

UNIVERSITY OF VAASA

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

Mengke Qiqige

FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN CHINA:

A Comparative Analysis of Anti-corruption measures in China and Singapore

Master's Thesis in
Public Administration

VAASA 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | page |
|---|-------------|
| LIST OF FIGURE AND TABLES | 2 |
| ABSTRACT | 3 |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 5 |
| 1.1. Background | 5 |
| 1.2. Literature Review | 10 |
| 2. CORRUPTION THEORY | 18 |
| 2.1. The Definition of Corruption | 19 |
| 2.1.1. The Main Body of Corruption | 21 |
| 2.1.2. The Behavior of Corruption | 22 |
| 2.1.3. The Purpose of Corruption | 22 |
| 2.1.4. The Consequences of Corruption | 22 |
| 2.2. The Forms of Corruption | 23 |
| 2.3. The Causes of Corruption | 25 |
| 3. CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN CHINA | 29 |
| 4. CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE | 51 |
| 5. CONCLUSION | 82 |
| LIST OF REFERENCES | 87 |

LIST OF FIGURE AND TABLES

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure1. Corruption Perception Index (1995 to 2005) | 55 |
| Table 1. Ranking of China and Singapore in Corruption Perception Indices 2001–2008. | 54 |
| Table 2. How trustworthy is the Chinese anti–corruption bureau considered by people? | 71 |
| Table 3. How many divisions do you know there are in Chinese anti–corruption bureau? | 72 |
| Table 4. How many points does the Chinese anti–corruption bureau get in general sense? | 72 |

UNIVERSITY OF VAASA**Faculty of Philosophy**

Author: Mengke Qiqige
Master's Thesis: Fighting Corruption in China: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-corruption Measures in China and Singapore
Degree: Master of Administrative Science
Major Subject: Public Administration
Year of Graduation: 2010 **Number of pages:** 92

ABSTRACT:

This study deals with the corruption situation in China and Singapore. Corruption is a serious issue not only occurs in the underdeveloped countries but also the developing and developed countries. The reality is that the majority of the countries suffer from corruption and problems it causes. As neighboring countries, China and Singapore performed very differently on the matter of curbing corruption. Singapore has one of the cleanest governments in the world while China is suffering from the problems caused by corruption.

China has been studying and drawing lessons from Singapore for over 30 years. However, the results are not quite what people had expected. The Singaporean example in curbing corruption seems ineffective when applied in China. By comparing the anti-corruption measures in China and Singapore, I explain the reasons why the adopted policies in China failed to function as effectively as in Singapore in order to shed some light on the issue of how to make anti-corruption policy that actually works in China.

The idea of thinking that by simply copying the Singaporean experiences, China could tackle the problems as well as Singapore has, is naïve and unrealistic. The problem that the anti-corruption measure is ineffective in China is because there is no matching environment for it to grow. In order to solve the problem, systemic, structural, and policy changes must be initiated beforehand to build the foundation for an effective anti-corruption policy in China.

KEYWORDS: Corruption, anti-corruption, China, Singapore, changes

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Corruption is a universal issue all over the world. It is also an important issue for authorities in every country. Today, corruption exists not only in the underdeveloped countries but also in the developing and developed countries as well. As a country that has the world's fastest economic growth, China belongs to the category of developing countries where the corruption situation is relatively severe compared to the developed countries. Knowing the situation at home, China never stopped the struggle of fighting corruption. However, due to its unique social, economical and administrative systems, it is destined that China cannot fight against corruption simply by copying other developed countries' successful anti-corruption measures and theories and most of these examples and experiences are not even suitable for China to learn from. Singapore, on the other hand, shares a lot of commonalities with China, and the fact that the Singaporean government is one of the cleanest governments in the world makes it not only possible but also conductible for China to study its triumphant anti-corruption examples and experiences.

The thing is that after studying the example of Singapore for over 30 years, China had borrowed one of the distinguished experiences—the world famous Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to build its anti-corruption agency, the result, however, is not as desirable as people expected. The purpose of this thesis is try to understand the essence of the Singaporean experience and the reason why it appears to be less helpful as expected as well as the truth of the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean government that has become popular in China for years and the consideration of how to apply it and what could be the obstacles if China chose to adopt it.

Corruption originally comes from the Latin word *corruptus* which means to destroy (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a). According to the Oxford Dictionary, corruption is defined as the destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or

favor; the use or existence of corrupt practices, in a state, public corporation etc. it is also defined as the activity of giving, promising or offering wrongful satisfaction or compensation, misuse of public power and so on. Mostly the reason that the corruption happens with public servants is that they try to fulfill their own interests, and benefit from the power that people have given them. The detailed introduction as well as other definitions of corruption that have been used commonly around the world are given in Chapter 2.

The common forms of corruption involve bribery, embezzlement, fraud, abuse of power, receiving an unlawful gratuity, favor or illegal commission, favoritism, nepotism and so on. Definitions and examples of these different forms of corruption are given in Chapter 2 as well. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

As to the causes of corruption, there are some theories such as 1. Cultural reasons like the existence of a gift culture, particularly in Africa, in which it is tradition that a small reward is paid for services rendered. Such a gratuity or tip becomes part of the cultural environment and in certain countries the payment of such rewards is so embedded in tradition that any attempt to rein in the practice would be seen as an attack on treasured cultural values. 2. The absence of rules, regulations, policies and legislation. All organizations, whether public or private, must have rules, regulations and policies that guide management and other employees in terms of acceptable behavior and conduct within the organization. Rules, regulations and policies are instrumental in organizing people, steering them towards a common goal and ensuring that everyone is treated fairly and equally. 3. Range of discretion. No system can exist unless one person or authority exists to make decisions. Such a person is said to have the power to exercise discretion—the freedom to act within certain limits. Corruption takes place in institutions where public officials have great authority; can exercise discretion with respect to interpretation and application of regulations; are not required to be accountable to anyone and are driven by greed. 4. The absence of transparency. Where there is no transparency in an organization, i.e. where tasks and functions are conducted in secret and are not open to examination by other government officers or the public, the opportunity for corruption increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for democracy in

which sovereignty is vested in the people and the conduct of civil servants must be open to examination. It is therefore vital that citizens in general and the media (radio, television, newspapers) in particular are guaranteed the right to freedom of speech; the media can inform citizens of any action by a civil servant that might be corrupt in nature and appropriate calls for action can be made. A transparent system deters corruption as the conduct of civil servants is under constant scrutiny. 5. The absence of accountability. In a democracy, public leaders and civil servants must be accountable to the people they serve. Accountability means that public leaders and officers must provide logical and acceptable explanations for their actions and decisions. Civil servants and officers in responsible positions must at all times adhere to the principles of transparency and be accountable to the people they serve. However, accountability is dependent on the enforcement of rules, regulations and policies, if there is a lack of effective institutional mechanisms civil servants cannot be held accountable and corrupt practices can flourish. 6. The absence of a watchdog institution. If there are no internal or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of corruption or that act on complaints relating to corruption, employees may take advantage of the fact that the chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote. Even if the offender is caught, the consequences would probably be minimal if the system has no watchdog function. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

In China, the situation is quite serious. According to the Global corruption report 2008 issued by the Transparency International, Denmark Sweden and New Zealand are the cleanest top three countries around the world, Singapore is the fourth, and Finland and Switzerland are both holding the fifth position, China is in the middle which holds the 72nd place among all together 180 countries.

The People's Republic of China, since its establishment in 1949, has witnessed so many dramatic and profound changes and evolutions both internally and externally throughout the half of the century till today. These changes and evolutions includes the political program, administrative structures, economical policies and the ideology of people, but no matter how things change, one thing remains the same, that is corruption among government officials.

Throughout its history from 1949, China launched several big campaigns of anti-corruption under the different theories advocated by different leaders in different periods of time. During Mao's time, the Three Anti Movement was the most featured one. And the case of Zhang and Liu was the most influential incident that reflected Mao's idea of inculcation should come first when investigating the crime of corruption, no tolerance and condonement when it comes to the punishment of those who were found guilty of corruption, stressing the importance of supervision.

Even though his ideology and theory had led to a great achievement in lessening the corruption and other major social problems, there still were some limits and even drawbacks if we look at it objectively, especially from today's perspective. The analysis of these limitations will be detailed in the paper as well as the anti-corruption that was launched during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s.

After Chairman Mao, China entered a time when the party engaged not only in reforming and opening-up but also fighting corruption under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. China began to push the concept of building a fine party culture and keeping its organizations clean in the process of comprehensive reforming, opening-up and socialist modernization. Deng Xiaoping's theory and ideology of fighting against corruption and building up a clean government will also be discussed in a more detailed way later in the paper.

After the Third Plenary Session, the Chinese government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping realized the limitations of the previous anti-corruption approaches and started to learn from these lessons and experiences, and determined that the right road leading to anti-corruption was the "rule of law". Laws and regulations were formulated and enacted. However, with the booming market economy, the corruption situation in China was made worse by the lack of balanced monitoring power in the period of transforming the planned economy into a socialist market economy. China witnessed 4 stages of fluctuation of corruption which are presented in Chapter 3.

When China was struggling to develop effective anti-corruption measures to curb deteriorating corruption situation, the successful example concerning this issue was set by Singapore who shares a lot of commonalities with China. These commonalities are analyzed in Chapter 4 as part of the framework of analysis.

Besides the common factors, the most important reason Singapore is chosen to be the comparative example of my study is that according to the Global corruption report 2008 issued by the Transparency International, Singapore is holding the top fourth place of least corrupt countries in the world while China was only the 72nd. Why the two neighboring countries with the similar cultural backgrounds performed so differently in building their governments, and what kind of experiences and lessons can China learn so that it could benefit from it are questions that are introduced in Chapter 4.

The analysis of Singapore's experience begins with a brief introduction of its history. Singapore has a tortuous history of independence just like China, and it was not corruption-free from the very beginning of its independence due to complex historical reasons.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is world famous as it played a vital role in constructing a clean government in Singapore especially after Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party took power in the country. The introduction of the CPIB is drawn in details in Chapter 4.

The strict and integrated legal system is the key factor that ensured the prevention and punishment of corruption. The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act are the most important anti-corruption laws that guide not only the CPIB but also the entire country concerning the issue of corruption. The introduction and analysis of these laws are resented in Chapter 4, other preventive measures can also be found in this chapter.

Since corruption is caused by both the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt, the integrated legal system that includes both the preventive measures and severe

punishment has succeeded in reducing possible corruption opportunities and deter the public officers from being corrupted. Other than an effective CPIB and an integrated legal system, government leaders' determination of fighting corruption is also a key element that could lead to clean government.

The success of CPIB was what caught China's eye. After the study and analysis of the Singapore example, China started to follow Singapore's footsteps by establishing similar anti-corruption agencies. However, what seemed to work in Singapore did not function well in China. The reason to this problems as well as the comparative analysis are given in Chapter 4.

Another catching part of the Singaporean example of fighting against corruption and building up clean government is what Chinese called the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean government. The reason why it is considered responsible for building the clean government and why it is going to help China to build a clean government by some Chinese are explained in Chapter 4 as well as the reality of this approach. The steps that have to be achieved in advance before China decides to employ this approach and the reason why I believe that it is not appropriate to be applied in China under the current circumstances can also be found in this Chapter.

1.2. Literature Review

Traditionally, corruption was seen in a moralistic perspective, as a pathological and negative phenomenon springing from the unscrupulous motives of dishonest individuals (Stechina 2008: 28). Moralists see corruption as immoral, unethical. Myrdal characterizes corruption as "selfish and improper conduct" (Myrdal 1968). However, this kind of definition is subjective. It is difficult to take the observer's moral or normative judgment away while constructing the definition, and the tendency to condemn also impeded the objective analysis. The limitations of a moralist approach are that it tends to individualize a societal phenomenon. To see corruption as a problem of bad incumbents would lead to a worse solution. By ignoring the systemic causes,

moralist solution make the underlying conditions worse. It tends to dichotomize what is good and what is bad. What is corruption and the extent whether a corruption is acceptable is relative and evolves through time.

Even if central, norm-defining institutions have widespread legitimacy, in many instances the legal system has not succeeded in identifying corruption actions with precision.

The weakness of moralist arguments is that they take little account of the societal context, nor do they examine the gap between the formal norms and the underlying practice-girded norms (Caiden & Caiden 1977). Heidenheimer (1970) categorized the nature of corruption into three groups: 1. market-centered orientation, 2. public-interest-centered approach, and 3. public office-centered perspective.

Market-centered definitions as Heidenheimer explained to Jacob Von Klaveren: A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will...seek to maximize. The office then becomes a "maximizing unit." The size of his income depends...upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve (Johnston 2004: 10) seem to be particularly relevant to define corruption as an act to pursue economical benefits. These definitions replace the "moral" or "public interest" consideration with "profit maximization" as the prime motivator. As such, they suggest that corruption is only another means of acquiring economic resources which lies into the framework of "functionalist" (Gibbons 1985).

The public-office centered definitions what Peters and Welch (1978: 3) call the legalistic definition can be illustrated by reference to the work of J.S. Nye who defined corruption as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (effective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains, or violates rules against the exercises of certain types of private-regarding influence (Nye 1967: 417). James C. Scott Agrees with Nye and uses his definition explicitly (Scott 1972: 3-5). Here the standards defining abuse are the law, or

regulations that have the force of law. Advocates of this approach point out that the law is in most societies more precise and stable than public opinion or conceptions of the public interest (Johnston 2004: 9). Heidenheimer contends that the legalistic view is too narrow and Nye acknowledges the difficulties of applying legal standards in many settings.

Public-interest-centered definitions are mainly expressed in the writing of Friedrich and Rogow and Lasswell. According to Friedrich (1966: 74): The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing things, i.e. who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favor whosoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests. Another definition proposed by Rogow and Lasswell (1970:54): A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civil order and is in fact incompatible (destructive of any system). A system of public or civil order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt.

These definitions broadened the range of corrupt behavior because they offer the concept of public interest. However, it is problematic to precisely determine what public interest is and to his credit, Friedrich seeks to retain an important moral aspect of corruption—harm to the public. But even if “the public interest” had a reasonably precise meaning, let alone one comparable from time to time and place to place, the definition of corruption, and its consequences, are different issues. And in fact, consequences might be complex. Harm may be tangible or intangible, short- or long-term, concentrated or widely distributed; given such contrasts and their possible underlying causes, it is doubtful that we gain anything analytically by attempting to resolve questions of consequences by definition. A given kind of corruption could do harm on balance but still be preferable to the real alternatives. Corruption could integrate elites on a more stable basis, and thus encourage short- to medium-term economic growth, while preempting democratizing forces and creating accumulated economic imbalances over the longer term (Johnston 2004: 11).

Functionalism looks corruption in terms of actual function that it plays in socioeconomic development. Functionalist examines the utilitarian consequences, whatever the morality involved, of certain corrupt behaviors. “Revisionists” among the functionalists who critique the earlier view that corruption is absolutely harmful find corruption to be useful in certain circumstances: in a society characterized by inefficient economic systems, political departicipation, and organizational slowness, corruption can create a kind of efficiency. “If the prevailing system is bad, then corruption may be good” (Klitgaard 1988: 33). Functionalism was at its height in 1960s, and it considers corruption as an alternative means of influence for marginalized social sectors, it puts grease in the gear, allowing cumbersome regulations and administrative red tape to be circumvented (Stechina 2008: 28). However, the supposed benefits of corruption need to be analyzed. Caiden (1980) said that promotion or tolerance of corruption, even as palliative, can only serve to soften the state further.

Some forms of corruption may be beneficial, others deleterious. Corruption may be useful in some ways, as in cutting corners, speeding services, or facilitating integration of outgroups, but harmful in others, such as societally unproductive, morally repugnant, economically distorting, and politically delegitimizing.

