involved and lack of publicity but there are also differences between the two institutions. Violation of the principle of equality, negligence and partiality belong to the Ombudsman's typical cases. Compared to the Ombudsman, the Chancellor is responsible for the cases of disqualification, misuse of public power and untrustworthiness of public actions which are near the ethics of civil servants. Rethinking the relevance of this information, that sort of issues belong mainly to the category of maladministration rather than of strict corruption.

For a country with some 520 thousand public sector employees, the above presented information and their existence seems comparatively insignificant. When

building the picture of Finnish low corruption and control mechanisms, these only provide circumstantial evidence regarding occurrence and incidence.

Financial and performance audit

Above codes, integrity, and legal settings of controlling corruption are discussed. Comparative experiences show that well-established tasks of financial and performance controlling institutions and transparent controlling mechanisms might reduce potential corruption. One might even argue that corruption increases if administrative control and audit mechanisms are missing or if controlling is not extensive. (Maor 2004; Caiden 2001a.)

Administrative control is decentralized in Finnish state administration and curbing corruption is handled by several institutions. A distinctive feature is that combating corruption is only a part of an institution's duties. The government has not established any special anti-corruption agency or institution.

Internal audit holds a significant role in preventing corruption because of its semi-autonomous standing and its functions as overseer of internal control mechanisms. In general, an internal audit may have greater access and higher potential for broad coverage of operation than any other controlling institution, but it is dependent on political and management intervention (Schwartz 2003).

How is the financial side of controlling corruption organized in Finland? All Finnish ministries and government agencies have a unit for internal control. However, these units are in the first place concerned with financial audits. Corruption related issues may be revealed in terms of performance audit and on the basis of denunciation. If internal units find misuse or any other references to corruption, they always pass the case to the police authorities. We dare to say, internal as well as police investigations are speeded up with external pressure: corruption cases are interesting topics for the media.

At the top of the system, the Finnish parliament controls and audits government finances alongside its legislative role. From among the Members of Parliament, five auditors of public accounts are selected. The formal duty of these auditors is to supervise the legality and appropriateness of the nation's public-sector finances. The auditors deal with inspection and monitoring actions. They observe how the budget is followed, monitor state subsidies and loans given from budget grants and foundations outside the budget, and monitor guarantees given by the state. They supervise the admittance of quittances, concessions and postponements of taxes, payments and other state debts.

In their annual reports to the Parliament over the past five years, the auditors have handled maladministration related cases and issues, such as potential problems of shadow economics and misuses of external financing in public organizations.

The National Audit Office performs financial and performance audits as an independent body. In terms of financial control, the office ensures compliance with the state budget and the provision of correct and adequate annual accounts by the state and agencies. In 2006, for instance, 115 financial audits were conducted. Performance audits consist of producing information on the effectiveness of administration and compliance with regulations and the principles of good administration. Performance audit serves the information needs of the Parliament, administration, and citizens, through evaluation. Some 30 performance audits are carried out per year. Only 1–2 audits cause further investigations. Yet, most of the audits consist of recommendations of better performance and conducts.

The formal audit is not the whole picture. Individuals and organizations can submit complaints to the National Audit Office concerning the state's financial management, public economy, and suspecting abuse or misuse of government funds. The citizen complaints accumulate for some reason in a few branches of administration, such as agriculture and forestry, education and transport and communication. The number of complaints varies annually approximately from 30 to 50 cases.

The audit functions presented here give a clear and extensive picture on control, but say little about the actual prevalence of misconduct. We have to agree with Huberts et al. (2006: 278) that there might be a 'dark number' of misconduct and certain un-controlled corruption which can be expected to remain unknown. Another issue is that more we pay attention to corrupt violations, the more corruption might appear, while that might not be the actual case.

Conclusions

This chapter dealt mainly with the control system of corruption in Finland. More than anything else the chapter discusses the potential linkages of control system and low corruption that are relevant for Finnish public administration in the first decades of the 21st century.

In our empirical analysis, perhaps the linkages remain more contributing than explicit causal factors. The major explanations on the linkages are below. The linkages are characterized by using different labels such as 'promoting', 'preventing' or 'watchdogging'. Promoting refers mainly to the ethical development work

in the public organizations. Preventing is understood as following ethical rules and regulations. Watchdogging is the image for the mechanisms which control that rules are followed and obeyed. The main observations are condensed in the following Table 1.

It is possible that an increase in corruption can be avoided by adopting these mechanisms. Some of the arguments presented implications on what the threats on low corruption are in general. Rather than finding absolute answers to corruption (or whether corruption is successfully controlled in practice), this qualitative analysis describes the core elements of a control system of corruption. It is hard to know how these sources of low corruption in society are interrelated, and therefore a more specific research agenda is needed for the future.

Table 1. Potential linkages and control of corruption

Linkages	Control particulars	Control characteristics
Benefits of good administration	Confidence in public institutions; citizen channels for whistleblowing	‘Promoting’
Integrity of civil servants	Legalism and loyalty to the office; ‘danger’ of public shame	‘Preventing’/ ‘Promoting’
The key anti-corruption acts	Behaving ethically and extensive sanctions of corruption undertakings	‘Preventing’
Role of Ombudsman and Chancellor	Maintaining just and clean administrative culture	‘Watchdogging’
Financial and performance audit	Decentralized monitoring; tight financial audits	‘Watchdogging’

By describing the control system, as we mainly did here, one can’t argue in a valid way how well corruption is controlled and how efficient the control system really is. Still, three additional conclusions can be drawn from the previous discussion.

First, we are convinced that the first two elements – more than others – make Finland a special case. At its best, administrative corruption is controlled by the public confidence in societal institutions, good administration, and self-control of

civil servants. Citizen influence and public confidence belong to the flexible, less strict way of fighting corruption, while the self-control of civil servants is based both on heavy regulation and the tradition of administrative culture. We see that this aspect of the Finnish experience, with ethical habits and procedures, can be compared to experiences of the neighboring countries.

Secondly, together the decentralized legislative framework, tight financial monitoring, and professional peer-control seem to facilitate functioning control environment. The absence of anti-corruption practices (investigatory bodies, independent commissions, etc.) indicate a low level of corruption in the Finnish case. In many countries, they are usually put in place either as a response to a public outcry or to pressures created by the media. On the other hand, this illuminates the low profile of handling petit corruption in the Finnish case. Praises of financial control might become problematic in combating corruption because it usually underestimates the controlling of political decision making and providing public services.

Thirdly, the legalistic tradition is in the frontlines for combating administrative corruption. The past ten years have been a spring time for ethical guidelines and codes of conduct at all levels of the Finnish government. The large municipal sector is still lacking comprehensive codes. The Finnish state tradition has been renewed, and public administration culture is no longer valid for judging actions and representing ethical procedures. The government has become market-driven and extensive privatizations have been made. To maintaining low administrative corruption, the public sector should offer proper and competitive work for future professionals and experts. Ethical training for public servants will be extremely important in the future.

By 2015, two thirds of Finnish government personnel will change due to the ageing workforce and retirements. Therefore, the maintenance and transfer of present knowledge and procedures, and investments in anti-corruptive behavior will become increasingly important. The renewed body of civil servants needs ethical training to clarify the common values and to understand the importance of being an ethical civil servant: we conclude that training should be preferred over regulation.

7 WICKEDNESS, GOVERNANCE AND COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS: CAN CORRUPTION BE TAMED?

Amr G. E. Sabet

Introduction

Tackling a problem requires the ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then apply the necessary tools and mechanisms to (re)solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be engaged, in this case corruption, happens to be complex (Fernandes & Simon 1999), ill-structured (Simon 1973) and/or wicked (Rittel & Webber 1973). The former requirements may become less straightforward or feasible, imposing modest expectations regarding the possibility of any definitive solution to such an insidious phenomenon. They also entail initially approaching and defining the problem abstractly, moving thereon, and if possible, toward what Herbert A. Simon indentified as the plane of a “well structured problem” (Simon 1973: 181).

This involves identification as well as problem representation (Fernandes & Simon 1999; Simon 1997). *Identification* allows for limiting the range of values to be considered to a set of specific aims or purposes rather than that of the entire domain of human counterparts. This allows for a measure of *parsimony*, task feasibility, as well as eventual representation based upon which alternative problem-solving strategies may be formulated (Simon 1999: 226; Simon 1997: 11). *Representation* is an ambiguity and complexity reducing exercise, based on establishing a common frame of reference and goals, and is the pre-requisite for any possible problem solving or strategy choice (Simon 1997: 52). It starts with advancing an abstract vision of an alternative followed by “decomposition” of the various components of sub-problems, addressing each one on its own then integrating all the sub- solutions into one (Fernandes & Simon 1999: 227). This constitutes a form of “diagnosis,” followed by “prescription” and then “action” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998: 32) or, in other words, analysis and then synthesis.

Unfortunately, things may not be that simple when dealing with the problem of corruption, when it is difficult to identify it with any single or group of factors and almost impossible to problematize in all its dimensions. Thus, Simon (1973) invites a measure of skepticism when he states – especially when it comes to non-exact social and organizational problems – that the boundary between solving a well structured and ill structured problem is vague and fluid and merely quantita-

tive depending on the “size of knowledge base.” Therefore, no new concepts or techniques are needed (Simon 1973: 181, 197, 200). Skepticism does not imply that Simon’s methodology offers no help, but rather is simply a reminder of some of its limitations. For the problem at hand may be more complex, related less to the boundary between the well structured and the ill structured, and more so to that between the ill structured and the *wicked*.

Corruption identified and represented in the context of this chapter as bribery and/or extortion is one of these kinds of problems. Both in its global but particularly national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even *wicked*. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem using the existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject (Simon 1973: 181) – i.e. its path dependency. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to “*subvert*” (Klitgaard 2000) the phenomenon’s entire matrix. For this to work, it may be more effective to focus on a certain aspect of this negative value (e.g. bribery) rather than on its entire spectrum. Invoking the *sufficing* principle and narrowly specifying bribery as a foundational factor or element that influences the phenomenon’s pervasiveness, and then targeting it may be a more practical option.

This study suggests collective punishment and sanctions (French 1985), and “modified vendetta” (Corlett 1989; Shipp 1987) as conceptual tools or mechanisms that may help in reducing or possibly undermining the untenable problem of bribery among corrupt and colluding citizens. These tools are linked to Kurt Lewin’s theory of change, incorporating the three steps of unfreezing a situation, inducing change, and then freezing the achieved changes as a norm (Cummings 2004: 34–35). By exploring these as potentially relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, unfreezing of some of the most prevalent and institutionalized aspects of citizen corruption, perhaps a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies may consequently evolve.

