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Forms of Network Governance for the European Trade Union Federations

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Abstract

By concentrating on the problem of the existence of different interests and agendas among the affiliates of the European Trade Union Federations (ETUFs) and their role vis-à-vis their national trade union affiliates, this chapter applies power resources theory and network governance approach to study their governance structures and tries to identify different governance forms they have adopted by bringing forth the problem of the existence of different interests and agendas among their affiliates. The network governance approach focuses on the structure of collective action, where the organisations are seen as a governed networks of organisations by explaining network outcomes through governance arrangements i.e. coordination mechanisms, processes and practices developed by network members at different levels of interaction. There are three forms of network governance based on goal-consensus: shared governance, lead organization governance and network administrative organisation models.

ETUFs function as network administrators responsible for mediation and coordination. By showing, how ETUFs are able to establish a joint policy-direction amid diverging interests of the affiliates from different countries, when these organisations do not have the possibility to coordinate or push through such decisions themselves allows for discussing the role of the ETUFs and their affiliates from a network governance perspective.

Keywords

network governance; power resources; network coordination; European trade union federations; coordination of collective bargaining

Short biography OLD

The author holds a PhD in sociology from University of Vienna and is currently Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Tampere University Faculty of Management and Business (MAB) in Finland. His research interests are on both European-level industrial relations systems and organisational structures as well as national health care systems and he has frequently applied organisational analysis and social network analysis in his research. The author has recently been involved research projects on wage-setting strategies in European countries and different social and health care reform projects in Finland.

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Introduction

Network governance approach combines market, hierarchy, and relational forms of coordination (Provan & Kenis 2008) by focusing on an interplay between actors within an organisational field, where their roles differ based on the external institutional conditions of the field that in turn affect the mode of governance. This approach draws from both sociology and organisational studies by using the network organisation as the unit of analysis and focusing on the structure of collective action (Powell et al. 2005) in order to be able to explain network outcomes through different governance arrangements. These include coordination mechanisms, processes and practices developed by network members at different levels of interaction (Moretti 2017, 12). While methodologically not strictly social network analysis, the network governance approach follows it theoretically by focusing on roles and positions of actors in an organisational network structure.

Network governance approach has been applied very seldom in industrial relations research and the few examples have concentrated on global production networks (c.f. Helfen & Fichter 2016; Sydow & Windeler 2004) or global value networks (e.g. Helfen et al. 2018). Research on European trade union federations (ETUFs) recently has been mostly about their role within the European polity in representing the interests of their affiliates vis-à-vis decision-makers at European-level either more generally (e.g. Müller & Platzer 2020) or by looking at particular cleavages within the EUs' multilevel system of employment regulation (Seeliger & Wagner 2016) and their power resources (Müller & Platzer 2017).

With only a few notable exceptions (e.g. Gajewska 2009; Hyman 2001), most of the previous research on national trade unions in the European arena has focused on either only a few trade unions or has presented only a general view without specifying how they aim to influence EU policies. Similarly, most of the research has focused on trade unions' influence over specific institutional applications, most notably social dialogue through the ETUC or sectoral social dialogue under the ETUFs mandate (e.g. Kaeding & Obholzer 2012; Keller & Weber 2011) or ad hoc processes such as opposing the Bolkenstein services directive that threatened the European social model (e.g. Bernaciak 2011) or harsh austerity measures during the financial crisis (e.g. Varga 2015; Bernaciak et al. 2014). The main strategic focus of national trade unions at the European-level has been lobbying EU legislation and policies (Bieler & Schulten 2008, 239) using their institutional mandate, while the collaborative emphasis has manifested itself through different networks of trade unions.

Relying primarily on expert interviews with the actors in the field representing both the ETUFs and their affiliates alongside official documents, this chapter applies network governance approach and power resource theory to discuss the differences in ETUFs' policy scope and organisational structure by bringing forth the problem of the existence of different interests and agendas among their affiliates and, hence, the need to oversee the direction of different policy issues. This way, ETUFs are seen more as governed networks of organisations that also provide a platform for their affiliates to deliberate and coordinate on policy issues on the European level. Understanding, how ETUFs go about creating and controlling a joint policy-direction in the face of diverging interests and agendas of the affiliates from different countries, when these organisations do not have the possibility to coordinate or push through such decisions themselves, allows for discussing the role of the ETUFs vis-à-vis their affiliates from a network governance perspective.