Corruption is conceived as the dark side of human conduct—unethical behavior, religiously branded as sin. It connotes standards, norms concerning how those in public office should behave but from which they have departed, have abused, have fallen short, or have let everybody down (Caiden 2001: 277). In his study of “Dealing with Administrative Corruption” Caiden (1999) identified the following factors to be crucial in curbing corruption:

1. Moral and trustworthy leaders (and their close relations). Able and virtuous people have to be attracted to public service and retained without great personal sacrifice. They have to be carefully selected, screened, and monitored to see that their hands (and shoes of their close relatives) remain clean. There has to be instant removal from office of anyone with dirty hands and immediate disciplinary action against anyone who condones corruption.

2. Appropriate social regulation. A root cause of corruption is social control for which there is virtually no support. Outward conformity is only achieved at the cost of sullen resentment and common cause to evade such controls. Governance intervenes where it is unwelcome, which merely results in evasion and lack of enforcement.

3. Regular law revision. Repeal is needed of vague, anachronistic, and internally contradictory laws and regulations that prevent the law-abiding from conducting their business in a lawful manner. In every jurisdiction there are probably orders that have outlived their usefulness but remain in the books because no regular review and revision is instituted.

4. Reduction of monopolies. Inevitably and almost unconsciously, monopolies exploit their position. Where competition cannot be introduced, they have to be carefully monitored and subject to transparency and full accountability to ensure their actions are legal, moral, productive, sensitive, and effective.

5. Open democratic governance. Clearly, autocracies have a higher propensity to corruption. Every effort had to be made to ensure government in the sunshine. This is very difficult to obtain in private organizations and in public organizations that have been exempted for good reason from democratic norms, procedures, and controls. At the very good least, redress and compensation should be provided when wrongdoing occurs.

6. Professionalism. Amateurism has its place in democratic governance but democratic administration requires professionals who adhere to professional ethics and standards, avoid harm, keep abreast of the state of the art, and are so jealous about their reputations that they ensure competent performance, discipline, and reliable self-policing.

7. Competence. Wherever there is incompetence, corruption creeps in. System, order, and regularity are essential for the detection of abuses. Competent administration in itself is a major deterrent to corruption as irregularities are likely to be spotted quickly, long before they can be routinized.

8. Personal integrity. When all is said and done, there is no substitute for individual integrity and the unwillingness of people to compromise with corruption. People who know right from wrong rarely depart from norms and prefer exit to participation in wrongdoing. Ethics education is imperative and cannot be taken for granted.

Also, Gould (1991: 467–480) suggested in his *Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Causes, and Remedial Strategies* that the following principles remedies for corruption have been tried or proposed in several countries:

1. Commissions of Inquiry. According to Riley, commissions of inquiry are appointed when “corruption scandal becomes public, or when changes within the government that can gain it good publicity, or when a serious financial loss or inefficiency is known to senior figures (and to a certain extent a process of face–saving has to take place(Gould qtd. Riley, S. 1983: 195–196). William deems that commissions of inquiry “have proved a major growth industry” but it is not the ultimate solution because they “always concern other people. Corrupt political almost never instigate inquiries into their own affairs unless they are certain to produce a cosmetic exoneration. (Gould qtd. Williams 1987: 198)

2. Codes of Ethics and of Leadership. According to Williams, the codes of ethics and leadership are proven useless, and the goals of setting standards and change by adopting these codes are crushed without consistent enforcement.

3. A Free Press. A vigilant, well supported, freely inquiring press provides a means for the public to monitor governmental activities including ascertaining the extent of corruption in higher places.

4. Tougher Laws and Enforcement. The temptation is great for governments faced with massive complaints about corruption to pass tough laws outlawing corruption in its various forms and establishing significant enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement of laws is vital, and it depends on the outer forces as investigators with sufficient authority to investigate, prosecutors with adequate authority to arrest and bring

deserving cases to trial, and a court system with unblocked power to assure impartial application of laws and justice.

5. Anti-corruption Agencies. Some governments have reacted to the public outcry over the scourge of corruption by creating agencies charged with investigating and prosecuting allegations of corruption practices. However, these agencies do not have promising futures when they are interfered with the bureaucracy's discretion power, and the investigators are constrained by resource scarcity and outnumbered, or when the safety of the investigator and the citizens who denounce corruption cannot be assured.

6. Systemic, Structural, and Policy Change. A judicious combination of external pressure for strengthened anti-corruption efforts (in the form of form, evidence-based, supportive advice and, if need be, as conditions of future aid) allied with mobilized internal support for reform is the answer for the possible policy change. These changes include: 1. Reform of personnel system, which includes job analysis and auditing; selection; salaries and incentives and sanctions. These measures could enhance civil servants' productivity, reduce their cost and diminish their drain on the taxpayers' hand-made money. 2. Strengthen the integrity of the auditing function. The auditing function is among the most promising for reducing corruption, yet the most susceptible to corruption, it should be insulated from politics. 3. Strengthen the integrity of the governmental bidding function. Like the auditing function, the government bid review function is, in systematically corrupt administrative systems, generally at the core of the system. 4. Decentralize and "participatize" governmental systems. The more broadly citizens participate in government, especially at levels of plan preparation and service delivery, the more "daylight will shine in," and the more difficult it will be for the authoritarian, centralized government institutions to act corruptly (Gould qtd. Gould 1985). 5. Upgrade laws. The search for contradictions, weaknesses, and loopholes in the present legal system, often the result of an undigested colonial legacy, needs to be intensified. 6. Strengthen court and prosecutorial system. It is possible for laws to be strengthened and the power of investigatory and prosecutorial authorities reinforced to deal with corruption, and Spartan behavior in high places and strong political commitment from the ruling group greatly facilitate this goal. 7 Strengthen existing

anti-corruption strategies and forces and create new ones. Thought and effort need to be invested in studying the existing anti-corruption forces, analyzing their weaknesses, and proposing way of beefing them up.

2. CORRUPTION THEORY

Corruption is one of the serious problems that people have realized for a long time and strived to put a stop to it but failed no matter how hard they tried. It cannot be denied that there are countries that manage to keep it under control and succeed in maintaining a relatively clean government but we should also be aware of the fact that according the Corruption Perception Index 2008 issued by the Transparency International, among 180 countries that have been surveyed, only 34 countries scored over 6 points out of 10 point (highly clean) (Transparency International 2008), which means that only less than 20% of the world's governments pass the failing line. This means that over 80% of the participants are eliminated for not reaching the favorable point. The situation is severe and cannot be neglected.

The word corruption is originally from the Latin word *corruptus* which means to destroy, nowadays, we use this word to describe the phenomenon of government officials conducting wrongful doings such as influencing the decision-making process of a public officer or authority, or influence peddling; dishonesty or breach of trust, by a public officer, in the exercise of his duty; insider dealing or the conflicts of interests; and influence peddling by the use of fraudulent means such as bribery, blackmail, which includes the use of election fraud. Any person who directly or indirectly accepts, agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person to benefit him or herself or any other person is guilty of the crime of corruption. The person who makes the offer or inducement to another to commit a corrupt practice is also guilty of the crime of corruption. Although there is an active and a passive side to the crime, both parties are equally guilty of corruption. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)

There are plenty of definitions of corruption, here are some quotes that have been commonly used. In broad terms, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. It encompasses unilateral abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, as well as abuses linking public and private actors such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling, and fraud. Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized. Though corruption often

facilitates criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and prostitution, it is not restricted to these activities. For purposes of understanding the problem and devising remedies, it is important to keep crime and corruption analytically distinct.

2.1. The definition of corruption

In the Handbook on Fighting Corruption, the Centre for Democracy and Governance, corruption is defined as behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them. This would include embezzlement of funds, theft of corporate or public property as well as corrupt practices such as bribery, extortion or influence peddling. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)

Whilst there is no single definition for corruption, common definitions include:

A standard definition used by Transparency International (TI) defines corruption “as the abuse of public power for private gain.” (Transparency International FAQ.)

Corruption is an abuse of public power for private gain that hampers the public interest. Corrupt entails a confusion of the private with the public sphere or an illicit exchange between the two spheres. In essence, corrupt practices involve public officials acting in the best interest of private concerns (their own or those of others) regardless of, or against, the public interest. –United Nations Manual on Anti–Corruption Policy 2001. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)

An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. It includes bribery, but is more comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly done, though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by another. By Law Library’s Lexicon. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)

World Menu (1992) defines corruption as the “use of political influence for personal gain...inducement to or engagement in improper or wrongful acts.”

The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008a.)

The Oxford English Dictionary identifies nine meanings of corruption that consist three aspects: first, corruption refers to process of physical decay, disintegration and decomposition with associated unwholesomeness and putrefaction. Secondly, corruption signifies moral deterioration and decay; a loss of innocence or decline from a condition of purity. The third aspect relates to the sphere of government and administration, to the discharge of public duties. According to the Oxford English Dictionary corruption is “the perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor” (Edevbaro 1998: 29.)

Through all these definitions given above, we should have a basic idea about what corruption is. However, because there are too many definitions and explanations about this subject, it is hard for us to come to an agreement on the common sense of it. In this study, I am going to combine all the ideas given above, analyze what they have in common and what are the differences so that the viewer would have a relatively clearer idea about what corruption involves.

According to the above definitions, there are two things in common. First, corruption is an act that abuses public power for personal gain; second, corruption is an act that violates public interests. To be precise about the definition of corruption there are five points that need to be clear, which are: 1. to highlight the main body of corruption; 2. clear the behavior of corruption; 3. stress the purpose of corruption; 4. state the

consequences of corruption and 5. be abstract and theoretical. Considering the different situations in different counties and the 5 points given above, we can define the concept of corruption on two levels: in a broad sense, corruption is the exercise of public authority to use public power for personal gain which is seriously detrimental to the public interests. In the narrow sense, corruption is an act where the state power exerciser uses the power of the state for personal gain and seriously undermines the interests of the state and the people.

Irrespective of whether it is in the broad sense or the narrow sense, there are four main factors in each definition which are: 1. the main body of corruption; 2. the behavior of corruption; 3. the purpose of corruption and 4. the consequences of corruption. Here I am going to explain these factors from the narrow sense.

2.1.1. The Main Body of Corruption

It should be the exerciser of state power including the state owned public servants and the non-governmental public servants who are entrusted with state power. The state owned public servants are people who get their income through the state financial system. Exercisers of state power are those who actually control the operation of the state power, and are able to abuse power for their personal propose. They are the ones who are qualified enough to be called the main body of corruption.

The idea that those who interfere with the state power in an indirect way for their personal gain are as the main body of corruption is incorrect because corruption is the decay of the state regime itself. So even if the actions of those non-state-power-exercisers have a close relation with corruption or even correspondent with it, we cannot call them the main body of corruption. Moreover, with the governmental downsizing, the transformation of the post function and the reform of the cadre and personnel system, the state government is entrusting some of the jobs to the people who work in the state-owned enterprises and private agencies such as asset evaluation, project auditing and verification. In a way, they are entrusted with state affairs and gain access to exercise state power which means they are also qualified as the main body of

corruption which means that one has to be extra careful when dealing with the concept of corruption with these new changes.

2.1.2. The Behavior of Corruption

Corruption is the abuse of state power. It has two aspects. First, using state power for personal gain; second, not using state power at all. For instance, the policeman who accepts bribe and sits aside watching the crime going on but does nothing to stop it is as guilty as the official who accepts the bribe and grants privilege to those who do not deserve it through the legal procedure, because misuse and not using the state power are both in the category of abusing state power. Meanwhile, state power exercisers also have their civil right when they are operating the state power, so to decide if one person is corrupted depends on if he or she takes advantage of the state power. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008b.)

2.1.3. The Purpose of Corruption

The purpose of corruption is to meet private interests. It can be for the person himself or herself or for his or her friends or the community the person belong to, which at the basic level is for private interests. Here we should pay attention to the word interest. Interest is the meeting of human needs in certain economical and social relationships that includes material and mental gain. People who are corrupted are mainly after material possessions which is easy to tell judging by the amount of the embezzlement and bribes they get. However, according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, mental interests and self realization also play important roles when dealing with corruption, so mental interests should be considered as well. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008b.)

2.1.4. The Consequences of Corruption

The severe damage to the state and people's interests is one of the consequences of corruption. Some people only see the damage but not as severe. It is neither operable nor healthy to treat some minor acts that damage the interests of the state and people as

corruption. The severity of the act should be considered when defining corruption because if not, there will be no specific target to really focus on and strike against.

2.2. The Forms of Corruption.

Having gone through the different definitions of corruption, it is necessary that we take a look at the different forms of corruption. Here I am listing some of the most recognized forms of corruption.

Bribery The promise, offer or give of any benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of a public official. A bribe may be given to a public servant (direct), or to another person or entity (indirect). A bribe may consist of money, inside information, gifts, entertainment, sexual or other favors, a job, company shares etc. A variation of bribery occur where a political party or government is offered, promised or given a benefit that improperly affects the decisions of or actions by the party or government.

Examples:

A traffic officer accepts cash in order not to issue a traffic fine.

Payroll abuses where personnel lists are inflated with the names of ghost workers and salaries are paid to officials' friends or relatives. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Embezzlement Theft of resources by persons entrusted with authority and control over these valuable resources.

Examples:

Hospital staff steals medicines and sells them to private pharmacies.

Government officials charged with food aid distribution steal a portion of food and sell it to other individuals.

Embezzlement also includes the conversion of government property and personnel for private use.

Examples:

An official uses the government garage to repair his private vehicle.

A government official rents out his public house. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Fraud A criminal deception, involving some form of trick, false pretence or representation to obtain a benefit or gain unjust advantage.

Example:

Claiming Travel and subsistence allowances without having undertaken a trip. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Abuse of power Using one's vested authority to improperly benefit or give undue preferential treatment to any group or individual (or using vested authority to discriminate against any group or individual).

Example:

An elected official responsible for maintaining all the roads in a Region assigns the road repair crews to areas where his/her constituents reside and neglects other areas in similar need of road repairs. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Receiving an unlawful gratuity, favor or illegal commission The receipt of anything with value as extra compensation for performing official duties from others wishing to conduct business with the agency, institution or organization.

Example:

An official is paid a commission for allowing certain advantages when goods or services are bought. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Favoritism The provision of services or resources according to personal affiliations such as family ties, party affiliation, tribe, religion, sect and other preferential groupings.

Example:

A public servant provides extraordinary services, commissions, jobs and favours to political allies, family and friends, while ordinary members of the public do not receive this special treatment. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

Nepotism Ensuring that family members are appointed to the public service or that family members receive contracts from state resources. Similar to conflict of interest and favoritism.

Example:

A head of department appoints his/her brother's child to a position despite that more suitable candidates applied for the same position. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008c.)

The different forms and examples given above is to give the reader a clearer idea of corruption so that they will have a better chance to recognize corruption from other different illegal acts that harm the state and people.

2.3. The Causes of Corruption

The next issue I would like to talk about is the cause of corruption, to find out what conditions allow corruption to occur and in which conditions does corruption continue to develop and spread. Most commonly, corruption lies in a culture where there seems to be very little or almost no punishment for it and where the rewards for being corrupt seem much greater than the risk of being caught but other than that, the things below also play a crucial part in nourishing corruption.

Low salaries

Corruption is often attributed to the low salaries of civil servants. This differentiates between need driven (satisfying basic requirements for survival) corruption and greed driven (satisfying desires for status and comfort that salaries cannot match) corruption. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

It may be true that it is more difficult to stay honest, hard-working and trustworthy on a low salary, but it is also true that most people with low salaries are still able to do so

and that many corrupt officials are people in high, responsible positions, earning good salaries.