Corruption as collective guilt

What is corruption, what are its causes, and why have numerous anti-corruption policies failed to deal with it have been questions, which dogged many theoreticians and practitioners alike. Svensson (2005: 21) for instance admitted that there is no clear definition of what constitutes corruption. Much, perhaps, has to do with the fact that “different causal chains” pertaining to this phenomenon have led to “different discourses on corruption prevention and corruption control” (de

Graaf 2007: 39). The anti-corruption organization Transparency International for instance, defined the phenomenon as ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit.’ A broader definition provided by the Tax Justice Network (2005) proposed that, “an activity which undermines public confidence in the integrity of the rules, systems and institutions that govern society is corrupt”.

The significant point in the latter understanding is no longer whether corruption can be observed and judged in relative or absolute terms, but rather if it fits the *duck test*. That is: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.” This suggests it suffices to identify the different, even if sometimes vague, fluid, or contested manifestations of a phenomenon or subject matter by observing its “habitual characteristics” and implications even in the absence of a clear definition or label¹. This necessitates that not only actual corruption be observed and prevented, but as importantly, the “appearance of corruption” (Warren 2006: 161). The “integrity of appearances” provides clues to the ethical performance of the citizen as an individual, a public official, or as part of an institution or organization. Failure in this respect, presumably “disempowers” citizens by denying them participation, or the “means for inclusion in public judgments” (ibid: 160).

Competing representations contribute to dissipating strategies and efforts of fighting corruption as they serve to undercut consensus on the issue, and challenge any common frame of reference that would guide policy action. This may not be merely a *cause* for failing to grasp the issue but perhaps also an *effect* of the immense complexity or wickedness of the problem and how to confront it. Corruption involves a most intricate and elaborate labyrinth of human moral, cognitive and social processes. These range from the psychological and ideological to externally imposed agendas, the economic, the political, the socio-cultural and the technological. It is contagious and nebulous, and in fact “can be attributed to almost anything” (Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra 2001: 21–26).

In poorer and transitional countries where corruption is structural, pervasive and endemic, and despite its harmful impact on “good governance,” “sustainable development,” and “human justice,” it is considered to be something of a natural

¹ The logic of this test is frequently utilized to counter confounding arguments that something is not what it appears to be; for instance that what constitutes ‘corruption’ is a *relative* matter. The elephant test on the other hand refers to situations in which an idea or thing “is hard to describe, but instantly recognizable when spotted”—a sort of ‘I know it when I see it’ type of argument. Both are utilized in this chapter as sufficing conditions in order to circumvent contentions about the diverse meanings of corruption in different cultures and societies or about cultural relativity.

order. It is the way things are done in the conduct of business and governance, “habitualized” and “institutionalized” into the social fabric, rationalized and justified. Reasons to fight it or oppose it are weakly internalized so as to sustain any significant counter collective action. In fact corruption undermines the very idea of citizen and citizenship, and it is much in this light that presumed ‘citizens’ in states pervaded by such a phenomenon see themselves – as mere ‘inhabitants’ rather than as citizens. Yet the system continues to self-reproduce until “conducting personal and public affairs eventually collapses” and as “rotteness” strikes at the core, society and the State are rendered “incapable of facing major outside challenges. Then, the price is very high in terms of uncertainty, loss of trust, and risky supersession at best– and civil unrest, revolt, and bloody revolution at worst”. (Caiden Dwivedi & Jabbra 2001: 2.)

This does not mean that the blame is to be rested entirely on the shoulders of the ‘system,’ guilty as it may be, while exonerating nominal citizens and group agents, explaining corrupt behavior by causes beyond their control. This would allow the ‘citizen’ as a “corrupt agent” to disappear together with the phenomenon under observation, despite that agent being a source of corruption. Agency consequently would be reduced to “background characteristics, translated into variables” (de Graaf 2007: 41); essentially, as Aaron Wildavsky has pointed out, “swallowing” the whole “subject matter”. On the contrary, this is to highlight agency and emphasize corruption as a collective citizens’ responsibility susceptible to forms of collective punishment and sanctions. Such recourse is justified by the nature and wickedness of the problem and applies to the system, state, government as well as groups and citizens.

The wickedness of corruption

While it is apt to refer to corruption as evil, wrong, and immoral, the term ‘wicked,’ at least as conceived back in the early 1970s by Rittel and Webber (1973), did not necessarily envisage negative ethical attachments to any particular issue. Rather, it was to contrast it with a tame, well-structured social problem. Wicked, as has been applied in this context was used to refer to the “malignant,” “vicious,” “tricky,” and “aggressive” nature of a social problem rather than to “malicious intent” (Rittel & Webber 1973: 160–161). This analytical distinction does not hold when dealing with the problem of corruption. In addition to being difficult to formulate, with no “stopping rule” or final and clearly identifiable solution, and in many cases symptomatic of other problems (ibid: 161–165), corruption is also wicked in an ethico-moral sense. It is wicked as a problem and as a value.

Yet, this does not simplify matters much. For while it may be possible to develop a consensus of condemnation in the abstract, this is likely to break down once action and policy are undertaken, and ‘interests’ threatened. As anti-corruption investigations of political and administrative executives, for example, “hit close to home,” attempts are made to derail these investigations by those very same executives (Maor 2004: 1). Accountability and transparency are early victims. In other cases and quite significantly, measures to fight corruption may end up producing adverse outcomes instead. One is then faced with the ambiguous task of having to “weigh” (Simon 1997: 47) trade-offs: what one hopes to achieve versus potential losses in terms of unintended consequences. One study found that policy measures providing incentives or positive sanctions to fight bribery have created, in some cases, inducements for extortion – a greater evil (Khalil, Lawrree & Yun 2010: 179). Citing an example of a corrupt police officer who when officially rewarded would presumably be less inclined to accept a bribe from a driver who ran a red light; he may in fact, and in lieu of the same reward, extort innocent drivers by claiming they have run a red light when they had not (ibid).

Ironically, even the ethical decision to provide incentives to reduce bribery incidences cannot be defined as correct or incorrect, right or wrong, good or bad (Simon 1997: 59; Rittel & Webber 1973: 162). While the chain of means-ends in such a case may be traced to the abstract realm of fighting corruption, the connection eventually becomes so “conjectural” and the “content” of the value so “ill defined” that analysis would hold little significance for administrative or policy purposes (Simon 1997). The “ramifications” of the problem solving decision turn out to be confusing, and the suggested solutions end up being, in many cases, worse than the symptoms; hence wickedness (Churchman 1967: B-141).

A more insidious component of such wickedness is that the margin of error is limited and in many ways quite risky. Once a decision has been made to confront the phenomenon, which must be first and foremost a political decision, failure is not an option. There is “no right to be wrong” so to speak (Rittel & Webber 1973: 166). With all its intricacies, corruption is like a hornet’s nest. Either one burns it down in its entirety or suffers the consequences of being painfully, if not fatally, stung by its agitated inhabitants. Half hearted, skeptical or insincere measures may very well incite a vicious response that would enshrine a self assured corruption structure against a seemingly weak or failed state. Good and well intentioned laws may end up causing social unrest and unraveling activities (Dobel 1978: 972), exacerbating the “softness of the state” (Caiden et al. 2001: 31). Thus, in addition to being a matter of collective moral and social responsibility, fighting corruption is also a matter of national security and high politics.

Corruption, particularly where it is structural, pervasive and endemic, is one of those problems which beg some form of “resolution,” where at best the “system of problems” or “mess”² can only be iteratively “re-solved—over and over again” (Ackoff 1974: 21, 33; Rittel & Webber: 1973: 160). It is a condition where, in most cases, one can only hope for a re-resolution rather than a solution, i.e. the type of response that may address a particular problem or aspect of it but at the same time creates a new set of problems. What this means is that no definite *solution* to the social “mess” (Ackoff 1974: 21) of corruption is or can be proposed. At the same time, corruption is perceived as wicked not as a matter of definite representation, but as a worst case scenario among better hopefuls, in order not to underestimate its complexity. If the problem happens to turn out to be tamer than it actually appears to be, then well and good. After all, there are societies that have gone a long way toward minimizing levels of societal corruption. Whether their examples can be replicated is a contingent matter which depends on context, situation and environment as well as leadership and a host of other factors. For there is always the alternative possibility that once the system of corruption gets on top of things “it stays there” (Rothstein & Uslaner 2005: 72).

Readymade representations of ‘good governance’ mechanisms as the ‘one best way’ may not therefore be totally relevant, administratively speaking. Rhodes (according to Kjær 2004: 3) for instance, perceived governance as “self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state”. Ironically, this same definition can apply to the very concept of corruption in societies where it is structural, pervasive and endemic. It becomes so pervasive that it incorporates most, if not all, the characteristics of the above designations. Corruption constitutes self organizing, interdependent, formal or informal networks, with their own rules of engagement and resource exchange, autonomous of the state or even in control of it. Old boy networks and nepotism are examples of such subtle unethical structures of pay-offs (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009b: 85). Other manifestations and forms of corruption are of course not so subtle and much more sinister and destructive of the entire integrity structure of society.

Under such conditions of pervasiveness citizens may accept and participate in corruption, even when conscious of the error of their ways (You & Khagram 2005: 139). This constitutes a “social dilemma”, where despite the fact that citi-

² According to Ackoff (1974: 21), “...no problem ever exists in complete isolation. Every problem interacts with other problems and is therefore part of a set of interrelated problems, a *system of problems*... I choose to call such a system a *mess*”.

zens do understand the situation and the disastrous consequences of their own attitudes, they are unable or continue to be unwilling to do anything about it (Kolllock 1998: 185).

Through a continuous process of ‘denial’ they may condemn corruption verbally but resist attempts at breaking its networks as many adapt to its order of things. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) observed that political allegiances in modern democracies filter perceptions or negative attitudes toward corruption depending on whether a group of citizens supports the government or not. This raises the question as to whether this group is guilty by association and therefore collectively responsible for corruption as well as deserving of concomitant collective punishment. In states, particularly those with weak controls, democracy can in fact be a source of corruption and crime, especially in societies with high socio-economic inequality levels, as the two separate studies of Rose-Ackerman (2001: 417), and You and Khagram (2005: 155) have observed.

State capture and globalization

Hellman and Kaufman (2001) introduced the concept of *state capture* as an alternative term to salvage that of ‘governance’; perhaps also as a means to circumvent the wicked problem. State capture is defined as “the efforts of firms (or such groups as the military, ethnic groups or kleptocracies, formal or informal) to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials”. It involves “parliament [legislative] capture,” “*executive decree capture*,” controlling and influencing the “*formulation*” and “*content*” of laws and regulations (e.g. courts capture), and shaping the “basic rules of the game”. (Ibid.)

As such, state capture is “closely embedded in political processes” as well as in legal and economic activities (e.g. banks capture) (Anderson & Gray 2006: 3, 7, 29, 85–86; Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2000: 3). With such extensive control, state capture reflects “not merely a *symptom* but also a *fundamental cause* of poor governance” as “collusion between powerful firms and state officials ... reap substantial private gains from the continuation of weak governance” (Hellman & Kaufman 2001).