Understanding the Role of European Trade Union Federations through Power Resources

Throughout the history of European integration, the development of industrial relations at the European-level has always followed the institutional processes undertaken at the political-level. Starting from the creation of European Steel and Coal Community in 1952 to the creation of single market through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and reaching the climax with the introduction of single currency, the Europeanisation of industrial relations and especially of trade union cooperation has adapted to the political integration in Europe. The first sectoral ETUFs were formed in the late 1950's and after several mergers throughout the years there are currently 10 of them (Table 1) excluding the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) that represents the national confederations in Europe.

Table 1. European Trade Union Federations (2021)

Name of the ETUF	Founding year	Merger of / Predecessor	Total number of members in the national trade union affiliates represented	National trade union affiliates
EAEA (<i>European Arts and Entertainment Alliance</i>)*	2001	UNI-MEI, IFA, FIM	600 000	150
EuroCOP (<i>European Confederation of Police</i>)	2002	UISP	230 000	27
EFBWW / FETBB (<i>European Federation of Building and Woodworkers</i>)	1958		2 000 000	73
EFFAT (<i>European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions</i>)	2000	ECF-IUF, EFA	2 600 000	112
EFJ / FEJ (<i>European Federation of Journalists</i>)	1994		320 000	72
IndustriAll (<i>European Federation for Industry and Manufacturing workers</i>)	2012	EMF, EMCEF, ETUF-TCL	7 000 000	180
EPSU (<i>European Federation of Public Service Unions</i>)	1978		8 000 000	270
ETF (<i>European Transport Workers' Federation</i>)	1999	FST, ITF	5 000 000	230
ETUCE / CSEE (<i>European Trade Union Committee for Education</i>)	1977		11 000 000	132
UNI-Europa (<i>European trade union federation for services and communication</i>)*	2001	FIET, EGF, MEI	7 000 000	272

* Part of UNI Global Union

Networks give birth to different forms of institutional organisations and these provide actors with power resources, i.e. means to control their environment to achieve desired ends. In applying the power resources theory (e.g. Haipeter & Dörre 2011; Schmalz & Dörre 2014) that distinguishes four different but partly mutually dependent sources of power - economic-structural power, communicative power, organisational power and institutional power - Müller & Platzer (2017) observed how compared to their national affiliates that are tightly embedded in the national industrial relations institutional setting and are, hence, powerful actors on their own, ETUFs' economic-structural power resources are weakly developed as they are part of the European institutional field and are therefore essentially dependent on the structural power resources

of their affiliates, while also relying on their affiliates' willingness to concentrate their own resources at the disposal of the ETUFs. All four power resources are subject to trans- and supranational economic and political influences that can be weakened or strengthened through national power resources.

In the research literature, economic-structural power resources reflect Polanyian notion of embeddedness, where economic activity is constrained by non-economic institutions (Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 1985). This is demonstrated by dynamics between labour market and production process in global process and value chains (e.g. Helfen et al. 2018; Helfen & Fichter 2016; Sydow & Windeler 2004), highlighting the cross-border effects of nationally different market power within the respective labour market and production models of member states. Here, trade unions are seen as part of a global or European multi-level governance structure, where through highly integrated production processes in a common market trade unions' cross-border capacity to disrupt production processes becomes possible. Influenced by the differences in the Member States' labour market and production models, cross-border competition between locations in the context of the internal market and wage dumping in the European Monetary Union can be symptoms of this phenomenon and solving it might require interference from the ETUFs as they take a role of mediators.

The concept of communicative power resources is related to Habermas' communicative action (1981) that transforms into political power in actual decision-making by enabling the co-production of meaning complement through deliberative politics. This refers to ETUFs capacity to influence public and published opinion towards both their own affiliates but also the European Union institutions and employers' organisations at the European-level. Müller & Platzer (2017) argued that because of the weakly developed communication structures between these different parties the struggle of ideas mainly takes place at the national-level.

