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Construction of Binary Oppositions in War Reportage
A Case Study of the Media Coverage of the 2014 Gaza War

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ABSTRACT

One of the typical characteristics of war/violence-oriented journalism is to represent warring parties in binary oppositions. The purpose is to justify violence, which turns every act of the Self into a defense mechanism, while that of the Enemy into intimidation, a violation, a threat. This approach is common in mainstream reportage of wars and conflicts, in which an excessive amount of attention is paid to the duel between the assumed two sides of the war, indicating a news value bias towards negativity and violence. On the other hand, stories about the background, the context leading to the war, conflict transformation, peace resolutions, the invisible and visible effects that the war can impose on the lives of civilians receive relatively less exposure. These debates are central to the theory of peace journalism.

Premised on Johan Galtung’s concept of peace journalism, this study aims to question the role of the media in the Israel–Gaza war 2014. The data are twelve articles retrieved from the online archives of two news outlets, Haaretz and CNN. The study focuses on their representations of conflict actors and events that took place during the war, specifically in terms of four topics: the onset of the war, the battle of Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold, and lastly, Hamas. The study employs Teun van Dijk’s framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, with an emphasis on the macrosemantic structure and dimensions of discourse semantics including perspectives, lexical choices and propositional structures. The study also takes into consideration the uses of multimodal texts such as images and videos, as well as their compositional patterns within the articles.

The analyses reveal that there is an imbalance in reporting, especially in terms of perspectives, as Israeli official narratives of the war are predominant in the news discourses. Hamas, one of the main conflict actors, by contrast, often appears in a trove of antagonistic representations that are based on preconception and bias towards the organization. The two news outlets also display a difference in their approaches to the news. While a large portion of CNN’s content is devoted to the confrontation and exchange of fires between Hamas and Israel, Haaretz proves to be more creative in terms of perspectives. Additionally, by including a number of articles that propose solutions and alternatives to the conflict, the latter implies an effort to find peace and put an end to the war. The practice of Haaretz demonstrates that violence-oriented reportage is avoidable.

KEYWORDS: Media, war reportage, peace journalism, binary construction, hegemony
1 INTRODUCTION

Reporting war has never been the easiest task. Broken houses, uprooted trees, graphic images of the dead and the wounded are all abridged on a few lines of breaking news reports. If facts form the basis of it all, why does the same war incite varied attitudes and polarized sides? Physical documentation of war has always been a question of “politicized facts” (Nordstrom 1997: 45), which may explain why the images of war can appear so black and white when they are in the newspapers. Over the past five decades, despite many wars that have been waged, the Israel–Palestine conflict has never ceased to be a source of controversy that has to do more with politics than with actual atrocities. Once again, airstrikes fell on both sides of the disputed land. These are the same images and this is the same war. Reporting the Israel–Palestine conflict has somewhat become a yearly routine, sufferings reduced to numbers, history repeating itself.

Between July 8 and August 26, 2014, Israel conducted a military campaign against Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip, codenamed “Operation Protective Edge”. Within the course of fifty days, thousands of air raids and tank projectiles targeted one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Though figures vary and remain disputed\(^1\), the United Nations (UN) Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza conflict estimates a number of 2,251 Palestinians killed, including 1,462 civilians, a third of which were children (UNHRC 2015: 6). Israel also records a death toll of 73, with six civilians killed (ibid. 6). The 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict has thus become one of the deadliest for both sides, in which most death counts remain those of civilians. Being longer and more destructive than any other previous military operation to date, operation Protective Edge attracted extensive media attention. One side fired, the other responded, the endless wrangle surrounding the conflict also triggered disputes on the media covering the war. If during operation Cast Lead from 2008 to 2009, international journalists had been

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\(^1\) Israeli government’s official statistics stand at 2,125 Palestinian fatalities in the Gaza strip, with 44% (936) alleged as militants while 36% (761) assumed as civilians (State of Israel 2015: 2).
barred from Gaza throughout the military operation, they were however allowed to enter the Gaza Strip during the 2014 war (Malsin 2014). Operation Protective Edge proves to have drawn great media attention, as the number of foreign journalists covering the 2014 conflict in Gaza doubles that of previous Israeli military operations (Tucker 2014). Despite the voluminous coverage, much criticism was weighed against the press for being biased, for being one-sided.

In the face of lethality and violence, what role do the media play, particularly in stages before, during and after the war? The June 2015 report by the UN Independent Commission has found evidence of possible war crimes committed by both Israeli and Palestinian armed groups, condemning excessive uses of artillery and precision-guided missiles in residential areas (UNHRC 2015: 19). The legitimacy of this war has then been taken into consideration. In that regard, the works of the media covering the war should also be reconsidered. In the end, all of these attacks against media bias seem to overlook one question: Were the media mediating or promoting the war?

1.1 Background

Confusion over the prelude to wars and conflicts has been common in mainstream reportage (Boyd-Barrett 2004: 28). The danger of this failing, however, is grave. It affects how the war is read once surfaced to the mass audience, how it is justified as an act of self-defense rather than atrocities committed against civilians (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 15). Narratives of the context leading to the 2014 Gaza war have been numerous, as each side seeks to tell the story in their own way. As a result, it is necessary to contextualize the war within a big picture, meaning that it should not be interpreted as a single event but a combination of a sequence of events that escalated into an armed conflict.

According to an official report released last May by the Israeli government, Hamas’ increasing rockets and mortal launches into Israel from June to July 2014 form the setting
of the military operations (State of Israel 2015: x). The discovery of a number of Hamas’ underground cross-border tunnels into Israel only intensified the situation. Within the same period, on June 12, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped while hitchhiking in Alon Shvut, an Israeli settlement southwest of Jerusalem. On the following day, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) immediately embarked on the operation “Brother’s Keeper” for an intensive search of the three missing teenagers (Booth and Eglash 2014; Cohen, et al. 2014). The target of operation “Brother’s Keeper” was no doubt Hamas, whom Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu quickly blamed as the culprit behind the abduction, despite the fact that there was no evidence backing his claim at the time (Sharon 2014). Ten days into the operation, IDF rounded up hundreds of Palestinians residing in the West Bank, the majority of whom were officials and senior members of Hamas (Norman 2014; Times of Israel 2014). On June 30, the bodies of the three Israeli youths were found northwest of Hebron, and posthumous examination showed that they were killed shortly after their abduction. Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to take a tough response for the murders. (Beaumont and Crowcroft 2014)

Shortly after the incident, Israel launched operation “Protective Edge”, IDF’s military maneuvers in Gaza, on July 8, 2014. Israeli government’s official statement of operation “Protective Edge” blames the intensified rockets from Hamas and other Gaza-based armed organizations as leaving it with “no choice but to launch an aerial campaign” into the Gaza Strip so as to protect Israeli civilians (State of Israel 2015: x). There were nevertheless far too many questions clouding the idea that these events were the catalyst for the war that broke out in summer 2014. The story might go back as far as March 2014, when Benjamin Netanyahu decided to retract his commitment with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to release twenty-six Palestinian and Israeli Arab prisoners detained since before the 1993 Oslo Accords, when Abbas refused to revoke plans to pursue Palestine’s statehood before the Hague International court (Derfner 2014). Failure in the nine-month peace talks with the United States since late 2013, loomed by Netanyahu’s advance in settlement activities in the West Bank and withdrawal of the deal, led Abbas to seek alternatives. On June 2, 2014, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, also leader of
Fatah, signed a Gaza agreement with Hamas in an attempt for reconciliation after almost a decade of internal political division (Power and van Hoydoonk 2015).

Angered by this decision, Netanyahu publicly condemned Abbas and his intention to form a transitional unity government with Hamas. This was followed by a series of punitive measures against the PA which were convened by Netanyahu and approved by the Israeli security cabinet. (Hatuqa 2014) The increasing tension between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authorities may have also served as the backdrop of Israel’s massive crackdown on Hamas infrastructure and personnel in the West Bank. In this case, would operation Brother’s Keeper be used by Israeli politicians as a tactical ploy for the raids? Within the scope of both operations, Israel reportedly resorted to the use of forces and violence in the West Bank, in which twenty seven Palestinians were killed (Power and van Hoydoonk 2015). Given the complexities and the politics behind it all, any attempt to deliver a clean-cut answer for the causes of the war might run into the risk of being dogmatic. It is therefore essential to look into it from various angles. While Israel’s justification of the war points to self-defense, its actions in Gaza have however been criticized as “punitive in nature” and motivated by the reconciliation of the two Palestinian factions (Power and van Hoydoonk 2015).

1.2 The War, the Media and Public Opinions

During the Israel–Hamas war in 2014, questions on the legality of the Israeli military operation in Gaza were central to the debates surrounding it considering the death tolls of civilians on both sides. The public however displayed different reactions towards the war. Whereas the main sources of criticism levied on operation Protective Edge were coming from the international community, in Israel there was a general consensus in favor of the military operations in Gaza. During the ongoing development of the war around mid-August 2014, a poll conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) and Tel Aviv...
University, with a sample of 600 participants, found that a majority of Israeli Jews (92 percent) considered operation Protective Edge as justified (IDI 2014).

![Diagram 1: Israeli public opinion on the use of IDF’s firepower in Gaza (The Peace Index Poll by the IDI and Tel Aviv University)](chart)

When asked about the use of IDF’s firepower in operation Protective Edge thus far, forty-five percent of Israeli Jews believed that it was appropriate while forty-eight percent thought that the IDF resorted to too little firepower in the Strip. More than sixty percent of Israeli Arabs however said that the use of firepower was excessive (see Diagram 1). At the time of war, facing a public overwhelmingly identifying with the military operations, should journalists question their government’s military actions?

A fact further complicating the matter is the indirect involvement of the West who has its own shares of vested interests in this conflict. As a result, any news on the disputed land would attract a wide range of coverage by the international press. The American press in particular, displays a great interest in the conflict and this is also reflective of the American public’s attitudes towards the war. (Peterson 2015: 93)
Diagram 2: American public opinion on Israel’s military actions against Hamas and Palestinians in Gaza (CNN/ORC International Survey)

Within the period from July 18 to July 20, 2014, at the peak of the fighting in Gaza, CNN/ORC International carried out a survey through phone interviews and registered votes with a sample of 1,911 adult Americans in order to learn about the American public opinion towards the war. The poll (see Diagram 2) reveals that more than half (57 percent) of the American respondents believed that IDF’s incursion into Gaza in 2014 was just. The results are consistent with those of previous Israel’s military operations in the Strip in 2012 and 2009, operation Pillar of Defense and operation Cast Lead (CNN 2014: 3). More importantly, the dominant view among those asked (43 percent) was that the use of forces by Israeli militia in Gaza was acceptable. The results of the poll should come as no surprise either, considering how Israel has long been the United States’ biggest ally in the Middle East. According to the same report, sixty-four percent of the American voters supported the continuation of their government’s military aids to Israel (CNN 2014: 3).

While Israelis and Palestinians have their versions of the story, the American press also treats the latest news on the conflict distinctively, more or less influenced by their government’s political ideology concerning the conflict. CNN for instance, though considered “neutral” in the U.S. compared with the right-wing, “partisan agenda” like Fox
News (Allan and Zelizer 2004: 6), has been assailed as being both pro-Palestine and pro-Israel at some point (Barkho 2007; Cox 2014; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014). Though very contentious, these critiques of mainstream media undoubtedly reflect the polarization when it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian issues.

Given the political and economic interests involved, it is impossible for the media to acquire any independence (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 69). Mass media inherently depend on various external factors to function, including the relationship they maintain with conflict actors, their target audience, the editorial guidelines and more. There exists also a commercial pressure to bring in the immediate, the breaking news from the battlefield for the audience at home and abroad, at the expense of contextualizing the news within the big picture. (Puddephatt 2006: 23) The controversy surrounding the media coverage of the conflict, the insatiable public demands of honest and unbiased reporting, the constant failure of the press in doing so, have altogether made us wonder if we have asked the right questions all along.

1.3 Research Aims, Questions and Methods

Debates on the media coverage of wars and conflicts often rotate around the lack of context, the prioritization of one side of the argument over another, the emphasis on militarized actions or the deflation of morality in the warzones. Given the extensive media attention to the Israel–Palestine conflict in the past decade, there has been a vast body of works studying the coverage of major news networks, from the international news outlets such as BBC (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Peterson 2015; Shreim and Dawes 2015; Barkho and Richardson 2010; Barkho 2008; Philo 2007; Philo 2004), the New York Times (Saariaho 2015; Fahmy and Eakin 2014), CNN (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Kandil 2009; Barkho 2008; Barkho 2007), Al Jazeera (Kandil 2009; Barkho 2007; Barkho 2008), the Guardian (Fahmy and Eakin 2014) to the Israeli ones such as the Jerusalem Post (Shreim and Dawes 2015) or Haaretz (Shreim and Dawes 2015; Fahmy and Eakin 2014).
While the mechanism and interplay of textual elements in shaping political ideologies have been thoroughly researched (Peterson 2015; Saariaho 2015; Baidoun 2014; Shami 2014; Tantish 2012; Kandil 2009; Zaher 2009; Wolf n.d.), there has also been an emerging interest in investigating the subjective and objective factors that might one way or another influence the quality of the news reports. Empirical studies on these factors are conducted by analyzing data containing the internal guidelines, blogs and transcripts of interviews with journalists or editors commissioned to cover the war, which give a glimpse into the modus operandi of different news networks. The results of these studies have demonstrated that there is a direct connection between the discursive practices and the institutional policies that govern the process of news production. (Philo 2007; Philo 2004; Barkho, 2010; Barkho 2008; Dunsky 2008; Barkho 2007) Interestingly, the issues of the relations between texts and institutions, between hegemony and knowledge, between discourse and power, have been brought up in the field of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Weiss and Wodak 2003), yet there is still a missing gap within media studies stressing this dialectics of news production and social practices (Barkho and Richardson 2010).

Discussions stemming from the war/peace journalism angle have also been brought forth, though only recently, to question the role of the media in waging warfare (Shreim and Dawes 2015; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Fahmy and Eakin 2014; Ozohu-Suleiman and Ishak 2012; Puddephatt 2006). The understanding that the media can actually incite more violence has led to the recognition that it can also take a constructive part in reducing tension during conflict. The concept of “peace journalism” was thus born out of the growing consciousness of the ideological portrayal of wars and conflicts, as a “counter-strategy” to the uncritical and polarized reportage during wartime. (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 86) Notwithstanding the general preference for peace journalism to the traditional war journalism, the former has been criticized as too narrowly defined and undermining the physical conditions of war reporting (Loyn 2007; Hanitzsch 2007; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014).
There is not yet any agreement on what defines good conflict journalism. It leaves room for discussions on how to actually locate conflict reportage within the historical and socio-political context that it entails when there exist such limits on time, space, brevity and competition with other outlets for the journalists and their editors to manage. Applying an approach which combines peace journalism with critical analysis of news discourse is rather novel in the field of study of conflict reportage, but this approach might be efficient in understanding how socio-political constraints affect the news discourse, how war/violence-oriented journalism is done, thus how to effectively avoid it.

The power of the image should also be reconsidered. The twentieth century marked conflict journalism’s turn to the visual. For the majority of spectators who do not have firsthand accounts of what goes on in the warzones, the images help to proximate the effects of destruction and secure an important role because of their memorability and durability. Borrowing the words of Susan Sontag, “the photographs are a means of making “real” (or “more real”) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore” (Sontag 2003: 7). For journalists, images are often schematized as the illustration, the evidence, in other word, the “backseat” of words (Zelizer 2004: 118). One believes the words because the image helps to confirm them and one interprets the image by tracing through the words. Thus the visual cues have gradually become part and parcel of war reportage not just for their explicit and visible content but also for the way they articulate and interact with the texts. Videography documentation has also recently been widely incorporated into news media, affirming the growing dependence on the visual in today’s conflict journalism.

Photojournalistic representations of the Israel–Palestine conflict have been a subject of scholarly studies which aim to understand the role of photographic influence in journalistic practices. Unlike words, photographs are often perceived as impartial and factual but under certain circumstances, news photographs can also be exploited as an object of manipulation, framed to fit in constructed narratives. The findings of previous studies on the subject have shown, for example, how the image-format representations of the main
actors in the conflict, the Palestinians and the Israelis, can vary according to their depictions in different news outlets. (Seo 2014; Woodward 2007; van Leeuwen and Jaworski 2002)

Due to the recent nature of the Gaza war 2014, few research on the media coverage of the war has been conducted (Shreim 2015; Malinsky 2015). While earlier works on the subject have delved into the assessment of the media bias of the Israel–Palestine conflict, this study questions the position of the media in the war and argues that the media play a crucial role as a conflict actor. In this sense it is then necessary to figure out whether the media have offered any critical assessment of the events in depiction.

The aims of the study are to have an insight into how war reportage is done, how noted events during the course of the military operations are framed and how conflict actors, including Palestinian civilians and Palestinian armed group Hamas, are represented in the news reports. Specifically, the study will look into the way the media cover the outbreak of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya where a high death toll of Palestinian civilians was recorded, and which consequently caused heated controversy on military attacks against civilian population (Pfeffer 2014b). It examines how the two news networks, Haaretz and CNN, one Israeli, one American, report the Israeli incursion into Gaza by discussing the differences in their news coverage and by deconstructing the textual and visual semiotics that are employed in their articles. The backbone of the study is Galtung’s model of “peace journalism” which will be applied as a frame of reference to compare and contrast with the conventional, war-oriented form of journalism. The research intends to address the following questions:

Q1: How do the outlets cover the onset of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya? What are the differences in their approaches to the news?
Q2: How do the two news outlets represent major conflict actors, Palestinian civilians and Hamas, on the news?
Q3: From the war/peace journalism perspectives, how can CNN’s and Haaretz’ news reports be distinguished from one another?
The data used consist of twelve articles that cover news of the war from the launch of IDF’s operation Protective Edge in Gaza on July 8 until the final truce on August 26, 2014. All of these articles are accessible through the online archives of Haaretz and CNN and they were manually selected on the basis of their contents which correspond in terms of the events depicted on both news outlets. The articles focus on four specific topics which are: (1) the onset of the war, (2) the battle of Shuja’iyya, (3) the official rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and (4) the representations of Hamas on the news outlets.

The methodology applied in this study is a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of multimodal texts (van Dijk 1985; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1995a). The four topics will be analyzed using different CDA methodological approaches due to the distinctive contents that they cover. In particular, for the first topic, a thematic and schematic structure analysis will be used to understand how the conflict unfolds, as well as how the events leading to the war are framed and narrated in the news reports. On the other hand, for topics (2), (3) and (4), the study will employ a microsemantic structure analysis in order to look into the representations the news events and conflict actors on the outlets. Further details of the theoretical and methodological framework are delivered in the fifth chapter of this study.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This paper begins with a background of the escalation to the Gaza war 2014, followed by a general overview of the Israeli and American public reactions towards the war. It then proceeds with a discussion of the role of mass media during conflict, with a brief look into the media covering the previous Israel–Palestine wars. In the third chapter of the study, aspects of ideology, hegemony and discourse will be conferred, with a focus on the significance of the binary construction of oppositions. The study continues with an introduction to the concepts of “conflict theory” and “peace journalism” as mapped out by Johan Galtung. Next, in the sixth chapter of the study, the data collected are analyzed and discussed. The paper then concludes with a review of the study.
2 MASS MEDIA COVERING CONFLICT

Mass media acquire a crucial position in today’s conflict. The act of compounding facts in conflict coverage has become so vital that it can unarguably influence or even control public opinions towards the matter. As the images of carnage come flushing in, they provoke multitudes of voyeuristic feelings and reactions: fear, then anger, a sense of indignation and maybe sympathy, but for whom, against whom? While the media are often quick at reporting any violence fueled in the Middle East, they barely offer any peace initiatives to solve the problems (Ahlsén 2013: 3). There have been many examples in the past pointing out how the media had their hands in heightening tensions in the region, which will be examined in this chapter. Although the argument that the press is responsible for either building up violence or removing it may border on a rather essentialist view, it does highlight an irrefutable fact that the media play an active role during conflict.

2.1 The Role of Media in Conflict

Mass media devote much airtime to wars and violence. The motive is simple: warfare, terrorism, refugees, ethnic cleansing, border dispute and similar topics, attract readership and increase circulation (Gilboa 2006: 605). It certainly suggests the idea that only when the process of news production is separated from the making of profits can the media acquire any independence. But until then, news production is a process largely confined to institutional regulations and external factors beyond the outlet’s practical operations. Since the end of the Cold war, research on conflict coverage has paid much attention to studying government–media relations based on two “diametrically opposing” frameworks including information management and the CNN effect (ibid. 605).

Information management indicates the state’s control and manipulation of mass media at the time of war. The media wind up being a strategic instrument for policy makers to propagate wars and invasions through the means of news distribution. The origin of the
information management approach can be traced back to the American war in Vietnam, when it was widely believed that the counter-war mass media contributed to the end of the war. Consequently, the lesson for the state is to take hold of the media, restraint and limit access to information on the battlefield. (Gilboa 2006: 605) News is then more carefully selected, pictures in the warzones framed in a way more favorable to the state’s military actions, critiques censored and repressed. These symptoms of a manipulated press can no doubt influence the interpretations of news and events. Until the news reaches its targets, it may have already been distorted and perverted in a way unknown to its audience.