Under such socio-economic and political conditions, identifying state capture simply as a form of bad governance when the boundaries between the good and bad had collapsed does not make much of a difference. In a morally, politically, socially and economically corrupt and decaying state or society, governance, state capture and corruption merge and fuse. They become largely interchangeable,

leading to a state of “banality of wrongdoing” (Moody-Adams 1994: 299) where corruption “cuts across all kinds of governance and operating environments” (Bhargava & Bolongaita 2004: 136).

It is important in this context to draw attention to the change in the very conception of the role of the state and how this serves to affect incidences of corruption. Traditionally, the modern state has been expected to play the role of a sovereign power structure that aims at projecting national economic demands onto the international system. As opposed to this image, neoliberal notions of global interdependence came to perceive the state as the instrument through which external demands of capital flows are imposed on domestic focal groups. This in fact, constitutes a reversal of its earlier role (Clark 1999: 94). Whereas bureaucracy reflects the organizational structure which serves the interests of the national state, state capture, bearing the seemingly benign term of ‘management reform,’ constitutes the changing domestic equivalent, mirroring demands of global capital flow. State capture has in reality become a demand of transnational capital and foreign direct investment, for economic but also political and strategic interests. This helps explain ambivalent attitudes toward such behavior and sheds light on the ecology of the reciprocally supporting connections between globalization, governance and pervasive corruption.

Even in civil society, informal NGOs are not above suspicion. In most cases, NGOs are funded and controlled by external actors with their own agendas, including, as Segal (1998: 2) has put it, encouraging capitalism’s secret weapon – an apolitical middle class, and empowering business leaders through trade, in order to create presumably alternative centers of power. Yet in many cases, both business leaders and the terms of trade are a major source of corruption. As alternative centers of power, they either become autonomous of the state, with external commitment and support, or in fact become the state; establishing a form of a kleptocracy or what has come to be termed “state capture” (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2000). This ‘wicked’ problem by its very nature is “enmeshed in established ways of life and patterns of thinking” (Clarke & Stewart 2003: 274) as the boundaries between kleptocracy on one hand, and freedom and free market on the other, wither away. Adding to the wickedness is a situation where ‘civil society,’ in many countries, fails to materialize as what may be designated the ‘corrupt society’ replaces any semblance of the former. In this sense, corruption reflects a

form of governance or in fact, *is* governance, for to capture the state as well as society is to run both.³

Within this framework, corruption has come to reflect the *politics* of global capital flow taken to a much higher dimension of unethical behavior. Particularly as it impacts on societies, where the modern state structure, and its concomitant social capital, had never been totally consolidated, and therefore legitimized, and as such constituted a partial and fragile historical existence. Consequently, as the formal and functional role of the state as the sole monopolizer of coercive power recedes in favor of global and external influences, marketing agents resort to hire or finance *informal* “specialists” in the use of violence such as, militias or mafias, but where tribes, sub-national as well as supranational groupings, may also play an important role. This becomes the means to self-protect but also “to enforce contract and assure property rights.” (Schwartz 2005).

Security, let alone other needs, becomes a marketing enterprise. Modern globalized marketing as Ramonet (according to Asad 2003: 152; my emphasis) insightfully observed, “has become so sophisticated that it aims to sell not just a brand name or social sign, but an identity. It’s all based on the principle that *having is being*”. In a world of scarcity, inequality and anxiety, *having* in order to *be* is conducive to, and helps explain why, corruption, the ripping apart of the fabric of ethical intersubjectivities, the destruction of vital forms of organizational structures and the degradation of human relations, and moral values in the global market, are being normalized as a way of life (Sabet 2008: 242). Having as being insidiously imposes corrupt behavior, and as it links such behavior to security, the foundational aspect of any subsequent welfare, it creates the *corrupt identity* and from thereon, the *corrupt society* which at its extreme, becomes the *insane society*—the “unadjustment” of the entire culture itself rather than just individuals (Fromm 1955: 6). This is why there has frequently been a fall back on alternative centers of power in the form of subnational loyalties or transnational identities, as corrupt states become increasingly dysfunctional or simply breakdown (failed states). In fact the very concept of citizen and citizenship dissipates. For as Garret

³ In fact, ‘state capture’ fuses two unvirtuous concepts: *Kleptocracy* and *Kakistocracy*. The first one refers to a rule or government by thieves; from Greek *kleptes* (thieves) and *kratos* (government, rule) (Wordsmith Words 2010a; Oxford English Dictionary 2010) and the latter to the government by the worst, least qualified or most unprincipled and unscrupulous citizens; from Greek *kakistos* (worst) + *-kratos* (government, rule). (Wordsmith Words 2010b; Oxford English Dictionary 2010). Together they combine the economic and political capture of the state and this is what makes the problem of corruption ‘wicked’ both ethically and in terms of having no possible solution. This fusion is common among many regimes in less developed as well as transitional countries. The Mubarak regime of Egypt is an archetypal case in point.

and Weingast (according to Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 18) put it, “to assert that [state] institutions help assure adherence to the rules of the game is to overlook a prior and critical issue. If the members of a community cannot agree to one set of rules, the fact that institutions might facilitate adherence to them would be irrelevant”.

On corruption, path dependency and bribery: the contagion of illegitimacy

Despite the corruption problem’s ‘wickedness’ one may still attempt, to the extent possible, to structure and contextualize it. If the above analysis and inferences are correct, then what we have here in fact is an institutionalized phenomenon – corruption that is, as *institution*. Conceptualization helps link both notions in a common framework where fighting corruption becomes intertwined with institutional perspectives. The question of how to fight corruption becomes one of how to perform acts of institutional subversion through both endogenous and/or exogenous imperatives i.e. to transform, demolish, deconstruct, infuse and rebuild institutions and their concomitant structures.

“Institutions are concentrations of power in the service of some value. A correlation between power and commitment to a certain value is thus the defining characteristic of an institution and determines its causal impact on social life” (Stinchcombe 1968: 9–10). If corruption is institutionalized, and commitment to bribery is a defining (negative) value, then shifting the power relations between the corrupt civil servant and the individual seeking service may be an important factor in changing behavior, while still maintaining an organization’s basic structure.

However, the concept of corruption should not be allowed to include all categories of deviant behavior, as for example Caiden (2001b: 17–18) seems to do. This would fail to economize on explanation and consequently would lack in *parsimony* and succinctness. The “law of parsimony” proposes to make issues, to the extent possible, “clear, simple and specific” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998: 28). In attempting to move closer in this direction it may help to seek a common or ‘foundational’ principle that permeates the dynamics of corruption in all its forms and characteristics. Admittedly this incorporates an element of subjectivity, but the attempt nevertheless remains worthwhile. For the purposes of parsimony, path dependency is chosen as the defining characteristic, bribery as the defining form. The connected dynamics of both elements contribute to perpetuating the environment in which citizens and groups function, largely shaping both their values and behavior. The focus on the latter form of corruption in fact is in line with Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka’s (2009b: 83) observation that bribery falls in “a league of its own” as a “most unethical action”.

Both elements of path dependency and bribery constitute the “contagion of [il]legitimacy” (Zucker 1987: 446) or the structure which “infects,” institutionalizes and socializes agents into this mess. To fight corruption therefore is to strike at those two conceptual elements by providing relevant counter-tools and mechanisms. Such tools and mechanisms do not have to do everything well, they only have to do something well (Rigby 1994: 23). One should not harbor ambitions for “doing it all” or “one all purpose” tools or mechanisms, as this rarely is feasible (Rigby 2001: 158; Rigby 1994: 24). They need not be there to eradicate all corruption, but perhaps only one aspect of it – bribery.

Choice may be informed by the same logic that Noonan (according to Lennerfors 2008: 13–14) has insightfully and parsimoniously applied when he observed that,

“[a]s a world evil,” “corruption,” defined as bribery, is not as bad as the exploitation of children by child slavery, child prostitution, child pornography, and child labor. Corruption is not as destructive of life as AIDS or as tobacco or some drugs. Corruption control may not be as vital to the planet’s health as arms control. All of these subjects may be more important globally than bribery. But the reduction, if not the elimination, of bribery may be the key to reducing each of the other evils.”

In other words, bribery is identified and represented as a “weakest strategic component” or least common denominator, which to a great measure determines corruption combating performance at all other levels (Rigby 1993: 9); a center of gravity so to speak. The mechanisms and tools to be chosen and used for that purpose must be representative and relevant to the problem at hand, specifically made to serve its focus. To improve the level of performance and probability of success in implementation, two main conditions are necessary, ideally speaking: Firstly a strong top-down support and commitment from the political hierarchy and secondly the chosen tools and mechanisms should be used in a “major effort” and as “linchpins” not as a “limited initiative” i.e. “go deep, not broad” (Rigby 2001: 152, 154).

Concentrating on bribery may still be a broad effort, given its pervasiveness. At an early stage of policy implementation it may be better still to narrow the focus further on a particular organization or (sub)sector (e.g. corrupt police force which presumably is responsible for law enforcement) where the full force and brunt of the tools and mechanisms could be applied. Maximizing ‘major’ effort while minimizing its targets may not only increase desirable outcome levels while economizing on energy, but also helps create a shock wave that spreads into other domains or sectors, bringing about additional desired outcomes elsewhere, even if one cannot fully anticipate its characteristics. By going deeper, one at the same

time can go broader, as change in the performance of one institution or sub-institutional structure can affect the functioning of others. (Jenkins 2007: 136.)

The second component or the path dependency of corruption relates to the mechanisms of reproduction which sustain this perverse institution. According to Mahoney (2000: 507–508), “path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic (self-reinforcing) properties”. An approach of this kind offers “insights” into the nature of both endogenous and exogenous influences or even shocks, which may help bring about a “breakdown” or “decay” in the highly resilient and institutionalized (path dependent) pattern of corruption (Thelen 2003: 209).

A relevant and interesting study has been conducted by Tirole (1996), which attempted to examine the persistence of corruption and some means to break its patterns. The study started with a hypothetical steady state low corruption economy that was subjected to a perturbation, at an initial date zero, resulting in a “one-shot increase in the gain to being corrupt (or a relaxation in the enforcement of anticorruption laws)” (Tirole 1996: 3). While the economy does not change much in subsequent times (1, 2...) most agents (individuals/citizens) at the initial date i.e. time 0, have in fact engaged in corrupt activities. Tirole found that in “the unique continuation equilibrium” the temporary increase in corruption due to an initial temporary perturbation, transformed into a long term condition. The economy is unable to return to the earlier low corruption steady state, and must therefore remain corrupt. The agents at time zero have already “smeared” their reputation with more incentives to engage in corruption than if they had always remained honest. They have already been “locked into corruption”, as the honesty barrier, so to speak, has been broken. (Tirole 1996: 3.)