Organisational and institutional power resources of ETUFs bear resemblance to Parsons AGIL (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency) model (1937), where an organisation may possess resources and gain approval based on the importance of its function in society; something that can also be reproduced at the formal organisational-level through examination of subunits. Goal attainment can be divided into four kinds of decisions: (1) policy decisions that reflect what goals to pursue and how they will be attained, (2) allocative decisions that deal with allocating resources and responsibilities among affiliates, (3) coordinative decisions, meaning how affiliates will be motivated and contributions coordinated and (4) supporting values that serve to legitimate and authorise decision-making rights in system.

Organisational power resources manifest themselves through their financial and personnel resources and their capacity to aggregate and coordinate their affiliates' national power resources at the European-level and these are contingent of their affiliates willingness to actively participate in European matters and occasionally setting aside their own political priorities in order to establish new opportunities for transnational solidarity and for joint European action that requires a multi-level approach (Müller & Platzer 2017). Similarly, institutional power resources reflect the specific structures at European-level which allow ETUFs to engage in supra-national norm-setting alongside other actors within the EU's sphere of influence both through formal and informal lobbying as well as officially recognised parties in the EU's multilevel structure of governance such as the European social dialogue at (cross-)sectoral-level and European Works Councils (EWCs) at the company-level.

These ambiguous plans to develop the European-level industrial relations structures with the reliance on the support from the European Commission have helped to integrate the ETUFs to the Europeanisation process (Erne 2008). Meanwhile, by gaining access to the European political arena through participation in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the ETUFs, national trade unions have become Eurocratic in their policy-making at the cost of a genuine European labour movement. Still, regardless of the perspective, the ETUFs have potential to provide a useful framework for transnational trade union networks by helping to create forums for joint-action among national trade unions (e.g. Larsson 2014). While the ETUFs are closely embedded in the European arena, the liberal market policies introduced since the 1990s have had the national trade unions to distance themselves from the Commission and actually oppose its agenda more often (e.g. Taylor & Mathers 2004; Turnbull 2006; Bernaciak 2008) as evidenced

by the demonstrations against the Draft Service Directive in 2004 and 2006 or against the harsh austerity measures in 2010 and 2014 on the European Day of Action.

Network Governance Approach

Governance implicates the mechanisms and processes through which organisations oversee the control and direction of different policy issues. In this abstract sense, it describes the patterns of rules and mechanisms that constitute social coordination and decision-making by a group of actors that regulate their collective policy issues and interests (Mayntz 2009, 9). A less rigid and abstract interpretation of governance reflects cooperative steering within a network structure. Network governance approach combines market, hierarchy, and relational forms of coordination (Provan & Kenis 2008).

Literature on organisational networks differentiates network analytical approach from the network governance approach (e.g. Provan & Kenis 2008). Network analytical approach draws from the sociological perspective of egocentrism and focuses on descriptive and explanatory research design by applying analytical concepts such as density, centrality and structural holes (Burt 1992; Wasserman & Faust 1994) to explain certain network outcomes. However, it concentrates on the nodes and relations that comprise the network instead of the whole network itself (e.g. Graddy & Chen 2006). With a few exceptions (e.g. Provan & Milward 1995; Powell et al. 2005; van Raaij 2006), the unit of analysis is usually a single node, dyadic or triadic relations or clusters instead of complete network, and therefore these are not able to grasp network functions as they do not involve network-level of analysis.

The network governance approach, however, combines sociology and organisational studies, using the network organisation as the unit of analysis and focusing on the structure of collective action (Powell et al. 2005, 1113). The focus is on explaining network outcomes by governance arrangements i.e. coordination mechanisms, processes and practices developed by network members at different levels of interaction (Moretti 2017, 12). Network governance approach and social network analysis differ in three respects: (1) The unit of analysis for network governance is the network, seen as a form of governance, whereas social network analysis focuses either on micro-level (ego perspective) or dyadic and triadic relationships perspective, (2) network governance approach focuses on organisational aspects of network results (coordination mechanisms, governance forms, social aspects of interaction etc.), while social network analysis deals with structural configurations of networks to explain actors' outcomes. Finally, (3) network governance takes a strategic approach by examining, how networks can effectively manage organisational and interorganisational arrangements in order to reach network goals, whereas social network analysis does not include the agency of individuals derived from the network structure (Provan & Sydow 2008).