In conjunction, corrupt practices flourish in systems where employees have high job security; where the level of professionalism in the public service is low; and hence officials rather serve their own interests than perform their duty to serve the public. However, low salaries are not a valid reason for and do not justify corruption. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

Culture

A gift culture exists, particularly in Africa, in which it is tradition that a small reward is paid for services rendered. Such a gratuity or tip becomes part of the cultural environment and in certain countries the payment of such rewards is so embedded in tradition that any attempt to rein in the practice would be seen as an attack on treasured cultural values. In Africa, this was traditionally seen as awarding special honors to the Chief and, in this light, it often regarded as acceptable and “normal” for politicians to accept such rewards. In some countries it is common practice in the commercial arena for business transactions to be accompanied by the giving of personal gifts or benefits, ranging from the Christmas bottle of whisky to much more elaborate and extravagant items. In essence, the root of corruption is greed rather than culture, public life requires a standard of its own; and those entering public office must be made aware of this from the outset. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

The absence of rules, regulations, policies and legislation

All organizations, whether public or private sector, must have rules, regulations and policies that guide management and other employees in terms of acceptable behavior and conduct within the organization. Rules, regulations and policies are instrumental in organizing people, steering them towards a common goal and ensuring that everyone is treated fairly and equally.

In order to be effective, such rules and policies must be clearly communicated to all individuals in order to be understood and applied objectively. Corruption is more likely to flourish in an organization that does not have a wide range of rules, regulations or policies that guide employees in their work. Similarly, a country must have clear policies and legislation that guide the behavior of all citizens and residents within that country. However, organizations and countries must strike a reasonable balance in terms of policies and legislation; whilst corruption flourishes in an environment without clear rules and regulations, similarly, corruption finds fertile grounds in a country that has a numerous laws, rules and regulations that restrict business and economic activities. Such a climate creates industries' dependence on individual civil servants to engage in economic activity; thereby circumventing bureaucratic red tape through corrupt offers. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

Range of discretion

No system can exist unless one person or authority is used, to some extent, to make decisions. Such a person is said to have the power to exercise discretion – the freedom to act within certain limits. Corruption takes place in institutions where public officials: have great authority; can exercise discretion with respect to interpretation and application of regulations; are not required to be accountable to anyone and are driven by greed. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

Therefore, an environment with a higher range of discretion without accountability is more conducive to corruption. In conjunction, political office is one of the primary means of gaining access to wealth in less developed countries. If corruption occurs on the top level and the political leadership of the country does not set a good example with respect to honesty, credibility, transparency, integrity and the prosecution of offenders, citizens become disillusioned and offenders are not deterred from entering into corrupt practices. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

The absence of transparency

Where there is no transparency in an organization, i.e. where tasks and functions are conducted in secret and are not open to examination by other government officers or the public, the opportunity for corruption increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for democracy in which sovereignty is vested in the people and the conduct of civil servants must be open to examination. It is therefore vital that citizens in general and the media (radio, television, newspapers) in particular are guaranteed the right to freedom of speech; the media can inform citizens of any action by a civil servant that might be corrupt in nature and appropriate calls for action can be made. A transparent system deters corruption as the conduct of civil servants is under constant scrutiny. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

The absence of accountability

In a democracy, public leaders and civil servants must be accountable to the people they serve. Accountability means that public leaders and officers must provide logical and acceptable explanations for their actions and decisions to the people they serve. Civil servants and officers in responsible positions must at all times adhere to the principles of transparency and be accountable to the people they serve. However, accountability is dependent on the enforcement of rules, regulations and policies, if there is a lack of effective institutional mechanisms civil servants cannot be held accountable and corrupt practices can flourish. (Zero Tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

The absence of a watchdog institution

If there are no internal or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of corruption or that act on complaints relating to corruption, employees may take advantage of the fact that the chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote. Even if the offender is caught, the consequences would probably be minimal if the system has no watchdog function. (Zero tolerance for Corruption 2008d.)

3. CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN CHINA

Although corruption is a universal phenomenon and exists in all countries, it is a more serious matter in less developed countries. The conditions of these countries are such that corruption is likely to have different causes and consequences than in more developed countries. Socio-economic conditions in low income countries are more conducive to the growth of corruption. Corruption is a symptom of deep-rooted economic and political weaknesses and shortcomings in the legislative and judicial system of the country. To aggravate the situation, accountability in these countries is generally weak, the chances of being caught are small and the penalties when caught are light. Non-governmental organizations that could serve as watchdogs and provide information on corrupt practices are generally not well developed.

That brings out the purpose for this paper. China as a country with the fastest-growing economy yet is still in the group of developing countries. Although the corruption situation in China is not bright, it is not hopeless, and while the government really puts up the fight against corruption seriously, the outcome is not very satisfying.

Here I am going to start with the little retrospect of the road of China's efforts and achievements in its fight against corruption.

Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has witnessed so many dramatic and profound changes and evolutions both internally and externally throughout the middle of the 20th century until now. These changes and evolutions include the political program, administrative structures, economical policies and the ideology of people, but no matter how things change, one thing remains the same, that is corruption among government officials.

The history of corruption is not what I am going to talk about in this chapter, however inevitably there are certain historical issues that we need to take into account, such as the different strategies the Chinese government adopted to fight corruption in different time periods in the recent fifty years and what kind of effectiveness these strategies

managed to accomplish. I will start with a flash back to the early times when the country had just earned its independence and strove to open up the situation and set up the foundation for the new born government.

Chairman Mao first came up with the concept of “Three Antis” which are Anti-corruption; Anti-waste and Anti-bureaucracy on the 20th November, 1951, and on the first of December the same year, the “Three Antis” campaign was officially initiated with the principle of combining the top down and bottom up strategy to discover and eliminate corrupt behavior, waste and bureaucracy (Shao Jingjun 2009).

Chairman Mao emphasized the importance of initiating the campaign by noting that since the takeover of the country there were several cases of severe corruption which indicated the necessity of overcoming the erosive impact that the capitalism caused to the Communist Party of China by launching the campaign. He also stressed that the campaign was related to the death or life of the Party and the country, so the government had to take it as important as the movement of suppressing counter-revolutionary, organizing the people including the democratic parties and the community with the same grand scale led by top officials in the government to discover corruption; call for come-forward confession and prosecution, criticize and inculcate those who committed lighter corruption, discharge and imprison(labor reform) those who committed heavier corruption and give death sentence to those who are most corrupted. (ibid.2009.)

Chairman Mao clearly realized back then that the campaign is against the interests of some corrupt officials in all levels of the government which in turn would cause certain conscious or unconscious resistance from the officials. In order to deepen the impact of the campaign, he set the principle that the head chiefs of the party at all levels had to take charge and personally deal with the cases. It is documented that from 20th of November to 31st of December 1951, he wrote a huge amount of instructions, criticism and letters, approved and transmitted a number of reports concerning the issue, in which over 50 were marked as important (ibid.2009).

He praised those who did great in the campaign and criticized those who made little progress. Under his instructions and supervision, the head chiefs of all levels worked aggressively and the campaign was implemented thoroughly. In order to reinforce the progress that the campaign had achieved, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (shortened as CPC in later references) launched another campaign of Five Antis which were anti-bribery; anti-tax-evasion; anti-state property theft; anti jerry-building and anti-economic intelligence theft on 26th of January 1952. (ibid.2009.)

By the 25th of October, 1952, the Central Committee announced the official end of the campaign that had carried on for 11 months. During which, about 3.836 million people from government organs above county level participated in the campaign (excluding military personnel) and 105 thousand people were discovered committing the offences of embezzlement or accepting bribes over 10 million Yuan (old currency) which was 2.7% of the total amount of people participated in the campaign. 6000 billion Yuan was taken or consumed by corrupted officials and 2000 billion of it was able to be recovered by the end October, 1952.

Among those who were exposed during the campaign of conducting wrongful doings, most of them were remitted of punishment, some were given the administrative sanction, and those who corrupted huge amount of money with abominable means and intransigent attitude that caused serious damage to the state were given severe punishments. 9942 people were sentenced to prison for a definite term, 67 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 with death sentences with a reprieve and 42 were sentenced to death which showed the principle of strict to some, lenient to most, focusing on the inculcation. (ibid.2009.)

The “Three Antis campaign” made big achievement in dealing with corruption, waste and bureaucracy and the case of Zhang Zishan and Liu Qingshan that had been processed by Chairman Mao was the most influential one that set the example of fighting corruption and building up a cleaner government which generated a strong positive impact on the future.

Liu and Zhang were both the Prefectural Party Committee Secretaries of the Tianjin City Committee of the CPC in sequence after the establishment of People's Republic of China. They joined the Party in 1930s and went through war with several military exploits. They withstood the hardness of the war but failed to keep up the good spirit and became corrupted after they were assigned to the position. They colluded with each other and embezzled money from the airport construction fund, flood relief loan and so on with the total amount of 15.54954 billion Yuan. During which time they were approached by the higher authority with attempt to save them from committing more wrongs but when all attempts proved useless, they were reported to Central Committee as one of the most notorious cases of the corruption situation in north China by the North China bureau which caught Chairman Mao's attention.

When processing their case, some officials thought that that their contribution to the country should be taken into account and they should be spared the death sentence, but Chairman Mao held the opinion of that their status, contribution and influence were exactly the reason they should be sentenced to death because it would generate the most profound impact to those who went through the same situation and shared the same experience with them to not become corrupted.

The death of these two would save the lives of thousands and even more lives of officials who were heading to the road of corruption. On the 20th of February, Liu and Zhang were executed through the public trial assembled by the people's government of Hebei Province. The execution showed the determination of the newly established Chinese government to fight against corruption, improved the Party's prestige and deterred those who were corrupted to come forward and confess about their crimes. Government officials and public servants were taught the lesson, and the working style of the Party and the social atmosphere were greatly improved. (ibid.2009.)

On 2nd of November, 1954, Central Committee of CPC approved and transmitted the report about the corruption that occurred after the campaign of "Three Antis" handed by the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council. The report analyzed the features of the corruption happened after the campaign which were: it was commonly seen in those

who had direct access to money and property; the amount of money that had been embezzled by individuals was huge and the behavior of corruption was in a more discreet manner. In response to these characteristics, thorough investigation of corruption cases was requested as well as the strengthening of ideological and moral education of cadres so as to establish the moral concepts of securing the state property with the establishment of sound financial management system to positively plug the corruption loopholes. (ibid.2009.)

In 1956, China had basically completed the socialist transformation of Private-owned System of Producer Goods and began to embark on the road of socialist construction. How to build socialism while maintaining the integrity of the Party and its cadres is a new topic the Party and the people were facing. From 1956 to 1966, the Party had explored many paths of building a clean government and launched several big battles of anti-corruption, put forward many new ideas, new approaches and had achieved many valuable results (ibid.2009). However, during this period, Chairman Mao began and some other leaders had gone down a path of no longer facing up to reality and respecting the objective laws. This led the fight against corruption gradually to embark on a tortuous path.

The “Cultural Revolution” that happened during May 1966 and October 1976 is considered the biggest mistake in the history of CPC. The “cultural revolution” is not and cannot in any sense be a revolution or social progress. It makes the Party and the people of China suffered the most serious setbacks and losses since the foundation of the PRC. The fight against corruption carried out in this kind of special social environment was only a deformed struggle (ibid.2009). Anti-corruption in this period seemed to have very effective results but the fact is that it was done with excessive costs and serious side effects. Considering that Chairman Mao’s concept and ideology of fighting corruption was the main pushing power in this period of time, it is necessary to analyze the basic content of his anti-corruption theory here.

Mao Zedong was the chief founder of the People’s Liberation Army, the Communist Party of China and the People’s Republic of China and he was also the man who set the

important theoretical and strategic foundations of how to fight against corruption. After the establishment of PRC, the ruling status of the Party and the peaceful environment increased the danger of going astray from the people and reality as well as the risk of corruption. In this regard, Chairman Mao led the Party to actively explore the means and paths of maintaining a clean government under the given conditions and gradually formed a relatively systematic and scientific ideology—the Mao Zedong Thought of Anti-Corruption which is a representation of the experience and wisdom of anti-corruption practices that the first generation leaders of CPC had accumulated, which is also an important part of Mao Zedong Thought. Here we are going to take a closer look into his theory of anti-corruption. (ibid.2009.)

First is the question of why should China fight against corruption. Mao Zedong believed that the degeneration of political ideology, corruption in economy, and the squandering for the enjoyment of life all belong to the scope of corruption. Corruption is the reflection of the ideology of exploiting classes in the Party and the government and the battle of anti-corruption is an important component of the proletarian class struggle. He considered that corruption was a behavior of anti-Party and anti-socialists, and the corrupt officials were the black sheep in the Party and government whose sole purpose was to exploit the people and destroy the very existence of the Party and the country. When talking about the “Three Antis Campaign”, he thought that the struggle of anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucracy should be considered as important as the struggle of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries (ibid.2009).

Based on this understanding of corruption, as early as after the establishment of the country, Chairman Mao called out that all our people and staff of the government should work with one heart to vigorously and resolutely carry out the large-scale opposition against corruption, against waste and bureaucracy to break down and wash away these poisonous old legacies. This is actually the very idea of seeing the acts of building a clean government by fighting against corruption as the basic foundation of establishing the Party and the country.

Second is the cause of corruption. Chairman Mao deemed that the class origin was the main cause of corruption which was also the poisonous old legacy. Besides this, bureaucracy and liberalism were the important reasons that the corruption phenomenon was able to exist and grow.

Third is the issue of whom should China depends on when fighting against corruption. He thought that the CPC was the only dependable leading force which the nation must follow and the mass people of the grass root were the source of power in the battlefield of fighting against corruption. The reason why the battle against corruption must be led by the Communist Party of China was because the Chinese Communist Party “serves the people wholeheartedly and will never be divorced from the masses; everything the Party considers of doing is for the people’s interests, rather than for the interests of individual or small groups”. The CPC represented only the interest of proletariat and the majority of the people, and is clean for it was not looking for any special kind of private interest for itself. “All of our staff, regardless of rank and status, are servants of the people. Everything we do, we do it to serve the people” this statement was drawn for that the Party was equipped with the scientific theory of Marxism and could fight against corruption in accordance with its rules and disciplines.

In China, there was no other kind of political force like the Chinese Communist Party that could lead the people onto the right path of fighting against corruption and achieve complete victory. As he believed in the purity of the Party, Chairman Mao also believed in the power of people. He truly thought that “the people are the true heroes”. All for people and all depending on people was the core of his leadership theory and the anti-corruption theory. By summing up historical experiences, he clearly pointed out: “As long as we are able to master the science of Marxism–Leninism, trust the masses and bring them closely together and lead them forward, we could transcend any obstacle and overcome any difficulties, and the strength we have is invincible” (ibid.2009).

The fourth question is how to fight corruption. Chairman Mao advocated the combination of inculcation, sanction and supervision, meanwhile kept an eye on the

relation between the task of anti-corruption and other major tasks the Party was engaging in.

1. When fighting against corruption, Chairman Mao always thought that education should come first. To establish the Marxist outlook on world, on life and power for the majority of Party members and cadres through education was the ideological basis of anti-corruption. There were five aspects of inculcation which were the objective education of serving the people; the traditional education of working hard and perseveringly; the style education of criticism and self-criticism; the experiential education of history and previous lessons and the education of examples.