Things get worse over time as a pattern of path dependency is established and as “poor collective behavior in the past ... make current good behavior a low-yield individual investment,” generating “poor collective behavior in the future” (Tirole 1996: 18). What we have here is a situation where, as Sewell (according to Thelen 2003: 218) has described it, “what has happened at an earlier point in time” affects “the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”. The result is a “vicious circle of corruption,” leading to such behavior becoming structural, pervasive and persistent (Tirole 1996: 3–4). This means that to be “stigmatized as ‘baddies’ in the eyes of society” (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 84) no longer becomes a constraining factor. In fact going further beyond mere bribery, the members of the group may deliberately seek to sustain a reputation of being corrupt in order to extract or extort bribes from their “trading” part-

ners (ibid). Consequently, even a “one-shot” enforcement of anti-corruption laws leading to some measure of short term reduction in corrupt activities would have no permanent impact as corruption “ratchets up” rather than “down” (Tirole 1996: 3, 10).

Path dependency and change: Kurt Lewin revisited

Path dependency implies stability, persistence, and continuity. Decisions are influenced by earlier decisions, forcing corrupt behavior and fomenting a corrupt culture, reproduced in a self-generative form. It becomes institutionalized as its structures, actions and roles proliferate. The question of dealing with institutionalized corruption becomes one of how to break its path dependency and the ‘rigidities’ it creates. What tools, if any, may serve this purpose? How may it be possible to bring about or allow for an endogenous process of “creative destruction” capable of undermining corruption “*from within*” (Schumpeter 1970: 83) with or without necessarily having to demolish an entire administrative structure, such as the bureaucracy for instance, with it? In a society where corruption is pervasive, connecting the concept of the collective to Lewin’s theory of change may help contribute to developing such contextual tools.

In his model, Lewin underscores the broad conditions that could bring about change in human behavior in terms of a balance of opposing, driving and restraining forces. He observes that it was more important to remove the “restraining” forces which resisted change than merely to consolidate the opposing “driving” forces, even though change from an earlier equilibrium was possible only when the latter were more powerful than the former (Schein 1999). The model comprises of three steps: 1) unfreeze (create a felt need for change), 2) change (attitudinal or behavioral modification or conversion) and, 3) freeze (institutionalizing and reinforcing the change in behavior) (Schein 1999; Mathews 2009: 7). The first step disconfirms, the second drives, and the third locks-in.

Unfreezing a corrupt situation, or the path dependent status quo equilibrium, takes place under “complex psychological” (agent) as well as structural conditions. This is due to the fact that a driving force in one direction almost inevitably produces counter restraining forces in the opposite direction in order to preserve the equilibrium (Schein 1999). Those involved in corrupt behavior will resist any type of change that would disrupt the benefits that accrue to them from such an attitude. Unless, of course, some increased benefit or cost is sufficiently involved

and a fundamental change in their perceptions of the situation has been brought about.⁴ The purpose here is to increase the driving forces, reduce their restraining counterparts, and to introduce “implicit” as well as “explicit” consciousness altering modifications (Mathews 2009: 7; Anderson, Klein & Stuart 2000). The latter involves creating an awareness that corruption “demoralizes the human spirit” even if the waste it causes in terms of energy and resources is not individually clearly observable (Johnson 2004: x). This constitutes the motivational, disconfirming stage.

Change involves moving to a new equilibrium through some form of “institutional conversion” (Thelen 2003: 228), “reeducation” (Coghlan & Jacob 2005) or, environmental shift. An ecological shift shocks institutions into conversion away from earlier objectives toward other ends by confronting actors with different sets of issues and problems, causing them to re-conceptualize the entire institutional culture in favor of a behavioral change (Thelen 2003: 228). It creates a situation of so called “survival anxiety” (Schein 1999). This means that the path dependent status quo, corruption in this case, must be perceived or deemed not only inappropriate and unethical, but also very costly, both individually and collectively, rendering identification with it, of any kind or form, self-defeating. Behavioral change, as a most effective way of transforming culture, or the mental programming of the mind, as Hofstede (2001: 12) has designated it, is to be followed by or commensurately associated with a process of reeducation: the “unlearning” of “patterns of thinking and acting that are well established in individuals and groups and operates at the level of norms and values expressed in action” (Coghlan & Jacob 2005: 446). In other words, change, whether environmental or institutional requires, as the content of such a change, both behavioral and values conversions, with the whole idea being to increase the cost of the path dependent status quo to intolerable levels.

Refreezing is the final stage which attempts to stall the possibility of reverting to an earlier or initial stage. It formally or informally co-opts (Selznick 2007: 143) the agents subjected to behavioral and values changes into the new institutional structure, through different policies and procedures, as well as through commitment to and following up on replacing old attitudes with new alternatives. Together these elements constitute the new legitimating and stabilizing tools and mechanisms. It is worth noting that this three-step model has been frequently and

⁴ Lewin observed behavior and change to be a function of the individual (agent) and the environment (structure). He set the formula as follows: $B = f(P, E)$ where behavior (B) is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E) (Coghlan & Jacob 2005: 446).

quite effectively used for political objectives of control, with various tools and mechanisms applied to politicize or depoliticize i.e. sway a populous in one way or another. It would be a relevant exercise to apply it to administrative ethics in an attempt to de-corrupt or sanitize a corrupt environment, as well. Some tools will be suggested in what follows which may serve the purposes of innovation in this respect; innovation being “the effort to create purposeful, focused change in an enterprise's economic or social potential” (Drucker 2002: 96).

Collective responsibility, collective punishment, and modified vendetta

Lewin constructed his model with the purpose of analytically identifying the steps that ought to be followed in order to bring about a desired change. However, he did not provide clear terms about what the agents of change should do in detail in order to accomplish such an objective (Levasseur 2001: 73; Mathews 2009: 8). In order to help launch the unfreezing stage where the “natural defense mechanisms” and “mental set” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998: 142) of corrupt group identifications may be surmounted, the notion of the ‘collective’ needs to be reinstated as a tool of change.

Collective sanctions refer to a situation in which “when an individual violates or complies with a rule, not merely the individual but other members of that person’s group as well are collectively punished or rewarded by an external agent” (Heckathorn 1988: 535–536). Its punitive aspect aims at pervasive corruption as an intentional and willful act of wrongdoing. In a collective sense it involves the perpetrator, the accomplice as well as possibly the witness or ‘fellow traveler.’ The latter may have not been a direct accomplice or culprit, yet becomes indirectly so, given that he could have done something to stop or report the wrongdoing but chose not to. In addition, the environment in which all three parties practice their agency also exerts a crucial influence.

Pervasive societal and organizational corruption therefore, is to be perceived from the different perspective of collective responsibility and collective punishment, as a means of changing the environment structure by altering agents’ behavior and increasing the cost of maintaining the status quo. This requires a major effort, and if fighting corruption is to constitute such an effort, punishment may well have to be *disproportionate*. Collective sanctions as a representation of disproportionality based on the principle that corruption is a collective responsibility helps “unfreeze” a situation and break path dependencies and patterns, as a prelude to changing behavior toward a new equilibrium. This is the case, because a one time or sporadic anti-corruption campaigns by an autonomous or semi-autonomous

supervisory agency may reduce the level of corruption during the operation, but frequently have no effect thereafter (Tirole 1996: 11).

Disproportionate sanctions can work both ways; not only in the direction of punishment but also in that of “amnesty”. According to Tirole’s study, amnesty, if feasible and depending on types of corruption involved, may be “*welfare enhancing out of [the] steady state*” of corruption (Tirole 1996: 12). Offered to those who had committed acts of corruption at some initial point say, time zero, “*yields a Pareto improvement,*” and enables a group to return immediately to the low corruption steady state (ibid).⁵ Certainly, an amnesty is not possible in all cases, and should not be offered to highly influential individuals/citizens as this would be a sign that they get away with their misdeeds. Any subsequent anti-corruption discourse would consequently lose its credibility, when the essence of any such endeavor is what has just been lost. As a result, no trust is likely to be restored.

Amnesty in other words is not a means of escaping consequences of misdeeds. In fact, it serves the additional purpose of its opposite—disproportionate punishment. It helps to justify and set the psychological ground for applying a strict and collective form of retribution beyond any reasonable excuses that could be made. Those who commit any form of administrative corruption or bribery, after time zero, would be administratively penalized individually, as well as being subjected to severe legal repercussions, but also as part of a collective form of punishment, all for having wasted their ‘second’ chance. The purpose is to help demoralize and weaken responsive defenses of a potentially corrupt (bribe sharing) cohort, as well as identifying an individual and collective focus of “responsible agency” (Moody-Adams 1994: 292).

Such a regime provides citizens belonging to a particular group with “incentives to regulate one another’s behavior,” thus enforcing norm compliance and creating a social context in which a wrongdoing individual turns his entire group into a group of wrongdoers as well. For it is to be clear that when dealing with others, a corrupt individual “never stands alone” (Heckathorn 1988: 535–536). This constitutes a form of “modified vendetta” which recalls ancient tribal and group notions of informal and ‘unofficial’ control and retaliation against aberrant behavior by an individual(s) belonging to a collective, as well as injury by ‘outsiders’ (Shipp 1987: 606).

⁵ Pareto improvement refers to a situation where a change in the allocation of goods or outcomes makes as a minimum one individual better off with no negative consequences to any other individuals.

Advocates of individual responsibility, to whom group punishment is perceived as a “primitive” and “disreputable atavism of premodern, communalist cultures,” as “anachronistic” as “punishing the innocent is immoral,” may strongly oppose the idea (Levinson 2003). This would tend to confine possible approaches to linear perspectives despite the need of applying non-linear tools to ill-structured or wicked problems such as pervasive corruption. Tools should be evaluated in relation to their “utility” not their “novelty,” as they exist for the benefit of the citizens not the other way round (Rigby 1993: 15). Yet, despite Levinson’s (2003) interesting study justifying the principle of collective sanctions, he seemed constrained by the limitations of linearity. Levinson (ibid: 6) felt obliged to speak in the language of a “forward-looking, functional perspective” perhaps in order to avoid perceptions of being backward looking and therefore adopting some form of a non-linear approach.

This however, need not be necessary in general, but particularly when dealing with pervasive corruption in societies where the idea of the collective is not strange to their culture and ethical values. In many of these societies, members can readily accept the notion of collective responsibility to an act committed by an individual within the group. Levinson (2003: 5) suggests a strategy of “delegated deterrence” as an alternative conception by which the “responsibility for deterring individual wrongdoers is effectively delegated by an external sanctioner to a group that is well-situated to implement an efficient regulatory regimen”. This is a form of an “informal monitoring” mechanism or tool, delegating the monitoring of individual members to the group. Internal informal monitoring is believed to be much more effective than formal monitoring by an external agent (Heckathorn 1988: 538), as it becomes a form of self-policing.