Because of their assumedly non-hierarchical form and the autonomy of their members, most literature on organisational networks regard them as cooperative endeavors without explicitly addressing network governance. However, some form of governance is required for goal-directed organisational networks to function properly and to ensure that network members engage in collective action and network resources are acquired and utilised efficiently and effectively. The overall functioning of the networks is still a bit under-researched topic, with some theoretical holes that need to be addressed. Among these is the question of how a single network governance form can differ across different networks. Also unexplored is specifically whether and how well network administrator organisations can potentially improve cohesion, coordination, and performance metrics among network participants.

There are considerable advantages of network coordination, including enhanced learning outcomes, resource-efficiency, capacity to address complex problems and greater understanding of positions and targets of network members (e.g. Brass et al. 2004). Although in a simplistic form, networks are able to develop structures that are borne out of interactions among network members, these can also be seen as products of strategic decisions made by network administrators and participants, adding governance and coordination to the process.

Three Forms of Network Governance


It is possible to identify three forms of network governance based on goal-consensus: (1) shared governance model, (2) lead organisation governance model and (3) network administrative organisational model (Provan & Kenis 2008, Raab & Kenis 2009, Figure 1). All of these draw from the power resources approach with slightly different emphasis.

Unlike the two other forms of network governance, shared governance networks are highly decentralised, involving all or most of the network members on an equal basis. They rely on communicative power resources by emphasising deliberation because of their un-coordinated structure. These networks are governed by the members themselves with their success depending on the involvement and commitment of these members as all the network-level decisions are made collectively and members are responsible for managing internal and external relations and operations of the network. This means that the power structure of this form of network is more or less symmetrical and reciprocal, even though the size and resources of network members may vary. Shared governance can be accomplished either formally through regular meetings and information-sharing or more informally through un-coordinated efforts by actors with a stake in the success of the network.

Whereas shared governance often indicates decentralised network structures, lead organisation governance aims to centralise the network functions. Lead organisation governance is characterised by an asymmetrical power dimension and it draws from economic-structural power resources where the unilateral power position of the lead organisation is derived from its position in the institutional field and importance for the market. Here, the members often have moderately low goal-consensus and, hence, are willing to give the operative network governance responsibility to lead organisations that make most strategic and operational decisions on behalf of the network (e.g. Graddy & Chen 2006) either through formal or informal channels. Therefore, this form is the most suitable for attaining network-level goals in cases when network members are not able to agree on fundamental network-level goals on their own or may only be partially committed to those. Even though the lead organisation is tasked with the coordination of network activities and making key decisions on behalf of the whole network, all network members share at least some common ideas and goals. Alongside network-level goals, all members try to maintain their own individual goals and the role of the lead organisation is to facilitate the members' activities as they try to pursue shared goals. This situation may not be optimal to the long-term sustainability of the network, but in the short term, the lead organisations can help to maintain a broader, network-level focus than the network participants would be able to achieve otherwise on their own.

Network administrative organisation model relies on an independent and separate administrative entity with the responsibility to administer and coordinate network activities on behalf of the network members. Unlike in the lead organisation model, the administrative organisation is not a member of the network, but instead an external governing unit and the network administration is established either through a mandate or by the network members themselves with the sole purpose of network governance. Network administration form of governance reflect the organisational and institutional power resources where the focus is on allocative and coordinated decision-making. This is typical when goal-consensus among involved organisations is moderately high, since it requires legitimation of network administration to demonstrate impartiality. The administrative leaders and hired network staff (usually some sort of secretariat) are given the task to ensure that the network functions properly by working with all members on a regular basis. The role of the administrator is to aggregate the affiliates' means of power at transnational level by helping to establish cross-border networking along value chains and mobilising cross-border support of weaker affiliates by stronger ones. Thus, goal consensus may be quite strong in this form of network governance; at least within the core actors of the network. The other network members outside the core might be less committed and involved in network functions, showing only modest goal-consensus, while leaving the overall strategic work voluntarily to the network administrators and the members of the core. Yet, while the network members might agree on network-level goals and on the role of a network administrator as a whole, there might not be strong agreement about how network members should get involved and the excess of their participation is more likely to vary greatly depending on their commitment and resources.