2. Chairman Mao held a very strong and tough attitude towards corruption with no tolerance and condonement when it comes to the punishment of those who were found guilty of corruption, never fishing in the muddy water or just going through motions. He was not only putting forward approaches, but also supervising the process personally; not only giving instructions, but also solutions. In particular, he paid special attention to major cases and dared to tackle tough problems. The case of Zhang Qinsan and Liu Zishan was the best demonstration of his firm attitude towards corruption and corrupted officials which not only exposed the corruption, waste and bureaucracy that existed within the Party and state organs in the broad range and offered corresponding punishment, but also sent a vivid message to the majority of Party members and cadres and also gave them a profound ideological education on anti-corruption which built a solid foundation for the clean and efficient working environment for the Party and its government. (ibid.2009.)

3. Stressing the importance of supervision. Firstly, the inner-Party supervision. Chairman Mao believed that a sound democratic life is the fundamental guarantee of implementing the inner-Party supervision and carrying out the activity of criticism. He raised two principles of the inner-Party supervision: First, tell all that one knows and tell it without reserve; second, blame not the speaker but be warned by his words. In order to ensure that inner-Party supervision of the organization was achieved, he proposed, in the early days of the founding of the country, that the Party should

establish a Commission for Discipline Inspection which was approved and implemented right away. Secondly, the supervision by the masses. He personally handled people's letters, and earnestly warned the chief officials of all levels to listen to the voices of the people. Broad participation and supervision of the masses effectively promoted the anti-corruption work. Then it is democratic supervision. Mao founded the CPC-led multi-Party cooperation system, set up the "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" approach with the democratic parties. He thought highly of the advice from non-Party personages, and actively listened to and accepted their reasonable suggestions. Finally, media monitoring. Mao attached great importance to the supervisory role of newspapers and magazines and stressed that the press should publish people's letters, reflecting the people's voices and demands to monitor the government's work. (ibid.2009.)

4. Chairman Mao valued the dynamic integration of the task of fighting against corruption with the Party's central work and other tasks. He stressed that: "The Party committee must pay close attention to the central task as well as other tasks by carrying out other aspects of the work while doing the central task. We can not only focus on one part and ignore the rest of the problems" (ibid.2009).

Even though his ideology and theory had led to a great achievement in lessening the corruption and other major social problems, there still were some limits and even drawbacks if it was looked at objectively, especially from today's perspective. For example, as to the causes of corruption, he put too much emphasis on classes, but not enough on the economical and institutional reasons. Moreover, it was crucial that anti-corruption should rely on the masses, but adopting the "Mass Democracy" and "Mass Movement" approaches caused a number of negative effects. So if we carefully review and sum up the experiences and lessons that had obtained from the series of fights against corruption led by Chairman Mao from 1956 to 1976, it will be helpful for people to avoid making detours in the future when coming across the similar situations.

The first lesson learned is that China cannot idealize the process of building up a clean government. After the establishment of the new China, Chairman Mao was very

idealistic about the development of the country. He initiated the Great Leap Forward and the movement to establish people's communes in 1958 which attempted to "running into communism" under the conditions of not developing the social productive forces, especially the commodity economy (ibid.2009). Even through his idealistic idea had been challenged through practice and had been criticized by other Party members, he was still persistent about these ideas. During the Cultural Revolution, he once again pictured the blueprint of his ideal society.

He claimed that the whole country to be "the big school of communism" and all trades and professions of the society to become a economically self-sufficient or semi-self-sufficient social organization that progressively restrict the social division of labor and commodity production as well as the principle of distribution according to work and material interests. He wanted everyone in the society to be the "critic of the old world and the builders and defenders of the New World" who can "work if pick up the hammer, farm if pick up the hoe and rake, fight enemies if pick up the weapon and write articles if pick up the pen" (ibid.2009).

He also promoted the concept of "narrowing the differences between industrial and agricultural work, between the urban and rural area, and between manual and mental work" so that in such kind of a society, the government officials and the masses could merge with each other and become a harmonious whole and there would be no graft and corruption because the government officials were serving the people wholeheartedly with no consideration of self-interests and profit. But as reality proved over and over again, his idealistic state of country could never be realized under the given conditions and the anti-corruption war under these concepts and ideology would never be won. We have to come back to the idea that Chairman Mao had always advocated—proceeding from reality and seeking truth from facts.

The second lesson is that anti-corruption cannot be carried out in the form of a campaign. Mao was too drenched in the idea of building a perfect and pure socialism country, so when he saw that in reality many cadres gradually became the "decadent top dog who takes the capitalist road" with layer upon layer protection over their heads, he

decided to apply the mass movement that came most handy to him to solve the problem. He included anti-corruption into the scale of class struggle to make impact on the corrupted officials and “trigger an inner-revolution deep down in their soul” (ibid.2009) through a rather aggressive way. It was effective in scaring those who were planning to go corrupted to drop the idea, but was more destructive to the Party and the country by mixing different kind of conflicts that messed up the society and economy, caused a number of unjust, false and erroneous cases.

The third lesson is that power cannot be absolutized. The Cultural Revolution was seemingly promoting Mass Democracy, but in fact it was the absolutization of the supreme power. Democratic centralism was completely destroyed in the Party. And Chairman Mao was the “Great teacher, great leader, great commander in chief, and great helmsman” who stood above the Party and the government. His words were the absolute truth and supreme instruction to the Party, the country and the people that should be executed resolutely. However, absolute power was proved to be an illusion and a farce when the Gang of Four emerged with their hidden agenda of serving their own interests in the disguise of implementing Chairman Mao’s instructions which indicated that the power absolutization, no matter in what form, would eventually become the paradise for corruption. The attempt to fight corruption by using the absolute power is just a fantasy, just as Lord Acton accurately expressed “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. (ibid.2009.)

The forth lesson is that the society cannot be disorganized. The direct representation of Cultural Revolution is “chaos”. The notion of “suspect everything, and down with everything” was a universal idea of the whole nation at that time. It was said that the “chaos is the perfect time to disturb the enemy and train the masses”, but even Mao himself felt that this was the wrong way of doing things. Instead of chaos, he put forward that “the stability and unity of the society is a better way”. It had been proved by facts that chaos was never a good thing when you were already in the ruling status of the nation and controlled political power. All the social problems, including corruption, could never be settled in the chaotic environment. Order should be secured if China wants to create good living condition for the people, to maintain the social and

economical development as well as to fight against corruption and build a clean government. The implementation of democracy and nomocracy is essential when a stable political situation and an orderly social environment are in need. This is the profound and most valuable lesson that the CPC had learnt from the Cultural Revolution. (ibid.2009.)

All the lesson learned from Chairman Mao's strategic moves of anti-corruption analyzed above are important for us to study and use for reference in the future, one should also be aware that all the limitations and drawbacks are with its historical reasons. It is simply not acceptable to completely deny the historical periods and incidents with great influence just because they were considered to be flawed. Chairman Mao's theory of fighting against corruption was not perfect and in fact caused serious problems to the Party, the people and the nation, but still, it was with some positive aspects. In theory, it had laid a solid foundation for CPC to construct the anti-corruption theory with Chinese characteristics. In practice, it had succeeded in suppressing the trend of corruption that rapidly emerged in the early days after the founding of the new China which created a relatively clean and honest working style of government as well as the social and Party conduct in 1950s that have been praised by people up to today.

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, especially since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, by setting things right, the new China's anti-corruption struggle had gradually embarked on a healthy track.

After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, China entered the new historical stage of reform, opening-up, and socialist modernization, the construction of the Party's discipline and a clean government was also different from the previous time. The overall situation was that the violations of the law and breaches of discipline in some localities and departments increased sharply and corruption was occurring in a quite aggressive manner with the features listed below.

1. The phenomenon of the cadres seeking privileges was getting more and more serious. A lot of cadres who had been prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution were

reassigned to the government positions, most of which was working hard with assiduity as they were before, but some considered themselves to be mistreated and deserved a little payback. So it seemed only righteous for them to seek privileges and get some compensation by misusing the public power they were entrusted with. Such as building private houses by exploiting one's office or opening a back door for their children and relatives in order to offer them better jobs, better education, promotion and so on. (ibid.2009.)

2. The phenomenon of bribery and corruption as well as seeking illegitimate interests began to spread which was manifested in the way that some cadres took advantage of their position and power to embezzle public funds, misappropriate public property, ask for and accept bribes and smuggle and sell contrabands and so on. The country was in the age of shortage economy at that time. By abusing power or pulling strings, the officials were able to buy the expensive imports like colored TVs, washing machines, VCRs and other high-end consumer products with low-cost or a nominal payment from the business units to meet their private needs, which was a main reason why corruption became prevalent. (ibid.2009.)

In 1982, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that since the implementation of the policy of reform and opening-up and invigorating the domestic economy, there were a considerable number of cadres who had been corrupted in a short period of one to two years. The number of officials who had been drawn into the economical crimes was not small, but huge. According to the statistics, the number of cases that had been investigated by the Chinese prosecutorial organs for corruption in 1979 was 702 and 8181 in 1980, 15753 in 1981, and 29563 in 1982, which showed a significant upward trend of corruption occurring during this period of time (ibid.2009).

The features of corruption that happened in that time were: 1. The bribes that had been asked for and accepted were in the form of material possession. That is because the nation was in the period of shortage economy, the material goods were in short supply, and many household items could not be bought even with money. Thus, bribery in material form was quite popular at that time. 2. Corruption was mostly occurred in the

department that was in charge of import and export and the department of material resources and department of planning. 3. The corrupted officials in this period were mainly the persons in charge of the Party and government organs. They took advantage of the time when there was no specific restriction on powers and vigorously engaged in the way of seeking illegitimate interests and privileges by abusing the power they were entrusted with. 4. The means of corruption applied during this period was mainly the misuse of the distributive power of planned material and goods in short supply for personal gain which undermined the unity of the national plan and the fairness of the distribution. (ibid.2009.)

The 10 years from the Party's 12th National Congress in September 1982 to the 14th National Congress in October 1992 was the time China began to implement the policy of reforming and opening-up comprehensively. After the Setting Things Right from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee and initial reform and opening-up, China started great social changes in many aspects. It changed the economical system from a planned economy to a planned commodity economy, then to a socialist market economy; it started the reform first in the rural areas then gradually shifted it in the cities and the opening-up to the outside world was also extended to a deeper level, which greatly enhanced the enthusiasm of the people to change the world as well as the vitality of the development of the whole society.

Meanwhile, the imperfect political and administrative system, the big misunderstanding in thinking caused by the great rapid changes and the expanding of the space for people to pursue self-profit had led to a dramatic growth in corruptive conduct of public officers (ibid.2009). China entered the time when the Party engaged not only in reforming and opening-up but also fighting against corruption under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. China began to push the concept of building a fine Party culture and keeping its organizations clean in the process of comprehensive reforming, opening-up and socialist modernization.

For Deng, the core of his anti-corruption theory is the persistence of anti-corruption in the whole process of reforming and opening-up (ibid.2009). In his point of view, the

persistence of anti-corruption in the entire reforming and opening-up process is not only the important aspect of constructing the spiritual civilization of socialism but also the necessary condition for constructing the material civilization of socialism. If people keep a closed eye on the corruptive environment, it would eventually come and haunt the country despite how much progress China made in developing its economy. Besides this, the other important parts of his anti-corruption theory consist of the following aspects: to deal with the corruptive problem with the educational and legal methods; anti-corruption process should start from within the Party then spread to the whole nation. Also, it should start from the head officials to set up examples for the people below and there should be an outside supervisory power with the help of the people to examine the whole anti-corruption procedure.

The basic content of Deng's anti-corruption theory included the following 7 aspects:

1. China should always adhere to the principle of promoting the reform and opening up to the outside world and at the same time strengthen the construction of the legal system in the process of fighting against corruption (ibid.2009). The reform and opening up to the outside world side of this principle remained the same in years while the other side had been changing over the time, it originally was about striking the economical crimes, then changed into constructing the legal system, and then in the beginning of the 20th century it was developed into fighting against corruption. Although the focus shifted a bit with time, the importance of valuing both party equally has not changed, it was always what Deng emphasized during his time.

2. Anti-corruption should always be conducted on the basis of economical construction. In 1980, he had already raised the importance of economical construction. In his opinion, the economical construction was the centre of everything, and all the Chinese government did, it did it according to this central notion, if the government drifts away from it, it would face the risk of losing the economic base (ibid.2009). There is no exception on anti-corruption. Fighting against corruption and other economical crimes is the building up of the solid foundation and setting up of the right direction for opening up to the outside world and vitalizing the national economy.

3. Anti-corruption should be implemented top down, which means starting from the head officials to the civil servants below. In his mind, the reason corruption was so intense was that the head officials consider themselves untouchable and above the law, and they can do whatever they want without being punished. So making them the main target in the battle of fighting against corruption is with great significance. It is not only good to clear up the corrupt environment but also good for setting the record straight for the people below to be aware of the consequences of being corrupted. (ibid.2009.)

4. Anti-corruption should be focusing on strengthening and completing the construction of the legal system. He pointed out in 1980 that the system is the key to everything, a good system can prevent bad people from doing bad things and a bad one can make good people unable to do good things. The system he was talking about was the system that enables people's democratic rights as well as the legal system. He stressed the importance of completing the legal system in fighting against corruption again in 1990 when talking about anti-corruption and building a clean government. He advocated building a sound legal and social system to restrain people's behavior as well as the supervisory system to suppress corruption (ibid.2009).

5. Anti-corruption should begin with education in order to prevent corrupt behavior from happening in the first place. He emphasized the essentiality of anti-corruption in the ideological sense. He said that the more our country develops, the more we should pay attention to nourish the righteous mind of anti-corruption (ibid.2009). From the above mentioned point, it is clear that Deng had inherited and developed the tradition of stressing the ideological construction and education of the Party. Especially since the reform and opening up, he had been advocating the ideal of conducting the education on discipline, legal system, value and hard working, which is with great importance for Party members, to establish a firm ideal and conviction, and to reinforce the law-abiding concept, to improve anti-corruption awareness, and consciously resist the decadent ideas of corruption.

6. It is essential to severely punish the offenders with corruptive behavior in the fight against corruption. The ideological education of anti-corruption is to strike at the root

while punishing the corruptive government officials is the strike to the symptom on the surface, only if the two are combined together, could China attain the maximized benefit from the anti-corruption war.

7. The anti-corruption war is a long-term struggle (ibid.2009). It is not a temporary work, but something China should be always aware of and pay attention to. It does not end when one or several major cases are exposed and taken care of, nor does it end when the government thinks it have made some progress on suppressing corruption, as long as there is a sign showing there could be potential corruption going on, the anti-corruption war would never end. It would always be part of the everyday life.

In the period of socialist reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping, in view of the anti-corruption struggle that the Party had carried out and the experience and lessons learned, systematically summarized and put forward a series of important theoretical viewpoints.

First, Deng analyzed the errors the Party had been making ever since the day the CPC claimed authority over the country, especially the ones during the time of the “Cultural Revolution”, and found out that the “root cause” to the “unique socialist bureaucratism” (ibid.2009) that the country was experiencing was closely related to the highly centralization that the government was practicing. The leading organs at all levels had too much control over the things that were far out of their reach, which in turn led to the passive attitude towards doing their job properly as well as to corrupt behavior. Here Deng boldly pointed the analytical spearhead to the existing leadership system.

He pointed out that the over-concentration of power means inappropriate and indiscriminate concentration of all power in Party committees in the name of strengthening centralized Party leadership. Moreover, the power of the Party committees themselves is often in the hands of a few secretaries, especially the first secretaries, who direct and decide everything. Thus the “centralized Party leadership” often turns into leadership by individuals. And he believed that the prolonged lack of appreciation regarding this issue was the main reason for “Cultural Revolution” to take

place, and for which China had paid a really heavy price. Therefore, he raised the major task of reforming the Party and state leadership system.