Conversely, the CNN effect refers to the state’s intervention after the mainstream coverage of humanitarian disasters spreads to an extent that forces policy makers to take actions. Scholars, journalists and politicians have since used this term to describe phenomena in which mainstream media are considered to be the conduit for the Western governments’ military interventions abroad, as with the cases of Northern Iraq/Kurdistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia. While the theory generally describes the effects of news media on politics and policy-making, it takes roots in the influence that the popular television network CNN has posed on the states’ foreign policies in the post-Cold war era. (Gilboa 2006: 605) The idea is specifically demonstrated in the case of the first Gulf war 1990–1991. Up until today, the controversy surrounding the media coverage of the wars in Iraq has still been frequently brought up when it comes to discussions concerning the role of the media in supporting their state in waging warfare in foreign lands. The Gulf war is important, not only because it marks a confrontation between the West and Iraq, in which a coalition of thirty-four nations, the dominant members being the United States, Britain, and France, was against the Middle East nation because of its invasion of Kuwait, but also because of the questionable reportage that was undoubtedly in favor of the war led by the West. (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 17–18)

Numerous studies on the media coverage of the 1991 Gulf war have been conducted (Allen, et al. 1994; Eilders 2005), which detail how CNN broadcasts, live from a Baghdad hotel (Shaw and Arnett 2003), monopolized the circulation of cross-national news reports on the
war in Iraq at the time. Many studies demonstrate a lack of criticism and dimensions on the news coverage of the Gulf war which downplays any endeavours against the Bush administration in raising warfare in Iraq (Allen, et al. 1994: 257). The uncritical reportage of the war, along with the domination of CNN news reports on the global scale, subsequently influenced the general public opinion. Public polls during the U.S. military maneuvers in Iraq exhibited significant support for the war, at up to eighty percent (ibid. 260). In other words, the mainstream media at the time were overtly in compliance with its state. As Bernard Shaw, one of the three key CNN reporters during the Gulf war, recounts in an interview, journalists entering combat “effectively become hostages of the military” (Shaw and Arnett 2003).

The CNN incident has left a deep scar in the ever-changing history of the world media. The globalization of news corporates and the advancement in satellite technology have nevertheless broken the exclusivity and monopoly of information from Western news sources such as CNN (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 27). If during the Gulf war, even the majority of mainstream Middle East media networks relied heavily on the live broadcasts from CNN then today, this is no longer the case. A growing cohort of networks such as Reuters, AFP, AP and Anadolu agency has rendered more alternatives for the viewers. The rising importance of non-Western news platforms such as Al Jazeera, for instance, has also brought about a huge change in the global media landscape. They have no doubt offered more alternative voices, especially on issues concerning the Middle East. This extension of the media is worth appraising but there have been few significant changes in the journalistic practices, especially when news resources are still very much dominated by the twenty-nine largest media networks, the majority of which come from the West (Peterson 2015: 47).

The mounting popularity of social network has also affected the position of mass media in conflict. The increasing outreach of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has contributed to changes in representations of actors in conflict, by giving them a specific medium to communicate with the audience (Shreim 2015; Zeitzof 2016). Social media have since proved to be in competition with the traditional line of journalism, especially in terms
of information access and a wide diversity of perspectives. Without doubt the expansion of social networks only indicates an inclination towards media pluralism, while at the same time, putting quality journalism to the test.

There have been many other wars and the role of the media in conflict has continued to be under scrutiny from time to time. What few would deny is that if the media have the power to promote warfare, they also have the power to mediate an end to the war, first and foremost, by staying independently from all sides of the conflict and reporting accurate information. It was another war in Iraq in 2003 that once again shows the explicit complicity of certain news outlets in propagating war efforts. The sudden popularity of U.S. news houses such as Fox News which sympathized with their state’s decision in invading Iraq despite having no UN Security Council resolution this time (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 80), has shown the ugly face of media. Other major news networks such as the New York Times also admitted that they should have been more thorough in examining the evidence and emerging claims concerning Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, thus failed to substantiate the main cause of their government’s war in Iraq (Gilboa 2006: 607). In the end, the legality of the U.S. assaults in Iraq was left unanswered while the media coverage of the war, especially during the Battles of Fallujah, in the words of Noam Chomsky, was a “celebration of ongoing war crimes” (Hamedy 2010). Within the focus on the Middle East, the Israel–Palestine conflict is singled out due to its long-lasting duration and political complications. Likewise the media covering the wars in Iraq, the media reporting the conflict have already failed the public many times.

2.2 The Media Coverage of the Israel–Palestine Conflict(s)

In this long and grueling conflict, any rundown on the jousting between the opposing forces seems to be rather myopic, yet many news reports have rendered their headlines into the tug of war, drifting the discussion away from the structural issue. The media covering the
Israel–Palestine conflict are extremely divided on the subject inasmuch as periodicals accused of being both anti-Israel and a tool of Israeli propaganda are no longer exceptions.  

Among the most intensive works of the media and the Israel–Palestine conflict, Greg Philo and Mike Berry’s books (2004; 2011) on the subject reveal a major gap in the overall public knowledge on the conflict. Within a span of two years from 2001 to 2002, the pair conducted a study (2004) on the audience’s perceptions and understanding of the Israel–Palestine conflict, in reflection of television news reports of the war. The study (2004) demonstrates that a majority of the British public depended on television news as the major source of information on the ongoing conflict, as British television provided almost daily news reports during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. Despite the overwhelming reportage, the news reports offered no background information on the historical context and the background that premised the war, which led to a confusion in part of the audience even as to the point that a large portion of British participants mistook Palestinians as the settlers in the occupied territories. Furthermore, most viewers did not acquire any knowledge on the Nakba, in which more than 700,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homeland during the 1948 war. Many were unaware of the Western involvements in the conflict, one such as the U.S. government’s annual financial support for Israel. This deficiency of knowledge certainly affected the public perceptions of the conflict, as many rushed to blame Palestinians as the aggressors of the war while being mostly ill-informed of the grave physical conditions and the effects of the occupation. The study concludes that there was a prejudice in favor of Israeli perspectives on BBC 1 broadcasts, in which Israelis and U.S. politicians supporting Israel were interviewed twice as much as Palestinians were. (Philo and Berry 2004)

In another book released in 2011, “More bad news from Israel”, Greg Philo and Mike Berry once more time examine the details of the media coverage of the 2008–2009 war, also known as operation Cast Lead, as well as the Mavi Marmara incident or the Gaza flotilla raids in 2010. The results were once again hardly surprising. The lack of knowledge in part

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2 Take The New York Times, for example (Sullivan 2014).
of the participant, an assemble of viewers from the U.S., Britain and Germany, paralleled the lack of explanations in part of the news reports. (Philo and Berry 2011) According to the authors, BBC’s reportage of the conflict in Gaza at the time was a “carbon copy” of the 2000 conflict reports (Plunkett 2014).

In response to public criticism, in 2006, an independent panel led by Sir Quentin Thomas carried out a report on the impartiality of BBC concerning their reportage of the Israel–Palestine conflict. This report, however, clears out the allegations against BBC being systematically misleading by justifying that BBC made a mistake by not providing the complete picture of the situation while still taking a rather neutral stance. (Dowell 2006) The conclusion of this report is doubtlessly contrary to the findings of Greg Philo and Mike Berry (2004; 2011) which showcase how the de-contextualization of the news can actually affect the overall public understanding of the conflict. Another question remains whether neutrality can exist in war journalism, for neutrality in the context of exceeding disproportion, as in the case of Israel and Palestine, one as the strongest military power in the Middle East (Haaretz 2014a) while the other still under occupation, is also a source of criticism. The media report who threw the first stone, but hardly explain why the stone was thrown (Ahlsén 2013: 9). In this sense, BBC’s coverage can be seen as systematically inadequate by focusing on the violence of the war and its collateral damage, while largely downplaying the deeper causes behind it and remaining silent about the social and psychological problems in the wake of the conflict.

But the BBC is not the lone case when it comes to controversies surrounding the media covering the conflict. Many other news outlets have also been under fire for their reportage of the conflict. The inflammatory tones of both Israeli and Palestinian media are also an underestimated political complication (Puddephatt 2006: 9). Needless to describe the attention given to any news on the conflict as the media covering it have become the magnets of complaints from readers.
The media covering the 2014 Gaza war have already met much protest and disapproval from the audience (Plunkett 2014; Zacharia 2014). Readers continue to question the fairness of the media, accusing a number of outlets of being “devoid of context”, underrepresenting Palestinian voices (Plunkett 2014). Part of the reasons behind these accusations is an imbalance in reporting favoring the Israeli perspectives, which is what much research on the media coverage of previous wars also points out (Shreim 2015: 8). NPR for example, was also obliged to set up a self-assessment of their radio broadcasts of the Israel–Palestine conflict during the fourth quarter of 2013 (Schumacher-Matos 2014). Note that the review, conducted by NPR’s former foreign editor John Felton, similarly finds the network’s broadcasts of remarkable accuracy and without any systematic bias but there is an evident discrepancy in terms of narratives (Felton 2014: 9). According to the report, listeners of NPR’s radio broadcasts generally hear more often from Israelis and Israeli officials than they do from Palestinians (ibid. 9). In explaining for such imbalance, a NPR’s journalist writes:

> Israel generates more news in part because its officials are more open and the country is more democratic than in the Palestinian territories. Israel stages more newsworthy “official” events, such as elections, and its economy is far more dynamic. Israel also is an ally of the U.S., and its officials frequently visit. The Gaza Strip in particular is miniscule. NPR’s sole correspondent is based in Jerusalem. (Schumacher-Matos 2014)

This explanation, if anything, only confirms the accusation of the news network as being one-sided and unmistakably implies their political stance of the conflict. It also highlights a preference of official narratives over ordinary voices and a systematic structure of selected reporting based on exposure of information and preconceived notions. As the report reads, “voices convey authority and emotion as well as information” (Felton 2014: 9), hence, Israeli perspectives are given more weights and credibility simply because listeners get to hear more from the Israeli voices. Though problematic, the NPR example presents a commonly accepted reality of Mideast reports, suggesting geopolitics of information existing in the media landscape of this conflict.
3 HEGEMONY AND DISCOURSE

In the words of Roland Barthes, “language is never innocent” (1953: 16). Words produce various versions of realities, words shape our understanding of the world, words help to construct it. In an era in which the majority of people count on the Internet and television as their main sources of information, mass-mediatized representations of wars and conflicts can have a profound effect on our knowledge on the matter. But how do representations contribute to the receptions of news? How does the press construct the images of conflict actors based on their representational differences? What is the role of difference in structuring political discourses? What are the power relations between those represented and the institutions doing the representing? Are these representational constructions a deliberate attempt of a hegemonic articulation? In this chapter, we set out to answer these questions, by discussing the meanings of “difference” and “stereotype” based on Stuart Hall’s cultural theories of ideology, by examining the connection between hegemony and language according to Gramsci and by showing the importance of looking at how representations are constructed in journalistic practices.

3.1 The Binary Construction of Differences

There exists a connection between “difference” and “power”, which efficiently serves the politics of representation (Hall 1997: 229). Subjects perceived as significantly different from the majority, Us, are often exposed to binary forms of representation, in the opposing extremes of good/bad, civilized/savage, primitive/modern, forward/backward and the likes (ibid. 229). The markings of difference and otherness are compelling to the discursive and representational practices surrounding the discourse of wars and conflict. There are four theoretical disciplines that help to explain the question of difference and its importance, as mapped out by Stuart Hall (1997).
First, in terms of linguistics, difference matters because it is indispensable for forming meaning, that without difference, meaning could not exist (Hall 1997: 234). The idea is rooted in de Saussure’s structuralist view of semantics, that “language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (de Saussure 1966: 114). Citing de Saussure, “in language there are only differences” (ibid. 120), words acquire meaning in difference and in relations with other words and meaning gains value within the semiological system. These values are negative and inherently differential. We know the meaning of “black” when it is put next to the word “white”. It is this oppositional difference between “black” and “white” that creates the signification of the word (Hall 1977: 234). Drawing on de Saussure’s principles of semiological differences, Derrida proposes what he terms as différence, a concept that looks upon difference as a distinction, an inequality, “an interposition of delay” of meaning. For Derrida, the binary or elemental oppositions are not just a theoretical but also practical operation that defines texts in reciprocal determination with other texts, and there are very few neutral forms of these elemental oppositions. (Derrida 1973: 129) Although binary poles of opposition are necessary in constructing meaning, they are dangerous, especially when there exist relations of power between the binary oppositions in which one pole is more dominant.

Second, difference is important in the construction of meaning through a dialogue with the Other. It derives from the concepts of dialogic and dialogism by Russian philosopher and linguist Mikhail Bakhtin. (Hall 1997: 235) The processes of dialogues are central to the studies of Bakhtin, who believes that languages do not exist in a vacuum but rather they intersect. Bakhtin argues that the dialogic property of discourse exists in all languages, that “everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole – there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others”. (Bakhtin 1981: 426) Meaning is negotiated through the difference in dialogues, which explains why the presence of the Other is fundamental to the development of meaning (Hall 1997: 236). For Bakhtin, meaning is hybrid, it is not fixed, with differing nuances and
stratifications under a centrifugal force but the core content remains unchanged (Bakhtin 1981: 270).

Third, anthropologically, difference is considered to be the basis of a cultural order, that is to say, things are assigned meanings within a classificatory system. Lévi-Strauss argues that classifying is “a step towards rational ordering” (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 10), that human beings always feel the need to classify to order different objects within a coherent framework. In this sense, difference is needed in putting things in an order and the construction of binary oppositions is thus crucial to the classificatory system. Problems however can arise when the order of things is disturbed, when established assumptions are challenged, when some facts refuse to fit in any categories (Douglas 1966: 38). As this system of selecting and organizing objects in an order is largely subjective and at the same time, social, we slowly develop a conservative bias that requires things to remain the same, to be placed in their assigned positions. The theory also spells out an uncomfortable truth that cultures retain their originality, their purity and identity by retreating from anything alien and foreign that threatens to cross the symbolic boundaries and break the unwritten social norms (Hall 1997: 237). In the words of Stuart Hall, “marking difference leads us, symbolically, to close ranks, shore up culture and to stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure, abnormal” (ibid. 237). But paradoxically, it also makes difference appealing, precisely because it implies something taboo and forbidden to the established order (ibid. 237), hence the fascination with otherness, with anything exotic, different.

Fourth, the importance of difference is recognized in terms of psychoanalysis. Hall employs the Freudian theory of the Oedipus Complex to illustrate the idea that the presence of the Other is constitutive to the construction of the Self. This construction has both negative and positive implications. He argues that the Self is never “fully unified” and that it depends on the unconscious relations with the Other to complete itself. (Hall 1997: 238) At the same time, this process might never be fulfilled and although the Other is necessary to complete the Self, it is external, an outside subject, which indicates that it is something that the Self is always lacking. The psychoanalytic accounts of the Self and the Other have since
influenced various theories, including the binary construction of the Self and the Enemy which frequently comes up in the discourse of wars and conflicts (Carpentier 2011).

Overall, these four theoretical disciplines, the linguistic, the social, the cultural and the psychic levels, help to explain the importance of difference in different respects. For Hall, difference is “ambivalent”, in the sense that it can be both positive and negative. It is fundamental for the production of meaning, for social and cultural formations and classifications, for the construction of identity, but at the same time, it alludes to something menacing while building up fear and hostility of the Self towards the Other. (Hall 1997: 238) The danger of difference is when it is naturalized, finalized, fixed. Hall uses the difference between black people and white people to exemplify the process of naturalization. If the difference between them is considered cultural, it means that it is open to change and modifications, but if it is looked upon as natural, then it is perceived as being innate, permanent and unchanged. Naturalization is a representational strategy that secures discursive and ideological “closure”. It is however a dangerous approach, because it builds up racist stereotypes, in this case, of black people, reducing them to their “essence”. (ibid. 245) The current discourse on Islam and terrorism goes likewise, as the two concepts are often paired up on mass media, it gradually accumulates to the Islamophobic notion that there is a connection between them, that terrorism is rooted in the religion, ergo, any Muslim is a potential terrorist (nature). “Stereotyping” is thus seen as a practice that “essentializes, naturalizes, and fixes difference” (Hall 1997: 258). It reduces the subjects in depiction to few essential characteristics which are considered inherent and fixed by nature. It is one of the main approaches to the construction of the Other, typically and widely instrumentalized by mainstream media.

Stereotype distinguishes itself from “type” which on the other hand, refers to simple and widely accepted traits or most likely fixed characterization with little development over time (Dyer 2001: 355). Defining type is needed, however, in order to understand what stereotype is. In his essay on “Stereotyping”, Dyer states that, “types are instances which indicate those who live by the rules of society (social types) and those whom the rules are
designed to exclude (stereotypes)” (ibid. 355). In this sense, it is understood that stereotyping embodies in itself the idea of excluding, ostracizing anything repelling or abnormal to what is commonly accepted, or what one familiarizes with. Philosopher and literary critic Julia Kristeva calls this process of casting off, of excluding, an “abjection” (Hall 1997: 258). For this reason, stereotyping also reflects an inequality in power between the subject represented and those representing it. It is this discursive form of power that binds Us together into an “imagined community” against Them who are different, deviant, unknown (ibid. 258). More importantly, it reflects a hierarchy grounded in the establishment of a normalcy which is nevertheless the product of the ruling groups who have the power to curb the society according to their world views, value-system, and political ideology (Dyer 2001: 356). Interestingly, this is consistent with what Gramsci defines as a social hegemony.

3.2 Ideology, Hegemony and Discourse

The question of how ideology is (re)produced and perpetuated to maintain social inequalities has been thoroughly addressed by Marxist intellectuals (Barkho and Richardson 2010: 2). Though built on Marxist theories, the Gramscian model of ideology derives significantly from that of his predecessors while still retaining the conception of social classes, the capitalist mode of production and the distinction between the economic base and the cultural domain of the superstructure. The highlight of this theoretical development is the idea of an ideological struggle for hegemony between classes, which is created throughout the cultural realm of society. For Gramsci, social hegemony is not a matter of “coercion” or “consent”, but rather it is the ingenuous combination of the two. (Stoddart 2007: 202) Hegemony is a form of power, a political type of relation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 139) in which the dominant or ruling class successfully fashions the society according to their interests and world views in a way that gains consent from subordinate groups and is accepted as common sense.
One of the main issues for the ruling class is to maintain the relative power of the bureaucracy within the society, which demands a general consensus from the masses. This indicates a necessity to produce “a condition of moral and political passivity” that subdues the collective consciousness. (Gramsci 1971: 333) As a result, the crisis of hegemony is the failure to secure consent from the masses, prompting the state of political passivity to transform into activity (ibid. 210). The struggle for hegemony between classes is a constant process, in which a certain degree of equilibrium is compromised. Hegemony is, to that end, the result of a strenuous contestation between the ruling class and other social groups (Stoddart 2007: 201). There is never a single dominant ideology. The conception of ideology is replaced by a dominant discourse which implicitly manifests itself throughout all aspects of the public spheres (ibid. 328). In the words of Gramsci,

The ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony […] is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion, newspapers and associations which therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied. (Gramsci 1971: 80)

The ruling class gains support and consent from other groups in three principal ways: by taking into consideration the interests of groups that it exercises hegemony over, by promulgating the consent or the concessions that it has achieved and by maintaining hegemony via education. Gramsci believes that the school, the church, newspapers, magazines and book trades are the biggest cultural institutions responsible for disseminating hegemonic power, for “keeping the ideological world in movement” in a country. (Gramsci 1971: 342)

Integrating Gramsci’s theory of hegemony into post-structuralism, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau develop the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” which has been applied in various fields of research including journalism and media studies. One departure of the theory is the emphasis that all social subjects and phenomena acquire meaning through discourse and that hegemony emerges through articulatory practices that enable it to be passed on to the public. This is how political identities are constructed in the general field of discursivity which takes place in a
confrontation with antagonistic articulation. Thus the conditions for a hegemonic discourse are the antagonistic forces and the frontier within a dichotomized political space. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 134–136)

Laclau and Mouffe reject Gramsci’s essentialist idea that hegemonic identities are founded on the notion of fundamental classes and that every social structure revolves around a hegemonic center. For them, hegemonic ideas only become widely dispersed in modern times when articulatory practices have already been immensely broadened. As a result, every social identity is constituted in “a multiplicity of articulatory practices”, many of which are antagonistic. This is not to say that the identities of those represented/the articulated and those representing/the artificator are unchanged and permanent, but rather, they are fluid, with both subjected to a continual process of subversion and redefinition. Another interesting point in Laclau and Mouffe’s studies of hegemony is that there exists a relationship between hegemony, political subjectivity and discourse. Social inequalities are reproduced when hegemonic discourses are incorporated into individual subjectivities. There is always a need for a society to form its own intelligibility through a dividing mechanism, that is, by disregarding any “surplus of meaning” that subverts its own rationality. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 136–139) Common sense, after all, is the result of a political articulation, a struggle for hegemony.

With this expansion on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, the connection between discourse and power is further affirmed. At the same time, this connection implicates the exercise of power through representational practices (Hall 1997: 259). Edward Said’s discussion on Orientalism, for instance, pinpoints to a Western hegemony over the Orient politically, culturally, socially, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and even imaginatively. Said states that through tropes of representation, that is to say, means not just limited to literature, but also extended to art, architecture, education and the likes, discourse can build up an ideological, racialized image of the Other, embedded in the power relations between Us/the West and Them/the Orient. (Hall 1997: 259–260) Connecting Gramsci’s theory of hegemony with Foucault’s theorization of power-knowledge, Said emphasizes that power is
not exercised exclusively through force and coercion but it also wins consent, approval, concessions, compromise, by projecting itself onto the realm of knowledge, culture, arts, all that belong to private and public domains. “It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work”, argues Said, “that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength”, that produces a hegemonic discourse of a “European superiority over Oriental backwardness”, an idea so deeply ingrained that it can override any skeptical, independent views on the matter. (Said 1979: 7) Power, to that extent, not only prevents, controls, restraints knowledge but also establishes and reproduces new knowledge that is gradually taken for granted as the common sense.