Sanctions, deterrence and interdependency

Collective sanctions and delegated deterrence are not the same, even if they overlap and their differences remain quite subtle. Collective sanctions create a condition designated by Lewin as “interdependence of fate,” where a heterogeneous group comes to form a psychological construct, not because of any particular similarities among its members, but due to a feeling of a common fate, or due to a strong sense that the fate of each member as well as that of the group is interdependent. The stronger the interdependence of fate, the more an individual would be expected to contribute to the group’s welfare. Delegated deterrence, in turn, strengthens this relation by creating “task interdependence” or common goals and objectives among a group of possibly diverse members. (Smith 2001: 2–3.)

Both tools link the group members' task and fate in such a way that if the group as a whole fails to perform the task of monitoring and policing corruption among itself, all members are punishable. "[N]ot because they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals – and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so" (Levinson 2003: 4). If and when such a mechanism does in fact produce a new equilibrium of norm compliance, the external agent can eventually establish significant influence over group behavior as both formal and informal regimes of control buttress each other (Heckathorn 1988: 538–539).

It is possible however, that members of the entire group would choose to '*rebel*' and decide that all of them would take bribes. Since they are all culprits, the assumption is that no one will have an incentive to bear the risk or responsibility of exposing the activity. This situation can, however, be turned into an opportunity. For one thing, if all engage in taking bribes, such a group activity would become more visible and discernable to 'integrity' agencies as well as their network of informants, thus reducing the costs and demands of monitoring. In addition, it should be made clear that collective culpability and/or connivance would lead to ratcheting punishment up not down, given that as citizens they have failed to perform their collective *task*. There is no room here for pointing the finger of blame toward somebody else. Reporting a person who takes bribes becomes simply an act of self-preservation as well as self-defense given that such a person who chooses to commit this act has at the same time chosen to jeopardize the welfare of those working with him. In this case, he has already committed a threatening and detrimental act to all others, the entire group, or the colleagues in the bureau. He has broken the code of interdependency. Thus, when one or more members of the group reports the corrupt activities of a coworker to a supervisory agency, this individual is not to be perceived necessarily as a 'whistleblower' in the strict sense of the word.⁶ Knowing this is important in minimizing psychological hindrances that may be associated with possible feelings of having betrayed a coworker.

The application of the tool of amnesty is also practical in this framework. Any individual or member of this group who exposes corruption would become automatically immune from any kind of responsibility or liability even if at one point of time, he had engaged in this very same wrongdoing. 'Honor among thieves,' or the minimal level of trust that must exist among them in order to continue to func-

⁶ On the risks of whistleblowing see Dye (2007: 318).

tion effectively as a group or as a network, is to be undermined by creating a context or a permanent environment of distrust, anxiety and uncertainty— a sort of a pervasive prisoner's dilemma. This would set path dependency under constant stress, as past collaborative behavior need not ensure the same in the future. Each member of the group will constantly recognize that at any time in the future, one or more individuals may very well decide to defect or jump ship in order to save oneself, wipe the slate clean, or for any number of reasons, personal or otherwise.

Distrust of this kind also serves to unfreeze the problem. It destabilizes the 'rules of the game,' jolts citizens out of "moral lethargy" by bringing them around to the idea that one can still be guilty for shirking responsibility or doing nothing when one should have (Houston 2002: 1, 5; Rääkkä 1997), and subverts corruption by turning it against itself. In fact, the study on collective reputations conducted by Tirole (1996) made the insightful point that in order for an organization or firm to undergo the very difficult process of trying to restore a compromised reputation, due, for instance, to lax management and/or poor workers' performance, its only choice is to mass fire its workers if it could afford the cost, even without evidence. This presumably implied firing honest workers as well. For if the organization or firm were to rely on evidence to conduct firings and to renew its labor force, this structure, as the study concluded, would never be able to restore its reputation even long after negligent management had been replaced (Tirole 1996: 17). This outcome may be in stark contrast to the Kantian maxim that "only the guilty should be punished" (Corlett 1992: 209; Altman 2007). However, rehiring the honest workers, in case they are identifiable, remains an option, and is not to be precluded.

Collective responsibility and sanctions by the same token, contribute to producing the opposite effect of increasing broader social cohesion and responsibility and consequently, social trust. Social trust encourages the building of "reputations" as important sources of "social information," "identifiability," and "control" (Kollock 1998: 199), allowing for the restoration of a measure of societal integrity and equilibrium. Collective sanctioning, to the extent that it helps strengthen the notion of collective responsibility as well as social structures, and encourages reputation building, becomes an important tool and mechanism in an environment where the costs of monitoring individual moral agency may be prohibitive. By restraining the 'having to be' mind-set, it may contribute to unfreezing the corrupt identity and its cumulative manifestations.

Conclusion

Bribery, as a representation of structural, pervasive and endemic corruption, is wicked both ethically and as a problem seeking a re-solution. The global explosion in this phenomenon, which underlies much of all other forms of wrongdoing, has rendered it a form of “routine” cultural practice generating a state of “banality of wrongdoing”. A constructed environment, where cultural ‘blindness’ as well as “blindness” to ethical alternatives is set, in order to prohibit or constrain any possible questioning of the morality of ‘cultural practices’ of the kind (Moody-Adams 1994: 298, 294). The fact that corruption is contagious and capable of producing an intricate network of interests, spanning all class distinctions and economic variations, ‘freezing’ them into a self-consolidating complex environmental and cultural setting, makes any attempt to reverse this pattern risky and extremely complicated. Particularly so, when corrupt political, administrative and governmental systems are major causes as well as effects of such a wicked outcome.

Both formal and informal forces and structures are at play as the entire society becomes enmeshed in the vicious circle of corruption. State capture not only reflects high level corruption up the hierarchical echelons, but also the state as a producer of corruption, or the corruptor state, in response to demands of transnational capital flows, with serious economic and political implications. Administrative corruption in turn constitutes the lower level mirror image with additional negative social implications. The connective hierarchy of corruption which represents the wickedness of the problem goes something like the following: global capital flow demands → administrative and organizational corruption → domestic state capture → corrupt identity → corrupt society → insane society. Governance institutionalizes all those aspects of ethical decay into a ‘frozen’ framework – a norm.

To attempt to break the vicious circle of corruption, the very concept of governance need be recognized, if not as part of the problem, then at least not the one best representation of it. The focus in this chapter on the administrative manifestations of the dilemma is made for the purposes of analytical parsimony, despite the acknowledged shortcomings of such a method in dealing with a mess of this nature. I have tried, therefore, to develop a measure of form or structure to the problem by suggesting a possible comparison of policies adopted by many regimes to depoliticize their societies and to control political action, and refocus such policies instead on de-corrupting or ‘unfreezing’ strategies that help break path-dependencies. In many ways, corruption is similar to politics or to a political situation. A comparison with politics, with its different degrees of failures and successes, may allow for learning from actual experience. The characteristic resi-

lience and complexity of political gaming between protagonist and antagonist groups is relevant to the equivalent characteristics of corruption. Like politics, it is an expression of power and interests, taken to the extreme, unconstrained by moral, ethical, or legal considerations. It is also a form of base violence, deprived of any of the virtues of war as the continuation of politics by other means – to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz. An institutionally corrupt society, in other words, is a society at war with itself against itself – a subverted and therefore insane society.

Like a political process, corruption is a resilient phenomenon that at best may be resolved, not solved. Thus, I have attempted not to lose sight of a main constraint of dealing with a wicked or ill-structured problem, and that is not to be overly ambitious about what can be accomplished. Attempts at a ‘rational’ approach to problem solving may not be of much help, as it is very difficult to delineate all strategic options or novel tools and then choose the most appropriate. This is so as not much confidence in the representation of the problem is possible from the outset, nor can the outcomes and consequences of any proposed re-solutions or strategies be initially anticipated. For in a wicked setting any response is very likely to change the nature of the problem (Camillus 2008: 104); the type of resilience capable of making a comeback even if in a different form. The alternative is to simply “experiment” with any number of feasible strategies or re-solutions despite uncertainty about what may in fact transpire (*ibid.*); a form of action learning, consistent with Kurt Lewin’s aphorism “if you want truly to understand something, try to change it”.

In choosing tools one need not be constrained by their novelty – i.e. linearity. Experimenting with older or ancient wisdom is not necessarily a vice. As a form of ‘experimentation,’ I have suggested collective responsibility and collective sanctions/punishment as potentially relevant and effective tools and mechanisms of citizen corruption control. This is particularly so when efficient formal monitoring is inadequate, for whatever reasons, and needs to be complemented with some form of “mandatory self-policing” (Feinberg 1968: 681). They are relevant because in societies with endemic corruption, a collective phenomenon of the kind necessitates a collective rather than a mere individual case by case approach.

Collective sanction norms provide and highlight the link “between the macro- and micro-social levels and between formal and informal social control.” They also contribute to “norm emergence” particularly suited to the diverse contexts of “the agent and the group subject to the agent’s sanctions,” and can integrate the experiences of these contexts, e.g. politics, war, subversion, and corruption, into some common framework in order to gain additional insight (Heckathorn 1988: 540–

541). Such insight can inform action learning. By exacting social responsibility on diverse groups of citizens, norms of social as well as moral control may support counter-corruption values and behavior by re-constructing affective solidarities as well as inter-subjective communication in pursuit of an ethical “collective purpose” (Levasseur 2004: 147). Otherwise, endemic corruption can lead to very serious implications and consequences – as far as the deserved collective dismantling of the state structure itself.

Bibliography

Ackoff, R. (1974). *Redesigning the Future*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Ahonen, P., Hyyryläinen, E. & Salminen, A. (2006). Looking for Governance: Configurations of European Welfare States. *Journal of European Social Policy* 16: 2, 173–184.

Ahonen, S. (2000). Kansalaisyhteiskunta ja hyvinvointivaltio kasvatuksen sisältöinä. [Civil society and the welfare state as the contents of education] In S. Suutarinen (Ed). *Nuoresta pätevä kansalainen: Yhteiskunnallinen opetus Suomen peruskoulussa*. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopistopaino. 9–32.

Altman, M. C. (2007). The Decomposition of the Corporate Body: What Kant Cannot Contribute to Business Ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics* 74: 3, 253–266.

Anderson, B., Klein, E. & Stuart, J. (2000). Why Change is a Consciousness Choice. *Journal for Quality and Participation* 23: 1, 32–36.

Anderson, C. J. & Tverdova, Y. V. (2003). Corruption, Political Allegiances, Attitude toward Government in Contemporary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 1. 91–109.

Anderson, J. H. & Gray, C. W. (2006). *Anticorruption in Transition 3: who is succeeding ... and why?* Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Anechiarico, F. & Jacobs, J. B. (1996). *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Annual Reports of the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 2000-2006. Available 9.7.2008: <http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/ea/english/publications/annual.htx>.