Second, Deng summed up the lesson of the overspreading ideological trend in favor of bourgeois liberalization and the political turmoil in 1989 since the reform and opening up and found a master switch on the ideological and political line of defense in the battle of fighting against corruption which was the strict adherence to the ideological education of hard work. He concluded that “Our biggest mistake was in education, we got weaker in ideological and political work” since the reform and opening up. “The most important mistake is that we fail to inform the people, including Communist Party members that we should maintain the tradition of hard work under the circumstances that the economy has been prosperously developing, and people’s living standards have greatly improved” and “adhering to this tradition, is the crucial element of winning anti–corruption war.” (ibid.2009.) So what he advocated was that the government should firmly grasp this master switch in the ideological education of hard work, in order to withstand the erosion of corruptive phenomenon towards Party and people’s political power.

Third, he summed up the lessons learned from the unevenly distributed attention towards economic construction and clean government construction since China started the reform and opening up and put forward a solution to correctly handle the relationship between the two as what called the “Three Favorable” which refer to “whether it is conducive to the development of socialist social productive forces, whether it helps strengthen the socialist country's comprehensive national strength, and whether it helps improve people’s living standards” (ibid.2009). The construction of economy and clean government should obey the rules mentioned above in order to serve the purpose of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. This “three favorable” cleared out the confusion of how to deal with the relationship between the two.

Fourth, he summed up the experiences and drew the necessary lessons from clean government construction and anti–corruption in the period of reforming and opening up

that our Party had carried out, and put forward the overall strategy of the fight against corruption under the conditions of reforming and opening up and the construction of socialist market economic system. That is to fight against corruption through education, the legal system and the development and reform. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that “education” means to give the ideological and political education of hard work to the Party members, cadres and people. He also pointed out that the “legal” includes law, institution, system, management and many other elements. Deng Xiaoping made a special emphasis on development and reform. He thought that the problems occurred during the construction of clean government and anti-corruption often lined to the level of economic development of the local government as well as the deficiency of the system. Therefore, “pushing the economy forward is the permanent cure”. His theory of overall development and comprehensive reform pointed out the direction for us even today of how to build a clean government and fight against corruption. (ibid.2009.)

Throughout the anti-corruption history of China since 1949, it is unmistakable that the Chinese government does take anti-corruption seriously and considers it one of the crucial factors of consolidating political power, stabilizing the social environment and promoting the development of socialism. However, before The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, the anti-corruption usually were carried out in the form of campaign like the “Three Antis” which was effective in the period of times when it was launched but did not have a profound long-term influence regarding the issue of anti-corruption let alone solving the problem. Moreover, the campaign-styled anti-corruption, in some degree, often mixed with “rule of man” not “rule of law” which often resulted in ignoring or even trampling on democracy and the legal system.

After the Third Plenary Session, Chinese government under the head of Deng Xiaoping realized the limitation of the previous anti-corruption approaches and started to learn from these lessons and experiences and determined that the right road leading to anti-corruption was the “rule of law”. China enacted its fist systematic Criminal Law, in which the specific provisions of the offence of corruption and bribery were made in 1979. Then in 1982 and 1989, the Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Who

Have Seriously Sabotaged the Economy and the Supplementary Decision on Punishing the Offence of Corruption and Bribery were issued.

In the 1990s, however, with the booming market economy, the corruption situation in China was made worse by the lack of balanced monitoring power in the period of transforming the planned economy into the socialist market economy. Major corruption cases increased year by year. From 1984 to 1988, the number of corruption-suspected cadres in county level was only 10 000, not much in the number of bureau-level cadres, and almost none in the provincial level. From 1989 to 1993, 30 000 in county level, the number of offender had reached 173 in bureau-level cadres and five provincial level cadres were involved in the corruption cases which showed an growing trend of officials getting corrupted. Judging from the amount of money involved in the corruption cases, from 1984 to 1988, million-Yuan cases were scarce, from 1989 to 1993, only 81cases million Yuan involved, and since 1993, cases with more than million Yuan involved has increased rapidly. (ibid.2009.)

In general, after the reform and opening up policy, corruption in China has a close relationship with the contradictions and conflicts occurred during the transition period of the national economy system, and can be divided into four stages: the first cycle was between the years 1980-1988. In 1980, China just started the reform and opening up policy, and the interest differentiation of society was not in full swing, so the number of corruption cases and the amount of money and cadres involved were relatively small. However, with the gradually deepened interest differentiation and reforming process, the numbers of corruption cases were increasing and, in about 1986, reached the first peak. After that, this trend began to fall back due to the attention people began to put on corruption and the construction of a clean and honest administration that was strengthened. In1988, the first stage ended. In the first cycle, there were peaks and troughs, though the overall trend showed an upward development, compared to the upcoming cycles, the number was small and manageable. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.)

1988–1992 was the second cycle of corruption. The pace of reforming was accelerated and special approaches were carried out such as the double-track price system, which was a special price management system that helped with the transformation from the Chinese planned economy into the socialist market economy. This system meant that the same product can have two different prices. If the quota of the product was met according to the state plan, then the manufacture can sell the rest of the product with the price determined by the market. The downside of this approach was that it opened the door to corruption and made corruption an easy job with low risks and in 1989 reached the second climax. With the enhanced efforts of the government on anti-corruption, the situation remained under control. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.)

1992–1998 was the third cycle of corruption. In 1990s, the corruption began to take place in the fields of financial, securities and transfer of property rights and the amount of money involved in these corruption cases were far more than previous ones. And because of the lag of the system construction and the special nature of gradually-advanced reform, it is safe to say that corruption situation in this period of time was the most serious with its peak in 1997. In the same year later, China's anti-corruption strategy had a significant change, from treating the symptoms by investigating major cases to focusing on addressing both the symptoms and root cause by emphasizing the ideological education and other measures to control corruption from the source. This new approach achieved a desirable result that led to the rapid decline on the number of corruption cases in 1998. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.)

1998–2002, China entered the fourth corruption cycle. The number of corruption cases showed a gradually increasing trend, but the growth rate was limited. Moreover, since China had established an institutionalized anti-corruption approach, the fluctuating range of corruption decreased significantly. In this stage, the total number of corruption cases and cadres involved in them dropped dramatically compared to the previous examples, showing that corruption in general was more effectively controlled. However, the numbers of major corruption cases, the amount of money and county-level and above cadres involved in were increasing significantly, exceeding the former cases

indicated that major corruption cases and high-level official corruption became a serious problem in society. (Ni xing & Wang lijing 2004.)

4. THE CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE

Singapore, located in the north-east Asia, is a country formed by several islands. According to government statistics, the population of Singapore as of 2008 was 4.8 million, of whom 3.6 million were Singapore citizens and permanent residents. Various Chinese linguistic groups formed 76.7% of Singapore's residents, Malays 14%, Indians 7.9%, while Eurasians, Arabs and other groups formed 1.4%. (Focus Singapore.)

Singapore is effectively a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-lingual nation, the government recognizes four official languages: English, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay and Tamil.

Mandarin (Chinese) is spoken widely in Singapore. Mandarin's use has spread largely as a result of government-sponsored public campaigns and efforts to support its adoption and use over other Chinese dialects. It is generally spoken as a common language amongst Singapore's Chinese community. Most Singapore Chinese are, however, descended from immigrants who came from the southern regions of China where other dialects were spoken, such as Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka and Hainanese. (Country Studies 2007.)

Malay and Tamil are seldom spoken in Singapore even though they are the official languages. It is quite common for Singaporeans to speak English for formal occasions like in work place and Chinese for informal, everyday life. Singapore is the only other country except China in the world that the majority of the population is of Chinese origins and uses Chinese for communication. (Country Studies 2007.)

The first record of settlement in Singapore are from the second century AD, Some of the earliest records of this region are the reports of Chinese officials who served as envoys to the seaports and empires of the Nanyang (southern ocean), the Chinese term for Southeast Asia. The earliest first-hand account of Singapore appears in a geographical handbook written by the Chinese traveler Wang Dayuan in 1349. Wang noted that Singapore Island, which he called Tan-ma-hsi (Danmaxi), was a haven for several

hundred boatloads of pirates who preyed on passing ships. He also described a settlement of Malay and Chinese living on a terraced hill known in Malay legend as Bukit Larangan (Forbidden Hill), the reported burial place of ancient kings. The fourteenth-century Javanese chronicle, the *Nagarakertagama*, also noted a settlement on Singapore Island, calling it Temasek. (Country Studies 2007.)

From above mentioned historical materials and statistics, it is easy to conclude that Singapore has a profound relationship with China, and culturally speaking, both Singapore and China are influenced deeply by the Confucian culture. Singapore has a long history of Chinese migration. At least from the Ming Dynasty, since 14th century, China has a clear historical record of people living in Singapore. Although the recorded Chinese migration to Singapore was mostly consisted with the under-educated labor workers, they were drenched in the Confucian culture ever since their childhood and grew up in environment under that influence. It is inevitable that they would bring this culturally influenced ideology and traditions as well as the codes of conduct into the new environment they emigrated to, and with the wide spread and fast growth of the Chinese migrant population, Chinese culture was gradually infiltrated into the native culture.

Singapore has a quite tortuous history towards independence because its strategic geographic position. Singapore had been the colony of Britain for 143 years from 1819 to 1942, then directly after, from 1942 to 1945 was under the Japanese domination. After the Second World War, the Japanese were defeated and Singapore was back to British hands but after all the turbulence Singapore and its people had been through, the colonial status of the country was not welcomed by Singaporeans anymore, and they were struggling to fight for the day that they could be independent from any other country.

The year between 1945 and 1962 was this struggling period, during which time the Communist Party of Malaya was trying to take over the sovereign power of the country and led Singapore to declare the state of emergency for 12 years, and eventually resulted in the amendment of the Singapore constitution which empowered Singapore

with more independence. Finally in 1959, Singapore gained its complete independence, and then in 1963 joined the Federation of Malaysia. However, the conflicts in the ideology of ruling the country as well as the political and economical differences between Singaporean government and the central government led to Singapore being evicted from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. Singapore then joined the United Nation on 21st of September the same year and the British Commonwealth of Nations later in October for fear of being forced and attacked by Malaysia or Indonesia. (Singapore 1994.)

Singapore entered into the new age of developing and ruling the country on its free will. And at the beginning of this new age, Singaporean government was facing a tough task of saving the country that is dying for all its sufferings. Through hard work and insightful guidance by the government, the country was revived and burst with energy and prosperity in the 1980s. However, with dramatically increased living standard and opened social atmosphere brought by the soaring economic growth, came the ultra-individualism, hedonism and utilitarianism that spread around the nation swiftly.

Seeing this trend of development in social and cultural aspects, Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore at that time raised the idea of promoting the Confucian Culture at schools so that Singapore would survive from the damage these trends might have caused by its rapid economic growth and development. For he believed that the Confucian Culture could reinforce the influential power of society and family values that would bond people together and ensure a harmonious development. So, traditional Chinese culture and values were introduced back to the stage after all the turbulences of changing situations of history, and were greatly developed and implemented.

Singapore started to study the Confucian culture systematically across the country, and set up a special research institution—the Institute of East Asia Philosophies in 1983 to study the traditional ideas of Confucianism and its modernization and practical role, value and function in the current environment. This also led to a worldwide boom in Confucian studies, and awakened the Confucian scholars both in eastern and western countries to become aware of questions of the continuity and evolvement of

Confucianism and the development of its path in modern societies. (East Asian Institute 2008.)

The fact that both China and Singapore are located in Asia, and that the Chinese culture and values were commonly applied in Singapore as well as the fact that Singapore is the only other country in the whole world except China that the majority of the population speaks Chinese as mentioned above, make it reasonable to conclude that China and Singapore share commonalities that make my study conductible for the comparison of these two different nations. However, the commonalities are only part of the foundation of which I am going to build my research, the differences, which completes the other part of my research foundation, is of much more importance.

Other than the obvious and irrelevant differences such as the population, the climate and so on, I am focused more on differences that are relevant and significant.

Table 1. Ranking of China and Singapore in Corruption Perception Indices 2001–2008. (Transparency International 2009).

| | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| China | 57 | 59 | 66 | 71 | 78 | 70 | 72 | 72 | 79 |
| Singapore | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 |

From table 1, it is stunning to see that China and Singapore are performing so differently in the field of corruption. In 2001, there were 91 countries which participated in the survey and by the year of 2009, the numbers of countries in the survey were increased to 180. That explains why China ranked a bit higher in 2001 and then went straight backwards after that, while Singapore went on steady and even upgraded a little under the same circumstances. It is safe to say that Singapore is on the top of the countries that have a clean and transparent government whereas China From the year

2001 to 2009 averaged 3.425 on a 1–10 scale (the lower the index, the more corrupt a country is perceived by its public, domestic entrepreneurs, and overseas investors).

Here is a graph dated from 1995 showing the different rankings of Singapore I selected from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau's home page.




Figure 1. Corruption Perception Index (1995 to 2005).

From figure 2, we can see that Singapore's CPI ranking never fell out of top 10 positions and in the years 1996 and 1997, it showed a backwards trend of rankings from 3 to 7 and 9, but since 1998, the score was improved every year till now.

The question is now on the table. Why do Singapore and China, the two Asian countries that are basically sharing the identical cultural background and have other similar traits

perform so differently in the anti–corruption area? I will begin my analysis starting from the 1950s when Singapore, like its neighbors, was a place rampant with corruption.

In 1940 and the early 1950, corruption was so commonly accepted by Singaporeans and their government that it was considered a part of life and necessary measure to get things done in the public or private sectors. S.R. Nathan, the president of Singapore once told a little story about him applying for a job in the City Council, and he was interviewed by the Indian leader of the Trade Union Congress, during the interview, he was asked about a strange question of “how many tables”, Nathan was so confused and had no idea of how to answer that, and of course he was rejected for the job. It was only until later that he found out the strange question that got him jobless was the leader asking him how many tables would he book in the local restaurant to thank them if he got hired. It is a quite vivid story that reflects the situation in Singapore before the People’s Action Party took charge of the country. Corruption was seen everywhere that people actually have to pay the civil servant of the government tip for picking up application forms. This period of time is also considered the most corruptive time in Singapore’s history. (Record office of Singapore 2009.)

The reason that corruption was so rife at that time was firstly because the law of Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was weak since the government just came to power.

Secondly, public officers were not as highly paid as compared to those in the private sector. Some of them became indebted due to lack of savings to tide them over difficult times and some resorted to corruption to make ends meet. (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption–A Comparative Study 2005.)

Finally, the population was generally less educated then and did not know their rights. As a result, the only way they knew how to get things done was through bribery. (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption–A Comparative Study 2005.)

In the years prior to 1952, Singapore had an anti-corruption branch, the one under the Singapore Police Force that was in charge of all the corruption cases investigations. The thing was that this department did a terrible job of fighting against corruption, especially when it came to the corruption concerning police officers. So, in 1952, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau was established as an independent body responsible for the investigation and prevention of corruption in Singapore that was directly taking orders from and responsible to the Prime Minister's Office.

The beginning of CPIB was not smooth going due to the incompleteness of the anti-corruption regulations and laws which made the investigation and collecting evidence impossible to accomplish as well as the low confidence and support from the people. To complicate matters further, the CPIB officers were drawn from the Singapore Police Force and, consequently, not committed to investigating corrupt practices that mainly involved their former police colleagues and were therefore not psychologically prepared to committing themselves to fighting corruption. Also, being on secondment did not provide the officers with adequate protection and security of tenure.

As a result, many officers were reappointed before they were able to conclude their investigation. In addition, the public service was prone to corruption due to low skills, low salaries and lack of integrity, together with a general culture of supremacy of public officers over citizens and related public acceptance of unfair treatment by government officials (Ali 2000:3-4). There was also a lack of support among the population as the public was skeptical of the effectiveness of the CPIB.