Figure 1. Three Forms of Network Governance (Provan & Kenis 2008, Raab & Kenis 2009)



Successful adoption of a particular form of network governance is dependent on four key structural and relational contingencies: (1) adequate number of network members that are engaged in network-level activities, (2) mutual trust among the members to strive for network-level goals, (3) goal-consensus among the members and finally, (4) trying to add value beyond members' individual capacities (Goldsmith 2012, 143). Raab & Kenis (2009) identified two different forms of network governance with different identities: (1) serendipitous networks they called "networks an sich" ("networks in itself"), which do not develop a collective identity and (2) consciously created goal-directed networks as "networks für sich" ("network for itself"). It is the latter that represents a new organisational form that has replaced the formal hierarchical organisation structures and what ETUF with their affiliates are trying to become as part of the Europeanisation process of industrial relations that requires coordination of all efforts towards achieving defined shared goals.

Functioning network governance is dependent on accommodation and coordination of member organisations' needs and preferences. Shared governance is often the best solution for network members, since they can retain full control over the direction of the network while at the same time share individual responsibility between them to ease the burden (Provan & Kenis 2008). However, shared governance works best for small networks as it requires active participation to succeed. As the network grows in size, governance becomes extremely complex, making shared governance highly inefficient (Faerman et al. 2001). Complexity also increases the more network members are spread out geographically and culturally (including language barriers) as interaction between all participants becomes difficult or impossible. By concentrating network governance around a broker organisation that can be either a lead organisation or a network administrator, it is possible to evade his problem.

Emergence of Network Governance at the European-Level of Industrial Relations

Networks governance within the European-level of industrial relations field has been an under-researched domain. However, networks have become a common and increasingly important governance mechanism at various levels, with increasing use of interactive forms of governance and government-initiated networks of stakeholders in preparing (public) policies. These endeavours require broad collaboration between these stakeholders through the formation of strategic alliances and other kinds of network structures.

The broader institutional domain of the European industrial relations has evolved around three central agents: the ETUFs representing national (sectoral) trade unions and above them the ETUC representing

the national confederations, lobby groups representing employers (BusinessEurope and European Roundtable of Industrialists) and the EU Commission. Between these three is the consultative EESC that brings together representatives from both the national trade unions and employers' organisations.

Power Resources and Different Forms of Network Governance within the ETUFs

Network administrator form is a common governance model for most of the international organisations, where the everyday tasks have been given to an organisation that is not part of the network, while the central actors still have the overall strategic power over the network that they can use. In general, all the ETUFs have a similar organisation structure, with the Congress that takes place every four or five years having the responsibility for agreeing on policy priorities and electing leadership positions. Between the Congresses the Executive Committees are responsible for determining policies and these meet usually once or twice a year. Representation of the affiliates in the Executive Committee is on a country or regional basis and dependent of the number of members the affiliates have.