On that premise, Said examines the active role of the media, as part of the cultural field of production, in producing and maintaining ideological and hegemonic discourses. By bringing forth examples of the mediatized representations of Muslims and Arabs, and later more specifically of Palestinians, he questions the objectivity of Western mainstream media in terms of the power-knowledge analysis. Squarely referencing to the Israel–Palestine conflict, Said believes that the construction of representation of Israel on the American news as “our staunch ally”, “the only democracy” in the Middle East, has been used as “the foil” for the Islamic world, perpetuating the Western hegemony with its defined virtues of modernization. According to Edward Said, “Israel has appeared as a bastion of Western civilization hewn out of the Islamic wilderness”. Thus for Said, this kind of one-sided reporting leaning towards Israel manifests the Western interests in shoring up their self-image and power over the Orient in three ways: the view of Islam, the ideology of civilization, and the attestation of Israel’s values to the West. (Said 2000: 194) No doubt the content of these discussions is indispensable for the subject of this research paper.
4 WAR JOURNALISM AND PEACE JOURNALISM

Conflict can be considered as being one of the defining features of modern-day societies (Puddephatt 2006: 5). Many wars broke out due to conflicts of interests as violence is the extreme form of aggression. For journalists covering conflict, it is important to first and foremost identify the many structural layers of conflict: how the conflict unfolds, the sources of conflict, the elements of conflict, or possible resolutions to conflict, all of these aspects can be referred to as the “conflict dynamics” (Lynch 2007: 8). Johan Galtung is the pioneer of Peace and Conflict studies, a transdisciplinary field that seeks to examine the origins and the nature of conflict, offering conflict resolutions and transformation in order to prevent and control violence. Conflict theories lay the ground for the peace journalism model later developed by Galtung (1996).

4.1 Conflict Theory, Conflict Formation and Conflict Transformation

According to Johan Galtung, a conflict takes place when it involves “actors in pursuit of incompatible goals” (Galtung 2009: 24). Conflict exists in interactions and relationships between individuals, among groups and manifests itself through actions or attitudinal and behavioral patterns that can be dormant, accumulated and built into systems or institutional levels of governments, corporations, or civil societies (Miller 2005: 22).

![ABC conflict triangle](Galtung 1996: 72)

**Figure 1:** The ABC conflict triangle (Galtung 1996: 72)

- **Attitude:** Empathy (hatred, distrust, apathy)
- **Behavior:** Nonviolence (physical and verbal violence)
- **Contradiction:** Creativity (blocked, stymied)
Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle (see Figure 3) can be used as a conceptual framework in order to define conflict. There is reciprocation among A—Attitude, B—Behavior, C—Contradiction, which exhibits on either a manifest or latent level. Contradiction may be experienced when a goal cannot be reached, which then leads to an attitudinal and behavioral escalation: a frustration. Frustration can turn inwards and intensify into attitudes or acts of aggression which may not be compatible with those of other group(s) or individual(s) concerned, resulting in a contradiction/conflict between them. Violence breeds violence, hatred produces more hatred, all make it a vicious cycle that only ends at the point of destruction. (Galtung 1996: 72–73) A minority marginalized by a government or elite groups, deprived of needs and rights that need to be fulfilled, may accumulate frustration and resentment against the ruling parties, the consequences of which are heightened tensions between groups, conceiving conditions for potential physical confrontation.

The root of conflict is in the incompatibility between parties of conflict when competing for goals. This goal-seeking system is referred to by Galtung as “conflict formation”. Conflict formation is a complex process, with many parties, many goals and many issues involved. The elementary conflict formation with two parties and one goal is rare, but this commonly known concept of conflict, as often mistakenly depicted on mainstream media, is usually simplified and polarized for economic and political sake. (Galtung 1996: 79)

According to Galtung, there are four levels of conflict: (1) the micro level (intra and interpersonal conflict); (2) the meso level (intergroup but intra-society conflict); (3) the macro level (interstate, inter-nation); and (4) the mega level (inter-region, inter-civilization) (Galtung 2003: 7). In the field of international relations, conflict is generally identified as either interstate, internal or state-formation conflicts. While interstate conflicts are about disputes among nation-states, internal and state-formation conflicts include civil and ethnic wars, secessionist or autonomous movements, territorial disputes, or anti-colonialist movements, to name a few. (Miller 2005: 22) The concept of “global conflicts”, though a fairly new phenomenon, has been widely used to describe groups that can inflict influence
and violence on both international and regional levels (ibid. 22). In terms of current global conflicts, the conflict parties can be “territorial actors” (countries and other territories), “non-territorial actors” (organization, associations, corporations), “human groups” (national or transnational), humans in general and nature (Galtung 2009: 126).

The life-cycle of a conflict is divided into three main phases: outbreak of violence, the phase of violence and cessation of violence, with truce or ceasefire taking place in the interim (Galtung 2009). Although cessation of violence is often accompanied by a peace agreement between conflict parties, which supposedly indicates the end of the war and the fact that civilians are not under any imminent threat or dangers, this has not always been the case. The Israel–Palestine conflict is the clearest demonstration, in which there have been numerous ceasefires and peace agreements brokered by foreign states but there is still no sign of peace and civilians are frequently under threat. The concept of conflict however, should not be confused with violence in any case, as conflict is part of human nature, a “complex human phenomenon” (Galtung 2003: 5). Violence should not be seen as a fundamental and unavoidable means of conflict because conflict can also be a peaceful process that aims to sustain peace through peaceful resolutions and initiatives. In this sense, violence is preventable when the conflict is transformed.

A conflict involves all A, B, and C (see Figure 3), so the resolution to the conflict, according to Galtung, is the de-escalation of all of these aspects (Galtung 2009: 105). It is crucial to approach all A, B and C in order to tackle the central incompatibilities of parties concerned. A conflict solution is only efficient when it is “acceptable” and “sustainable” for all those involved (Galtung 1996: 87). Conflict transformation is not a temporary but a perpetual, continuing process. Ceasefire, for instance, is not a peace solution and it does not signify the end of the war. Peace negotiations, in this understanding, demand a resolute end to fighting and aim to solve all the contradictions existing among the opposing parties. Conflict transformation follows a general formula that requires first, to identify the goals of the parties and second, to distinguish whether these goals are legitimate or not. The next
step is to build peace, to reduce violence, to reconcile the parties and to depolarize existing social and political structures. (Galtung 2003: 9)

Each conflict is unique and the sources of conflict can draw on various reasons, from a contest for natural resources, a structural imbalance of power, disputes over territorial boundaries, to religious and ethnic tensions. In the end, the basis of any political discussions on conflict is simply about the basic human needs. (Galtung 2009: 116) Basic needs correspond to a number of socio-political aspects and remain recurrent problems in contemporary societies. In order to provide a complete picture of the conflict, journalists should provide information on the background and socio-economic context that govern the political sphere of the conflict as well as the attitudinal and behavioral changes of all parties concerned (du Toit 2014: 9). Too often however, these issues are not thoroughly addressed in conflict reportage.

4.2 What is Peace Journalism?

Peace journalism is a concept first coined by Johan Galtung, which later evolved into a philosophical framework and entered discourses on journalism during the 1970s. This journalistic concept draws on studies of conflict theories that examine the root and actors of conflict formation in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the conflict dynamics for better conflict transformation (Galtung 1996). According to Galtung, peace journalism distinguishes itself from traditional war journalism by depolarizing the process of reporting war, looking into the perspectives of all those involved and not just that of “our side”, de-escalating tension by emphasizing peace via peaceful means and mapping the conflict within structural, cultural and historical contexts (Galtung 2002: 262). Peace journalism is proposed as the alternative to the uncritical, perfunctory, one-dimensional reportage of the war (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 81).
Conventional media, which Galtung labels as “war journalism”, concentrate on the visible effects of the war such as physical demolitions, casualties, death tolls, and the like, but they are likely to be negligent of the invisible aspects such as socio-cultural damages, psychological impact or post-conflict traumatic experiences that can affect generations to come. Conflict, in war journalism, requires winners and losers, which is nonetheless sports-archetypical. Ceasefire is not a temporal option but a solution, for “winning is not the only thing, but everything”. When covering conflict, journalists often face two directions. On the low road, the focus is placed on the battleground: How many are wounded and how many killed? Who holds the reins and wins the war? In his words, the battle zones turn to be a “sports arena and gladiator circus” where violence is regularly confused as conflict, and journalists report violence when they mean conflict. On the high road, the focus is however on the process of transformation, giving voices to all, as opposed to the zero-sum analysis, prioritizing truths over propagandas and cover-ups, even when it means to write against one’s own administration. (Galtung 2002: 259–260)

Galtung also argues that peace journalism is a “journalism of attachment”, in the sense that terror and injustice should not be reported with neutrality, indifference. This nonetheless can be accomplished with responsible, professional reporting. War journalism that celebrates animosity among nation-states should be considered as a relic of the past. Conventional mainstream media values more often than not go in the opposite direction. News is newsworthy when it is about elite people in elite countries and when it is negative and personalized because as the reasoning goes, it sells. On the other hand, stories dealing with transformation, structural changes, with focus on non-elite people from non-elite countries, are not considered crowd-pullers. (Galtung 2002: 262) Still sports journalism of wars and conflicts has, for decades, predominated Western journalistic practices that are often taken to be objective (Keeble, Tulloch and Zollman 2010: 262).

Information leaving the war zones never stays in the same form when it reaches the audience but often has to go through a process of being selected, edited, filtered. Peace journalists are information brokers and their job is not only about informing the audience,
but also going between exposing and critically inspecting the information (Keeble, Tulloch and Zollman 2010: 262). To report is to select the news, according to Jake Lynch, and the basic idea of peace journalism is when editors and reporters, all those involved in the process of news production, make conscious choices on what and how to report, suggesting creativity and opportunities for the society to opt for non-violent resolutions (Lynch 2007: 1). Peace journalism challenges the prevailing norms of mainstream media, targeting journalists and editors covering wars and conflicts from an ethical perspective.

Peace correspondents are obliged to face a range of questions governing their works: What are the roots of the conflict in terms of structure, culture and history? Who are the parties and what are their real goals? What are the visible and invisible effects once violence gets in the way? Who is working to prevent violence and promote reconciliation? (Galtung 2002: 260). As for readers, peace journalism encourages them to look for alternative media that opt for constructive and comprehensive insight into the conflict while at the same time, still allowing them to form their own opinions (Ahlsén 2013: 6). In the end, communication is the key and the media, both local and international, play a central role in offering possible conflict resolutions by enabling dialogues between opposing groups in the conflict.

Galtung’s model of peace journalism is based on a series of comparisons and contrasts with traditional war journalism, which, according to his opinion, feeds on violence, propaganda, victory and a partiality for “our side”, as opposed to peace journalism that is considered to be more people-oriented.
Table 1. Peace/conflict journalism versus war/violence journalism (Galtung 2002: 261)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace/conflict journalism</th>
<th>War/violence journalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Peace/conflict-orientated</td>
<td>1. War/violence-orientated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues</td>
<td>▪ Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general “win, win” orientation</td>
<td>general zero-sum orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ open space, open time; causes and</td>
<td>▪ closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outcomes anywhere, also in</td>
<td>threw the first stone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history/culture</td>
<td>▪ making wars opaque/secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ making conflicts transparent</td>
<td>▪ “us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for “us”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ giving voice to all parties; empathy,</td>
<td>▪ see “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding</td>
<td>▪ dehumanization of “them”; more so the worse the weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ see conflict/war as problem, focus on</td>
<td>▪ reactive: waiting for violence before reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict creativity</td>
<td>▪ focus only on visible effect of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons</td>
<td>(killed, wounded and material damage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ proactive: prevention before any</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence/war occurs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ focus on invisible effects of violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(trauma and glory, damage to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure/culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Truth-orientated</td>
<td>2. Propaganda-orientated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Expose untruths on all sides</td>
<td>▪ Expose “their” untruths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ uncover all cover-ups</td>
<td>▪ help “our” cover-ups/lies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. People-orientated</td>
<td>3. Elite-orientated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged children,</td>
<td>▪ Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>giving voice to voiceless</td>
<td>being their mouth-piece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ give name to all evil-doers</td>
<td>▪ give name to their evil-doers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ focus on people peace-makers</td>
<td>▪ focus on elite peace-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Peace = non-violence + creativity</td>
<td>▪ Peace = victory + ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ highlight peace initiatives, also to</td>
<td>▪ conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent more war focus on structure, culture, the</td>
<td>▪ focus on treaty, institution, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceful society Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction,</td>
<td>controlled society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconciliation</td>
<td>▪ leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on Galtung’s model, various studies have looked into war/violence journalism in terms of representations of parties involved (Cammaert and Carpentier 2009; Carpentier 2011; Boulton 2013). The duel between opposing forces, which war journalism often mistakenly reduces to two, is often highlighted and over-reported. When constructing images of conflict actors, war journalism often rotates around the dichotomies of good/evil, justified/unjustified, innocent/guilty, rational/irrational, civilized/barbaric, civilian/militant. When entering war, each side seeks to rationalize their actions by building the image of the Enemy, structuring their discourses around the political identities of Us and Them, making sure that the voice of the Enemy is stifled, repressed, silenced. This is strengthened by a range of juxtaposition before, during, and after the conflict, the effects of which turn out to be inflammatory. (Carpentier 2011: 4–5)

When mass-mediatised, these political representations can trigger different attitudes and emotions from spectators who will likely look upon Them as a subject that creates fear and violence. The danger of this approach is that it can potentially build up misleading stereotypes of conflict actors. Examples of the media coverage during the War on terror, the circulation of the Abu Ghraib torture images, to name a few, have demonstrated how dichotomy was strategically propagated by the media to vindicate violence (Cammaert and Carpentier 2009: 7). Mainstream media coverage of wars and conflicts tends to be hegemonic in two respects: first, in their building images of the Self and the Enemy and second, in the process of news production that already in itself connotes hierarchy: What is newsworthy? What conflict should be prioritized? The media’s tendency to exclude voices of non-elite sources in interviews, in reports, only makes this genealogical approach a “sanitized narration of the war”. (Cammaert and Carpentier 2009: 5)

4.3 Critiques of Peace Journalism

Peace journalism, nevertheless, has received much criticism not only from academics but also from journalists themselves. Some of the main arguments against the concept point to
its oversimplification of battlefield complexities, as well as its inevitable breach of journalistic objectivity, much foreign to the professionalism that it claims.

One of the main opponents of peace journalism is David Loyn, who has been a BBC correspondent for more than three decades and who claims that peace journalism is the opposite of good journalism. Loyn criticizes that peace journalists, by deliberately positioning themselves as participants within the conflict, run the risk of transgressing into peace advocators and that the job of the conflict journalists is observing and reporting, not peacemaking. Loyn argues against the “journalism of attachment”, saying that journalistic objectivity requires journalists to report what they see and not to close their eyes to what in their opinions does not fit. (Loyn 2007) In a commentary discussing the ethics of reporting the 2014 Gaza war, Loyn expresses a strong objection against the idea of setting sentiments in journalism, as for him, “emotion is the stuff of propaganda, and news is against propaganda” (Loyn 2014).

In the same vein, Hanitzsch criticizes peace journalism for its overestimation of journalists’ influence on political decisions and more importantly, its “overly individualistic and voluntaristic perspective” that tends to undermine the structural constraints that conflict journalists face, such as personnel, time, material resources, editorial procedures and hierarchies, textual constraints, field access, sources of information and the likes. Hanitzsch classifies peace journalism into two major concepts, “interventionist reporting” which actively promotes peace through the means of public advocation, and the classic “good journalism” which rejects antagonism and hegemony or the dichotomy of “the good” and “the evil”. He recognizes that news reports are based on “cognition and contingent (re)construction of reality”, thus these subjective reconstructions can be made objective as long as they are coherent with other supposed “facts”. The loophole in peace journalism is the lack of a clear-cut epistemological foundation, the seemingly unchallenged nature to the sense of detachment, objectivity and neutrality which, in his opinion, are the conventional values that define professional journalism. Furthermore, the practice of peace journalism might encounter various difficulties when applied to a range of conflict constellations, as it
underestimates the fact that individualistic values cannot overtake corporate values, especially during this era of globalized media corporates. (Hanitzsch 2007: 5)

Nevertheless, various studies on peace journalism have shown that it has developed into complex media strategies that aim to raise critical awareness and improve representations of conflict actors (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005; Shinar 2009; Fahmy and Eakin 2014). News production depends on a systematic process of information selection, which gives gatekeepers the power to decide which news items can be admitted through the gate and which should be kept out (Lynch 2007: 2). Story framing defines and characterizes the practices of making news and what we should be questioning is not just how far and accurate the information is but also what the media want us to know. The fact remains that the media have been previously employed by interest groups as a means of propaganda to promote their political doctrines, so when it comes to analysis and discussion of conflict reportage, it is an omission failing to mention propaganda (Lynch 2007: 2).

Reporting the activities of combatants and the brutality of the war is simply not enough, as the job of journalists is also about organizing and contextualizing the information within the “conflict dynamics”: the root of the conflict and its diversion, the causes and effects, the conflict actors and their great interests, voices from the experts, voices from the ordinary (Lynch 2007: 8). Peace journalism has more ambitious intentions. By encompassing all sides of the war, it strives to get them all at a roundtable, rather than dichotomizing the parties into victims and aggressors. In whichever way it is to be read and interpreted, the basic idea of peace journalism is to provide the audience accurate news from the conflict within hindsight. Reliable information remains the priority of conflict reportage, and by reporting different views of actors within the conflict, the media already help to break down misconceptions and stereotypes of conflict actors (Puddephatt 2006: 25).

In response to the criticism that conflict reporting should divorce from expressions of emotion in order to retain objectivity, it is necessary to emphasize that there is a distinction between objectivity and neutrality. Many journalists argue that it is fairly possible to be
objective by simply reporting facts, but it does not mean that they have to be neutral in the face of carnage and horror (Gilboa 2006: 597). In the words of Ed Vulliamy, the Guardian's war correspondent during the Bosnian war, “by remaining neutral, we reward the bullies of history […]. We create a mere intermission before the next round of atrocities” (Vulliamy 1999: 603). Vulliamy and many other conflict reporters opt for the journalism of attachment, which impels journalists to work more with people: those who incite the war, those who fight for it and those who suffer from it (Gilboa 2006: 597). Practicing the journalism of attachment does not necessarily separate journalists from their professional integrity but only demonstrates that in reporting news, journalists also represent their views and interests.

In any case, given the politicization and complexities of the media infrastructure, neutrality in conflict reporting seems like a myth. When it is generally agreed that the media are also part of the conflict and have in fact, shaped our overall understanding of contemporary conflicts, it should then be reflected that with proper attention and support, they can also create and build up the “conditions for peace” (Puddephatt 2006: 5).
5 DATA & METHODOLOGY

While the connection between text and institution, or the “mediation between the social and the linguistic” in the words of Weiss and Wodak, has been previously a subject of study in the field of critical discourse analysis, there is still a lack of a theoretical framework that reconciles the sociological and linguistic properties of news discourse (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 7). For much research on the subject, the question would be what conceptual tool can be applied, as the practical intentions to analyze the dialectics between text and institution are to assess media accountability and to reappraise the institutional polices that govern the process of news productions (Barkho and Richardson 2010; Kniep 2015). Due to the limited scope of this study however, the main objective is to understand how this mediation is actually practiced, how it is encoded in the stylistic, linguistic and visual manifestations of the news discourses. Within this section, the data and the research methodology will be discussed in more details.

5.1 Data

There are several reasons that explain why Haaretz and CNN were chosen for analysis in this study. First, both news outlets are considered as being rather consistently liberal in the ideological spectrum, in compared with a myriad of other networks in their states (The Guardian 2014; Pew Research Center 2014). Second, their reporting of the Israel–Palestine conflict(s) throughout the past decades has been among the most fruitful and active, as a result, they both have been placed under scrutiny when it comes to discussions concerning the media coverage of the Israel–Palestine conflict. Thus past studies have demonstrated that both news outlets take on certain political stances when it comes to this controversial issue (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014). But what actually makes it rather interesting when juxtaposing the two outlets to each other is their connections with the main actors of the conflict, which can be illustrated in the following diagram:
Diagram 3: Haaretz and CNN’s positions during the Gaza war 2014

The concept of a left-wing, right-wing press simply denotes the pragmatics of a political mapping (White 2010). These notions carry different perceptions ranging from country to country, implying the political ideology presupposed by the press and additionally, the type of consumers predominantly presented in their shares of audience. Therefore, when assessing the news network’s position in the war, there are many questions to consider: Who are their target readers? What are their editorial directives? What external factors might influence their editorial policy? What are their news values? How much influence do they have over the public and their government? By mapping the position of a newspaper or a news agency in the conflict, we can have a general macrosociological estimation of their connection with the conflict actors which can fetter the discursive structure of the news content and may one way or another affect the coverage of the war. As the relationship between the press and their government has been thoroughly researched and theorized, hence reaffirmed, it proves to be the key factor that shapes the media’s ideology and political stance on a conflict. Perhaps this is something to bear in mind when gauging the media’s accountability and transparency in reporting conflict.
5.1.1 Haaretz & CNN

Ever since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Hebrew press has always been an integral and indispensable part in shaping the public opinion, contributing to the “Jewish revival in the land of Israel” (Gilboa 2008: 88). During the 1980s however, the Israeli media-scape undertook vast structural transformation, including deregulation, privatization and advancement of new technologies (ibid. 88). Politically indoctrinated party newspapers and public television channels were replaced by the new media, more independent and more commercial, which quickly stormed a country where press censorship by the military had been formerly exercised (Kniep 2015: 2). Interestingly, the increasing popularity and influence of new privately-owned newspapers and broadcasting companies are also translated into their greater involvement in the political arena.

Founded in 1918, Haaretz (“The Land”) is Israel’s oldest daily newspaper and it was later purchased by the Schoken family in 1937, who has owned the media group ever since (Noam 2015: 949). Haaretz was among the first media groups in the country to establish online news portals both in Hebrew and in English, having set up the latter in 1997 to target the English-speaking immigrants, foreign reporters, businessmen and diplomats based in Israel (Gilboa 2008: 90). Crediting itself as an independent daily “with a broadly liberal outlook” (Haaretz 2001), Haaretz tries to associate with an elite, intellectual readership. Despite having modest market share and circulation, stalling at around six percent for weekday exposure (Kniep 2015: 12), Haaretz’s reputation as “the newspaper for thinking people” (Madmoni-Gerber 2009: 45) might speculate bigger influence than its circulation suggests.