In 1959, when the People's Action Party (PAP) that was led by Lee Kuan Yew took power in the country, the new government made it an immediate task to minimize corruption and make it a high-risk, low-reward activity. In 1960, a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy was initiated through the enactment of the *Prevention of Corruption Act* (POCA). The strategy was based on the principle that "corruption is caused by both the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt" thus requiring that both the incentives and the opportunities for corruption be removed (Quah 2003:83).

Leading by example and a policy of zero-tolerance for corruption were key elements of the strategy for changing people's attitudes. The POCA also expanded the powers of investigation of the CPIB, giving the Bureau the tools it needed to combat corruption, as well as increased the punishment for corruption. Strong action were taken against corrupt officials and examples were set that showed the government's conviction concerning the issue of combating corruption and had greatly boosted the confidence and support of the public towards CPIB as well as a clear message being sent that the law was going to be stringently implemented and that corruption had become a high-risk, low-reward activity. (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption—A Comparative Study 2005.)

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is an independent body which investigates and aims to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors in Singapore. Established in 1952, it derives its powers of investigation from the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241). The bureau is headed by a director who is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006a.)

The bureau is responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the public service and encouraging corruption-free transactions in the private sector. It is also charged with the responsibility of checking on malpractices by public officers and reporting such cases to the appropriate government departments and public bodies for disciplinary action. Although the primary function of the bureau is to investigate corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, it is empowered to investigate any other sizable offence under any written law which is disclosed in the course of a corruption investigation. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006a.)

Besides bringing corruption offenders to book, the bureau carried out corruption prevention by reviewing the work methods and procedures of corruption-prone departments and public bodies to identify administrative weaknesses in the existing systems which could facilitate corruption and malpractices, and recommends remedial and prevention measures to the heads of departments concerned. Also in this regard,

officers of the bureau regularly conduct lectures and seminars to educate public officers, especially those who come into contact with the public, on the pitfalls of and the avoidance of corruption. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006a.)

The functions of the CPIB are:

- to receive and investigate complaints alleging corrupt practices;
- to investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers with an undertone of corruption; and
- to prevent corruption by examining the practices and procedures in the public service to minimize opportunities for corrupt practices. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

The organization structure of CPIB

The CPIB is under the charge of the Prime Minister's Office. Organizationally, the CPIB has two divisions namely: The Operations Division and The Administration & Specialist Support Division

Operations Division. The Operations Division executes the main function of the Bureau in investigating offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It comprises 4 investigation units, one of which is the elite Special Investigation Team (SIT) which handles the more complex and major cases. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

Completed investigation papers are submitted to the Public Prosecutor based on the available evidence. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, no prosecution can be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Public Prosecutor. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

Cases against public officers with insufficient evidence to support a court prosecution are referred (with the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor) to the head of the

department concerned for disciplinary action. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

An Intelligence Department was established under the Operations Division. It gathers and collates intelligence to support the investigation needs of the Operations Division. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

Administration & Specialist Support Division. The Administration & Specialist Support Division has four units which are:

- Administration Unit is responsible for corporate and investigation support services, including registry, finance, procurement and personnel matters.
- Prevention & Review Unit carries out reviews of the work procedures of corruption-prone government departments to identify the administrative weaknesses, which could facilitate corruption and malpractices, and thereafter recommends appropriate preventive measures.
- Computer Information System Unit undertakes computerization projects and develops application systems to manage the records and enhance the effectiveness of the Operations Division.
- Plans & Project Unit undertakes various staff work relating to planning projects, operations support and policies. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

It is commonly recognized that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, after Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP took charge of the country, played a vital role of saving Singapore from the dark and degenerated time of corruption and transforming it into one of the world's most effective countries that manage to control and restrain corruption and maintain a clean and transparent government. Singapore placed 5th out of 159 countries on Transparency International's *Corruption Perception Index 2005*. However, we should be aware that the success of anti-corruption in Singapore does not lie on the CPIB alone. Without the strong and strict anti-corruption laws and regulations, the CPIB could never achieve what it achieved.

Prevention of Corruption Act
Chapter 241

The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) was enacted in June 1960, to provide for the more effectual prevention of corruption. The law also empowers CPIB officers to investigate and arrest corrupt offenders. The PCA was amended a few times since its enactment. Through these amendments, punishments for corrupt offenders were enhanced and CPIB officers were given more investigative powers to make the fight against corruption easier. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.)

Under the PCA, the President may appoint an officer to be the Director of the CPIB. The President may also appoint a Deputy Director and such number of assistant directors and special investigators of CPIB as he may deem fit. What is commonly known as a “bribe” is described as a “corrupt gratification” in the PCA. “Gratifications” can take many forms, and they include:

1. money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property or interest in property of any description, whether movable or immovable;
2. any office, employment or contract;
3. any payment, release, discharge of liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability whatsoever, whether in whole or in part;
4. any other service, favor, advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary or penal nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official power or duty; and
5. any offer, undertaking or promise of any gratification within the meaning of paragraphs mentioned above. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c)

Under the PCA, an ‘agent’ means any person employed by or acting for another, and includes a trustee, administrator and executor, and a person serving the Government or under any corporation or public body, and for the purposes of section 8 of PCA includes subcontractor and any person employed by or acting for such subcontractor. On the other hand, the ‘principal’ includes an employer, a beneficiary under a trust, and a trust estate as though it were a person and any person beneficially interested in the estate of a deceased person as though the estate were a person, and in the case of a person serving the Government or a public body includes the Government or the public body, as the case may be. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.)

The anti-corruption law has been reviewed regularly to ensure that offenders do not escape legal punishment and that corruption does not pay. The amendments to the law so far included:

- empowering the court to order offenders to pay a penalty equal to the amount of bribe received apart from punishment in the form of fines and/or imprisonment term
- empowering investigators with wider powers
- rendering it unnecessary to prove that a person who accepted a bribe was in the position to carry out the required favor
- empowering investigators to order public officers under investigation to furnish sworn statements specifying properties belonging to them, their spouses and children
- empowering the public prosecutor to obtain information from the comptroller of income tax
- empowering the court to admit wealth disproportionate to income as corroborative evidence
- empowering the removal of the accomplice rule which views evidence of accomplice as unworthy of credit, unless corroborated
- rendering it a legal obligation to provide information required by investigators of the bureau

- rendering Singapore citizens to be liable for punishment for corrupt offences committed outside Singapore and to be dealt with as if the offences had been committed in Singapore
- creating a new seizable offence of knowingly giving false or misleading information (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.)

The principle that corruption does not pay was further fortified by the enactment of The Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act of 1989. This provides the court with powers to confiscate the pecuniary resources and property which a person convicted of a corruption offence cannot satisfactorily account for. This Act was replaced by the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes, Confiscation of Benefits Act, Chapter 65(A) in 1999. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006c.)

Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act Chapter 65(A)

Under Section 13 of the PCA, when a corrupt offender is convicted, the Court shall also order him to pay a penalty equivalent to the amount of bribes he received. To further make sure that corrupt offenders do not benefit from their criminal conduct, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, Chapter 65(A) was enacted in 1999 to allow the Court to confiscate properties from convicted corrupt offenders, if the said properties are found to be benefits of corruption offences. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

The essence of building clean government lies in the prevention from the institutional level. In order to prevent corruption from happening, the CPIB constantly sums up the loopholes found in the government's policy–implementing process during the investigation of corruption cases and proposes the specific measures and suggestions from the institutional level and the implementation section to prevent corruption. Furthermore, the Congress enacted a series of laws and regulations on the behavior of the civil servants, including the “Civil Service Law”, “instruction manual and the discipline provisions of the Civil Service” and so on to restrain and regulate the civil servants. Besides laws and regulations, there are also administrative measures of

preventing corruption. Several administrative measures were taken to reduce the chances of public officers getting involved in corruption and wrongdoings. These measures included:

- replacing seconded police officers with permanent civilian investigators
- removing opportunity for corruption
- streamlining administrative procedures
- slashing down red tape
- reviewing public officers' salaries to ensure that they are paid adequately
- reminding government contractors at the time of signing that bribing public officers administering the contract can lead to termination of contract (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Also, various preventive measures are in place to reduce opportunities for corruption particularly in the public service that include the following content:

Declaration of Non-Indebtedness. Every public officer is required to declare once a year that he is free from pecuniary embarrassment. An indebted public officer could easily place himself under obligation and be exploited. He is also more likely to succumb to corruption. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Declaration of Assets and Investments. Every public officer is required to declare, when he is first appointed and subsequently annually, his properties and investments in companies, including those of his spouse and dependent children. If the officer owns more than one property that is not in keeping with his salary earnings, he could be queried on how he could have the means to purchase them. If he owns some shares in private companies, he could be asked to divest ownership to prevent a conflict of interest. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Other than the detailed classification of bribery under the "Prevention of Corruption Act", the definition of "receive remuneration" covers a very broad range from money, gifts, securities, properties and any kind of interest to positions, employment or contract and support, relieve, release, discharge of any loans, debt; it also includes any services,

favors and benefits, such as providing protections to be free of punishment, discipline, litigation and so on as well as a variety of implementation delays; it even includes the commitments or promises regarding to the above mentioned remuneration.

The accepting of gifts of the Singapore civil servant is also included in the scope of suspected corruption, and is strictly regulated: First, the civil servant may not accept any gifts, money or other benefits, such as entertainment or free travel and etc. from the public; second, the civil servant, except in case of retirement, shall not accept gifts or entertainment from subordinates.

If to accept the gifts presented by subordinates because of retirement, then he/she must write a report to the head of the department to declare the value of the received gifts etc.; the value of the received gift should not exceed 300 dollars; third, if one cannot refuse or reject the gifts under the special circumstances, then he/she may temporarily keep the gift, and report and hand over the gift to the head of the department afterwards. The officer, however, can retain the gift if he/she pays for it at the value assessed by the Accountant-General; fourth, if to accept the entertainment activity offered by subordinate officers, he/she must report the time and place of the activity, the activity must be appropriate and cannot cost more than 2% of the subordinate office's monthly wage. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Singapore does not take the death penalty as a way to deter and stop corruption, but considers the confiscating of property and imprisonment to be the most severe and effective punishment. In Singapore any person who is convicted of a corruption offence can be fined up to 100,000 Singapore dollars, or sentenced to imprisonment of up to five years or to both. If the offence relates to a government contract or involves a Member of Parliament or a member of a public body, the term of imprisonment can be increased to seven years. Besides the fine and imprisonment, a person convicted of a corruption offence will be ordered by the court to return the amount of the bribe he had accepted in the form of penalty. In addition, the court is also empowered to confiscate the property and pecuniary resources which a convicted person cannot satisfactorily account for. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Section 8 of PCA is a presumption section which states: “Where in any proceedings against a person under section 5 or 6, it is proved that any gratification has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of the Government or any department thereof or of a public body by or from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks to have any dealings with Government or any department thereof or any public body, that gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved.” This effectively shifts the burden to the corrupt offender, who has to prove to the Court that the gratification involved is not given or received corruptly. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

A corrupt public officer may be charged in court if there is enough evidence to do so, or he may be dealt with through departmental disciplinary procedures if there is insufficient evidence for court prosecution. A public officer charged in court for corruption will also lose his job and if he is pensionable, his pension and other benefits. As for departmental disciplinary action, the punishment may include: dismissal from service; reduction in rank; stoppage or deferment of salary increment; fine or reprimand; retirement in public interest. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Tan Kia Gan, then Minister for National Development, was investigated in August 1966 for attempting to help his close businessman friend Lim Tjin Hauw and his son William Lim to clinch the sale of Boeing aircraft to Malaysian Airways. He also acted as an intermediary for his brother-in-law in the sale of a tin mine to Lim. For this, he was given 70,000 shares worth \$1 each. As the witnesses did not want to implicate him, Tan Kia Gan was administratively stripped of all his public appointments by the Government. Teh Cheang Wan, then Minister for National Development, was investigated in 1986 for accepting 2 bribes totaling \$1 million from Hock Tat Development Pte Ltd and Ho Yeow Koon of Keck Seng Pte Ltd in 1981 and 1982 respectively. Hock Tat Development had paid Teh a gratification of \$500,000 after he helped the company to retain a piece of land that was earmarked for acquisition by the Government. Ho Yeow Koon had also given a gratification of \$500,000 to Teh for helping to buy over a piece of State land for private development. Teh committed

suicide before he could be formally charged in court. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

Since corruption is caused by both the incentives and the opportunities to be corrupt, the integrated legal system that includes both the preventive measures and severe punishment has succeeded in reducing the possible corruption opportunities and deter the public officers from being corrupted. Beside the effective CPIB and the integrated legal system, the government leaders' determination to fight against corruption is also a key element that leads to the clean government.

After Independence in 1965, the new political leaders took it upon themselves to set good examples for public officers to follow by divesting themselves from financial and commercial ties and by working harder than their subordinates. In 1979, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister of Singapore stated: "The moment key leaders are less than incorruptible, less than stern in demanding high standards, from that moment the structure of administrative integrity will weaken, and eventually crumble. Singapore can survive only if ministers and senior officers are incorruptible and efficient... Only when we uphold the integrity of the administration can the economy work in a way which enables Singaporeans to clearly see the nexus between hard work and high rewards. Only then will people, foreigners and Singaporeans, invest in Singapore; only then will Singaporeans work to improve themselves and their children through better education and further training, instead of hoping for windfalls through powerful friends and relatives or greasing contacts in the right places." (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006d.)

The Singapore example of successfully curbing corruption is always considered a miracle and is greatly promoted in China. It is believed by most Chinese that the Singaporean way of anti-corruption is the ultimate answer to China's deteriorated corruption problem. And more than 30 years ago, China started to study and analyze the Singaporean experience at home as well as send investigation groups to Singapore to obtain the first-hand information hoping that it would help with the Chinese corruptive situation, some even went so far as to suggest that China should copy the measures such

as building the anti-corruption bureau in China or implementing the high salary approach because they are proven useful in Singapore.

However, those who think that China can just copy and paste whatever works in Singapore, they were mistaken. They only see what is on the surface but not what is within. To achieve what Singapore had achieved, we have to see through the appearance to perceive the essence. Just like the Establishment of the Chinese anti-corruption bureau. China took the form of CPIB but not the essence of it.

The greater investigative powers and deterrent terms against the corrupt under the revamped legislation would be futile if not buttressed by effective enforcement action. “The CPIB strikes fear in the hearts of many Singaporeans, especially those bent on corrupt activities. In the words of an observer, ‘In Singapore bureaucracy, the CPIB is feared as the PAP’s leadership’s all-seeing eye, and respected for its near clockwork efficiency and its sophisticated operational methods.’ The CPIB’s formidable name in Chinese is ‘Foul Greed Investigation Bureau’.” (Quah 1978).

Although the CPIB is responsible to the Prime Minister’s Office, with its own independent and complete investigative powers, it can start the investigation against the government ministers, parliamentarians and other high level officials, even the senior members of the People’s Action Party that are suspected of corruption without reporting to the Prime Minister to get the consent. Of course, as a department under the heads of Prime Minister's Office, the director of CPIB must keep the Prime Minister updated and brief him with the proceedings of the ongoing investigation, but such briefings shall not affect the independence of the investigation the bureau is conducting.

The distinguished feature of CPIB is that it has the completely independent and integrated investigative power which is similar to FBI, Scotland Yard and other independent secret investigative police forces. Notably, the anti-corruption agencies that have the independent and integrated investigative power like CPIB and ICAC (Independent Commission against Corruption) in Hong Kong are not commonly seen in

the world, and both regions are securing a successful and promising performance in the battle against corruption compared to the rest of the world.