Aristotle (2009). *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Eds. Ross, D. & Brown, L. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Asad, T. (2003). *Formations of the Secular*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bhargava, V. & Bolongaita, E. (2004). *Challenging Corruption in Asia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Borg, S., Ketola, K., Kääriäinen, K., Niemelä, K. & Suhonen, S. (2007). *Uskonto, arvot ja instituutiot: Suomalaiset World Values-tutkimuksissa 1981-2005*. [Reli-

gion, Values and Institutions: Finns in the World Values researches 1981-2005.] Tampere: Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tietoaarkisto.

Bossaert, D. & Demmke, C. (2005). *Main Challenges in the Field of Ethics and Integrity in the EU Member States*. Maastricht: EIPA.

Bouckaert, G. & Van de Walle, S. (2003). Comparing Measures of Citizen Trust and User Satisfaction as Indicators of 'Good Governance': Difficulties in Linking Trust and Satisfaction Indicators. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 69: 3, 329–343.

Brannan, T., John, P. & Stoker, G. (2006). Active Citizenship and Effective Public Services and Programmes: How Can We Know What Really Works? *Urban Studies* 43: 5/6, 993–1008.

Bruce, W. (Ed) (2001). *Classics of Administrative Ethics*. Boulder: Westview press.

Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1985). *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life*. Aldershot: Gower.

Caiden, G. E. (1991). *Administrative Reform Comes of Age*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Caiden, G. E. (2001a). Dealing with Administrative Corruption. In Cooper, T. L. (ed). *Handbook of Administrative Ethics*. New York, Basel: Marcel Dekker. 429–455.

Caiden, G. E. (2001b). Corruption and Governance. In Caiden, G. E., Dwivedi, O. P. & Jabbara, J. (Eds). *Where Corruption Lives*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. 15–37.

Caiden, G. E., Dwivedi, O.P. & Jabbara, J. (Eds) (2001). *Where Corruption Lives*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Camillus, J. C. (2008). Strategy as a Wicked Problem. *Harvard Business Review* 86: 5, 98–106.

Chang, E. C.C. & Chu, Y. (2006). Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies? *The Journal of Politics* 68: 2, 259–271.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2002). New Public Management. Puzzles of democracy and the influence of citizens. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 10: 3, 267–296.

Christensen, T. & Lægreid, P. (2005). Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography. *Public Performance and Management Review* 28: 4, 487–511.

Churchman, C. W. (1967). Wicked Problems. *Management Science* 14: 4, B-141–B-142.

Clark, I. (1999). *Globalization and International Relations Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clarke, M. & Stewart, J. (2003). Handling the Wicked Issues. In Reynolds, J., Henderson, J., Seden, J., Charlesworth, J. & Bullman, A. (Eds). *The Managing Care Reader*. London: Routledge. 273–280.

Clark, W. A. & Jos, P. H. (2000). Comparative Anti-Corruption Policy: The American, Soviet and Russian Cases. *International Journal of Public Administration* 23: 1, 101–148.

Cleaver, E. & Nelson, J. (2006). Active Citizenship: From Policy to Practice. *Education Journal* 98, 34–37.

Coghlan, D. & Jacob, C. (2005). Kurt Lewin on Reeducation. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 41: 4, 444–457.

Cooper, T. L. (Ed) (2001). *Handbook of Administrative Ethics*. 2nd ed. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Cooper, T. L. (2006). *The Responsible Administrator: An Approach to Ethics for the Administrative Role*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Corlett, J. A. (1989). The “Modified Vendetta Sanction” as a Method of Corporate Collective Punishment. *Journal of Business Ethics* 8: 12, 937–942.

Corlett, J. A. (1992). Collective Punishment and Public Policy. *Journal of Business Ethics* 11: 3, 207–216.

Cummings, T. (2004). Organization Development and Change: Foundations and Applications. In Boonstra, J. J. (Ed). *Dynamics of Organizational Change and Learning*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 25–42.

De Vries, M. S. (2002). Can You Afford Honesty? A Comparative Analysis of Ethos and Ethics in Local Government. *Administration & Society* 34: 3, 309–334.

Demmke, C., Bovens, M., Henökl, T., van Lierop, K., Moilanen, T. & Salminen, A. (2007). *Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union: A Comparative Study of the Rules and Standards of Professional Ethics for the Holders of Public Office in the EU-27 and EU Institutions*. European Commission.

Derlien, H-U. (1992). Observations on the State of Comparative Administration Research in Europe – Rather Comparable than Comparative. *Governance* 5: 3, 279–311.

Dobel, P. J. (1978). The Corruption of a State. *The American Political Science Review* 72: 3, 958–973.

Dobel, P. J. (1999). *Public Integrity*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dogan, M. & Pelassy, D. (1984). *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers.

Drucker, P. F. (2002). The Discipline of Innovation. Drucker, P. F. (2002). *Harvard Business Review*. Special Issue: The Innovative Enterprise 80: 8, 95–102.

Dye, K. M. (2007). Corruption and Fraud Detection by Supreme Audit Institutions. In Shah, Anwar (Ed). *Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 303–322.

Fawcett, G. & Wardman, M. (2008). Ethical Governance in Local Government in England: A Regulator's View. In L. Huberts, Maesschalck, J. & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (Eds). *Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives Across Frontiers*. Cornwall: Edward Elgar. 123–142.

Feinberg, J. (1968). Collective Responsibility. *The Journal of Philosophy* 65: 21, 674–688.

Fernandes, R. & Simon, H. A. (1999). A study of how individuals solve complex and ill-structured problems. *Policy Sciences* 32: 3, 225–245.

Frederickson, G. H. & Ghere, R. K. (Eds.) (2005). *Ethics in Public Management*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

French, P. A. (1985). The Hester Prynne Sanction. *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 4: 2, 19–32.

Fromm, E. (1955). *The Sane Society*. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

Galtung, F. (2006). Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices. In Sampford C., Shacklock A., Connors C. & Galtung F (Eds). *Measuring Corruption*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 100–130.

Gant, G. (1979). *Development Administration: Concepts, Goals and Methods*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Garofalo, C. (2003). Toward a Global Ethic: Perspectives on Values, Training and Moral Agency. *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 16: 7, 490–501.

Gensler, H. J. (2006). *Ethics: A contemporary introduction*. London: Routledge.

Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. O. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: an Analytical Framework. In Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R.O. (Eds.). *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Graaf, G. de (2007). Causes of Corruption: Towards a Contextual Theory of Corruption. *Public Administration Quarterly* 31: 1, 39–86.

Graaf, G. de & Huberts, L. (2008). Portraying the Nature of Corruption Using an Explorative Case Study Design. *Public Administration Review* 68: 4, 640–653.

Grant, R. W. (2008). *Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

GRECO (2003). *Ensimmäinen arviointikierros: Suomea koskeva vaatimustenmukaisuuskertomus*. [First Evaluation Round: Requirement Report on Finland] Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

GRECO (2009). *Third Evaluation Round: Compliance Report on Finland. Incriminations & Transparency of Party Funding*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Harford, T. (2006). *The Economics of Trust*. Available 10.6.2010: http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/22/trust-economy-markets-tech_cx_th_06trust_0925harford.html.

Harisalo, R. & Stenvall, J. (2001). *Luottamus kansalaisyhteiskunnan peruskivenä: Kansalaisten luottamus ministeriöihin*. [Trust as the Cornerstone of Civil Society: Citizens Trust in Ministries]. Helsinki: Edita.

Heady, F. (2001). *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*. 7th ed. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Heckathorn, D. D. (1988). Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner's Dilemma Norms. *The American Journal of Sociology* 94: 3, 535–562.

Heikkilä, M. (2005). Valtio vastaa, mutta mistä? [The state is responsible – but for what?] *Yhteiskuntapolitiikka* 70: 1, 1–2.

Heintzman, R. & Marson B. (2005). People, Service and Trust: Is there a Public Sector Service Value Chain? *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 71: 4, 549–575.

Helander, V. (2003). Public Sector Reforms and the Third Sector. *Finnish Local Government Studies* 31: 4, 290–297.

Held, V. (2006). *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hellman, J. & Kaufmann, D. (2001). Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies. *Finance & Development* [Internet publication] 38: 3. Available 10.6.2010: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm>

Hellman, J. S., Jones, G. & Kaufmann, D. (2000). *Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition Economies*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2444. Available 10.6.2010: <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17638/seize.pdf>.

Hoffman, D. (2000). Putin Aims to Assure Tycoons: Russian Disavows Pressure by Police. *Washington Post* 29.7.2000, A1.

Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. London: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (1991). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Holmes, L. (1993). *The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaign and Legitimation Crisis*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Houston, B. (2002). Taking Responsibility. *Philosophy of Education Yearbook 2002*. Available 3.6.2010: <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/2002/01-houston%2002.pdf>.

Huberts, L., Lasthuizen K. & Peeters C. (2006). Measuring Corruption: Exploring the Iceberg. In Sampford C., Shacklock A., Connors C. & Galtung F. (Eds). *Measuring Corruption*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 256–293.

Huberts, L., Maesschalck J. & Jurkiewicz C. L. (Eds.) (2008). *Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives Across Frontiers*. Cornwall: Edward Elgar.

Hulten, M. van (2007). *Ten years of Corruption (Perceptions) Indices. Methods – Results – What Next? An analysis*. Available 5.11.2010: http://www.partos.nl/uploaded_files/Ten%20years%20of%20Corruption%20%28Perceptions%29%20Indices.pdf

Hyvä kunnallinen hallintotapa (1993). [Good Local Governance: Ethical Principles in Action.] Helsinki: The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.

Ikola-Norrbacka, R. & Salminen, A. (2007). Kuntapalvelujen strategiset vaihtoehdot. *Kunnallistieteellinen aikakauskirja* 35: 1, 57–70.

Ikola-Norrbacka, R. (2010). *Johtamisen eettisyys terveydenhuollossa: Esimiestyön ja hallinnon eettiset arvot julkisen terveydenhuollon kahdessa professionissa*.

[Ethical Management in Healthcare Organizations: Ethical Values of Administration and Management in two Professions of Public Health Care]. *Acta Wasaensia* 222. Julkisohtaminen 14. Vaasa: University of Vaasa.

Isaksson, P. (1997). *Korruptio ja julkinen valta*. [Corruption and Public Power.] Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto.

Jackson, T. & Artola, M. C. (1997). Ethical Beliefs and Management Behavior: A Cross-Cultural Comparison. *Journal of Business Ethics* 16: 11, 1163–1173.

Jenkins, R. (2007). The Role of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability. In Shah, A. (Ed). *Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 135–181.

Johnson, R. A. (2004). *Struggle against Corruption: A Comparative Study*. Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnston, M. (1999). A Brief History of anticorruption Mechanisms. In Schedler, A. & Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. F. (Eds). *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 217–226.

Jreisat, J. E. (2005). Comparative Public Administration Is Back In, Prudently. *Public Administration Review* 65: 2, 231–242.