The role of general secretaries in ETUFs is similar to that of CEOs in firms and they are legally responsible for managing the overall operations and resources of the ETUF¹ by preparing the Executive Committee meetings and ensuring proper implementation of the decisions taken at the Congress and the Executive Committee. Mostly, the rest of the secretariats consists of experts under the general secretary and they are responsible for the implementation of mandates given by the Congress and decisions taken by the Executive Committee vis-à-vis the EU Parliament, Commission and the employers' representatives. On significant policy issues the Executive Committee bears main political responsibility, but in cases where there is little or no goal-consensus, general secretaries tend to take a bigger role in formulating the ETUFs stance. The general secretaries' personalities and affiliations play a big role in whether an ETUF follows more the network administrator or lead organisation model of network governance. Some general secretaries who have been from big trade unions in big countries have shifted their ETUFs towards the lead organisation model, whereas others from smaller trade unions have tried to turn their organisations to that of a mediator and administrator by giving more (political) power to the affiliates, who are responsible for jointly preparing policies in the policy committees or in their Select Working Parties (SWPs). Whereas the Executive Committees give political clout to the ETUFs and are meant to coordinate affiliates' policy preferences, policy committees' work is to discuss and prepare more concrete and practical solutions. In many ways the policy committees – especially the ones dealing with company policy - demonstrate the purest form of shared governance model, with a high degree of independence to discuss issues without formal governance structure, relying on communicative power resources in form of deliberative approach that extends beyond the aggregation of self-interest.

It has been argued (Müller & Platzer 2017) that the key determinant of organisational power resources aside from financial and secretariats' staffing is the intensity with which affiliates are involved in the coordinative work of the ETUFs, and the extent to which they make their resources available. This also helps to keep the (smaller) affiliates satisfied, since no trade union is able to possess formal power over the network, even though there might be informal power structures within the network that have different institutional mechanisms than the formal ones. These informal institutional mechanisms include the SWPs for which the members are nominated - although they are officially open for everyone - and also bilateral or regional structures. Still, for many affiliates the importance of ETUFs is only marginal. This is reflected in the motions brought up at their Congresses, in the articles on European developments in the trade union journals, in the (social) media coverage and in the commitments between trade unions to fight together. Also, only a few trade unions actually inform their members of actions in support of demands towards the European institutions and Member States or write letters of protest to national governments or employers who are suppressing workers and their trade unions, underscoring the problems and challenges in building up ETUFs' legitimacy and importance across different national industrial relations regimes.

Even the ETUFs secretariats as network administrators can have a role in coordination across the regional networks by arranging meetings of "big groups", consisting of 50-60 trade union officers to discuss broader

¹ Most of the ETUFs are located in Brussels and, hence, fall under the Belgian law.

issues such as working time charter. Even though the ETUFs can be described as being multipolar instead of dominated by one single big trade union or country, some policy issues are taken up based on the assumption that the key affiliates will support it, meaning that the general secretaries discuss significant policy initiatives with the biggest affiliates before they are being brought up at the general meetings to hear out whether these initiatives have the support of these affiliates. Alongside official institutional structures of the ETUFs also some semi-attached solutions like the initiatives to build trade union affiliates' organisational capacities mostly outside the EU15 exist as well as regional groups especially in the Nordic countries (Nordic Industry Workers' Federation NordicIN, Service- och tjänstebranschens Union i Norden (SUN) and Nordic Transport Workers' Federation (NTF), Mediterranean countries (Annecy Group in the metal sector) and Visegrád countries.

National trade unions are not on an equal ground because of their differences in resources available and the character national industrial relations systems (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman 2013) but also due to their position towards the EU: The Anglo-Saxon and Nordic trade unions have traditionally been more "Euro-sceptic", advocating a weaker mandate for the ETUC and ETUFs - i.e. moving away from the strong network administrator form of governance - than their continental and southern counterparts and being more reluctant to participate in formulation of European wage policies and regulations (e.g.; Busemeyer et al. 2008; Furåker & Lovén Seldén 2013; Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman 2013), while at the same time especially in the case of Nordic countries, the emphasis has been on building their own regional structures that have a better cultural and national industrial relations regime fit (Furåker & Larsson 2020, 75-107).

ETUFs' capacity to aggregate and coordinate their affiliates' interests and activities through their organisational power resources have been slightly dampened because of the growth in membership both through mergers and integration of trade unions from the Central and Eastern Europe, while their secretariats' human resources have remained relatively stable. Similarly, institutional power resources have been affected by greater diversity within their membership and thus limited their capacity to find consensus. Because of the limited capacity of trade unions from Central and Eastern Europe to implement transnationally agreed policies at national-level due to their scarce resources and dominant company-level industrial relations systems, they have in many cases stayed on the outside of the policy formulation of the ETUFs, while their counterparts from the EU15 have been able to obtain more power from the secretariats, who have concentrated their efforts to focus on engaging all the affiliates and help some of them with capacity building. This has meant in some cases a shift from network administration model (back) towards the lead organisation model of network governance. The German sectoral trade unions IG Metall, IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE), IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt (IG BAU) and Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) have traditionally taken the lead organisation position, striving towards a more European network governance structures.