The internal relations between the independent power and the superior performance in anti-corruption cannot be ignored or overlooked. In order to ensure the CPIB'S achievement on anti-corruption, Singapore has repeatedly revised and improved the "Prevention of Corruption Act" and other laws, so that the corruption Investigation Bureau can independently exercise their powers to execute their duties without the interference from the police force or other state departments.

All special investigators of CPIB are issued with certificates of appointment (similar to the warrant cards used by some local law enforcement agencies). CPIB officers may exercise the following powers of investigation:

- Powers of Arrest under Section 15 of the PCA

The Director or any special investigator may without a warrant arrest any person who has been concerned in any offence under this Act or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. The Director or a special investigator arresting a person may search such person and take possession of all articles found upon him which there is reason to believe were the fruits or other evidence of the crime, provided that no female shall be searched except by a female. Every person so arrested shall be taken to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau or to a police station. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

- Powers of Investigation under Section 17 of the PCA

In cases relating to the commission: of an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code, or under sections 213, 214 and 215 of the Penal Code, or of any conspiracy to commit, or of any attempt to commit, or of any abetment of such an offence; of an offence under this Act; or of any sizable offence under any written law which may be disclosed in the course of an investigation under this Act. CPIB officer is empowered to exercise all or

any of the powers in relation to police investigations into any offence given by the Criminal Procedure Code. (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

- Powers of Search and Seizure under Section 22 of the PCA

Director, CPIB may, by warrant directed to any CPIB officer, empower them to enter any place by force if necessary and to search, seize and detain any document, article or property relating to the commission of any corruption offence, or a conspiracy/attempt to commit or an abetment of any such offence. If the CPIB officer has reasonable grounds to believe that any delay in obtaining the search warrant is likely to frustrate the object of the search, he may exercise the powers of search mentioned above without a search warrant. (Corrupt practices Investigation Bureau 2006b.)

China's anti-corruption agencies have been developed for 20 years, in which contained three stages: the first stage was the launch of a pilot project in local government. In 1989, the first Anti-Corruption Bureau was set up in Guangdong Province under the Guangdong Provincial People's Procuratorate; the second stage was the establishment of General Bureau of Anti-corruption and Bribery under the Supreme People's Procuratorate in November 1995; the third stage was the establishment of Anti-Corruption Bureau under all levels the Procuratorates nationwide.

The main task of the anti-corruption bureau at all levels is to undertake investigation or detection of corruption offences. If the investigated is proven guilty of corruption offences after the investigation, prosecution is made by the public prosecution department of the Procurator and then sentenced by the court of justice. Chapter VIII (Graft and Bribery) of Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China provisions that Anti-Corruption Bureau all levels is responsible for the detection or investigation of following offences: corruption, embezzlement of public funds, accepting bribes, offering bribes, introducing bribes, large amount of properties with unidentified sources, concealing of the offshore deposits, illegal possession of state assets and confiscated properties.

In order to investigate and handle the above mentioned corruption offences, Anti-Corruption Bureau at all levels can exercise the following six major powers: first, to collect and identify the facts of the case and obtain the necessary documentary evidence, material evidence; second, to question witnesses and suspects; third, to inquire, freeze bank deposits and accounts; forth, to search the body, procession, home and other places of the suspected offenders and those who are suspected of withholding the evidence and detain the related articles and documents, mail, telegram, etc.; fifth, to investigate and examine the places, articles, people etc. related to the offence; sixth, to carry out the coercive measure against the offenders such as summon by force, residential surveillance, bail, detention, arrest and so on in accordance with the law.

In the 20 years of exploration and development, the anti-corruption bureau has achieved some results. On March 11, 2010, at the first plenary meeting of the Third Session of the Fourth National People's Congress, Cao Jianming, attorney-general of the Supreme People's Procuratorate revealed in the Work Report of the Supreme People's Procuratorate that the Supreme People's Procuratorate had put on record and investigated 32,429 cases of taking advantage of duty, among which 18,191 cases were major cases involved with corruption; 3175 cases of severe malfeasance, 2670 county-levelled cadres, 204 bureau-levelled cadres and 8 provincial levelled cadres were investigate and dealt with accordingly. From these figures mentioned above, it is no exaggeration to say that the anti-corruption bureau had played an important part on anti-corruption.

However, despite the result the bureau had achieved, China still faces the challenges of improving the case-handling quality of the anti-corruption bureau as well as the grim corruption situation. The reasons to these challenges are complicated not only because of the mechanisms, but also the constraint from the lack of qualified human resources. But the fundamental reason is the constraint from the current employed mechanism.

Below is a demonstration of one survey conducted online about the public's perception on the Chinese anti-corruption bureau. The survey is between the anti-corruption agencies in Mainland China and Hong Kong.

Table 2. How trustworthy is the Chinese anti-corruption bureau considered by people? (Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007).

| Options | Keys | Number of answers | Percentage of answers | Graph |
|------------------------------|------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| 100% | ■ | 40 | 4% | |
| 80-99% | ■ | 120 | 11% | |
| 60-79% | ■ | 221 | 21% | |
| 30-59% | ■ | 225 | 21% | |
| 10-29% | ■ | 157 | 15% | |
| 1-9% | ■ | 62 | 6% | |
| Just another corrupted organ | ■ | 229 | 21% | |

Table 3. How many divisions do you know there are in Chinese anti-corruption bureau? (Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007).

| Options | Keys | Number of answers | percentage of answers | Graph |
|--|------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Don't know | ■ | 523 | 49% | |
| Similar to CPIB | ■ | 164 | 15% | |
| The bureau is only fighting corruption not preventing it | ■ | 166 | 15% | |
| Same as above and failed to teach people not to be corrupted | ■ | 202 | 19% | |
| Don't want to know, it is useless | ■ | 3 | 0% | |
| Too many and none is doing their job | ■ | 15 | 1% | |

Table 4. How many points does the Chinese anti-corruption bureau get in general sense? (Zhi ji zhi bi, 2007).

| Options | Keys | Number of answers | Percentage of answers | Graph |
|---------|------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| 100 | ■ | 28 | 3% | |
| 80-99 | ■ | 82 | 8% | |
| 60-79 | ■ | 211 | 20% | |
| 40-59 | ■ | 240 | 22% | |
| 20-39 | ■ | 177 | 16% | |
| 1-19 | ■ | 136 | 13% | |
| 0 | ■ | 141 | 13% | |

From table two, we can see that people's attitude towards the trustworthiness of the anti-corruption bureau is quite different. 221 people think that the bureau is 60-79% trustworthy which takes one fifth of the total number of answers, another one fifth of the people who answered the survey think that it is 30-59% trustworthy and 229 people consider the bureau completely untrustworthy and see it as another corrupted organ. Majority of the answerers hold a negative attitude towards the bureau, which suggests that the bureau failed to build its reputation among the public.

Table three shows that the structure of the anti-corruption bureau remains a secret to almost half of the people who answered the questionnaire. It is no wonder that the people in China have absolutely no idea about the anti-corruption bureau since there is little information about it. Only in newspapers, could the people see the mentioning of the anti-corruption bureau and its working performance in figures. The information about how the bureau is working, how it is structured and what the functions of its divisions are remain unknown to the public.

Table four indicates that up to 64% of answerers think that the Chinese anti-corruption bureau scored unfavorably in general sense in the 0-100 scale. However, 20% of the

answerers reckon that it is above average means that there still are people in China who believe in the bureau and recognize its effort on fight against corruption which shows that the bureau is not a complete disaster.

The lack of independence and supervision of the anti-corruption bureau in China will make the bureau another bureaucratic agency with no credibility and integrity among the public if the adjustment such as separating the anti-corruption bureau from the Procuratorial system to ensure the anti-corruption agencies and the current administrative system cannot be assured.

Check and balance of power

One reason that Singapore succeeded in curbing corruption is because of the cooperation and division of labor between the CPIB, Attorney-General's Chambers and the District Courts according to different jurisdiction. While the Bureau has the main responsibility for investigating cases of corruption, the Attorney-General, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister (Article 35[1] of the Constitution), is also the Public Prosecutor and, as such, is vested with the power to institute, conduct or discontinue proceedings for any offence (Article 35[8] of the Constitution).

The Attorney-General is independent in this role and not subject to the control of the government. The Attorney-General heads the Attorney-General's Chambers of Singapore, which is divided into five divisions. Of these, the Criminal Justice Division is the organizational extension of the Attorney-General's role as Public Prosecutor and, as such, advises on and prosecutes criminal cases as well as exercises the Attorney-General's control and direction of criminal prosecutions by directing law enforcement agencies in their investigations. In order for a prosecution to be instituted based on an investigation conducted by the CPIB, the consent of the Public Prosecutor must be sought (POCA, Section 33).

In addition to this, the Public Prosecutor can grant the Director and special investigators of the CPIB or any police at or above the rank of assistant superintendent special

powers of investigation, including investigating bank and other types of accounts (POCA, Subsection 18[1]) as well as, by order, authorize the CPIB to exercise the powers of a police investigation in the case of any type of offence (POCA, Section 19). The Public Prosecutor also has the power to order the inspection, by the CBIP, of bankers' books (also of the spouse, children or others who may have acted as his/her agent) (POCA, Subsection 20[1]). Section 21 gives the Public Prosecutor further powers to request information on the resources and property of the accused and his/her family and associates, including ordering the Comptroller of Income Tax to provide any information on offenders that it has in its possession (POCA, Section 21). Offences under the POCA fall under the jurisdiction of the District Courts, which try the cases and determine punishment following a conviction (POCA, Section 34).

The POCA further provides that, during any trial or inquiry by a court into an offence under the POCA, the failure of an accused person to account for acquisition of resources or property shall be seen as corroborating that the accused has made these acquisitions through corrupt practices (Subsection 24[1]). When a defendant is convicted of a serious offence, the court shall, on the application of the Public Prosecutor, issue a confiscation order of any means which are considered to have been acquired through criminal activity (CBA, Subsection 5[1]). (Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption—A Comparative Study 2005.)

From above, it is clear that although CPIB is independent with the power of investigation, arrest and search and seizure, in order to make sure that its power is appropriately used and counterbalanced, two measures are carried out: first, the CPIB does not have the right of prosecution and conviction of the suspected offenders. Prosecution is done by the Attorney-General's Chambers, while the conviction is done by the courts. Therefore, the rate of successful prosecution and conviction is the goal that the CPIB is chasing after. From 2000 to 2004, the CPIB is responsible for the rate of cases being convicted as high as 96.7%, 94.8%, 99.1%, 98.7% and 97.1% respectively. Second, if the corruption occurs within the bureau and the staff is suspected of corruption, the investigation, although also carried out by the CPIB, the

involving officer must be suspended as well as the director of the bureau. (The 23rd study group of party school of the CPC to Singapore 2008.)

Another approach that caught the attention of the Chinese is what is called the High Salary Nourishing a Clean Government approach in China. It is believed by some people that this approach is responsible for building the clean government in Singapore since the prime Minister and ministers in Singapore government have the world's highest annual salary and the Singapore government is one of the cleanest governments in the world, and that it is absolutely going to be helpful in China as well. The reason that they deem the approach useful is as follows:

The previous planned economy systems that China had for almost 30 years had led to the egalitarianism which constrains people's motivation of performing better and more efficient, the complete equality in every level of the society makes it no different of how well you do. Everyone was getting the same pay no matter of self-performance had made people lose the spirit of compete and being outstanding that also made people disappointed and dissatisfied about their jobs. When the monthly pay is fixed and not satisfying, it is normal for people with the recourses to look for other ways for more material compensations by illegal conducts such as accept briberies, misuse of public fund, nepotism and so on so that they can maximize their profit while have the power to do so. So the approach of nourishing a clean government by high salary has its positive effect, and, to some extent, will help to resist the corruption.

The high salary for nourishing a clean government also manifests a concept of the prevention of corruption, the idea of preventing job-related crimes which is quite important when fighting corruption. If the government only takes actions after corruption has happened and not paying any attention on preventing them from happening, the situation would never be improved. People tend to focus on the anti-corruption afterwards instead of preventing corruption beforehand. The war against corruption is not something that can be done in the short period of time but in a long run, if the government can provide a clean environment so that the actions of corruption would never have the opportunity to occur in the first place, it would be much easier for

us to see the progress that have been made about anti-corruption then only punishing the corrupted public servants after been exposed.

As said above, the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean government is, to some extent, expediency with positive effect on fighting corruption. It respects the human nature of being an economic man struggling for what is best for them, which is quite human, and it focuses on the prevention of the corruption rather than just thinking of a countermeasure after the corruption has been done. In these senses, the approach of high salary for nourishing a clean government is a very unique and advanced solution for mitigating the serious situation of corruption in the public sector in China.

Before any conclusions are drawn, let's go back to the source where this approach comes from and take a good look at the reality in Singapore.

Singapore is world renown for its high salary among the government officials. By the year of 2000, the annual salary for the Prime Minister of Singapore was 1.94 million Singapore dollars (1 U.S. dollar=1.3 Singapore dollar), Minister is 1.42 million, other top officials is about 1.1 million Singapore dollars, Permanent Secretary is 600000–700000 SGD, middle-ranking officials for a bit over 100 thousands Singapore dollars.

Although it appears that the Prime Minister of Singapore is having the world's highest annual salary, there are two facts that should be observed: first, the amount of officials who get one million dollar annual salary stand a very small proportion of the entire public servant population, the estimated number is about 30; second, the salary is all that the Singaporean government offers, ministers (including the Prime Minister) are not equipped with special transportations or full-time drivers, they have to go to work with their own cars, only with grand public events, should they get the free ride from the Government sent vehicles. They need to pay taxes, and have no government-provided pension and medical insurance; everything has to be paid by themselves with the government paid salary.

If a minister fails in the general election, he loses everything. The salary of Minister seems high, but this is all they get. They don't have any other income in any forms, nor do they have any special treatment. They have to buy the houses in the market just like anybody else which is unimaginable in China. According to Singapore's overall wealth, the material benefit that the Singapore government officials obtain from their positions is not huge. The salary standard of the Prime Minister and Minister is calculated carefully. It is to take the median salary of six highest occupations such as bankers, accountants, engineers, lawyers, local businessmen and senior executives of multinational corporations. Therefore, although the salary seems to be extremely high, it is in fact matches the development of the nation.

The reason that the senior civil servants, especially senior government officials in Singapore enjoy such a high salary is not because the government believes that it nourishes a clean government, but because it is a strategy to attract and retain qualified personnel both from abroad and at home and to keep the talented personnel to willingly offer a long-term service in the government. As a matter of fact, in Singapore, the "clean government" appeared before the "high salary".

During the time of British colonial, the public servants were having favorable salaries but the corruption was no way near controlled. After the independence of Singapore, facing the troubled national economy and the depraved corruption situation, Lee Kuan Yew decided to lower the civil servants' salary so that they could strive with the people to overcome the difficulties together. It is only after the take-off of the national economy in 1973, 8 years later, that the salary of the public officials was gradually increased. (Cai Dingjian 2009.)

Now the truth has been told, we can be aware that the high salary does not necessarily lead to the clean government. But as a measure to attract and hold on the talented people to work for the government so that everyone could benefit from it, it is important for the Chinese government to employ this approach to somehow improve the current corruption situation. However, if China really determines to do so, then the following considerations must be taken into account beforehand in order to avoid yet another disappointment of the Singaporean experience:

First, the increasing of the salary of the public servant concerns the interest of many sensitive aspects of society, in which sense cannot be achieved immediately but gradually and step by step. Gradual process in fact is a continuous exploration and learning, continuous feedback and testing process. Policy makers must adjust the policy objectives to achieve satisfactory results based on the existing conditions and means and drawing on the previous knowledge and experiences. The gradual reform is conducive to social stability, and can avoid significant risks and serious mistakes brought by policy-induced changes before any major losses.