Kakabadse, A., Korac-Kakabadse, N. & Kouzmin, A. (2003). Ethics, Values and Behaviours: Comparison of Three Case Studies Examining the Paucity of Leadership in Government. *Public Administration* 81: 3, 477–508.

Kallio, J. (2010). *Hyvinvointipalvelujärjestelmän muutos ja suomalaisten mielipiteet 1996–2006*. [Change of welfare services and the evolution of public opinion in Finland, 1996–2006.] KELAn tutk. 108. Helsinki. Available 10.2.2010: <http://hdl.handle.net/10138/15810>

Kant, I. (2005). *The Moral Law: Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*. Paton, H. J. (Ed). Milton Park: Routledge.

Kantola, A. & Kautto M. (2002). *Hyvinvoinnin valinnat: Suomen malli 2000-luvulla*. [Choices for welfare: the Finnish model in the 21st Century.] Helsinki: Edita.

Kasulis, T. P. (2002). *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Kaufmann, D. (2004). Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World. In *The Global Competitiveness Report 2004/2005*. The World Bank. 83–102.

Keränen, M. (2001). Vertaileva ja poikkikulttuurinen tutkimus: Kaksi tapaa lähestyä muita maita. [Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research. Two Ways of Approaching Other Countries.] *Politiikka* 43: 2, 82–92.

Khalil, F., Lawrree, J. & Yun, S. (2010). Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils. *The Rand Journal of Economics* 41: 1, 179–198.

Kim, U., Helgesen G. & Ahn B. M. (2002). Democracy, Trust, and Political Efficacy: Comparative Analysis of Danish and Korean Political Culture. *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 51: 2, 318–353.

Kjær, A. M. (2004). *Governance*. Bodmin: Polity Press.

Klitgaard, R.(2000). Subverting Corruption. *Finance & Development* [Internet publication] 37: 2, 2–5. Available 10.6.2010: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/klitgaar.htm>

Kollock, P. (1998). Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, 183–214.

Kolthoff, E., Huberts L. & Heuvel, H. van den (2007). The Ethics of New Public Management: Is Integrity at Stake? *Public Administration Quarterly* 30: 4, 399–439.

Korruptiotilannekuva [Report on the Corruption Situation in Finland] (2008). National Bureau of Investigation. Available 4.6.2008: [http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/krp/home.nsf/files/Korruptiotilannekuva%20PDF%202008/\\$file/Korruptiotilannekuva%20PDF%202008.pdf](http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/krp/home.nsf/files/Korruptiotilannekuva%20PDF%202008/$file/Korruptiotilannekuva%20PDF%202008.pdf).

Laine, S. & Dorff, J. (2008). Osallistuva nuoruus. [Participative youth]. In Autio, M., Eräranta, K. & Myllyniemi, S. (Eds). *Polarisoituva nuoruus*. Nuorten elinolo -vuosikirja. Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisuja 84. Helsinki: Hakapaino. 118–126.

Landell-Mills P. & Serageldin I. (1991). Governance and the External Factor. *Proceedings of World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Landman, T. (2005). *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Langseth, P. (2007). Measuring Corruption. In Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. & Galtung, F (Eds). *Measuring Corruption*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 7–44.

Lawton, A. (1998). *Ethical Management for the Public Services*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Lawton, A. & Doig, A. (2006). Researching Ethics for Public Service Organizations: The View from Europe. *Public Integrity* 8: 1, 11–33.

- Lawton, A., Macaulay, M. & Palidauškaite, J. (2009). *Towards a comparative methodology for public service ethics*. Paper presented at the EGPA Conference in Malta 2.–5.9.2009. Available 2.6.2010: <http://www.egpa2009.com/documents/psg7/Lawton-Macaulay.pdf>
- Lennerfors, T. (2008). *The Vicissitudes of Corruption: Degeneration, transgression, jouissance*. Published PhD dissertation. Stockholm: Arvinius.
- Levasseur, R. E. (2001). People Skills: Change Management Tool. Lewin's Change Model. *Interfaces* 31: 4, 71–73.
- Levasseur, R. E. (2004). People Skills: Change Management Tool. The Modern Leadership Model. *Interfaces*, 34: 2, 147–148.
- Levin, M. & Satarov, G. (2000). Corruption and Institutions in Russia. *European Journal of Political Economy* 16: 1, 113–132.
- Levinson, D. J. (2003). *Collective Sanctions*. NYU Law School, Public Law, Research Paper No. 57. Available 10.6.2010: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=389980
- Lewis, C. W. & Gilman, S. C. (2005). *The Ethics Challenge in Public Service: A Problem-Solving Guide*. 2nd, rev. ed. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Listhaug, O. (1984). Confidence in Institutions: Findings from the Norwegian Values Study. *Acta Sociologica* 27: 2, 111–122.
- Lähdesmäki, K. (2003). *New Public Management ja julkisen sektorin uudistaminen*. [New Public Management and reforming public sector management.] Acta Wasaensia No 113. Hallintotiede 7. Vaasan yliopisto. Vaasa.
- Lähdesmäki, K. (2010). *Hyvää hallintoa – Ketä kiinnostaa? Nuorten käsityksiä hyvästä hallinnosta ja reilusta yhteiskunnasta*. [Good administration – Who cares? Youth perceptions on good administration and a fair society.] Vaasan yliopiston julkaisuja. Tutkimuksia 292 Julkisojohtaminen 38. Vaasa.
- Maesschalck, J. (2004). Approaches to Ethics Management in the Public Sector. *Public Integrity* 7: 1, 21–41.
- Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. *Theory and Society* 29: 4, 507–548.
- Maor, M. (2004). Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective. *Governance* 17: 1, 1–28.
- Maravić, P. von (2008). Studying Methods, not Ethics: Exploring the Methodological Character of Administrative Ethics Research. *Public Integrity* 11: 1, 9–33.

- Mathews, J. (2009). Models of Change Management: A Reanalysis. *The IUP Journal of Business Strategy*, 6: 2, 7–17.
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110: 681–711.
- Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research. *Finance & Development* 3, 11–14. World Bank Publications.
- Menzel, D. C. (2001). Ethics Management in Public Organizations: What, Why, and How? In Cooper, T. (Ed.). *Handbook of Administrative Ethics*. New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Menzel, D. C. (2005). State of the Art of Empirical Research on Ethics and Integrity in Governance. In Frederickson, H. G. & Ghere, R. K. (Eds.). *Ethics in Public Management*. Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 16–46.
- Menzel, D. C. (2007). *Ethics Management for Public Administrators: Building Organizations of Integrity*. Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Mill, J. S. & Bentham, J. (1987). *Utilitarianism and Other Essays*. Ryan, A. (Ed.) London: Penguin Books.
- Ministry of Finance (2000). *Civil Service Ethics*. Helsinki: Ministry of Finance.
- Ministry of Finance (2007). *Values in the Daily Work of the Civil Servant: Analysis of Current Status of Civil Service Ethics*. Research and Studies 4/2007. Helsinki.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2005). *Combating Corruption: The Finnish Experience*. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
- Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B. & Lampel, J. (1998). *Strategy Safari*. London: Prentice Hall.
- Mizzoni, J. (2010). *Ethics: The Basics*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Moilanen, T. & Salminen A. (2007). *Comparative Study on the Public Service Ethics of the EU Member States*. Research and Studies 1/2007. Helsinki: Ministry of Finance.
- Moody-Adams, M. M. (1994). Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance. *Ethics* 104: 2, 291–309.
- Morgan, G. (2006). *Images of Organization*. Updated ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Mulgan, R. (2005). Outsourcing and Public Service Values: the Australian Experience. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 71: 1, 55–70.

National Youth Barometer (2006). Ed. Wilska, T-A. The Department of Education, The National Advisory Council for Youth Affairs. Helsinki.

Niemi, S. (2008). *Dimensions of Citizen Participation: The Comparative Study of the Nordic Village Action Associations*. Vaasan yliopiston julkaisu. Tutkimuksia 287. Administrative Science 36.

Noddings, N. (2002). *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Noddings, N. (2003). *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

O'Higgins, E. R. E. (2006). Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries: Addressing the Vicious Cycle. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 16: 2, 235–254.

OECD (2000). Building Public Trust: Ethics Measures in OECD Countries. *PU-MA Policy Brief* 7. Available 10.6.2010: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/24/35061342.pdf>.

OECD (2007). *Draft Checklist for Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement*. *OECD Papers* 7: 7, 1–35.

Ollila, A. K. (2008). *Kerrottu tulevaisuus. Alueet ja nuoret, menestys ja marginaalit*. [Reality explained. Regions and youth, success and the margins.] *Acta Universitatis Lappeensis* 141 & Nuorisotutkimusverkosto, julkaisu 85. Rovaniemi: Lapin yliopistokustannus.

Osborn, M. (2004). New Methodologies for Comparative Research? Establishing 'Constants' and 'Contexts' in Educational Experience. *Oxford Review of Education* 30: 2, 265–285.

Oxford English Dictionary. Online edition.

Paakkunainen, K. (Ed) (2007). *Sukupuolipolitiikka: Nuoret ja eduskuntavaalit 2007*. [Generation politics: The youth and the elections 2007.] Nuorisotutkimusverkosto / Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisu 72. Helsinki.

Paine, L. S. (1994). Managing for Organizational Integrity. *Harvard Business Review* 72: 2, 106–117.

Paloheimo, H. (2005). Poliittinen osallistuminen ja demokratia. [Political participation and democracy.] *Kunnallistieteellinen aikakauskirja* 33: 2, 126–130.

Peters, B. G. (1988). *Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems of Theory and Method*. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.

- Peters, B. G. (2001). *The Future of Governing*. 2nd, rev. ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Pickvance, C. G. (2001). Four Varieties of Comparative Analysis. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 16: 1, 7–28.
- Plant, J. F. (2001). Codes of Ethics. In Cooper, T. L. (Ed). *Handbook of Administrative Ethics*. New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2004). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Przeworski, A. & Teune H. (1970a). Equivalence in Cross-National Research. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30: 4, 551–568.
- Przeworski, A. & Teune H. (1970b). *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Quah, J.S.T. (1999). Comparing Anti-Corruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lessons to be Learnt. *Asian Review of Public Administration* 11: 2, 71–90.
- Richter, W. L. & Burke, F. (Eds.) (2007). *Combating Corruption, Encouraging Ethics: A Practical Guide to Management Ethics. Second Edition*. New York: The American Society for Public Administration. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Rigby, D. K. (1993). How to Manage the Management Tools. *Planning Review* 21: 6, 8–15.
- Rigby, D. K. (1994). Managing the Management Tools. *Planning Review* 22: 5, 20–24.
- Rigby, D. K. (2001). Management Tools and Techniques: A Survey. *California Management Review* 43: 2, 139–160.
- Riggs, F. W. (1962). Prismatic Society and Financial Administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5: 1, 1–46.
- Rijckeghem, C. van & Weder, B. (1997). Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? *IMF Working Paper* 97/73. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
- Rittel, H. W. J. & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences* 4: 2, 155–169.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001). Trust and Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies. *Kyklos* 54: 2/3, 415–444.