Balance of Power between the Secretariats and the Affiliates – Emergence of Multipolar Networks

There are big differences between different ETUFs and their power balance. ETUFs representing export oriented manufacturing industries are more bound for lead organisation model than the ones representing the public sector, where network administration model can be seen as a more natural choice, although there are also examples where affiliates from some big countries have tried to increase their own influence over these networks. In general, network governance of ETUFs differs greatly, depending on whether the sector is exposed to international markets or when the affiliates mainly act in their home countries without threat from the outside as for example coordination of collective bargaining is less relevant for the latter, with the focus being more on social dialogue.

Ideally, the affiliates are in charge and have delegated day-to-day operations to the secretariats whose task is to treat every affiliate equally. Regarding power balance, lead organisation model does not necessarily mean that there is only one organisation that has this role. Recent research has brought forth the Nordic trade unions as an example of wielding greater power than their size would suggest (e.g. Andersen 2006; Larsson & Törnberg 2019; Vulkan & Larsson 2019; Seeliger 2019), as together they form the in many cases either the second or third largest formally organised coalition of national trade unions within many of the

ETUFs after the Germans and in some cases the British trade unions², making the ETUFs in essence multipolar. The strong Nordic presence can be explained with the role played by strong institutionalised structures within the Nordic countries. The most advanced of these has been the Council of Nordic Trade Unions (NFS) which has a formal structure and was tasked with coordinating regional strategies toward EU policies. At the regional sectoral-level some bargaining cartels have also emerged, most notably the NordicIN in the metal sector. At the same time, a fear of European regulation undermining national autonomy has been especially strong in the Nordic countries and in particular in Sweden and Denmark, because the floor on European industrial relations protection and regulation has been much lower than the national ones in the Nordic countries. This is why the Nordic trade unions have been at crossroads on whether to focus on the established and institutionalised cooperation within the Nordic context or instead widen the perspective to include common European policy initiatives through the institutionalised European platform. This dilemma materialised in the case of Posted-Workers Directive (96/71/EC), when the Swedish trade unions wanted to open the whole directive, while the Finnish trade unions were happy just to add some amendments to it (Rönmar 2008). Leading up to the adoption of the directive in 2018, a clear East-West division within the employers' organisations emerged, but not within the trade union movement (Furåker & Larsson 2020, 109-139), while the ETUFs were positive but not uncritical as they wanted a more radical reform.

Starting in the late 1990s some of the ETUFs began establishing different platforms to enable better inclusion of their affiliates on broader policy areas. These coordination platforms followed three different levels (1) sectoral issues related to industrial policies at the EU-level or sectoral social dialogue, (2) broader issues concerning certain employee groups like women or young employees and finally (3) cross-sectoral issues that included coordination of collective bargaining and company policies like EWCs'. These platforms that took a form of policy committees provided the affiliates an opportunity to build trust among themselves in order to agree on common positions and therefore draw binding guidelines that the ETUFs would then promote. Although for a long time, these policy committees were mostly attended by the affiliates from the EU15, which also showed in their agenda, these internal coordination structures formed an institutional precondition for improving ETUFs' organisational power resources through a more intensive interaction between their affiliates. While there are still considerable variations in how intensively affiliates participate in the committees depending on the sector or issue, the representation has widened in recent years and new sectoral policy committees have emerged.

The political framework in Europe and the European Union in particular clearly has had an impact on the capacity of the affiliates vis-à-vis ETUFs in defending their members' interests, with austerity policies being a prime example of impinging on trade union rights and collective bargaining rights. Job cuts, austerity measures, privatisation and outsourcing impact both ETUFs and their affiliates equally but in a slightly different way. Whereas ETUFs must see the whole picture from a European perspective and, hence, balance between different national stakeholders' expectations and demands, national trade union affiliates can take a narrower zero-sum perspective, although still showing at least in rhetoric some solidarity towards others.