Against the backdrop of the country’s ongoing internal conflict and friction with neighboring Middle East nations, the need to cultivate an independent media climate to monitor and assess political processes parallels the demands that Israeli journalists be attached to the national, collective interests (Kniep 2015: 2). When it comes to these regional conflict issues, especially issues related to settlements and conflicts with
Palestinians, whereas the dominant voices in the Israeli media scene remain conservative and pro-establishment (Madmoni-Gerber 2009: 45), Haaretz’s op-ed, editorial pages are by contrast known to profess a vehement anti-occupation stance, oppositional and critical of their government’s actions (Peri 2004: 239). Amos Schoken, the newspaper’s current owner and publisher, is committed to end Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and is out-spoken on issues such as press freedom, minority rights, and exposure of military abuses (Remnick 2011). Although this may have earned Haaretz an international prestige, the oppositional, hardline criticism of the Israeli government’s military actions and the publication of sensitive information in the time of crisis have deprived the newspaper of economic and symbolic capital in their home country. Kniep’s study on the media accountability in Israel has found that Haaretz is one of the few newspapers refusing political collaboration with the state, thus retaining a high place in the autonomous pole, weathering its enduring financial struggles. (Kniep 2015: 14) In a country where voices of discord are on the margin, where the few journalists publicly criticizing the war, the occupation are called out as “traitor” on the street (Gideon and Levac 2014), it might perhaps be all the more necessary for dissidence to exist.

However, there are laws and regulations that the Israeli press is compelled to, which somewhat influence their reporting of any subjects related to national security. These are the law on licensing, the military censorship, the libel law, the gag order, all those regulate and at the same time hamper the freedom of expression in Israel (Kniep 2015: 15). The gag order, for instance, has been applied in multiple occasions in order to censor news on Israeli authorities (Kniep 2015: 15) or sometimes even information concerning the Palestinian affair (Berger 2016). As Israeli Defense Forces exert much influence on virtually most aspects of the Israeli society, the media not exempted, there exists a special tie between them (Kniep 2015: 17). Under this power-knowledge relation, a form of Gramscian hegemony is exercised, in which news reporting is not governed in a manipulative or repressive manner, but follows the basis of a “collaborative self-censorship” to back what is considered the national efforts for security (ibid. 17).
For an independent press like Haaretz, these rules and regulations are yet to be the singular obstruction, as its journalists also confront other challenges including the physical restrictions of covering conflict-affected areas in the region. In particular, Israeli journalists have been barred from entering Gaza Strip since 2007, while this had not been the case before Hamas seized the now blockaded enclave (Malsin 2014). During the last Gaza war in 2014, this ban was still in effect. Consequently, a large portion of Haaretz’s news reports and articles on the war had to resort to citations of foreign press (Remnick 2011), which inevitably affects the quality of reporting, testing the news outlet’s ideological integrity.

The American Cable News Network (CNN), on the other hand, is a recognized global news network. The launch of CNN in 1980 by its founder Ted Turner, along with innovations in cable and satellite technologies, have opened a new chapter in the history of news broadcasting. The globalization of communications and the transnational expansion of CNN have contributed to its burgeoning influence on various aspects of the society, conferring the redefinitions of concepts such as warfare, terrorism, human rights or refugee. During the early years in operation, the television network was however paid little attention to by academics and professionals in the journalistic field, and not until its successful and preeminent coverage of the first Gulf war 1990–1991 was the weight of its influence reckoned and reflected on. Not only did this global expansion of the news network inspire other outlets like BBC or NBC to follow the example by extending the scope of their newscast, it also contributed to CNN’s growing importance and emergent role as an actor in communications and international relations. (Gilboa 2005: 27–28) Much attention was then paid to CNN’s influence on the process of policy-making, a phenomenon later coined and theorized by scholars in the journalistic field as the “CNN effect”, the content of which was deliberated and discussed in great details in the second chapter of this research paper.

While the forte of CNN is its real-time television news coverage, it has gradually evolved into a multiplatform network with an international online portal and a radio division. Despite competition from other rival news outlets, CNN’s standing and popularity remains remarkably steadfast in its home country, the United States. An analysis of the digital
traffic data by the Pew research center on the state of the news media in January 2015 finds that CNN’s digital population ranks only after that of Yahoo-ABC News, outrunning other major news outlets including NBC, Huffington, CBS or the New York Times (Pew Research Center 2015: 11). With its digital format consistently in the lead of top online entities, CNN’s footing in the global media landscape proves to be diametrically opposite to Haaretz, whose digital consumption accounts for much smaller proportion. But likewise Haaretz, CNN’s American consumers are mostly liberals, with conservatives relatively underrepresented among its audience’s profiles (Pew Research Center 2014).

As research on the CNN effect demonstrates, mainstream Western media have the upper-hand in terms of influence on their government’s attention and decisions to intervene in a conflict (Gilboa 2005: 29; Puddephatt 2006: 6). This has been the case for CNN. While the failure to address the needs of average American audience to focus on national issues in the time of a global recession has resulted in its recent loss in revenues to Fox News or MSNBC (Holcomb, Mitchell and Rosenstiel 2011), CNN has long been esteemed for its coverage of international affairs, channeling its interest towards the country’s involvement abroad. This is proliferated in its up-to-the-minute reportage of the Middle East, drawing on issues such as the Arab Spring or the Israel–Palestine conflict. The main challenge for CNN then, is how to engage its domestic audiences with the international issues that it covers. A tactic that appears to be common among the most powerful international media whose main targets are North America and Europe is to locate “a point of identification” in the conflict they need their audiences to take heed of (Puddephatt 2006: 6).

In covering the Israel–Palestine conflict, CNN’s reportage is navigated from a position quite different to that of Haaretz. Israel is the U.S.’ “staunch ally” (Said 2000: 194), and has been the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aids since World War II, most of them in the form of military assistance (Sharp 2015: 2). Stout congressional support for Israel also means that it enjoys benefits that are not available for any other countries (Sharp 2015: 20). The Israel–U.S. alliance is in fact, crucial to the U.S.’ foreign policy in the Middle East where the U.S.’ involvement in the region has not really been well-received. Though not a
Western country, Israel is looked upon as the key factor that mediates the Western view towards the Islamic world. In addition, Israel’s security in the region, from the American perspective, becomes “conveniently interchangeable with fending off Islam” (Said 2000: 194). Even though the U.S.’ Mideast policy’s pivot to Israel has been going on for decades, little attention has been brought to critically examine this relation. This negligence, especially by the U.S. mainstream media, has effectively stifled any alternative and oppositional voices on the issue. (Peterson 2015: 50)

As the ideological profiles of CNN’s and Haaretz’s consumers might suggest, readers are often prone to the press or journalists sharing the world views and political ideology that they identify with. The idea seems to apply to the case of the media covering the Israel–Palestine conflict, when the content of the articles is sometimes measured based on the background and the views of the journalist in particular, and the ideology of the outlet in general, on the conflict (Kniep 2015: 21). An analysis of Haaretz’s online comments for example, has shown how its readers would criticize first and foremost its “approach” and “legacy” on the conflict, before considering the facts being correct or not. The criticism levied on Haaretz in this case, is directed at the institution rather than the content of the coverage. (Kniep 2015: 21–22) It is interesting then, to put Haaretz and CNN, two media with different backgrounds and represented legacies, under the microscope. But while these macrosociological observations might prove that media texts are not simply just news and facts but constructed entities that contribute to our making-sense of the world, they are not sufficient in understanding how ideology is shaped in news discourse, how this mechanism functions and organizes, the end goal of which requires an integral structural analysis of the properties of news discourse.

5.1.2 Data Collection

The data collected for this study were retrieved from the online archives of Haaretz and CNN International. The data are a set of articles covering Israel’s military operations in
Gaza, also known as operation “Protective Edge”\(^3\), operated from July 8 until August 26, 2014. Given the extensive database of both news outlets on the fifty-day war in Gaza, only twelve articles from both Haaretz and CNN are selected for analysis. The articles will be divided according to four topics, including (1) the onset of the violence, (2) the battle of Shuja’iyya, (3) the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and lastly, (4) representations of Hamas.

The selection of the data in a non-chronological order, with a focus on the reportage of noted events within the course of the military operations, aims to understand how the conflict unfolds and the differences in the two outlets’ depictions of specific incidents and conflict actors such as Palestinian civilians or Hamas. Note that both news outlets do not cover all events on the same day, which may be attributed to various external reasons such as time differences or editorial preferences. Haaretz has live updates of the war, every day during the course of the military operations, while CNN often prefers to combine different news into one piece of article. It is this difference that can explain the discrepancy in terms of the content of their news articles, despite the fact the they may have reported on the same event or incident. This also proves to be a difficulty in collecting the data, but it no doubt offers a look into how news information is processed and performed in different journalistic practices and according to different policies.

Due to the limited scope of this study, only news articles will be selected, except for the analyses of Hamas, which means that op-eds, editorials, letters to editors, live-updates, opinions and agency dispatches will be excluded. As previously mentioned in the first chapter of this study, the four above-mentioned topics will be analyzed using different methodological approaches in critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1985). The details of these approaches will be delivered in the next section, but the collection of the articles for the study and their corresponding analytical dimensions are outlined in the following table:

\(^3\) The military campaign’s codename was set up by the Israel Defense Forces and later it was widely adopted by the media to refer to the Gaza war 2014.
Table 2: The data collection and dimensions of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onset of the war</td>
<td>Missing: A responsible power to broker Israel–Hamas ceasefire (Pfeffer July 8th 2014a)</td>
<td>Ground operations in Gaza ‘might become necessary’, Israeli official says (Magnay, Payne and Levs July 8th 2014)</td>
<td>Thematic &amp; schematic structure (van Dijk 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The battle of Shuja’iyya</td>
<td>In Gaza, a war of two narratives (Pfeffer July 20th 2014b)</td>
<td>Hamas claims it captured an Israeli soldier; Israel says no (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul July 20th 2014)</td>
<td>Macro-semantics and local semantics (van Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gazan tries to answer his son’s question: Who broke the house? (Hass July 29th 2014a)</td>
<td>U.N. shelter in Gaza hit: 16 dead (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz July 25th 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Hamas is looking for a way out (Bar’el July 8th 2014a)</td>
<td>What is Hamas’ end game in Gaza? (Castillo July 23rd 2014)</td>
<td>Local semantics (van Dijk 1995a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamas too stands to win from a cease-fire with Israel (Bar’el July 15th 2014b)</td>
<td>Gaza crisis: Who’s who in Hamas? (Mullen and Todd July 15th 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, for the data on the onset of the war, a topical analysis of the news discourses (van Dijk 1985) will be applied in order to find out how topics of the events are organized in the articles. Although both Haaretz and CNN publish more than one story on the first day of operation Protective Edge, only two articles are selected for their comparable length and content (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Pfeffer 2014a).
Second, for the media coverage of the battle of Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b; Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014), the study will employ a macro-semantic structure analysis along with a micro-semantic assessment of lexical choices, perspective and multimodal properties (van Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1985). The choice to apply a macrosemantic analysis, combined with an analysis of two dimensions of discourse semantics, stems from an interest in understanding how the main event, as well as the conflict actors, are represented on the news.

Third, in the subchapter on the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold, the study aims to find out how the rhetoric of home and terrorist cell, of civilian and militant, of warning leaflets and human shields are expressed on the news outlet. The data are four articles central to the subject, even though they do not report the same events or follow a chronological order (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014; Hass 2014a; Martinez July 23rd 2014; Penhaul, Payne and Fantz July 25th 2014). Due to the specific rationale, the analysis is limited to three dimensions of discourse semantics which are lexical style, perspective and position (van Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988).

Fourth, the study will look into the representations of Hamas on the news by looking into the discourse semantics (lexical style, propositional structures, level of specificity and degree of completeness) and multimodal properties (van Dijk 1995a) of four articles devoted to Hamas (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014). The aim is to understand how the group, their members, their actions and their goals are represented. The four articles chosen for analysis tell specific descriptions and profiles of the organization, meaning that they are not simply news, but analytically structured.

5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Recent research on media has shown a shift from traditional, empirical studies of media texts that mainly apply quantitative methods such as content analysis towards qualitative
studies of the “contextualization” and the “localization” of meaning of news discourse, weighing on its broader social, cultural and political significance. There is an emphasis on media texts within critical linguistics, but the integration of both structural and sociological methods suggests an interdisciplinary approach to the texts in order to have an insight into how properties of the news discourse operate under social and institutional constraints. Due to its growing and widespread popularity, the online press has received more attention within critical analysis of news discourse in compared with other news genres such as television or radio. (Wodak and Busch 2004: 106–108)

5.2.1 Aims and Ethics of CDA

Critical linguistics, or more recently referred to as critical discourse analysis (CDA), is rooted in sociolinguistics, as well as applied linguistics and pragmatics. It takes a keen interest in the relations between language and power, as a result, the issues of power, dominance, hegemony, ideology, inequality, racism and other sociological variables play a crucial role in analysis and interpretation of the text. (Wodak and Busch 2004: 108) The questions of how news discourse is (re)produced to distribute dominance and ideology, how the process of news production can be seen as an institutional production of discursive and social power are central to CDA research. The job of discourse analysts is to investigate the strategies, the structure, the organization of textual, verbal, visual properties of communicative events in order to understand how processes of (re)production operate (van Dijk 1993: 250). In the words of Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, whose works in the field pioneer CDA scholarship, language is seen as a “form of social practice” that emphasizes the dialectics between discursive events and background categories including the context, the institution, and the socio-political structure: it is shaped by these categories, but at the same time, it also helps to shape them (1997: 258).

For critical discourse analysts, “language indexes power, language expresses power”, while power itself is not derived from language, but people make use of language to generate and
enact power (Wodak and Busch 2004: 109). Thus CDA is motivated by social issues concerning power relations, which it aspires to understand by analyzing discourse. For van Dijk, while the subject under study of critical analysts may solely be the text, it requires them to take a specific “sociopolitical stance”, as critiques of the language that legitimizes, endorses and sustains inequality and dominance presuppose an applied ethics (van Dijk 1993: 252). Public spaces, academia, textbooks, political speeches and especially the media are strategic instruments that can be utilized to (re)produce ideology and dominance, making them specific entities of interest for critical analysts.

The majority of research on the role of the media in sustaining power and ideology look from this sociological angle, regardless of the differences in approaches or methods of analysis. Studies from a macrosociological perspective, for instance, focus on the institutional, socio-cultural and professional context of news production, which has been briefly brought forth in the first part of this chapter as this research paper attempts to make some observations regarding the relations of the two main subjects Haaretz and CNN with the main actors of the conflict that they cover. Microsociological analysis, on the other hand, aims to assess journalistic processes, given rules and regulations, along with the news values and the ideology that altogether govern the news production. Much attention is also paid to the content, the style and the form of news items, as well as their socio-cultural significance and influence. (van Dijk 1985: 70–71) More recent is the analysis of comments and reactions of the audience to news articles, as the concurrent trend in media studies reflects on the media–audience interaction where readers are no longer looked upon as decoders of “fixed meanings” but actively participating in the process of negotiating the meaning of the message (Wodak and Busch 2004: 106). Textual analysis of news discourse however, mainly takes heed of textual and verbal semiotics, syntax, stylistics, lexical components and rhetoric, purely from a linguistic perspective. The goal of CDA is the integration of both methods, from both sociological and structural perspectives, as the advancement of linguistic and discourse analysis has shown how analysis of textual elements without their context of construction and vice versa is incomprehensive and “half of the story”. (van Dijk 1985: 71)
Given that direction, this study employs a critical discourse analysis methodology based on Teun van Dijk’s structural framework for news analysis with an expansion on properties of the news discourse including not just texts, but also images, videos, and their overall composition in the news item, looking from a peace journalism perspective. CDA scholarship departing from a peace journalism angle is no doubt singular in terms of their focus on conflict reportage, as the study argues that the news outlets’ ideology and editorial navigation have a huge influence on the structural organization of the news discourse. This is why in order to qualify whether the product of the press in question is war journalism or not, it is necessary to understand their way of words, their mechanism, their structural approach to the news, all those can explain how socio-political, ideological and institutional constraints impose on the news discourse.

5.2.2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework

The focuses of the structural analysis of news discourse are the thematic structure and the schemata. Due to the complexities of the textual layer, such research often excludes analysis of syntactical, lexical, semantic, stylistic and rhetoric properties of the text. In other words, the focus is on the macro-organization rather than the micro-features of the discourse. The thematic structure of news discourse is the coordination of global topics of the news, therefore, it indicates the general content of the news. Schemata, theoretically coined as the superstructure, on the other hand, present the news schema, the form of news discourse. (van Dijk 1985: 69)

Take, the Headline, for instance. The headline is often placed at the top of the news item, formatted in big and bold text, and often used to highlight the most significant subject of the news item. The fixed form of the headline is in fact strategically utilized by the majority of news outlets as an “expedient signal” that presents the information considered to be the most important of the news content. For readers, the headline is used as a macrostrategy to conjecture “a provisional topic” of the news item, which can be quickly grasped without
having to go through the whole text. If the headline does not adequately summarize the content and message of the text, it can be inferred that it is biased. The example simply illustrates the idea how the thematic and schematic structures of news discourse are closely interrelated. (van Dijk 1985: 77)

That said, news stories often follow a “relevance structure” that tells the readers which information is the most important, which information is the latest, the links, causes and consequences of an event. News editors or journalists have the power to organize the relevance structure of the news item and which thematic structure is the most valuable, as the lower level thematic structure often follows the higher level thematic structure. In this way, the news content expresses news values by following a hierarchy of topics selected. Many outlets apply a principle of recency that seems to be useful for the thematic structure of the article. The general principle of recency is that, latest news is often prioritized, which is why the results or consequences of an event are usually placed at the beginning of the news item, succeeded by the conditions that might have contributed to the creations of the problem. This principle may explain why many news stories may not abide to a chronological order but rather follow the thematic structures prearranged. (van Dijk 1985: 78–83)

The superstructure, or the news schemata, on the other hand, is the macrosyntax of the news discourse. While the thematic structures of the news item select the news topics that the article discusses, news schemata organize the overall content of the news, which explains why news schemata are sometimes referred to by linguistics as the “story grammar”. Story grammar helps to construct, narrate the story, consisting of “a set of characteristic categories” and “a set of formation rules”. News categories are for instance, the Headline which as previously mentioned is usually formatted in a specific way, or the Main Event of a news story. According to van Dijk, there are also Background, Context, Quotation (or Verbal Reactions), Consequences, and Comments. (van Dijk 1985: 84–85) Based on the tentative categories of news discourses that van Dijk assumed, we can establish the order of the news schema as follows:
Figure 2: Order of news schemata

This order is nonetheless looked upon by van Dijk as a rather formal system that varies according to preferences of news outlets or news cultures. It is “context-bound” and “goal-directed”, and even considered as an “expedient” strategy in the process of news production. (van Dijk 1985: 89) For van Dijk, the organization of news schemata in fact, expresses a cognitive value, in the sense that it facilitates readers’ comprehension and processing of information and in many ways proves to be of great use for storage and retrieval of information from memory (ibid. 92). Though specific, such structural analysis of the news is not however confined in the examination of the thematic and schematic structures of news discourse.

News discourse contains other high-level properties such as local semantics or coherence, meaning the connection between sentences and paragraphs or stylistic and rhetorical dimensions (van Dijk 1988: 2). News discourse exhibits a general but very distinctive organization compared with other types of discourses (ibid. 2), as each news story is a combination of both textual and structural elements. Analyzing the stylistic phenomena, including, but not limited to, lexical and syntactic formulation, semantic properties such as presuppositions, implications and associations help to understand how the meaning of words and their stylistic expressions can produce and sustain media bias (ibid. 270). Due to
its limited scope, the study chooses to look into some specific dimensions of microsemantic structures of news discourse while neglecting many others. In particular, it will examine lexical choices, perspectives, positions, propositional structures and level of specificity and degree of completeness of news discourses concerning the battle Shuja‘iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and representations of Hamas.

Lexicalization is a dimension of discourse that ideologically selects a meaning of the word out of a possible many. Depending on various factors from discourse genres to political ideologies, language users have a number of options to describe a group of people, individuals, or events. (van Dijk 1995a: 259) Another dimension frequented in news reports is perspective. Journalists and/or editors might introduce a rather different version of reality by presenting it from their personal point of view or by quoting sources that are deemed credible. This means that one perspective might be considered more valuable than others, therefore, it is cited more frequently while other perspectives are downplayed and sometimes ignored. (van Dijk 1988: 272) Even when facts form the basis of the news, newspapers or outlets can still impose their ideology on readers by taking a position when telling the news story.

On the other hand, the propositional framing of a social group takes place when the group is consistently identified as the responsible agent of negative actions which add up to its representations. The hyperbolic emphasis of their negative actions and follow-up negative evaluations thus ideologically contribute to a semantic structure of the Enemy. The reverse is also true for Us, our side, when positive actions are regularly associated with Us being the responsible agent. Our negative actions are meanwhile understated and euphemized, and that these negative actions happen only because we are forced and obliged to do so. For van Dijk, construction of such preferred models is part of the production of meaning, with ideological propositions forming a structural transparence in which actors affiliated with negative actions generally take part in the models and their semantic structures, contributing to a “consistently biased discourse”. (van Dijk 1995a: 261–262) Additionally in a news discourse, information less important and often not needed might be included in
the news item to denote argumentative, rhetorical and even ideological implications and representations of an event or actors. The construction of such argumentation, according to van Dijk, indicates the level of specificity and degree of completeness of the news discourse. (van Dijk 1995a: 275)

A drawback in van Dijk’s proposed framework of structural analysis of news discourse, however, is the exclusion of non-linguistic properties including videos and images. Kress and van Leeuwen’s theory of the grammar of visual design (1996) has proved that the compositional structure of the image can contribute greatly to readers’ attention of one thing over another, hence, affects the overall interpretation of the news item. They develop a taxonomy of the visual that helps to understand the readings of press images, the grammar of visual design from the coloring, the perspective, the framing to the compositional patterns of multimodal properties of news discourse. They believe that these multimodal texts, with their “representational” and “interactive” elements, are organized in the news item in a way that make them all connected to each other. (1996: 176)

According to Kress and van Leeuwen, composition indicates (1) an information value which is the placement of the elements with distinct informational values, (2) salience or the capacities to attract the viewer’s attention and finally, (3) the framing of the image (1996: 117). The image alone toys with diverse interpretations but the image in composition, framed, captioned and positioned within the news item, is subjected to a limited and expected spectrum of interpretations. Barthes argues that “the press photograph is a message”, with the text, the caption, the lay out, altogether constituted in forming a selected meaning from many possible ones out of the image (1977: 15). The photograph placed in a news article is not structurally isolated but always in conjunction with these elements (ibid. 16). Given the changes in contemporary journalistic practices, rarely is any news item published without either a photograph or a video, the aim of which is to illustrate, to affirm, to make a point. Thus the increasing use of the visual in today’s journalism suggests that it has an indispensable role in shaping and facilitating readers’
understanding of the news, indicating a necessity to include the visual in the structural analysis of news discourse.