Second, Salary increase must be parallel with institutional reform in order to improve the incentive mechanism through competition by increased wages. Redundancy problem that the Chinese government is facing now is yet another obstacle to civil servants' pay rise because with such a huge number of staff in the system, it is extremely difficult to increase the average income of the public servants. By the year 2002, there were about 8 million civil servants in China, if they are paid 200 RMB more for each one of them on a monthly basis, it would be 1.6 billion extra expenses every month for the central government (Cai Dingjian 2009). So the wage increase should be supported by the administrative reform that only those who are competent remain, those who do not reach the standard should be cleared out so that the government can be efficient and clean.

Third, when fighting against corruption, it was discovered that the lower-leveled officials in the government have more opportunities in reducing the rate of corruption from being happening, but lack the stimulation to do so, and the senior officials, on the contrary, have more stimulation but less opportunities (Cai Dingjian 2009). So the increasing of wage as a stimulation to the middle or low-leveled officials to resist the corruption is theoretically doable. Another step is concerned with the welfare, such as pension or margin or any kind of insurance that was guaranteed with the position one holds. The measure of taking away all the job related welfare of the officers who are detected of having the corruptive behaviors would make corruption a much riskier activity to conduct for government officers when facing the lure of corruption which in turn would reduce the chances of them being corrupted.

We have discussed the reason why some people think that the “high salary” approach can be adopted in China and how to initiate the first moves, now it is the time to discuss whether it is a smart move.

The respect of human nature as economically motivated is the strong point as well as drawback of the approach of nourishing a clean government by high salary. It is true that the approach is humane enough to respect that all human have the right to pursue the maximum interest, but if we just indulge people to do so, keep on fulfilling people’s material needs, there could never be an end to this need. Though we try to convince ourselves that human are naturally moral and humble, it is unrealistic and often in vain to think that by preaching morality and conscience or by imposing the pressure of being publicly criticized, we can transform the never satisfying economic man into the selfless, dedicated “moral model” who can fight the greediness, the desire of wanting more rooted within by knowing when to stop.

Like the black hole in the space that is so powerful that nothing, not even the light can escape from it when passing by, the economic nature of human is somewhat like it with strong gravitational field of greed in the centre that no matter how many things it captures, there would never be a day that it could be fulfilled completely. There are always more things to have, more money to get, more power to hold. From the human perspective, selfishness, profligacy and greed are in our genes and cannot be eradicated, but only curbed by laws or other institutionalized rational powers. Simply put, if we hope to put an end to corruption only by offering more money, it is naïve and even absurd to believe that people’s moral character and conscience will be inspired by this mean solely that it would eventually overcome the selfish desires and restrain the obediently hand over the illegal gains.

Besides, the approach is not broadly supported by the masses of people in China, especially the under-developed people in the remote regions. The National Bureau of Statistics issued a report showing that by the end of the year 2006, there were approximately 0.577 billion people who lived in the city of main land China and about 0.737 billion rural population, among which there were over 23.65 million people still

living in absolute poverty with annual income less than 683 RMB per person. China ranks 104 of the average per capita gross domestic product ranking in 2007 though its ranking of world GDP is the third place which indicates that the majority of Chinese population is still struggling for food and clothing.

Although the living conditions of those who live in the rural area have increased dramatically over the past 30 years of development, there still are a lot of problems concerning their social security system such as pension and health care. Under the circumstances mentioned above, it is extremely unacceptable and unfair for those who barely have the money to feed their families to agree to apply the high salary policy to those who already have redundant resources only in the sense of making them do their job while maintaining clean and honest. I believe that only after the quality and the living standards of the entire nation are improved can the theory of high salary for clean government be truly accepted by people and function well when applied in China. (China Popin 2007.)

5. CONCLUSION

As one of the countries in the world that have a clean government, there is no doubt that Singapore has found the right way to battle with corruption. This right way consists of a comprehensive legal system, the check and balance of power, a professional and independent law enforcement institution and so on. The Singaporean success of curbing corruption and building a clean government is no miracle. Through a combination of the above mentioned factors, Singapore figured out its own unique way to fight against corruption according to the historical conditions, current administrative system and condition of the country that formed Singapore. By looking into the nature of the Singaporean experience and the corruption theory about the causation of corruption, we can see that Singapore succeeded in containing corruption and building the clean government because they have a conscious perception with full awareness of the source where corruption stems from, and with this full awareness, they constructed the corresponding countermeasure.

Corruption is more likely to flourish in an organization that does not have a wide range of rules, regulations or policies that guide employees in their work. Similarly, a country must have clear policies and legislation that guide the behavior of all its people including the public servants. However, without a reasonable balance in terms of policies and legislation, corruption would find fertile ground in a country that has numerous laws, rules and regulations.

Singapore enacted Prevention of Corruption Act and Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act as the leading legislation of anti-corruption. Beside these two, there are also laws and regulations that regulate the behavior of civil servants. Singapore put a lot of efforts on constructing a strict and rigid legal system. Together with intensive supervision power and severe punishment measures, they have formed a relatively complete legal system. Through practices over the time, the amendments of the laws and regulations are constantly formulated and enacted which ensure the co-development of the legal system through time in correspondence with the changing national and international environment. By doing so,

the corruption is always controlled within the certain framework and the chance that corruption would come back in Singapore is reduced to the minimum.

The situation in China is quite complicated. As introduced before, the Chinese government as well as its leaders in different times always considered corruption as the most urgent matter to be dealt with after the establishment of New China. In Mao's time, he emphasized the importance of anti-corruption, and launched several campaigns against corruption that did have a short-period of effectiveness, but it did not occur to him that the strict and comprehensive legislation system is the fundamental stepping point of anti-corruption. Deng Xiaoping, after taking over the power in the country and the Party from Mao, was too caught up by the idea of developing the economy of the nation.

He did a splendid job on boosting China's economy and creating a better livelihood for the people, but by doing so, the anti-corruption was often compromised. In his theory, the principal is to promote reform and opening up to the outside world and at the same time strengthen the construction of the legal system in the process of fighting against corruption and anti-corruption should always be conducted on the basis of economical construction. Though Deng realized the importance of strengthening and completing the construction of legal system to fight against corruption, the fact is that the legal provision regarding corruption can be found in the Criminal Law of People's republic of China and other laws and regulations, China till now still do not have specialized and professional anti-corruption laws.

Corruption is also commonly found where there is no transparency in an organization, if the one organization's tasks and functions are conducted in secret and are not open to examination by other government officers or the public, the opportunity for corruption increases. Transparency is a prerequisite for democracy in which sovereignty is vested in the people and the conduct of civil servants must be open to examination.

Singapore does a god job on this issue as well. The government and its organizations as well as the laws and regulations are informatized with the open websites that its tasks

and functions and performances are accessible for the public to inspect and supervise. Also, “press responsibility” is emphasized in Singapore and the media is seen as the important part of nation–building instead of checks and balances on political power. The government does not directly interfere with the operations of media. When accusations are made by the media towards government issues, the government does not block, bury or silence the media who made the accusations, but actively exposes and fully discloses the problem to the public. If the accusation is authentic, it is often dealt with strictly and publicly, if it is not, detailed explanations are giving to the public as well.

In China, things are different. China does have open websites of the government and some of the organizations, however, the information that is open for people to review and check is often selected. The whole truth is seldom revealed to the public. Besides, it is not secret in China that the government controls the media in the name of stabilizing the society by blocking troublesome information. As to what kind of information is considered dangerous that could threaten the order of the society and to what extent should the public be informed with the government issues still remain unknown, not only to the people but also to the government itself.

The internal or external institutions or bodies that investigate cases of corruption or that act on complaints relating to corruption is vital for they are responsible for making corruption a high risk activity. If such institutions are missing, people may take advantage of the fact that the chance of being caught doing something corrupt is remote, and corruption would be unstoppable.

The famous CPIB in Singapore is one of the watchdog institutions. It is so powerful and effective on fighting against corruption that it is considered one of the most valuable experiences of anti–corruption that may benefit other countries if adopted well.

China took this experience into practice and built anti–corruption bureaus within the procuratorial system at all levels. The Chinese anti–corruption bureau is useful in fighting against corruption in China but the result is not as impressive as CPIB. And

because of the non-transparent tradition of Chinese government, most people do not have a clear concept of its functions and operational approaches. Another reason that the Chinese anti-corruption bureau is not very successful is because it is not as independent as CPIB.

Just as Caiden and Gould suggested respectively in their studies, in order to curb corruption effectively, the combination of the following should be assured before any expected anti-corruption results appears: codes that construct trustworthy leadership and the public servants' integrity; tougher laws and enforcement; Systemic, Structural, and Policy Change; a free press; an anti-corruption Agency; a transparent government and so on. The answer to the question of why Singapore succeeded and China failed can be drawn from above. Singapore, as analyzed before, possess most of the acquired factors. China, on the other hand, is not.

Beside the CPIB, what the Chinese call the approach of high salary nourishing a clean government is another experience that China is thinking of adopting because some people believe that there is a positive connection between the high salary of the Singapore public servants and the world's top clean government that Singapore is having. Reason of why people think that high salary can lead to clean government is that corruption can be attributed to the low salaries of civil servants.

It may be true that it is more difficult to stay honest, hard-working and trustworthy on a low salary, but it is also true that most people with low salaries are still able to do so and that many corrupt officials are people in high, responsible positions, earning good salaries. In conjunction, corrupt practices flourish in systems where employees have high job security; where the level of professionalism in the public service is low; and hence officials rather serve their own interests than perform their duty to serve the public. Singapore government uses the high salary as a measure to attract talents to serve in the government and the country, not as a means to keep people from being corrupted. Thus, if China still wishes to apply the high salary approach, the changes of the civil servant system and the legal system should be achieved beforehand so that the

high salary will be seen as an incentive for public servants to be free of corruption instead of the reason to be corrupted because they want more.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Ali, Muhammed (2000). Eradicating Corruption–The Singaporean Experience. Paper presented at the Seminar on International Experiences on Good Governance and Fighting Corruption, Bangkok.
- Cai Dingjian (2005). What should we learn from Singapore? Available 27 March: http://www.cyol.net/zqb/content/2005-11/09/content_1200680.htm
- Caiden, E. Gerald and Naomi, J. Caiden (1977). Administrative corruption. *Public Administration Review*. 37: 3, 301
- Caiden, Gerald E. (1980). Public Maladministration and Bureaucratic Corruption Article presented at the Conference on Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Government, University of Pittsburgh.
- Caiden, Gerald.E. (1999). Dealing with Administrative corruption. In Terry Cooper L. (ed.) *Handbook of Administrative Ethics*. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
- Cao Jianmin (2010). Work Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Available 23 April 2010: <http://news.qq.com/a/20100311/003447.htm>.
- China Popin (2007). Available 12 March: http://www.cpirc.org.cn/news/rkxw_gn_detail.asp?id=8180.
- Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (2006a). Available 15 March: http://app.cpiib.gov.sg/cpiib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=147.
- Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (2006b). Available 15 March: http://app.cpiib.gov.sg/cpiib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=237.
- Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (2006c). Available 15 March: http://app.cpiib.gov.sg/cpiib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=237.

v.sg/cpib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=203.

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (2006d). Available 15 March: http://app.cpib.gov.sg/cpib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=203.

Country Studies (2007). U.S. Library of Congress. Available 22 March: <http://countrystudies.us/singapore/3.htm>.

East Asian Institute (2008). Available 13 March: http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Profile_&_Objectives.htm.

Edevbaro, Daniel Osakponmwun (1998). *The Political Economy of Corruption and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Focus Singapore Available 21 March: <http://www.focussingapore.com/information-singapore/singapore-population.html>.

Friedrich, Carl J. (1966). Political Pathology. *The Political Quarterly* 37: 70–85.

Gibbons Kenneth M. (1985). Towards an Attitudinal Definition of Corruption: Evidence from a Survey of Canadian University Students. Paper given at the 1985 International Political Science Congress, Paris.

Gould David J. (1991). Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Causes, and Remedial Strategies. In A. Farazmand (ed.) *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (1970). The Context of Analysis in Heidenheimer (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption—A Comparative Study (2005). United Nations Development Programme Democratic Governance Practice Team UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok.

Johnston, Michael (2004). Keeping the Answers, Changing the Questions: Corruption Definitions Revisited.

Klitgaard, Robert (1988). Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mo Zhixu (2010). High salary for nourishing a clean government is a myth. Available 7 February: <http://star.news.sohu.com/20100105/n269386707.shtml>.

Myrdal, Gunnar (1968). Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nation Corruption: Its Causes and Effects. New York: Twentieth Century.

Ni xing & lijing Wang (2004). The measurement of China's current corruption situation and the estimation of its outcome. New China Abstracts 3: 2004.

Nye, Joseph (1967). Corruption and Political Development: A Cost–Benefit Analysis. American Political Science Review 61:2, 417–427.

Peters, John G., and Welch Susan (1978). Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory. American Political Science Review 72: 155–168.

Prime Minister's Office Singapore (2009). Available 17 March: <http://www.pmo.gov.sg/News/Speeches/Minister+Mentor/MM+Lee+at+Speak+Mandarin+Campaign+launch.html>.

Quah, Jon S.T. (1978). Administrative and Legal Measures for Combating Corruption in Singapore. Singapore: Chopmen.

- Quah, Jon S.T. (2003). *Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study of Six Countries*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press
- Record Office of Singapore (2009). Available 12 March: <http://www.sginsight.com/xjp/index.php?id=3423>.
- Rogow, Arnold and Harold, Lasswell (1970). *The Definition of Corruption*. In Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.) *Political Corruption: Reading in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Holt, Rinehar and Winston, Inc.
- Scott, James C. (1972). *Comparative Political Corruption*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice–Hall.
- Shao Jingjun (2009). *The Brief Anti–corruption History of New China*. Beijing: the Press of Chinese communist party history. Available on 12 February: http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/index_104906.html
- Singapore (1994). Available 14 March: <http://asnic.utexas.edu/countries/singapore/Singapore–History.html>.
- Stechina, Viviana (2008). *Conditions for Corruption: Institutions, Executive Power, and Privatization in Argentina and Chile in the 1990s*. Uppsala: University Printers.
- The 23rd study group of party school of the CPC to Singapore (2008). Available 16 April: http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2008–02/07/content_7579464.htm.
- Transparency International (2008). *Global Corruption Report 2008*. Available 28 March: <http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2008.html>.
- Transparency International (2009). Available 13 March 2010: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/cpi2009/cpi_2009_table.

Transparency International FAQ. Available 24 March 2010: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq.

United Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy (2001) Available 25 March: <http://www.unhabitat.org/cdrom/TRANSPARENCY/html/toc.html>

Word Menu 1992. New York: Random House.

Zero Tolerance for Corruption (2008a). Available 25 April: http://www.anticorruption.info/corr_def.php.

Zero Tolerance for Corruption (2008b). Available 12 April: http://www.anticorruption.info/other_defs.php.

Zero Tolerance for Corruption (2008c). Available 12 April: <http://www.anticorruption.info/forms.php>.

Zero Tolerance for Corruption (2008d). Available 12 April: <http://www.anticorruption.info/causes.php>.

Zhi ji zhi bi (2007). Available 27 March: http://www.zhijizhibi.com/op_FullResultReport!questionnaireid_100051553!charttype_3!pi_-1.html?scroll=2.

Legislative and Normative Acts:

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. Available 2 April: <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg>

Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A) Act 29 of 1992 as amended up to 2004 (CBA). Available 25 February: <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg>

Penal Code (Cap. 224) Act 4 of 1871 as amended up to 1998. Available 1 May: <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg>

Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 251) Ordinance 39 of 1960 as amended up to 2002 (POCA). Available 1 May: <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg>