Rothstein, B. (2005). *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rothstein, B. & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). *All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust*. *World Politics* 58: 1, 41–72.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1997). *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*. Edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rowat, D. C. (1965). *The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Rowson, R. (2006). *Working Ethics: How to Be Fair in a Culturally Complex World?* London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

Rutgers, M. R. (2004). Comparative Public Administration: Navigating Scylla and Charybdis – Global Comparison as a Translation Problem. *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 26: 2, 150–168.

Räikkä, J. (1997). On Disassociating Oneself from Collective Responsibility. *Social Theory and Practice* 23:1, 93–108.

Saarela, P. (2004). Nuorisobarometrit vuosina 1994–2002. [Youth barometers in the years 1994–2002.] In Wilska, T.-A. (Ed). *Oman elämänsä yrittäjät? Nuorisobarometri 2004*. Opetusministeriö, Nuorisotutkimusverkosto, Nuorisoasiain neuvottelukunta. Julkaisuja 28. Helsinki: Edita. 111–135.

Sabet, A. G. E. (2008). *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations*. London: Pluto Press.

Salminen, A. (1999). *Vertailevan metodin tutkimuksellinen perusta? Johdatusta hallintotieteellisen vertailun metodologiaan*. [Theoretical grounds of the comparative method? Introduction to comparison in administrative sciences]. Vaasan yliopiston julkaisuja, Tutkimuksia 223, Hallintotiede 25. Vaasa.

Salminen, A. (2006). Accountability, Values and the Ethical Principles of Public Service: The Views of Finnish Legislators. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 72: 2, 171–185.

Salminen, A. (2009). *Julkisen johtamisen etiikka*. [Ethics of Public Management.] Vaasa, Vaasan yliopiston julkaisuja, Opetusjulkaisuja 60, Hallintotiede 3.

Salminen, A. & Ikola-Norrbacka, R. (2009a). *Kuullanko meitä? Eettinen hallinto ja kansalaiset*. [Are we being heard? Ethical governance and citizens.] Vaasan yliopiston julkaisuja. Tutkimuksia 288. Hallintotiede 37. Vaasa.

Salminen, A. & Ikola-Norrbacka, R. (2009b). Trust and Integrity Violations in Finnish Public Administration: The Views of Citizens. *Halduskultuur* 10, 74–93.

Salminen, A. & Ikola-Norrbacka R. (2010). Trust, Good Governance and Unethical Actions in Finnish Public Administration. *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 23: 7, 647–668.

Salminen, A. & Temmes, M. (1994). The Evolution of Public Administration and Administrative Research in Finland: A Historical Overview. In Modeen T. (ed). *Public Administration in Finland*. Helsinki: Ministry of Finance.

Salminen, A. & Viinamäki, O-P. (2001). Market Orientation in the Finnish Public Sector: From Public Agency to Privatized Company. Research Reports 2/2001. Ministry of Finance, Finland.

Salminen, A., Viinamäki, O-P. & Ikola-Norrbacka, R. (2007). The Control of Corruption in Finland. *Revista Administratia si Management Public (Administration and Public Management Review)* 5: 9, 81–96.

Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. & Galtung F. (Eds) (2007). *Measuring Corruption*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Santas, G. (2010). *Understanding Plato's Republic*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Sartori, G. (1985). Faulty Conceptions. In Lewis, P. G., Potter, D. C. & Castles, F. G. (Eds). *The Practice of Comparative Politics*. Burnt Mill Harrow: Longman. 228–265.

Schein, E. H. (1999). Kurt Lewin's Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom: Notes Toward a Model of Managed Learning. *Reflections* 1: 1, 59–74.

Schmitt, M. (2010). Transparency for What. *The American Prospect* 21: 2, A10–11.

Schumpeter, J. (1970). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London: Unwin University Books.

Schwartz, H. (2005). Globalization: The Long View. In Stubbs, R. & Underhill, G. (Eds). *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Available 10.6.2010: <http://people.virginia.edu/~hms2f/globalization.html>

Schwartz, R. (2003). *Breaches of Integrity and Accountability Institutions: Auditors, Anti-Corruption Agencies and Commissions of Inquiry*. Paper presented in EGPA Conference, Oieras, September 2003.

Segal, G. (1998). Not Bombs But Baywatch. *Newsweek* 8.3.1998.

Selznick, P. (2007). The Cooptative Mechanism. In Shafritz, J. M. & Hyde, A. C. (Eds). *Classics of Public Administration*. 6th ed. (international student edition). Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth. 143–149.

Shipp, S. (1987). Modified Vendettas as a Method of Punishing Corporations. *Journal of Business Ethics* 6: 8, 603–612.

Simon, H. A. (1973). The Structure of Ill Structured Problems. *Artificial Intelligence* 4: 3/4, 181–201.

Simon, H. A. (1997). *Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations*. 4th ed. New York: The Free Press.

Six, F. & Huberts L. (2008). Judging a Public Official's Integrity. In Huberts, L., Maesschalck, J. & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (Eds). *Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives Across Frontiers*. Cornwall: Edward Elgar. 65–82.

Slote, M. (2007). *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Smith, M. K. (2001). *Kurt Lewin: Groups. Experiential Learning and Action Research*. [Internet publication] Available 10.6.2010: <http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-lewin.htm>.

Snare, F. (1992). *Nature of Moral Thinking*. Florence: Routledge.

Solomon, R. C. (1999). *Better Way to Think about the Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stinchcombe, A. (1968). *Constructing Social Theories*. New York: Harcourt.

Stohs, J. & Brannick, T. (1999). Codes of Conduct: Predictors of Irish Managers' Ethical Reasoning. *Journal of Business Ethics* 22: 4, 311–326.

Svensson, G. & Wood, G. (2004). Codes of Ethics best practice in the Swedish Public Sector: A PUBSEC-Scale. *The International Journal of Public Sector Management* 17: 2, 178–195.

Svensson, J. (2005). Eight Questions about Corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19: 3, 19–42.

Tax Justice Network (2005). *Corruption and the Offshore Interface*. [Internet publication] Available 10.6.2010: http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=100.

Thelen, K. (2003). How Institutions Evolve. In Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (Eds). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. 208–240.

Tiihonen, S. (2003). Central Government Corruption in Historical Perspective. In Tiihonen, S. (Ed). *The History of Corruption in Central Government*. Amsterdam: IOS Press. 1–36.

Tiihonen, S. (2004). *From Governing to Governance: a process of change*. Tampere: Tampere University Press.

Tirole, J. (1996). A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality). *Review of Economic Studies* 63: 1, 1–22.

Torke, H-J. (1989). Administration and Bureaucracy in 19th Century Russia: The Empire and the Finnish Case. In Tiihonen, S. (Ed). *Institutions and Bureaucrats: Institutions and Bureaucrats in the History of Administration*. Helsinki: Commission on the History of Central Administration in Finland.

Transparency International (2008). Corruption Perception Index. Available 29.5.2008: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007/regional_highlights_factsheets.

UNDP (1997). *Corruption and Good Governance*. Discussion Paper 3. Management Development and Governance Division. Bureau for Policy and Programme Support.

UNESCAP (2010). *What is Good Governance?* [Electronic publication.] Available 10.6.2010: <http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.pdf>.

af Ursin, K. (2007). *Moraali, hyveet ja eettiset normit liikkeenjohdon konsultoinnissa*. [Morality, virtues and ethical norms in management consulting.] Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1243. Tampere: Tampere University Press.

Van de Walle, S. (2008). Perceptions of Corruption as Distrust? Cause and Effect in Attitudes Toward Government. In Huberts, L., Maesschalck, J. & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (Eds). *Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives Across Frontiers*. Cornwall: Edward Elgar. 215–236.

Van de Walle, S., van Roosbroek, S. & Bouckaert G. (2008). Trust in the public sector: is there any evidence for a long-term decline. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 74: 1, 47–64.

Van Wart, M. (1996). “Reinventing” in the public sector: The Critical Role of Values Restructuring. *Public Administration Quarterly* 19: 4, 456–478.

Warren, M. E. (2006). Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption. *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 1, 160–174.

Vartola, J. & af Ursin, K. (1987). Hallintovirkamieskunta Suomessa: Suomen Akatemian rahoittaman tutkimusprojektin "Virkamieskunta, hallinto ja yhteiskun-

ta" perusraportti. [Civil Service Corps in Finland: report of the project "Civil service corps, administration and the society" funded by the Academy of Finland.] Tampereen yliopisto. Julkishallinnon julkaisusarja 2/1987 A. Tampere.

Vesikansa, S. (2007). Demokratiaperiaatteen soveltaminen lasten ja nuorten kanssa toimittaessa [Applying the democracy principle when working with youth and children]. In Hoikkala H. & Sell A. (Eds). *Nuorisotyötä on tehtävä: Menetelmien perusteet, rajat ja mahdollisuudet*. Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/ Nuorisotutkimusseura, Julkaisu 76. Helsinki. 191–216.

Viinamäki, O-P. (2004). *A Theory of Coordination and Its Implications on EU Structural Policy: A Comparative Study of the Challenges for Coordination in Structural Funds in Finland, Ireland, and Sweden*. University of Vaasa. Acta Waasensia No. 132, Administrative Science 9. Vaasa.

Viinamäki, O-P. (2008). *Julkisen sektorin arvoympäristön kompleksisuus. Tutkimus julkisten organisaatioiden arvojen, johtamisteorioiden ja arvojohtajuuden erityisyydestä*. [The Complexity of Public Sector Values. A Study on the Specificity of Organizational Values, Management Theories, and Ethical Leadership in Public Organizations.] University of Vaasa. Proceedings of the University of Vaasa. Research Papers 283, Administrative Science 35. Vaasa.

Viinamäki, O-P. (2009). Intra-Organizational Challenges of Values-Based Leadership. *Journal Business Ethics and Organizational Studies* 14: 2, 6–13.

Wordsmith Words (2010a). *Kleptocracy*. Available 3.6.2010: <http://www.answers.com/topic/kleptocracy>.

Wordsmith Words (2010b). *Kakistocracy*. Available 3.6.2010: <http://www.answers.com/topic/kakistocracy>.

You, J.-S. & Khagram, S. (2005). A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption. *American Sociological Review* 70: 1, 136–157.

Zimmerman, J. F. (1982). Ethics in the Public Service. In Bruce, W. (Ed). *Classics of Administrative Ethics*. Boulder: Westview press. 220–237.

Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional Theories of Organization. *Annual Review of Sociology* 13, 443–464.

Øyen, E. (Ed.) (1990). *Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Research*. London: Sage.