Besides news discourse, newspaper and magazines, according to van Dijk, also utilize editorials to express a collective opinion, meaning that editorials can be regarded as the voice of the newspaper. Editorials are based on general social observations and representations, rather than personal opinion of the editor or the journalist. They are sometimes considered a genre of news discourse but more commonly grouped together with opinions, letters to editors, letters of complaints or columns into categories of opinion discourse. Their function is mainly to formulate and express opinions about a recent news event, but editorials and opinion pieces also exhibit discursive and persuasive values which are no doubt ideologically oriented. (van Dijk 1995b) In the following analysis and discussion, the study will also briefly look into the type of articles as well as the use of foreign dispatches of both news outlets in an attempt to understand their editorial lines which can contribute to readers’ receptions of the news.
6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents analysis and discussion of articles collected from Haaretz and CNN online. The data are outlined and divided into four sets with different subject matter and analysis intentions, namely the onset of the armed conflict, the battle of Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and the representations of Hamas. These topics are analyzed using van Dijk’s framework of critical analysis of news discourse. Much attention will be paid to the structure of the news, along with discourse semantics and compositional patterns of multimodal texts. The analysis proceeds with first, an overview of the two outlets’ editorial preferences, followed by other subsections that look into the coverage of the events noted.

6.1 Editorial Preferences

Due to political and ideological differences, both news outlets have distinctive approaches in covering the events during the war, which we will consider a difference in terms of editorial preferences. Haaretz, for instance, as an Israeli press, prioritizes any information concerning the war, with a 24-hour live update from the battlefield, each day during the course of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. A large portion of the news published on Haaretz online during this period are either directly or indirectly linked to the armed conflict, which is comprehensible considering that it was regarded as a matter of national security and of great emergency. Around the end of Phase One of operation Protective Edge (airstrikes), from July 8 to July 16, until the beginning of Phase Two (ground invasion), from July 17 onwards, Haaretz publishes on average eighteen news items per day, solely devoted to any news regarding the military operations and Gaza (see Table 3). This number excludes live updates, opinions, letters to editors, features, blogs, analyses, editorials and interviews.
Table 3: Number of news articles relating to the war published on both outlets during Phase One of the operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haaretz: 2 live updates, 2 opinions, 1 cartoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 3 opinions, 1 blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 3 opinions, 3 blogs, 1 letter to editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 feature, 4 opinions, 1 analysis, 1 blog, 1 letter to editor, 1 editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 blog, 2 opinions, 1 analysis, 1 editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 2 features, 4 opinions, 2 blogs, 1 daily photo, 1 editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 7 opinions, 1 podcast, 1 letter to editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Haaretz: 1 live update, 6 opinions, 1 blog, 1 analysis, 1 cartoon, 1 editorial, 1 interview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CNN, on the other hand, assembles around one to three articles per day even during the peak period of fighting which is the few days before Phase Two of the operation (see Table 3). This does not necessarily mean that there is less attention to details in one over another, it may however indicate editorial choices. CNN’s news articles are generally longer but constantly updated, with a tendency to merge two or more events which are thematically relevant into a single news item, as exemplified by its coverage of the first day of the war (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) which will be analyzed in greater details in the next part of the analysis. On the other hand, Haaretz is prone to sunder news of different events into different items, which explains the large quantity of articles published. In this way, while news articles on CNN seem to be more compact, those of Haaretz are more subject-specific.
Moreover, the two outlets’ journalistic styles are also comparatively distinctive in terms of their types of articles as well as the use of foreign agencies and correspondents’ reports. Haaretz’s signature, as mentioned in the brief introduction of the newspaper, is its op-ed pages and editorial lines. As can be seen in Table 3, the outlet publishes a number of blogs, opinions, editorials and letters to editors on a day-by-day basis alongside the news items, with an average of six items per day during Phase One of the operation. These types of articles are however virtually absent on CNN online edition. Editorials are routinely published on Haaretz, notably during the few days prior to the commencement of Israeli forces’ ground incursion into Gaza on July 17, 2014. The dominant type of articles on CNN, by contrast, is news articles.

A glimpse through the reportage of the two news outlets of the military operations in Gaza reveals that Haaretz is more dependent on foreign sources compared with CNN. Haaretz cited and reposted texts, images and especially videos from a number of international agencies for their news articles, while this is not the case for CNN. The fact that Israeli journalists were barred from Gaza during operation Protective Edge (Malsin 2014) can explain the resort to foreign dispatches, which proves to be an inevitable disadvantage for the news outlet. As a result, the majority of Haaretz’s non-agency news reports locate in Israel. CNN, on the other hand, has correspondents in Jerusalem and in Gaza, thus they were able to obtain information from both sides. The role of perspectives in shaping and narrating the news story will be analyzed later in this chapter.

6.2 Onset of the War

Rockets had been exchanged between Israeli and Palestinian forces days before the military operations, but the beginning of the war is widely assumed to coincide with the first day of Israel’s operation Protective Edge in Gaza. Still the starting date of the war remains unclear, as articles on the first day of the operation from a number of major news outlets such as Haaretz, the New York Times or the Guardian are dated July 8 (Haaretz 2014b;
Yourish and Keller 2014; Associated Press 2014), while CNN and Israeli official source say July 7 (Khadder, Wedeman and Mullen 2014; State of Israel 2015: vii). Despite being a source of confusion, the difference should not be a matter of great concern when considering the analogy of the news stories. After all, the purpose of analyzing the first day of the military operation is to understand how the conflict unfolds, how the events leading to the war are presented on the news.

During the few days just before the war, news of a Palestinian teen’s murder and torture by Israeli extremists as a revenge for the kidnap and murder of three Israeli teens was widely reported on Haaretz (Hasson 2014; Hasson and Levinson 2014), while on CNN it is included in articles about the military operations such as in the article chosen for analysis in this part (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). Later, the tensions and escalating situations between Israeli forces and Hamas led the Israeli security cabinet to expand the scale of the airstrikes, call up reservists, step up attacks against Hamas, which eventually resulted in the launch of a new military operation later known as operation Protective Edge (Ravid and Cohen 2014). It is interesting to see how the background of the military operations is covered on both news outlets as it is an important category in mapping the causes of the war, especially for readers.

6.2.1 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of CNN’s Article

During the first day of the war, CNN published three articles about the event (Wedeman 2014; Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Mullen 2014). The first one, which is also the article that will be dissected in this section, assembles latest information on the development of the operation (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). The other two articles tell details relevant to the armed conflict, with one structured like a question-and-answer item (Wedeman 2014) and the other a compilation of experts and analysts’ opinions on the escalating situation in Gaza (Mullen 2014). Even though CNN’s amount of articles on the war may be less compared
with that of Haaretz, the content of their individual article says quite the opposite, that the news network is in fact rather resourceful in terms of materials concerning the operation.

CNN’s articles are mostly multimodal, with visual data including videos, images and sometimes even maps making frequent presence on each of their news items. The use of visual data on CNN proves to be a journalistic strategy that can enhance the effects and the urgency of the issues in depiction. Thus multimodal texts are employed in many of CNN’s reports of the conflict, regardless of the types of article, contributing greatly to the distinctive structure of the outlet’s news reports. Likewise, the article under analysis (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) contains not just textual but also visual properties including one main video captioned “Israel raises shield against rocket attacks”, along with nine other videos in thumbnail visibly aligned in the sidebar, a map of Israel and a photoset, all compressed in a single news item (see Picture 1 and Appendix 1).
CNN’s main headline of the first day of the conflict quotes an Israeli official’s statement of a possible, upcoming ground invasion as an expansion of the military campaign, even though this is only the first day of IDF’s airstrikes on Gaza (see Table 4). There is an implication of an increasingly worrying situation that is about to be made more intense, more violent. The headline alone also suggests the idea that Israeli forces’ spearheading to the state of more violent, the ground invasion, might as well be the last resort but after all, a matter of necessity. While the function of the headline in news reports is to summarize the news story or to emphasize the most important subject mentioned in the discourse (van Dijk 1985: 77), it does not seem to be the case of that of CNN. Their main headline does in fact refer to one of the story highlights but it might not reflect the main content of the news item. The use of an official source in the headline puts gravity on the claim but at the same time, it also suggests an inclination towards a single perspective. The article is in fact divided into seven subsections covering different topics, most of which are, however, not ranked under the story highlights. These seven subsections also have their own headlines which summarize the main contents. The headlines are presented as follows:

Table 4: Headlines of CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Headlines</th>
<th>Note/Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ground operations in Gaza “might become necessary”, Israeli official says</td>
<td>main headline,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>big, bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>People “in human shield” killed on Gaza rooftop</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Israel warnings: Stay away from Hamas</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Teens’ deaths sparked new violence</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Long-range threat</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>“Red-lines” crossed</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Political strains</td>
<td>bold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, this article does not have a lead. Instead, the lead is replaced by the story highlights which are situated at the sidebar just under the main headline. The story highlights recapitulate the events described in the news and function as expedient signals for readers to quickly get hold of the general subject matter of the article. In this sense, their
function might be similar to that of the lead. The story highlights express the following topics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story highlights</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW: Palestinians say 24 killed in Israeli attacks targeting militants</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for rocket fired at Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Actor/Cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Hamas militants killed trying to &quot;storm&quot; into Israel from sea, Israel says</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli minister tells CNN a ground operation &quot;might become necessary&quot;</td>
<td>Reaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Picture 2:** Screenshot of CNN’s story highlights and their thematic categories (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)

The topics of the story highlights express four different themes concerning the conflict which are: the casualties of the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, the claim of a Palestinian armed group over rockets fired at Tel Aviv, the deaths of five Hamas members and lastly, Israeli official’s statement on a possible expansion of the military campaign. The first story highlight indicates the highest topic of the news item which in this case, is the casualties of the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. All of these four topics, even though reported in the same article, describe four different events. The headlines of the subsections (see Table 4) show how the story highlights employed in this article do not necessarily summarize the news events described but only outline some of the latest news that the outlet considers to be the most important.

As previously discussed, news events described in the press do not have to follow a chronological or causality order but are usually organized according to the principle of recency, with the results or consequences of an event being reported first, followed by the conditions (history, background, context) and subsections with extra details relevant to the main event. First topics are considered to have a higher level thematic structure and they
usually describe the most recent news or events (van Dijk 1988: 76). Table 5 rounds up the complete topic details of CNN’s news article on the first day of the war (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). The topics listed cover the global semantics of the news content and they are arranged in the same order as in the news article on CNN. The topics are broken down into seven subsections corresponding to the seven headlines listed above (see Table 4). Topic details express information connected to the main topics, with each assigned different topical categories such as the result, the consequence, or the reactions of an event.

**Table 5:** Thematic structure of CNN’s news article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Topic detail(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I a. Results</td>
<td>i Israel intercepted rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii Israel killed militants entering Israel’s territory through Zikim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Event (1)</td>
<td>Palestinian militants fired more than 130 rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Result (2)</td>
<td>24 Palestinians were reportedly killed, 150 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Cause (2)</td>
<td>Israel said it targeted “150 terror” sites in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Verbal reaction (1)</td>
<td>IDF said “Hamas will pay a heavy price”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Actor/Cause (3)</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for rockets fired at Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Actor/Cause (1)</td>
<td>Hamas claimed responsibility for rockets fired at Jerusalem and Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Reactions (1)</td>
<td>i Israeli Cabinet authorizes the military to call up troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Actor/Cause (4)</td>
<td>ii Israeli official referred to “possible ground maneuvers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Event (4)</td>
<td>Hamas claimed it entered Zikim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Results (4)</td>
<td>i Five Hamas militants were killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Event (5)</td>
<td>ii One Israeli soldier was slightly wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Consequences (5)</td>
<td>i Karem Shalom’s residents were ordered to turn off the lights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii Israeli aircrafts hovered and fired above Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II a. Circumstance (1)</td>
<td>Mohammad Sha’aban was killed in an Israeli airstrike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Actor (1)</td>
<td>i Sha’aban is leader of Hamas’ militant wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii Israel called Sha’aban “a senior Hamas terrorist”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Result (2)</td>
<td>Some Palestinians were killed in an Israeli airstrike on a Gaza rooftop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Actors (2)</td>
<td>i Palestinian sources said victims formed the “human</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
shields”
ii Two of them were children
Another victim of Israeli airstrikes was also a child
Israel said Hamas used “human shields”

III a. Reactions i Israel sent messages warning people to steer clear of
Hamas
ii Israel dropped fliers warning Gazans about militant
activities

b. Context Operation Protective Edge is “part of an effort to restore a
state security”

IV a. History/Events (1) i Kidnap and killings of three Israeli teenagers sparked
tensions
ii Israel blamed Hamas
b. History/Event (2) Palestinian teen was abducted and killed in Jerusalem
c. Event/Result (2) Israel arrested suspects
d. Consequence (2) The slain Palestinian teen’s cousin was beaten
e. Actor (IV. d) Men in Israeli security uniforms
f. History/Event (3) Israeli Arab confessed to a killing of another Israeli teen
in May
g. Commentary (3) Israeli police said the killer was motivated by Palestinian
nationalism
h. Reactions (1) i Palestinian president Abbas condemned the killings of
three Israeli teenagers
ii Abbas was criticized by his condemnation

i. Verbal reactions (I.d) i Abbas condemned Israeli airstrikes
ii Palestinian spokesman accused Israel of carrying an
“open massacre”

V a. Context (I.d) The offensive is to strike Hamas and stop rockets fired at
civilians
b. Event/Result A rocket hit the city of Hadera
c. Reaction IDF’s position was changed from de-escalation to
preparing for a deterioration of the situation

VI a. Verbal reaction Hamas leader Mushir al-Masri said Israel had “crossed
the lines”
b. Consequence Rockets into Israel increased
c. Actor/Cause Hamas claimed responsibility

VII a. Consequence (1) The conflict created political strains within Israeli PM’s
coalition.
b. Verbal reactions i Israeli foreign minister Lieberman expressed the intention
The first three topics, (I), (II) and (III), cover the development of Israeli military operations. Subsequent topics, (V), (VI) and (VII) reflect the verbal, physical reactions and political complications of the parties involved. One subsection (IV), however, delves into details of the aftermath of the killing and torture of Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khdeir. Thus it can be seen that CNN applies the principle of recency in which the latest information is prioritized and placed at the top of the news item. The seven parts in the news item cover different stories but they are connected in a relevance structure. The arrangement of the topics in a relevance structure assigns a hierarchy of importance to the topics themselves (van Dijk 1988: 76), meaning that the information in the first part (I) of the news is considered to be the most important in the article. It is also the result or consequence of the military campaign and in fact, the deaths reported are among the first casualties of operation Protective Edge.

Within the first part (I) there already exist different levels of importance in which news of Palestinian militants firing rockets at Israel (I.b) is ranked as the top event. The article however opens with a sentence that briefs about Israel’s intercept of rockets and killings of Palestinian militants who tried to enter Israeli territories through Zakim waters (I.a). Incident (I.a.i), or “Israel intercepted rockets”, is the direct result of the first event (I.b), “Palestinian militants fired more than 130 rockets”, whereas incident (I.a.ii), “Israel killed militants entering Israel’s territory through Zikim”, is the result of the fourth event (I.j) which is the fighting between IDF and Hamas members at Zikim.

Throughout the article, a series of Event–Consequence–Cause–Reaction is tangled and intersected in a complicated but rather coherent manner, without being obliged to the actual timeline of the first day of the conflict. One thing these events do have in common is that they are all thematically related to the latest developments of the military operations.
fact that CNN’s news articles are constantly updated (this article’s last update is, for instance, July 9, 2014) can explain the compact body of information. Despite the large volume, the main macroproposition (topic) concerns the verbal feud and the exchange of rockets and airstrikes between Palestinian and Israeli forces (18 topic details) while the lower level ones are for instance, the political tensions (04 topic details) or reports of civilian casualties (05 topic details). Topic details about the duel between Hamas and the IDF occupy high positions in the overall thematic structure. They are reiterated several times in the news article and some of these details are even chosen as the story highlights (see Picture 2). The reason might be that these events express salience or the quality to attract readers’ attention, which at the same time helps to explain why a verbal reaction of an Israeli official on the escalating situation is picked out to feature as the main headline.

Part (IV) is the only section that is not directly pertinent to the developments of the armed conflict but is connected to the major events of the article, as both main conflict actors, Hamas and Israel, also took part in the news stories about the killings and abductions of three Israeli and one Palestinian teenagers. There is no direct indication that the killings were the cataclysm for the ongoing war but much attention is surely paid to the incidents and their aftermaths. In an article about the first day of the war, there are four videos and a photoset solely devoted to the incidents of part (IV), over ten videos in total. Even though these videos are hyperlinked and put in thumbnail under the title “Related videos”, they are well visible at the sidebar (see Appendix 1), which pronounces their significance and connection to the main events mentioned in the article. The incidents form the backdrop of the armed conflict, but whether or not they are considered the cause and condition of the war is left ambiguous.

The organization of the thematic structure of the news article is mapped out in the following diagram:
Diagram 4: Schema of CNN’s news report (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)
CNN’s news article on the first day of the military operations is rather rich in materials. The information is able to address the basic questions of how, what, where and when the war broke out. The “why” question of this war is however, unclear. One thing to consider which is that the act of compiling the episodes of fighting, the political wrangles and internal disputes, the history of the four teenagers’ deaths altogether into one news article about the first day of the war might as well suggest that these events did not happen in a vacuum.

6.2.2 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of Haaretz’s Article

Haaretz’s first few articles on operation Protective Edge are dated July 8, 2014, as search results using this keyword display no match prior to this date (see Picture 3).
A look through news titles dated the day before of the operation, July 7, 2014, shows that there are actually ten items related to Gaza, with two reports specifically describing the escalating situation: one about the alarmingly increasing rockets fired at Israeli cities (Haaretz 2014c) and the other about IDF calling up reservists to prepare for an expanded operation (Ravid and Cohen 2014). On the first day of the war, there are up to twelve items concerning Gaza and the military operations, including two live-updates of two consecutive days (Haaretz 2014b; Haaretz 2014d), five news heads (Pfeffer 2014a; Bar’el 2014a; Oren 2014; Ravid 2014; Hass 2014b), one feature (Prusher 2014), two agency dispatches (Haaretz 2014e; Koopmans and Ramadan 2014) and two opinions (Dershowitz 2014; Levinson 2014). The news items discuss topics concerning the drop in support for Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas (Hass 2014b), Israeli security cabinet’s decision to escalate the military operation (Ravid 2014), what Israel wants from the war (Oren 2014), what Hamas wants from the war (Bar’el 2014a) and lastly, a recap of the sequence of events that took place on the first day of the war (Pfeffer 2014a).

From their editorial preferences it can be seen that Haaretz tends to combine the latest news or events into one master-post which is the live updates of the war, whereas other articles categorized as “Israeli news” often entail some analytical dimensions. The article selected for this study (Pfeffer 2014a) is no exception to this rule, even though the reason for its selection is precisely because of the content that it covers which is the summary and the analysis of the main events of July 8. The article is also in fact the news item last published at the end of the day.

Unlike CNN, Haaretz’s article on the first day of the war only has one big headline titled, “Missing: A responsible power to broker Israel–Hamas cease-fire” (Pfeffer 2014a). There is a difference in the main headlines of the two news outlets, as CNN’s headline aims to stress an escalating point of the conflict (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) while that of Haaretz looks for a solution for the escalation. Haaretz’s headline appears as a remark, a commentary and it satisfies the assumed function of the headline which is to summarize the content of the article or emphasize the most important information of the news.
Particularly, the latter part of the article delves into the question of a possible ceasefire broker, the details of which are discussed in the topical analysis of the news item (see Table 6). The article’s lead is placed underneath the main headline in normal font and takes the form of a sentence that rationalizes the motive of Hamas behind their engagement in the duel with Israeli forces.

(1) All Hamas has now to try and grab the world's attention and improve its standing in the eyes of its people – are its missiles. (Pfeffer 2014a)

A skim through the article shows that the lead is formulated by using one of the sentences in the last paragraph of the news item, which serves as an explanation for the Palestinian armed group’s decision to join in the fight against Israeli forces.

Haaretz’s article (Pfeffer 2014a) is comparable to that of CNN (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) in terms of content, as it recounts and encapsulates some of the main events that took place on the day IDF undertook the airstrike operations. What distinguishes the two is Haaretz’s preference to interweave facts with analysis. This difference in journalistic practices can thus be attributed to Haaretz’s distinction in terms of the news structure. Macropropositions of the ongoing development of the war stretch across the thematic structure of the news, with additional information on stages before and during the war and a contemplation of what might follow. These are the extra details that altogether work out to explain how previous events build up to the armed conflict, along with possible consequences of the war.

### Table 6: Thematic structure of Haaretz’s news report (Pfeffer 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Topic detail(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Commentary</td>
<td>Escalation is predictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Event</td>
<td>Hamas lost seven members in attacks on tunnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Reaction</td>
<td>Hamas fired missiles at Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Event/Reaction</td>
<td>Israel launches offensives against Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Result (1)</td>
<td>First civilian casualties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Topics concerning the latest developments of the war remain high in the thematic structure of the news discourse, as the article opens with descriptions of the main events and their results as seen in topics (1) and (2), followed by verbal reactions and commentaries. Even
though news of the fighting is central to the article, the author does not go into details of the tit-for-tat between Hamas and IDF but presents relevant information of the conflict as an attempt to explain the background and contextualize the news within the course of recent history. Further observations also point to missing statistics such as the number of civilian casualties killed on the first day of the fighting. The article instead focuses on the analysis of the current situation which is accompanied by a number of commentaries and predictions, supposing IDF expands its military operations. The question featured in the headline, the absence of a foreign ceasefire broker, is examined in topic (7), as the article then concludes with remarks of Hamas’ status quo (8).

From the organization of the thematic structure it can been seen that the article is rather unconventional and does not follow the standard format of a news discourse. It is informative but at the same time analytical, which makes the format resemble that of an analysis piece even though it is defined by Haaretz as “News”. In fact, the outlet does have their own distinctive genre of “Analysis”. That said, even though information on the fighting between Hamas and Israel still occupies a high position in the relevance structure of the news discourse (05 topic details), more room is spared for the categories of commentaries, analyses and predictions (13 topic details), which confirms the idea that the news article expresses higher analytical value than informative value.
Diagram 5: Schema of Haaretz’s news report (Pfeffer 2014a)
“Schematic superstructures organize thematic macrostructures”, according to van Dijk (1985: 69). Thus the events are narrated according to a local coherence of cause–consequence order, as main events are connected together in a sequence, more or less according to the author’s intentions or interpretation of the news. An example of this is the decision to use news of Hamas members’ casualties in an attack on the tunnel on the Gaza border as a main event rather than the consequence of another event. Accordingly, events of the first day of the war are arranged in the following order: (1) Hamas lost seven members in an attack on the tunnel, (2) Hamas fired at Israel, (3) Israel launched offensives against Hamas, (4) Israeli airstrikes caused Palestinian civilian casualties, (5.a) Hamas and Islamic Jihad fired at Israel, (5.b) Palestinian militants entered Zikim and lastly, (6) five Palestinian militants were killed by Israeli forces at Zikim.

The choice to construct the events in this order tells the story in a rather different manner from that of CNN which resolves to describe episodes of the fighting separately and not in a causality order. The events depicted in CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014), though all related to the ongoing development of the war, are perceived to take place independently and in fragments. Even though Haaretz’s way of reporting may influence the reception of the news, it presents a rather efficient journalistic strategy which enables readers to follow the events more easily. It might, nevertheless, run into the risk of being biased, as it is clearly based on the author’s interpretation of the news.

Interestingly, despite the fact that both news articles from Haaretz and CNN recap the same incidents and events that took place on the first day of the war, their ways of reporting quite differ from one another. CNN seems to focus more on the duel between Hamas and Israel, as information on the fighting and exchange of fires is emphasized throughout the news item, while Haaretz seems to downplay details of these events even as to the point that numbers and statistics are not reported. Haaretz does, however, offer a great number of commentaries and predictions, showing its interest in finding solutions for the escalating conflict between Hamas and Israel. The composition of semantic categories of the
development of the war, the political background (history/context), and the follow-up analysis of the events altogether makes Haaretz’s article rather structurally complete.

6.3 The Battle of Shuja’iyya

The battle of Shuja’iyya, which took place between July 20 and 24, 2014, witnessed some of the deadliest days since the outbreak of the hostilities between Hamas and the IDF. Much criticism was waged against Israeli forces’ onslaught on one of the most densely populated neighborhoods in the Gaza strip which resulted in a high death toll of Palestinian civilians who got sucked into the maelstrom of missiles and artillery. Few days prior to the battle, the IDF began a ground invasion of Gaza as an attempt to target the ground tunnels that Hamas members had used. What began as a “limited” ground incursion quickly spiraled into a “full-scale” campaign, with Shuja’iyya, situated north of the Gaza strip, ultimately bearing the brunt of the intense combats (Yourish and Keller 2014; Pfeffer 2014b). Israel had their own justification of the assault that was deemed by Palestinians and their government as a “heinous massacre” at the expense of at least sixty Palestinian civilians (Yourish and Keller 2014). Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu defended IDF’s military actions, adding that Israeli forces “only target the sources of terror and this [Shuja’iyya] is a source of terror” (Haaretz and Reuters 2014).

What we have come to acknowledge so far is a dispute in terms of narratives, as one side mourned the deaths of their civilians while the other claimed that its targets were militants. It comes to the press to assume the responsibility of weighing the different claims while taking into consideration the accounts of all sides. Given the controversy surrounding the incident, the study attempts to analyze the two outlets’ reports of the battle of Shuja’iyya, both dated July 20, 2014 (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014) in order to see how the event is narrated and whether the outlets offer any perspectives concerning the controversy surrounding the assault.

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4 Also known as Shaja’ia, Shujaiyeh.
The news stories selected for analysis in this section are constructed in the same ways as the two articles analyzed in the previous part (see subchapter 6.2). CNN combines different but relevant information into one article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014), while Haaretz prefers to focus on one theme which is the fighting in Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b). Since CNN’s article on the subject has a compact body of content, only two parts of the text devoted to the events in Shuja’iyya will be used for analysis which are “Gaza battles’ deadliest day for both sides” and “Dozens dead in Shaja’ia” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014).

It is necessary to mention that the choice to boil down the news article into just two paragraphs detailing the events in Shuja’iyya affects the overall schematic structure of the CNN article. Particularly, when separated from other news events mentioned in the article, they present a structure which van Dijk refers to as a “topical kernel”, meaning that only the main event, with little or no background information, history, causes or consequences, is covered (van Dijk 1988: 82). Haaretz’s item, on the other hand, is structurally similar to the previous article sampled in subchapter 6.2, in which facts and follow-up analyses are interweaved (Pfeffer 2014b). That said, the major topics covered in both news outlets are:

**Table 7:** Topics of CNN’s and Haaretz’s news articles on Shuja’iyya (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Israel’s ground assaults led to high casualties in the suburb of Shuja’iyya.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palestinian casualties were reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IDF soldiers casualties were reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Israeli official source defended IDF’s military actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Palestinian sources condemned IDF’s military actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>IDF claimed it had already warned residents of Shuja’iyya</td>
<td>only CNN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be pointed out, the only topic that CNN covered and that Haaretz did not report, is IDF’s claims that it had already distributed flyers and warned Shuja’iyya residents of the
upcoming onslaught. This information might as well be categorized and identified as a cause that explains the high toll of Palestinian civilian fatalities on this day. Despite being a high-level thematic structure in the article, the news of Shuja’iyya is not featured in CNN’s headline which instead chooses to disclose a detail of another event about an Israeli solder suspected to be captured by Hamas (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). This decision might express the outlet’s preferred news value. CNN’s story highlights do, however, mention news concerning Shuja’iyya. The topics mentioned in the story highlights are: (1) the current Palestinian death toll thus far, (2) Israeli–American soldiers’ deaths in Shuja’iyya, (3) U.S. Secretary of State’s travel to Egypt and (4) the number of Israeli soldiers killed on Sunday.

No recap of Palestinian casualties in Shuja’iyya is featured in the story highlights, despite the fact that the number of the dead and the wounded recorded on July 20 is the highest in a single day ever since the launch of the military operations (Yourish and Keller 2014). The same goes for the Israeli side, which by contrast receives a rather different treatment as two among the story highlights are devoted to recount the deaths of Israeli soldiers in the Gaza neighborhood, two among which are American nationals. One can easily observe an imbalance in terms of casualty reporting when one side’s casualties seem to draw more attention than those of the other.

The headline on Haaretz (Pfeffer 2014b), on the other hand, can be considered as a summary of the article’s content. The article presents both IDF’s defence of their military actions and Palestinians’ testimonies of the incident, hence the headline “In Gaza, a war of two narratives”. The lead of the article (see Example 2) describes the escalation of IDF’s ground invasion from a “limited” to a “full-scale” onslaught on Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b).

(2) What began on Thursday night as a “limited” ground operation, specifically targeting the tunnels in a relatively narrow strip of around 1.5 kilometers from the border fence, expanded 48 hours later into a full-scale onslaught on Shuja’iyya and its environs. (Pfeffer 2014b)
The lead of this Haaretz article is also a sentence extracted from the body of the article, which is similar to the case of the Haaretz article on the onset of the war that was analyzed in subchapter 6.2. The lead (see Example 2) presents the result and at the same time the happening of the main event which is the Israeli ground invasion into Shuja’iyya.

In terms of lexical choices, there exists a difference in the way that the two news outlets refer to Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups:

(3) Since beginning ground operations Thursday, Israel said, it has killed at least 70 terrorists and captured others. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

(4) The IDF claims that, since the start of the ground offensive on Thursday night, it has killed around 110 Palestinian militants; military sources report that troops are facing stiff armed resistance in Shuja’iyya. (Pfeffer 2014b)

Despite the fact that both Haaretz (Pfeffer 2014b) and CNN (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) cover the same information, there are discrepancies in their reporting which are first, the death counts and second, the lexical style. Even though the two articles seem to suggest that the “Palestinian militants” and “terrorists” killed by Israeli forces are likely to be members of Palestinian armed groups and not just of Hamas, there is an emphasis on the latter as they go on to tell further details of the group’s activities. One thing to consider is that they both report a statement of an Israeli official source, which assumingly requires certain precision and caution of words, especially when this is a paraphrase of a direct quotation. The use of “terrorist” instead of “militant” and vice versa, thus, may be intentional and may indicate a personal or institutional point of view, especially when Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by both Israel and the U.S. (Bar’el 2014a; Mullen and Todd 2014).
Interestingly, both CNN and Haaretz also mention the fact that the attack in the neighborhood Shuja’iyya was called out by Palestinians as “a massacre” whereas Israel presented it as a battle against “Hamas’ terror infrastructure”.

(5) But people in Gaza who spoke with CNN painted a different picture. “What is happening is a massacre,” said a resident of the al-Ramal neighborhood. [...] For three days, the IDF had warned residents of Shaja’ia to flee, Israel said. Such warnings are delivered through calls and text messages as well as fliers that said “it is the intention of the IDF to carry out aerial strikes against terror sites and operatives” in the area. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

(6) Israel is presenting the push as a battle against the hub of Hamas’ terror infrastructure [...] The Palestinians, for their part, are presenting it clear and simple as the Massacre of Shuja’iyya [...]. (Pfeffer 2014b)

The wording no doubt reflects the reactions to the event on both sides, as Palestinian sources consider IDF’s military action as a deliberate extermination of civilians while IDF justifies its actions as a fight against a terrorist stronghold. The rhetoric of “civilian” and “militant” casualties and the conflation of the two are routine in the reportage of the conflict, and which will be examined in more details later in this chapter.

Given the polarized accounts when it comes to debates concerning the fighting of Shuja’iyya, much attention should be paid to the perspectives of all sides of the war. In their reportage of the casualties in Shuja’iyya, CNN was able to acquire quotes from both Palestinian and Israeli sources, as well as the casualty figures from IDF and the Palestinian Health Ministry. The outlet however utilizes different ways to present the casualties from both sides.

(7) Eighty-seven Palestinians died, at least 60 of them in Israel’s assault on the town of Shaja’ia, the Gaza Health Ministry said. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

(8) The IDF said 13 soldiers were killed. [...] Among those killed was Max Steinberg, a California native, according to the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles. Steinberg attended Pierce College and served as a sniper. Sean
Carmeli, an IDF soldier from South Padre Island, Texas, was also killed, according to Rachel Simony of the Congregation Shoova Israel in South Padre Island. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

By introducing the detailed profiles of the two fallen Israeli-American soldiers, one “a California native”, one “from South Padre island”, the authors of the CNN’s article are effectively able to find a point of identification with its target North American readers (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). This is not the case for Palestinians whose deaths are by contrast summed up in a number without any further details. Such treatment of any news relevant to the U.S. context is common in the American press as well as the majority of Western press (van Dijk 1988: 74; Puddephatt 2006: 6).

On the other hand, statistics of fatalities are pretty much absent in Haaretz’s article which does not even bother to state any exact figures, except for a vague reference of “dozens of Palestinians killed”.

(9) According to Palestinian sources, dozens of civilians have killed [sic] in the bombed-out houses and streets. (Pfeffer 2014b)

That the article concentrates more on analyzing rather than offering the facts which can be referred to from their live updates might as well be a factor for this negligence.

Both news outlets, however, adapt the Israeli perspectives by directly quoting a number of Israeli sources. In particular, both articles depend heavily on IDF’s official statements, with CNN citing the Israeli forces five times and Haaretz seven times, as presented in Examples 10 and 11.

(10) But the IDF said Hamas “ordered them to stay” and “put them in the line of fire.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

(11) IDF officers have acknowledged the significant escalation in fighting since last night, using descriptions such as “taking off the gloves” and “it’s not an operation, it’s a war”. (Pfeffer 2014b)
Besides IDF, CNN also quotes Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu two times in reference to the battle of Shuja’iyya (see Example 12). Hamas, on the other hand, is cited once in the two parts of CNN’s article (see Example 13).

(12) At a news conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed the country’s “deep pain” at the loss of the soldiers. [...] “We’re doing everything we can not to harm the people of Gaza,” Netanyahu added. “Hamas is doing everything they can to make sure the people of Gaza suffer.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

(13) Hamas claimed responsibility for the deaths of the Israeli soldiers [...]. The attack “destroyed the force completely,” Hamas said, calling it a “heroic operation.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

Even though Hamas and the Israeli P.M. can be viewed as the official sources from both Palestinian and Israeli sides, they are cited in a contrastive manner in which one offers his condolence to the fallen Israeli soldiers while the other hails the killing of the soldiers as “a heroic operation” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). Such semantic moves formulate a victim–aggressor relationship, emphasizing their negative action which is the killing of the Israeli soldiers while at the same time effectively understate our negative action which is the killing of Palestinian civilians. These negative values are thus added to the negative representations of the Palestinian armed group Hamas. Haaretz, on the other hand, does not have any direct quotation from Hamas.

The fact that CNN correspondents were allowed to enter Gaza gives the outlet the benefit of a vantage point by being able to access to testimonies from both sides of the conflict. This was not the case for Haaretz whose physical restrictions to Gaza already hindered the possibility, prompting the outlet to resort to agency dispatches for a large amount of news on Gaza. Undeniably, Haaretz’s news article (Pfeffer 2014b) relies largely on data provided by Israeli official sources, which can have effects on the authenticity of the information as well as the weight of its claims and analysis. An example for this is the discrepancy in the number of Hamas members being killed, that Haaretz reports 110 in accordance with the Israeli military source while CNN reports 70 (see Examples 3 and 4). The author of
Haaretz’s article later resolves to admit that the number of fatalities on both sides are just “rumors”.

(14) At this point, there are swirling masses of rumors on both sides of the border regarding the number of fatalities. (Pfeffer 2014b)

The numbers and figures mentioned in CNN’s news article paint a more comprehensive picture, as estimations of casualties of both Palestinians and Israelis are supplied by credible sources of both sides (see Examples 7 and 8). However, when discussing news of IDF’s warnings of Shuja’iyya residents, the authors consult exclusively IDF sources including a tweet that accuses Hamas of ordering the civilians to stay put “in the line of fire” (see Examples 5 and 11).

In terms of the visual, Haaretz uses an image from a television report of Shuja’iyya by al-Aqsa TV which is a Hamas-run news network.

**Picture 4:** Image of Shuja’iyya in Haaretz’s news article (Pfeffer 2014b)

The image depicts three corpses lying on the ground which are likely to be of children. Graphic photographs are meant to disturb, the aim of which is to provoke emotions,
feelings and reactions. The use of such an image to describe carnage, even when it is made blurry, is rare in a news outlet with a liberal reputation like Haaretz. But the fact that the image is retrieved from a television channel owned by Hamas, the so-called Enemy of the state of Israel, and at the high time of war, undoubtedly implies an ideological choice. It befits the storyline which questions the narratives presented by both Israeli forces and Hamas that the author remarks as “hotly contested versions” of reality (Pfeffer 2014b).

On the other hand, CNN’s article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) does not enclose any specific visual medium of Shuja’iyya. The article, however, is accompanied by a video clip discussing news of an Israeli soldier suspected to be captured by Hamas (see Picture 5).

**Picture 5:** Screenshot of the main video of CNN’s article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014)

The fact that the story of the missing Israeli soldier occurs highest in the relevance structure, meaning that it is among the latest news and reported first in the article, may explain for the use of the video. The video tells details of the suspected capture of an Israeli soldier that Hamas claims responsibility whereas Israeli authorities deny the claims. It includes a footage from al-Aqsa TV which features a moving image of a Hamas
spokesperson. Interestingly, it can also be seen that both outlets make use of materials from the same Hamas’ television channel, though on different subjects, as one is about Shuja’iyya while the other about the missing Israeli soldier. Additionally, the visual representation of a Hamas member in CNN’s main video, fully covered, muted, in the background, is also an ideological construction. The representations of the organization will be analyzed in depth in the fifth section of this chapter.

Overall, the most notable differences in the way that the two outlets cover the battle of Shuja’iyya (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b) are in terms of casualty reporting and how the news story is presented in the relevance structures of the articles. First, there are discrepancies in the statistics of casualties of both Palestinian civilians and Palestinian militants as presented on Haaretz and CNN, which raises questions on the dead: whether they were militants or civilians. As the conflation of civilians with militants is central to the disputes surrounding the war, it is important to take into consideration these discrepancies as they might imply the outlets’ different views on the matter. Additionally, whereas Haaretz refrains from quoting the figure of civilian casualties, suggesting the idea that exact statistics were not available at the time of reporting (see Example 14), CNN has different ways in presenting the deaths on both Palestinian and Israeli sides (see Examples 7 and 8).

Second, the news story on Shuja’iyya occupies different positions in the two outlets’ articles. While news concerning Shuja’iyya remains the major macroproposition in the Haaretz article (Pfeffer 2014b), it only occupies two over seven parts in total in the CNN article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). Both the headline and the main video of the CNN article are devoted to another topic which is the missing Israeli soldier suspected to be captured by Hamas (see p.83 and p.89). These differences certainly indicate the preferred news values of Haaretz and CNN as it is necessary to emphasize that both articles are published on the same day, July 20.
6.4 Rhetoric of Terrorist Stronghold: When is a House not a Home?

Much controversy surrounding the 2014 Gaza war is over the targets of civilians and residential areas. What is considered to be legally permissible at the time of war is when conflict parties attack the other’s military targets, while taking cautionary measures to avoid any civilian casualties (Gross 2014). Crossing that line equals the possibility of committing war crimes. Both Israeli forces and Hamas have been condemned for their military actions and there is also evidence pointing to indiscriminate attacks against civilians from both sides (UNHRC 2015: 19). As the analysis of the battle of Shuja’iyya in the previous section demonstrates, Israel consistently used the rhetoric of a “terror infrastructure”, a “source of terror” to legitimize its airstrikes and artillery on Gaza neighborhoods (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b). In the midst of the fighting in July 2014, IDF released posters with the headlines: “When is a house a home? And when does it become a legitimate military target?” and “In Shuja’iyya” (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). The posters show pictures of a fully-functional residential house with a bedroom, a living room and oddly, an operation room, a weapon storage and a commander center. The posters are apparently a product of propaganda, the rhetoric of which has nevertheless been widely disseminated and mass-mediatized. All in all, the controversy surrounding the conflict as well the major blame-game between Hamas and Israel raise questions on the fine line that distinguishes a civilian from a militant.

The four articles selected for analysis cover different incidents in which a Gaza hospital, a residential house, a U.N. facility and a U.N. shelter were struck by Israeli airstrikes (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014; Hass 2014a; Martinez July 23rd 2014; Penhaul, Payne and Fantz July 25th 2014). From Table 8, it can be seen that the sites targeted by airstrikes are referred to by a number of lexical choices, the majority of which are cited from Israeli official sources.
Table 8: Lexicon describing target sites of bombardment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlet</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Lexical choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014)</td>
<td>al-Wafa hospital</td>
<td>compound, Hamas command center, rocket-launching site, launching point, closed military zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (Hass 2014a)</td>
<td>A residential house</td>
<td>IDF target, home, house of a Hamas’ senior commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN (Martinez 2014)</td>
<td>U.N. school</td>
<td>shield, Hamas institution, vacant school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014)</td>
<td>U.N. shelter</td>
<td>shelter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 8, the example in CNN’s article on the bombing of the U.N. shelter (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014) is the only case among the four articles that does not have a diversity of lexical choices, as the word “shelter” in reference to “the U.N. shelter” is the only lexical option applied throughout the article. On the other hand, in Haaretz’s news item on the bombing of the al-Wafa hospital in Gaza, the hospital is labelled in accordance with Israeli official source as “a compound”, “a Hamas command center”, “a rocket-launching site” and “a closed military zone” (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014). Such lexical options effectively impose on the hospital a number of militarized characteristics, turning it into a legitimate military target as opposed to its generally assumed notion of a place where the sick and the vulnerable are medically treated.

(15) The Israel Defense Forces said the strike was aimed at “specific terror targets within the hospital compound.” It said Hamas operatives had fired at IDF forces in recent days from the compound, using light weapons and anti-tank fire “which increased in recent hours, endangering our troops.” (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014)

(16) The hospital was empty, after its patients and medical staff had left on July 17. Contrary to reports, militants had not been in the hospital before its evacuation. (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014)
Al-Wafa Hospital is Gaza’s only rehabilitation hospital and most of its patients were disabled, paralyzed or in a coma, without relatives to look after them and in need of constant care and supervision. (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014)

“Contrary to [IDF] reports” that the hospital had been used by Hamas as a “compound” to fire at Israeli forces in recent days (see Example 15), Haaretz notes that the hospital had been in fact emptied since July 17 and it had not been used by Hamas operatives (see Example 16). The article further adds that the al-Wafa hospital is the only habilitation center in Gaza for disabled, paralyzed patients or those in a coma (see Example 17). Should the fact that the site was a hospital for the sick and had not been used by Hamas invalidate the quality of it being a legitimate military target? The IDF’s arbitrary declaration of the hospital as a “closed military zone” (see Table 8) denotes certain meaning: that anyone staying in the area is a militant, thus can be bombed, shot and killed. This ideologically-controlled vocabulary mostly appears in quotes from Israeli official sources while the authors of the article choose to refer to the subject in depiction as “al-Wafa hospital” or simply “the hospital” (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014).

In the same vein, the residential house featured in other Haaretz’s article (Hass 2014a) and the U.N. school depicted in CNN’s article (Martinez 2014) are described as having connection to Hamas. While the residential house featured in Haaretz is referred to by the author as an “IDF target” or more specifically, house of a Hamas’ senior commander (Hass 2014a), the U.N. school depicted in CNN’s article appears in an indirect quote of an Israeli source as a “shield”, a Hamas “institution”.

The Issa house was undoubtedly an IDF target: Marwan Issa is a senior commander in Hamas’ military wing, apparently the heir of Ahmed Jabari, whom Israel assassinated in 2012. But Marwan didn’t live there with his parents and brothers — eight families in all, totaling 55 people. He was hiding out somewhere in Gaza, as the Israeli security services knew very well. (Hass 2014a)

Tuesday’s discovery of rockets hidden in a vacant U.N. facility is the sort of evidence that Israel cites when it accuses Hamas of using civilians and their
institutions as shields in the ongoing Gaza conflict. The rockets were found in a vacant school between two other U.N. schools being used as shelters for 3,000 displaced Palestinians, the United Nations said. (Martinez 2014)

In Example 18, the author of Haaretz’s article attempts to explain the reason behind the bombing of the house belonging to the Issa family, confirming that the house was undoubtedly “an IDF target” because its family members have ties to Marwan Issa, “a senior commander of Hamas’ military wing”, “the heir of Ahmed Jabari” (Hass 2014a). At the same time, the author also adds that Marwan did not stay in the house and was in hiding, a fact that Israeli intelligence was well aware of. It ultimately raises the question of what the purpose of bombing the house of eight families was. Later in the article, the author then goes on to question the reasons behind the bombings of other residential houses in the area:

(20) Why was the house of someone who just joined Hamas’ military wing a month ago treated like the houses of its senior leaders? Was another house bombed because one brother works for a Turkish company? The family says it can’t think of any other “incriminating” factor. (Hass 2014a)

The author addresses the “why” question of the bombing by quoting the Issa family who attribute it to an “incriminating factor” (Hass 2014a), suggesting that the Issa house, along with other residential houses, were bombed as punitive measures for simply being relatives to Hamas members.

The idea that any site connected to Hamas is at the risk of being destroyed is further affirmed in Example 19 in CNN’s article on the bombing of a U.N. school (Martinez 2014), in which the author by contrast asserts that there was evidence of rockets being hidden in the U.N. facility, meaning that it had previously been used by Hamas. An important detail that must be pointed out here is that the author indirectly refers to the U.N. school as a “shield”, “their” institution even though the U.N. school was in reality a public property. The fact that U.N. schools, according to the author, were used as shelters for displaced Palestinians makes them effective human “shields” for Hamas against Israeli airstrikes and to hide their rockets. But the act of referring to the school as their institution essentially
associates the school to the group, suggesting that the school is an example, a representation of such Hamas institutions. This is a dangerous lexical choice because it turns the site into a legitimate military target, backing up Israel’s claims that Hamas used human shields to protect their missiles and creating a diversion that the blame should be placed on them, Hamas, not Israeli forces who bombed the school.

Two articles from both news outlets chosen for this section take on rather interesting perspectives (Martinez 2014; Hass 2014a). Haaretz’s article dated July 29, 2014 is a news story about a Palestinian family whose house was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes (Hass 2014a). The article discusses the dispute surrounding Israeli forces’ attack on residential areas, as the author narrates the news story from the perspective of a Palestinian civilian.

(21) “Now my oldest son, aged 4, asks me, ‘When are we going home?’” Raid said. “I took him to the ruined house, and he asked me, ‘Who broke the house?’ I told him the planes of the Israelis. He asked me why, and I told him they ‘broke’ ours like they broke others. He’s always asking how this could be. And then he told me, ‘I’ll break the Israelis’ house like they broke my house.’” (Hass 2014a)

The article tells the story of the Issa family whose house was struck because they happen to be related to a senior commander of Hamas’ military wing, even though the latter did not even live there. Given the prevalent reports of the tit for tat between Hamas and Israeli forces, such insight into the voices of civilians, who suffer from the fighting and exchange of fires, is rare. It also raises critical questions on the tactics and the methods of IDF in targeting personal dwellings, as well as their systematic conflation of Gaza’s innocents with Hamas.

The CNN’s article dated July 23, 2014, by contrast, looks from the viewpoint of the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. (Martinez 2014). The Israeli official’s narrative of the same subject, cited in the main video of the article, shows a rather conflicting view.
“They [Hamas] are putting missiles, military command center in hospital, for crying out loud. That’s something that the world should be outraged about, not outraged at Israel for defending itself against this rocket attack.” (Video, Martinez 2014)

In the extract from the CNN’s interview with the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., the Israeli official emphasizes that by targeting areas qualified as military targets even when they are hospitals or residential homes, We, meaning Israel, are only defending ourselves, thus Israel should not be made responsible for the civilian casualties, while Them, meaning Hamas, is using civilians as human shields. This exclusive interview with a high-rank Israeli official by CNN indicates an inclination towards an official narrative of one party involved.

The official rhetoric leads the public to believe that civilians were killed because they formed the “human shield” in order to protect Hamas, signifying that they were part of the war effort, which in turns downplays their deaths. In the video, the Israeli Ambassador then goes on saying that “If human shield is an effective strategy, it will be used again and again” (Martinez 2014), implying that it was imperative for Israel to bomb such residential areas to dismantle Hamas’ strategy. When asked to address the controversy over how the international media have been accused of being complicit in Hamas’ propaganda effort by broadcasting pictures of Palestinian civilian deaths, the Ambassador replies:

Hamas intends to harm Palestinian civilians and to harm Israeli civilians. The more civilians they kill, the better for them. [...] The media is different; the media is obviously looking for a story. You have these heart-wrenching photos, these Palestinian civilians who were killed. You have four kids who were killed on the beach. [...] When I see a picture like that, it’s very hard. But in placing the blame on Israel, they are unwittingly complicit to what Hamas is trying to do. (Video, Martinez 2014)

What one can observe is an apparent concession, followed by an apparent denial of responsibility. When being questioned about the high number of civilian deaths who were caught in the crossfires between the two forces, the Israeli official admits that it was difficult to see such photos of Palestinians who were killed but in the end it is Hamas who
should be placed the blame on, for “Hamas intends to harm Palestinian civilians” (see Example 23). The antagonistic tones and the dehumanization of the Enemy coming from a representative of the Israeli government is no surprise. The issue is in how these claims are evaluated, how they are presented to the public. By paying extensive attention and emphasizing their hyperbolic negative actions or alleged threats, elite groups can marginalize, discredit the voices of less dominant groups (van Dijk 1993: 264), as in this case, of Them, Hamas and Them, the civilians.

It comes to the press to decide from which angle the readers should be looking in and how the events or actors in depiction should be represented to the mass. Throughout CNN’s article on the subject of human shields (Martinez 2014), Israeli official narratives prevail ordinary voices, building up what van Dijk calls a “segregated” structure of discourse where opinions of less dominant groups are not heard (van Dijk 1993: 260). Still there is apparent effort to include testimonies from the Palestinian side which are often obscurely and interchangeably cited as “Palestinian leaders” or “Palestinians”, two concepts that denote completely different meanings.

(24) The geography and population density of Gaza further clouds efforts to determine whether civilian casualties are part of Hamas strategy of using human shields or collateral damage from Israel’s ground and aerial assaults, Palestinians say. (Martinez 2014)

(25) What complicates the dispute over alleged human shields – an offense against international law – is how Hamas is also a political organization embedded in civilian life in the Palestinian territory, Palestinian leaders say. (Martinez 2014)

These lexical choices, “Palestinians” and “Palestinian leaders”, can create confusion over who these Palestinians and Palestinian leaders are. Senior members of the Palestinian Authority are considered as Palestinian leaders, but senior members of Hamas are too Palestinian leaders. At the same time, Palestinian civilians and their politicians might share different perspectives regarding the issue. Considering the ideological and political distinctions among the Palestinian conflict actors including Hamas, the Palestinian
Authority and Palestinian civilians, more attention should have been paid to avoid such conflation.

All in all, it can be seen that the outlets’ choices to tell the same story but from very different angles give practical insight into the subject. It is interesting to see how an author of an Israeli press (Hass 2014a) attempts to put herself in the shoes of Palestinian civilians whose opinions are often censored and neglected, so as to look at the war from a different picture. On the other hand, throughout the CNN’s article (Martinez 2014), it can be seen that the information is largely supported by official sources (see Examples 23 and 25) rather than eyewitness accounts. According to van Dijk, such construction of “surface” structure is regulated by rules which may be institutional, and which enables an “unofficial exercise of power” (1993: 261). Discourse control is an enactment of power (ibid. 261), and when an outlet is highly dependent on official narratives to construct the story, it insinuates the idea that some sources should be more prioritized and some narratives are more credible.

By selecting one perspective over another, the outlet already takes a position when telling the war story. In fact, in the CNN’s article on the use of human shields in Gaza (Martinez 2014), the author constructs several reasons backing up Israel’s claims that Hamas used human shields in Gaza so that the killing of Palestinian civilians was unintentional.

(26) Measuring such bloodshed is “very difficult because Hamas is using them, Palestinians, as human shields,” Netanyahu told CNN. (Martinez 2014)

(27) “Hamas is not just an isolated, you know, sort of armed individuals. [...] if you are going to destroy everything related to Hamas as a party, as a movement, it means that you're going to go on the rampage against families, homes, hospitals, schools and social services,” Ashrawi said. (Martinez 2014)

(28) Israel has accused Hamas of using human shields in previous conflicts in Gaza. Also, in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon with the intention of destroying the PLO, it accused PLO combatants of using civilians as human shields in that conflict, too [sic]. (Martinez 2014)
As can be seen in Example (24), (25), (26), and (27), the factors that can explain the high toll of Palestinian civilian deaths in Gaza are: its geography, population density, civic presence and the use of human shields by Hamas. At the end of the article, the author includes the fact that Israel had previously accused Hamas and the PLO of using human shields in previous conflicts (see Example 28), suggesting that these incidents set a precedent to the 2014 war where the question of human shields is once again raised. According to the author, these factors altogether make civilian casualties “inevitable” (Martinez 2014). The construction of such discourse effectively puts the blame on external factors and completely removes Israeli forces’ responsibility and involvement in the civilian casualties.

The media reports of IDF’s issue of warnings prior to many of its airstrikes should also be noted. Two articles from both news outlets, one about the bombardment of the U.N. shelter (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014), the other about the bombardment of a residential house (Hass 2014a), put the matter in perspective.

(29) The IDF said it had told people at the school to evacuate because of the fighting in the area and given a four-hour window to get people out. Israeli officials told CNN they had warned U.N. officials for three days to evacuate. (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014) (emphasis added)

(30) At 1:30 A.M. on Wednesday, July 16, the Azara family’s cell phone rang. The mother answered, and quickly hung up in fright. Then Samer Azara’s phone rang, and the 26-year-old police officer answered.

The caller, Azara related, introduced himself as David from the Israel Defense Forces and told him in good Arabic: “You have three minutes to leave your house. I intend to launch a missile at the Issa house, your neighbors. What’s most important is that you remove the children; I don’t care about the adults.” (Hass 2014a) (emphasis added)

In Example (29), CNN reports a statement of Israeli officials saying that they had notified the U.N. officials three days prior to the bombardment of the U.N. shelter. Yet at least sixteen civilians were killed in this airstrike, many more severely wounded (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014). By contrast, in the Haaretz’s article, Azara, a Palestinian civilian whose
house was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes, recounted a phone call from an IDF official notifying that his family had *three minutes* to leave the house (see Example 30). There is an interesting analogy in the two stories whereby the aspect of time is a significant variable in the construction of the news. Given *three days*, one might have enough time to prepare for the evacuation whereas given *three minutes*, there is simply no time. But then a question also stems from the first incident (see Example 29) is that if the U.N. shelter was given enough amount of time to evacuate, why were there still so many civilian deaths? These aspects are missing in the CNN’s article which refrains from questioning the contradiction in IDF’s claims.

Later in the Haaretz’s news story (Hass 2014a), the author reveals that many houses were in fact destroyed without any prior warnings.

(31) Some houses have been bombed with no prior warning, with all their inhabitants still inside, for reasons incomprehensible to those relatives who survived. (Hass 2014a)

The decision to tell the story from the perspectives of Palestinian civilians whose houses were bombarded by Israeli airstrikes indicates the position of the author, who chooses to look at the issue of warnings in a critical light. As Examples (30) and (31) might suggest, in the end, the aim of these arbitrary issues of warning seems to be that Israeli forces would be cleared of responsibility over anyone who chooses to remain in the targeted sites because they would then automatically assume the status of non-civilian.

6.5 Hamas

In a press conference that took place during the escalation of the Gaza war 2014, Israeli president Benjamin Netanyahu attempted to justify the ongoing battles in Gaza against Hamas’ leaders by referring to Hamas as part of a network of Islamist terror groups including the Islamic State, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, calling them “branches of the same
tree”, “the savagery”, “the enemies of all civilized countries” (Times of Israel 2014). What then slipped into the political lexicography of this particular conflict is a confrontation between the good and the evil, the civilized and the barbaric, a war against terror between Israel, often portrayed as a democratic, Western-friendly country in the Middle East and Hamas which is a terrorist organization as designated by Israel and Western countries (Mullen and Todd 2014). Suddenly the war sounds just when it is represented as a global fight against terrorism (Fattal 2014). Here the Enemy, Hamas, being grouped with ISIS and Hezbollah, automatically acquires the same category. The implication here is that, since there has been a massive campaign against the terror of ISIS across the globe, it makes sense to conquer Hamas in the same vein. With that being said, four articles from both news outlets (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014) will be analyzed in this section in order to learn about how the media portray one of the main actors of this conflict, Hamas, given such preconceived assumptions of the organization.

As previously suggested, the conflation between “militant” and “civilian” can turn the innocents into part of the war effort, making them specific targets by the armed groups fighting in this war (see subchapter 6.4). The case is on the contrary for Hamas which is considered as a terrorist group by both Israel and the U.S. Given the position and the relationship that both news outlets maintain with the conflict actors, one can infer that the use of the word “terrorist” of both news outlets when depicting Hamas is not simply the result of an evaluative categorization but a conscious ideological choice.

**Table 9:** Lexicon depicting Hamas and their members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Lexical choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (Bar’el 2014a)</td>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>organization, sole ruler of the Gaza strip, terrorist organization, Hamas government, Hamas leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (Bar’el 2014b)</td>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>militant, armed wing, military wing, group, PA’s military wing, Hezbollah, authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN (Mullen and Todd 2014)</td>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>movement, monolith, group, military wing, the resistance, rebellion, terrorists, Palestinian militant group, political arms, military arms, the Osama bin Laden of Hamas, movement of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
resistance, Islamic resistance movement, military force, fighters, military commanders, in Iran’s good books

| CNN (Castillo 2014) | July 23 | organization, terrorist organization, the resistance, faction, operatives, militants, political wing, cadres |

As can be seen in Table 9, the references of Hamas and its members to “terrorist” are mentioned once in the texts on the organization (Bar’el 2014a; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), with the exception of Haaretz’s article dated July 15 where the lexical choice is absent (Bar’el 2014b). In both news outlets (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen and Todd 2014), Hamas’ status as being a terrorist organization with an infamy compared to that of Hezbollah and al-Qaeda is axiomatically assumed, as a matter of course. The Western definition of “terrorist” is strongly associated to Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, and here it is in reference to a group of people who is radicalized and uses violence against Israeli occupation of Palestine (van Dijk 1995a: 260). Such consistent lexicalizations of the Palestinian armed group no doubt spell out the authors’ ideological positions of the conflict actors (ibid. 260). The two CNN articles begin with an assumption of the group being a terrorist organization before adding that they call themselves “the resistance” or “movement of resistance”, both in quotation mark (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014).

In the CNN’s article that introduces the profiles of Hamas’ leadership (Mullen and Todd 2014), Hamas appears as a weak, outlawed, Iranian-backed group who uses violence to vindicate their ideology and achieve their goal which is “to fight Israel”, as seen in Examples 32 and 33.

(32) “The Qataris, who are backing him now, are not able to provide the military expertise and training on rockets and drones that the military wing needs to fight Israel,” he said. “These are things that only the Iranians can provide.” (Mullen and Todd 2014)

(33) Khaled Elgindy, who was a former adviser to the Palestinian Authority, said Hamas is in one of the weakest positions it’s been in in several years. […] And that weakened position, he says, is fueling the military wing’s belligerence. (Mullen and Todd 2014)
In both CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), much attention is paid to Hamas’ military wing as it is referred to by a range of lexical options such as “military arms”, “military force”, “military commanders”, “fighters”, “operatives” and “cadres” (see Table 9). The diversity of lexicon depicting the group points out that neither its military wing nor its political wing is “monolith”, as stated in the CNN article on the profiles of its leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014). The main topic of the article is in fact to discuss who is in charge of Hamas, whether it is its military wing or its political wing. At the end of the article, the author quotes a former adviser to the PA who suggests that the “weakened position” of Hamas in the recent years might be attributed to the rise of its military wing, Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which is responsible for the physical confrontation with Israel (see Example 33).

On the other hand, Hamas on Haaretz seems to appear in a slightly different manner. Even when Hamas is called out as a terrorist group at some point (Bar’el 2014a), they are portrayed as a fully-functioning organization with a leadership appointed to separately coordinate a military wing and a political wing.

(34) The abductions caught Hamas during a period that put its political strength to a severe test, when it turned out that the new unity government did not intend to pay the salaries of most Hamas government employees in Gaza […]. (Bar’el 2014a)

(35) The rebellion of the Hamas government officials made it clear to the organization’s leadership that as a result of the reconciliation its control over the funding of its supporters is in danger. (Bar’el 2014a)

(36) […] Hamas, until the reconciliation with Fatah, was seen as a separate authority that couldn’t influence the Palestinian Authority. (Ba’rel 2014b)

Throughout both Haaretz’s articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b), Hamas is frequently represented as a “government” (two times) and an “authority” (one time). Both articles also discuss the relationship that the group maintains with the Palestinian Authority (see Examples 34, 35, 36) as the author refers to their coalition as a “unity government”. There
is a an emphasis on the group’s political effort in reconciling with the PA and a number of political and financial problems that Hamas faced due to this new coalition. Such lexicalizations of the group highlight the diplomatic and political issues involved, as the author argues that these political complications led to the escalation in the conflict between Hamas and Israel (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b).

In the second Haaretz article on Hamas’ goals out of a ceasefire with Israel (Bar’el 2014b), however, the role of its military wing appears more clearly.

(37) [...] if Hamas’ military wing doesn’t agree to it, the cease-fire will be a theoretical exercise in a strategy of mini-conflicts. (Bar’el 2014b)

(38) Now Hamas looks like the PA’s military wing. In this way, it resembles Hezbollah, which thanks to its military might and private conflict with Israel can dictate Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policy. (Bar’el 2014b)

The comparison of Hamas with “the PA’s military wing” and Hezbollah is ideological (see Example 38). It implies the power of the military wing in terms of control and decision-making that according to the author, resembles that of Hezbollah which is able to assert authority over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policy owing to its conflict with Israel. With this interpretation, the function of Hamas’ political wing is comparable to that of the PA which exercises no independent power over the military due to its security coordination with Israel (Hass 2014b). Whereas in the CNN’s article (Mullen and Todd 2014), the question of who is in charge of Hamas remains unanswered, the author of the Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014b) affirms that it is Hamas’ military wing who is in charge, who has the right to say in the organization, as is clearly seen in Example (37).

In terms of the propositional structures, Hamas is regularly associated with forbidden, terrorist actions, as well as being accused of having intentions to harm Palestinian and Israeli civilians. The CNN’s article on Hamas’ endgame of the war (Castillo 2014), in particular, is an example for this idea.
“The goal of Hamas—the actual, overarching goal—is to terrorize the Jews of Israel, through mass murder, into abandoning their country,” Goldberg wrote. (Castillo 2014)

Reports of civilian casualties in Gaza – without the context of rockets being fired at Israel – play into Hamas’ media strategy, he [CNN Middle East analyst and former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren] said. (Castillo 2014)

As can be seen in Example 40, Hamas is purportedly accused of taking advantage of reports of civilian casualties as a “media strategy”, implying that the group is using the civilian death tolls to build up a legal and public ground so as to fend off Israel’s military actions. Both opinions denounce the group as deliberately harming Palestinian and Israeli civilians, using inflammatory hyperbole such as “to terrorize the Jews”, “through mass murder” (see Example 39). The author of the article then delivers a clean-cut description of Hamas’ endgame in Gaza which are outlined by the small headlines of the article (Castillo 2014). Compared with Haaretz’s article on the same subject, dated July 8, 2014 (Bar’el 2014a), there are discrepancies in what are perceived as Hamas’ goals out of this war as stated in CNN (Castillo 2014).

**Table 10:** Hamas’ goals of the 2014 Gaza conflict (Bar’el 2014a; Castillo 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Haaretz</strong> (Bar’el 2014a)</th>
<th><strong>CNN (Castillo 2014)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  The preservation of its status as the sole ruler of the Gaza Strip</td>
<td>The destruction of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  The solution to its economic crisis</td>
<td>An end to the Israeli blockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  The continued implementation of the reconciliation with Fatah and the PA</td>
<td>The release of prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  The improvement of its political standing</td>
<td>Rally support at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  A temporary cease-fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  The end of further arrests of its activists in the West Bank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  The release of the prisoners freed in the Gilad Shalid deal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When juxtaposing what are mapped out on both news outlets as what Hamas wants from the war (Bar’el 2014; Castillo 2014), one can observe a number of differences. Haaretz (Bar’el 2014a) presents a rather in-depth analysis of Hamas’ demands, with an emphasis on the group’s struggle to address its economic and political problems which already faltered its reputation and put the funding of its supporters in danger. Facing such serious problems, Hamas’ military confrontation with Israel, according to the author, serves as an ad hoc solution to rehabilitate its political status (see Examples 41, 42 and 43).

(41) Hamas did not order Operation Protective Edge. All these were in clear contrast to the interests that have guided Hamas so far. (Bar’el 2014a)

(42) Operation Protective Edge, despite all the damage it is causing in Gaza, could as a result actually improve Hamas’ political standing for now. (Bar’el 2014a)

(43) [...] Hamas leadership is calling on all the organizations in the Gaza Strip to “unite in the face of the Israeli aggression”. [...] Hamas is incapable of enforcing its will over some of the organizations, and it has been dragged into a war situation because of the actions of the separatist organizations who started the rocket attacks in the first place. (Bar’el 2014a)

At the same time, the author includes the group’s effort to push for a ceasefire with Israel, propounding the idea that it was “dragged into the war” because of other Palestinian separatist factions who had started firing rockets at Israel in the first place and that operation Protective Edge is not what Hamas “ordered” (see Examples 41 and 43). Even though such argumentation is analytical, hence, personal, it keeps Hamas’ appeal in perspective, signaling that what the group wants is not a war with Israel, which was not its primary intention, but rather long-term solutions to address its socio-economic issues and the continued implementation of the reconciliation with Fatah and the PA in the West Bank. Such an in-depth analysis certainly allows the author to be in the position to come to terms with Hamas’ practical demands. This is what Galtung means when he says that the basis of any political discussion on conflict is about the basic human needs (2009: 116), as
a result, it is necessary for the media to look at the issue in a broader social, political and economic context that controls and governs the conflict dynamics.

As opposed to Haaretz, according to the author of the CNN’s article on Hamas’ endgame in Gaza (Castillo 2014), there are four goals that Hamas wants to reach (see Table 10). One can observe that the three goals which are, an end to Israeli blockade, the release of prisoners and rally support at home have been similarly discussed in Haaretz’s article (see Table 10). In particular, the goal to put an end to Israeli blockade corresponds to Hamas’ demand to solve its economic problem which in reality stems from this blockade (Castillo 2014). On the other hand, the support at “home”, meaning both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would also bring about a rehabilitation of Hamas’ political status and standing in the area. And finally, the demand that Israel release Palestinian prisoners is also mentioned in details in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a).

Aside from these three practical demands, the author of CNN’s article (Castillo 2014) reveals a catchline: Hamas wants the destruction of Israel.

(44) This mission is written into the preamble of Hamas’ founding document: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it.” It’s a demand that is globally repudiated as outrageous. (Castillo 2014)

(45) It is unrealistic for Hamas to think that it can somehow destroy Israel. As long as Hamas leaders latch on to that as an endgame, the result will be continued flare-ups for years to come. (Castillo 2014)

The idea that Hamas wants to destroy the state of Israel comes from a charter of the organization’s founding document, according to the author of the article who later comments that such goal is simply “outrageous” and “unrealistic” (see Examples 44 and 45). That Hamas wants to destroy Israel is a persuasive rhetoric frequently echoed by Israeli officials (see Examples 23 and 40) and here it is reiterated by the media. Such discourse formulates models of the proposition that Hamas is the threat to Israeli national security, hence, it should be eliminated, which is in line with what Israeli prime minister
Netanyahu meant when he called on greater international support for Israel’s battles against Hamas (Times of Israel 2014), as previously mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter. Regardless of the origin and authenticity of the statement, when such proposition is widely disseminated by the media and eventually accumulates to a cultural mass, it turns every act of the Enemy into a war effort, building up general negative attitudes towards them and implying that fighting against them, Hamas, is imperative.

When the CNN’s discourse is juxtaposed to what is analyzed as Hamas’ practical demands from the conflict in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a), it appears as a myopic and inciting view. The article on Haaretz places focus on the group’s diplomatic and political efforts rather than its insistence on a physical duel with Israel, which in turns suggests that antagonistic propositions of the group can be avoided.

Another important dimension of discourse semantics is the level of specificity and degree of completeness of discourse, in which the “irrelevant negative categorization” of the Enemy can effectively deligitimize their opinions or actions (van Dijk 1993: 275). In CNN’s article on the profiles of Hamas’ leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014), one can observe the overcompleteness of discourse when portraits of Hamas’ leaders are depicted:

(46) “Despite his George Clooney-type looks, he’s very much a dangerous man because he aids and abets Hamas’ very destructive policies and strategy,” said Neri Zilber of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. While it’s not clear how much control Meshaal has over the military wing of the group, one Israeli official calls the 58-year-old “the Osama bin Laden of Hamas.” (Mullen and Todd 2014) (emphasis added)

(47) The military wing is led by Mohammed Deif, a shadowy, savvy figure who analysts say has survived multiple Israeli assassination attempts. [...] It [the Qassam Brigades] says he took the name “Deif,” which means “guest,” because under the pursuit of Israeli security forces, “he kept moving from village to village and from place to place.” (Mullen and Todd 2014) (emphasis added)
In this CNN article (Mullen and Todd 2014), Khaled Meshal, or Meshaal, Hamas’ leader of its political wing, is portrayed as a “dangerous” man with “George Clooney-type looks”, “the Osama bin Laden of Hamas”, while Mohammed Deif, leader of al-Qassam Brigades, appears as a “shadowy, savvy figure” who took the name “Deif”, meaning “guest” in Arabic, because he moved from village to village to avoid Israel’s pursuit. These personal characteristics may be irrelevant but they hyperbolically add up to the representations of these figures. In the case of Khaled Meshal, for instance, the Hamas’ political leader is profiled as “the Osama bin Laden” of Hamas. Such is an ideological lexicalization hinged on preconceptions and stereotypes of Western definition of “terrorist”. It also implies that Hamas’ political wing is no less treacherous and threatening than its military wing, and that these figures, who may appear as simple, ordinary characters are in fact capable of “dangerous”, threatening acts (see Example 46). This dimension of discourse semantics by contrast does not appear on Haaretz’s articles on Hamas, which might partly be due to the fact that both of their articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b) do not focus individually on Hamas leadership.

Photographs and videos of Hamas are included in both news outlets, as a result, it is important to look into their roles in the discourse. When considering the four articles chosen for this section (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), there is a difference in terms of the way that the two outlets make use of the visual data such as images and videos. Haaretz’s articles are more textually structured, as each news item is accompanied by only one photograph (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b). On the other hand, CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014) are more visually supported, as they each have one main video and other small videos in thumbnail with a layout similarly featured and analyzed in section 6.2.2 of this chapter (see Appendix 1).

In the Haaretz’s article and the CNN’s article dated July 15, 2014 (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen and Todd 2014), images of Hamas’ armed wing Iz al-Din al-Qassam are featured. The image of Hamas used in Haaretz’s article about the prospects of the Hamas–Israel ceasefire (Bar’el 2014b) is captioned “Palestinian militants of Iz al-Din al-Qassam, Hamas’ armed
wing, Gaza Strip, in 2014” and credited to AFP. On the other hand, Picture 7 is a screenshot of the main video titled “Hamas explained” in a CNN article on the profiles of the group’s leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014).

**Picture 6**: Image of Hamas used in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014b)

**Picture 7**: Screenshot of CNN’s main video on Hamas (Mullen and Todd 2014)
In both images (see Pictures 6 and 7), the group appears masked, heavily armed and in the screenshot of the CNN’s video, a Hamas member seems to look directly at the camera, standing in stark contrast to a supporting crowd. The video in fact elaborates on Hamas and their goals, featuring almost exclusively images and details of activities of the al-Qassam Brigades (Mullen and Todd 2014). The use of these visual data in both news outlets displays an interest and attention to Hamas’ armed wing which is known to be responsible for the rockets at Israel. More importantly, the images are used in articles specifically about the organization (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen and Todd 2014), which signals the vital role of the armed wing in Hamas’ organizational structure. In this case, the armed wing represents the mass appeal of Hamas as a militant group whose tenacity borders on a will to fight against Israel. This ideological portrayal, if anything, only confirms the stereotypes of the Western descriptions of a “terrorist” group: Islamic, fanatic, fundamentalist, radicalized, armed.

Additionally, in an extract of the CNN’s video, Hamas is introduced as a democratically-elected government in Gaza and one of the first Islamist parties in the world to win political office, a fact refuted and unrecognized by Israel and many Western governments (Mullen and Todd 2014). One year into its elected office, the CNN’s presenter adds, Hamas published a charter calling for the destruction of Israel (Mullen and Todd 2014), a detail that has been previously analyzed in this section (see p.108). This goal is visualized by the news outlet, as seen in Picture 8.
This graphic design of the Hamas’ goal to destroy Israel is notable. The image consists of a background which is a green shade symbolized as the color of Islam, along with white Arabic script, on the left-hand side of the image and the phrase “the destruction of Israel” capitalized and formatted in big font size on the right-hand side of the image. The Arabic script, which is known as the shahada or an Islamic creed, and the green shade are in fact components of Hamas’ official flag, as can also be seen in Picture 6. But the composition of all of these graphic elements, the green color, the shahada, the capitalized “The destruction of Israel”, leaves an impression that there is a connection between them. With this interpretation, the goal which is “the destruction of Israel” is not only associated with Hamas but also with Islam, insinuating the idea that the religion also represents a threat to Israel (see also Example 44).

On the other hand, when describing Hamas’ political leader, Khaled Meshal, the two news outlets look from rather different perspectives (Bar’el 2014a; Mullen and Todd 2014). In the Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a), Khaled Meshal appears charismatic, looking in another direction and surrounded by a number of supporters waving the Islamic flag which is also
the Hamas flag (see Picture 9). The image renders the representation of a leader who seems to be greatly supported by the mass. The choice to use such an image of the leader of Hamas’ political wing in this case is ideologically strategic. It goes well with the storyline (Bar’el 2014a) which discusses the details of Hamas’ political and diplomatic efforts to improve its standing not just internationally but also domestically.

On the other hand, the CNN’s article on the profiles of Hamas’ leaders has a specific video devoted to Khaled Meshal, displayed in thumbnail at the sidebar and titled, “Israeli spies poisoned a Hamas leader” (Mullen and Todd 2014). The interaction of the video with the text and an image of Khaled Meshal screenshot from the video can be seen in the following pictures:

**Picture 9:** Image of Khaled Meshal on Haaretz (Bar’el 2014a)
Here’s an introduction to Hamas’ key players:

**THE POLITICAL WING**

**KHALED MESHAAL**

He’s Hamas’ top political leader and often its public face. He’s had the role since 2004 after Hamas’ then-leader, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, was killed in an Israeli airstrike.

A former teacher, Mashaal operates mostly from Qatar and is known as Hamas’ external deal-maker, raising money from supporters in the region.

"Despite his George Clooney-type looks, he’s very much a dangerous man because he aids and abets Hamas’ very destructive policies and strategy," said Nerly Zilber of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

While it’s not clear how much control Mashaal has over the military wing of the group, one Israeli official calls the 58-year-old “the Osama bin Laden of Hamas.”

**Picture 10:** Screenshot of a part of CNN’s article (Mullen and Todd 2014)

**Picture 11:** Screenshot of video featuring Khaled Meshal on CNN (Mullen and Todd 2014)
In Picture 11, the image of Khaled Meshal is juxtaposed to that of Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda. The image is actually the visual illustration for what has been presented in Example 46, in which the former is referred to as the “Osama bin Laden of Hamas” by Israeli officials. In reality, the video tells details of the poison attempt of Khaled Meshal by Israeli agents in Jordan and how the fact that he survived the assassination radically changed his position from an unknown to a very popular leader.

(48) Once he survived this attack, this leader who was previously virtually unknown became very popular. His stature goes straight to the top. He is a living model. (Video, Mullen and Todd 2014)

The proposition that Khaled Meshal rose to his position today thanks to his survival of the assassination attempt, instead of his capability of leadership or any other skills, effectively delegitimizes his public appeal. At the same time, the comparison of Meshal with Osama bin Laden, as previously stated, presents an image of a dangerous man who has much influence over Hamas and is thus a threat to Israel. This portrayal of Meshal by Israeli officials might amount to propaganda, but the mass distribution of such an image by a mainstream international outlet can have a huge effect on readers and consequently contribute to the stereotypical representation of Hamas.

The press images play an active role in shaping the visual representations of conflict actors. Throughout their coverage (Mullen and Todd 2014), these negative portrayals of Hamas and their leaders seem to be rather routine on CNN. Haaretz, on the other hand, resorts to less image-format depictions of the organization, which in turns is able to avoid ideological representations of the group.
7 CONCLUSION

News from the Middle East has been frequently in the focus of international news reports throughout the past decade. The region meets all the necessary criteria earmarked for a front page’s feature: negativity (war/violence), elite nations (relations with the U.S.), ideological proximity (fight against terrorism), among many other economic and political interests (van Dijk 1988: 39). News is newsworthy when it is about elite people in elite countries, when it is personalized and negative, according to Galtung (2002: 262), which helps to explain the media’s fascination with any news related to the Israel–Palestine conflict.

This study examines the coverage of the latest war in Gaza from two online news portals, Haaretz and CNN International. It focuses on the outlets’ approaches and reportage of the events taking place during the war, fixating on four topics: the onset of violence, the battle of Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and lastly, the representations of Hamas. Twelve articles, six from each news outlet, were analyzed using Teun van Dijk’s CDA framework for news discourses. The purposes were to find out how the events, the outbreak of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya, are reported, how conflict actors including Palestinian civilians and Hamas are represented, and how news articles from Haaretz and CNN differ from one another in terms of the war/peace journalism perspectives. These were also the three research questions of this study. The assessment was based on an interest in knowing whether the media coverage of the war has been fair and if the outlets have been critically assessing the weights of different claims which emerged in the conflict and thereby, providing readers with accurate and authentic information. Thus within the scope of the study, the thematic and schematic structures of the news, dimensions of discourse semantics including lexical styles, perspectives, propositional structures, positions and level of specificity and degree of completeness, along with the visual data, were analyzed.
To begin with, what we have come to acknowledge so far is the differences in the way the outlets narrate the news stories on the outbreak of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Pfeffer 2014a; Pfeffer 2014b). In terms of structure, due to having a body of content usually constricted, CNN’s news topics are organized according to the principle of recency in which latest news occurs at the highest level of the thematic structure before other thematically relevant macropropositions. This is also reflective on CNN’s headlines and story highlights which seem to prioritize prominent news that express a salient quality rather than the main content of the news (see subchapter 6.2.1). This is an aspect where it differs from Haaretz which usually resolves to less shocking or startling news headlines, even though this is only an observation based on the headlines collected. Haaretz’ news articles are also structurally different, which sometimes follows a causality order (see subchapter 6.2.2).

In terms of content, more than necessary attention is paid to the coverage of the duel, the series of exchange of fires, constant fighting and inflammatory verbal reactions from Hamas and Israel on the CNN’s coverage of the onset of the war (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). Such is an approach on the low road, as defined by Galtung, which points to the media’s reportage of the battlefield where physical confrontation, violence, casualties from the two sides are put in the spotlight. It is one of the aspects that characterize sport-archetypical war journalism. (Galtung 2002: 259) Even if reporting news and updates of the fighting is indispensable to the news media covering conflict, such perpetual focus on the tug of war between the two warring sides is avoidable. Haaretz, for instance, in their reportage of the first day of the war (Pfeffer 2014a), the author of the article places the focus on Hamas’ political and diplomatic efforts, while suggesting a number of possible solutions that can be applied to prevent the escalation of the situation. These are the dimensions lacking in the CNN’s reportage.

On the other hand, the most prominent issues in the two outlets’ coverage of the battle of Shuja’iyya (see subchapter 6.3) are perspectives and casualty reporting. In CNN’s news article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014), more priority is given to the official narratives,
while less attention is paid to the ordinary. There is an imbalance of reporting, especially in terms of casualties. The article first presents the fallen Israeli soldiers as individuals, rather an anonymous mass, before calling the figure of the Palestinians who were killed in the Israeli airstrikes. Throughout the CNN’s report of the event, official sources outweigh ordinary voices. It implies a systematic preference that entrusts official narratives with more credibility and higher values. The Haaretz’s article on the same event (Pfeffer 2014b) also has the same problem. Despite this fact, the article attempts to look at the event, the battle of Shuja’iyya, from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives in order to present a broader picture of the conflict.

In terms of the representations of conflict actors, the study takes an interest in the way Palestinian civilians and their dwellings are represented on both news outlets. As a result, articles on the military targets of what are normally deemed as safe spaces including a hospital, a home, a school and a shelter were selected in order to see how the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold is reflected on the news (see subchapter 6.4). In the analysis of the four articles, it emerges that these sites were considered by Israeli officials as legitimate military targets because of their connection to Hamas, whether it is a rehabilitation hospital alleged of firing Hamas’ rockets at Israel (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014), a civilian home with family ties to a Hamas senior member (Hass 2014a), or a U.N. school and a U.N. shelter suspected of storing Hamas’ missiles (Martinez 2014; Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014).

In this analysis, the issue of perspectives once again emerges and proves to have a great influence on the way the stories are presented to readers. In one of the CNN articles selected for this part, the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. was interviewed to address the controversy over “human shields” (Martinez 2014). By contrast, in one of the two articles on Haaretz (Hass 2014a), the author positions herself in the place of a Palestinian civilian whose family relationship with a senior Hamas member led to a complete destruction of his home. According to the Israeli official, these residential areas were targeted because they formed the shields to protect Hamas from Israeli airstrikes (see p. 96–97). But according to the Palestinian civilian, the destruction of his home is an incrimination for simply being
related to a Hamas member (see p. 94–95). Interestingly, both stories reflect the polarization and contestation of narratives of this war. Borrowing the words of Hanna Arendt, it is this distinction “between soldiers and civilians, between army and home population, between military targets and open cities, upon which the Hague Convention’s definition of war crimes rested, that had been obsolete” (Arendt 1963: 256).

Antagonistic representations of Hamas are also present on Haaretz and CNN’s articles about the organization (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), which seem to be based on an editorial bias that takes such ideological, dichotomous lexicography and imagery for granted. Both of CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014) vent to rather inflammatory references when describing the organization, their leaders, their goals and actions. As previously examined (see subchapter 6.5), the word “terrorist” denotes a preconceived ethnic hierarchy and a popular propositional structure that suggests either you are with us, or you are with them, the “terrorists”. Hamas’ negative actions are consistently emphasized and overstated on CNN, while more subtle, moderate criticism is waged against IDF, Us, our side, even when it is responsible for the civilian casualties in Gaza. The fallout of this systematic and structural emphasis of the binary oppositions of the conflict, the Us and the Enemy, is the civilians who are ultimately caught in the salvo of air raids and missiles. The fact that Hamas is a terrorist organization is also recognized in both Haaretz articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b) but more attention seems to be paid to the group’s political efforts rather than its physical duel with Israel.

In spite of their assumed ideological positions, the two outlets represent rather distinctive approaches to conflict reportage, looking from the war/peace journalism perspectives. CNN seems to be more engrossed in the hostilities between Hamas and the IDF and the visible effects of the war (calamities, destruction, physical sufferings). Haaretz, on the other hand, is more critical in their reporting of the war. The outlet has raised a number of discussions that effectively put the conflict into perspective, as many of its articles question the legitimacy and legality of their government’s military actions in Gaza, challenging the official rhetoric of the war (see Bar’el 2014a; Hass 2014a; Pfeffer 2014b). It also focuses
more on the de-escalation of the war, by offering analyses on possible solutions of the ongoing conflict (see Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Pfeffer 2014a), as well as by bringing forth both the visible and invisible consequences that the war indicted on the lives of civilians (see Hass 2014a). Haaretz’s portraiture of Hamas and their members (Bar’el 2014a) is also written in less antagonistic tones compared with that of CNN (Mullen and Todd 2014). Even when these Haaretz articles may only account for little changes, it presents creativity and efforts to avoid violence, implying that there are alternatives to a war between the warring sides.

Due to the fact that only a handful of articles were selected for analysis, there exist certain limitations that should be acknowledged, one of which is first and foremost the size of the study. Throughout the fifty-day war, both news outlets publish a large volume of articles depicting the development of the conflict, not to mention articles in stages before and after the war which are indispensable for a comprehensive study on the role of the media during conflict. The colossal amount of articles made it very difficult for the process of data collection of this study which covers only four topics relating to the conflict. The process of collecting the data is itself intentional, hence subjective, but this is inevitable in such a qualitative study. As a result, the analysis of the data is grounded within the scope of this paper. In this way it is necessary to mention that the issues pointed out in the analyses and discussions of the articles from both news outlets might not be recurrent and consistent throughout their coverage of the 2014 Gaza war or any other previous Israel–Palestine conflict(s) for that matter.

The study does, however, look specifically into the differences in the two outlets’ coverage of noted events as well as their representations of conflict actors. It gives an insight into how these differences in their approaches can result in different interpretations of the news, thus explains how the excessive attention invested into the duel between the assumed both sides of the war, Hamas and the IDF, can amount to what is defined as war journalism and more importantly, how dichotomized construction of conflict actors contributes to their stereotypical representations.
With that being said, the study argues that the media has an important role during conflict, urging more critical and comprehensive assessment of its works. Specifically, more attention should be paid to the binary and hierarchical construction of oppositions in conflict, as well as the importance of perspectives in shaping narratives. Further research is needed in order to address questions that derive from this study: How does the relationship that the media maintain with conflict actors influence their coverage of the conflict? What factors can affect international media in representing wars and conflicts? How does the geopolitics of information affect the media representations of conflict events and actors? Indeed, the third question is the one that needs to be taken into more consideration, given the predominant Western media representations of wars and conflicts. The fact remains that some conflicts receive more exposure and responses while others are undermined and neglected, which raises questions on the extent to which the media locate their priority of coverage (Puddephatt 2006: 6). The local media are also targets that need to be looked further into, especially when a majority of media research are devoted to studying international media. While the possibility of being mobilized to promote a partisan agenda is equally applied to all media, internationally or locally, the risk is even more so for the latter (ibid. 6), prompting a need to conduct more research into the role of local media during conflict.

Thus any solution to a conflict must take into account the fact that the media are an integral part of conflict and have an intermediary role as a bridge between the warring sides. Once it is also established that reporting is a subjective activity, it should be accomplished with a sense of responsibility and sensitivity.
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Appendix 1. Screenshots of the layout of CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)
Appendix 2. IDF’s propaganda poster, “When is a house a home?” (Credit: IDF)
Appendix 3. IDF’s propaganda poster, “Inside Shuja’iyya” (Credit: IDF)