Coordination of Collective Bargaining

Probably one of the most feasible and visible forms of network governance has been the coordination of collective bargaining. During the heyday of European integration from late 1990s to early 2000s, coordination of collective bargaining was one of the key areas of network governance not just in the export-driven manufacturing industries but also elsewhere (c.f. Pond 2009 for coordination of collective bargaining in the energy sector in Europe). As a frontrunner in coordination of collective bargaining IG Metall further fastened its position in the 1990s, when parallel to the EMF collective bargaining networks that included all the affiliates, it launched European cross-border collective bargaining regions to help coordinate the bargaining processes between Germany and its neighboring countries (e.g. Gollbach & Schulten 2000) in anticipation of the Single Currency and the Eurozone. Especially the Nord-Rhine Westphalia branch of IG Metall was active in this with regular monitoring of agreements in neighboring countries and embrace the

² c.f. Degryse & Tilly (2013) for the similar situation at the ETUC.

EMF bargaining coordination rule by endorsing observer exchange during the bargaining rounds and lodging claims to establish common standards.

In the early 2000s the EMF steering group with a broad representation was tasked with more broad aspects of collective bargaining coordination, including relocations and transnational mobility of workers that were expected to increase after the EU enlargement a few years later. Both of these groups helped enhance the visibility of collective bargaining activities among the EMF affiliates by helping them to communicate the European issues to their membership and thus gain legitimacy for their European sphere of policy-making.

The original idea of coordination of collective bargaining was to use wages to adjust to imbalances in international competitiveness and orienting wage growth in line with the sum of inflation and productivity growth throughout if not Europe, then at least the Eurozone (c.f. Dølvik 2000; Traxler 2002). In recent years, the coordinative role of ETUFs in collective bargaining has made way for more bilateral regional approaches (Brandl et al. 2021), since wage coordination is deemed to be most feasible among countries with similar industrial relations systems within geographical and cultural proximity, as well as in sectors that are transnationally integrated and export dependent (e.g. Glassner et al. 2013), leaving ETUF with informal role in information sharing through newsletters (Collective bargaining bulletins) at the European-level as they have shifted their governance efforts towards the political arena.

Conclusions and Discussion

This chapter discussed network governance as a theoretical concept to analyse ETUFs both from structure and policy issues perspective by referring to different power resources. Networks often emerge incidentally from dyadic interactions and eventually become aggregates of bilateral contacts and exchanges (Simon 1991), giving the emphasis to the increased connectedness between actors. Consciously created, goal-directed interorganisational structures that are bounded and governed through a network form of organising have received less attention (for literary review c.f. Provan et al. 2007). However, network governance often illustrates similar institutions as those they were meant to transcend, replicating hierarchies and (market) exclusions, and, hence, aggravating endemic distrust between the network members. Regardless, it still brings about the issues of trust and legitimacy of a networked organisation structure by presenting three different modes of organising a governance network through interdependencies based on their goal-consensus.

The most common network structure of ETUFs is a hybrid between the network administrative model and the lead organisation model. While the lead organisation steers the network *de facto*, a network administrator acts as a central filter, theoretically providing the same information to every network member (Hecló 1978). In terms of network governance, networks aim to provide coherence to an organisational field through decentralised but coordinated action and self-regulation prescribing interorganisational collaborations within a formal structure. Hence, network governance takes place through structural coordination and shared understandings of goals and actions. Still, this does not exclude possible formation of quasi-informal network structures alongside the formal structure. These often adopt the shared governance model because of their informal nature.

A lead organisation can emerge from within the network if it gains the trust and legitimacy of others or it can be appointed by an external actor that the networks members trust. In the case of ETUFs, lead organisation governance is often adopted when the network consists of a single powerful (often large) member and several weaker and (often smaller) members that are ready to accept the former as a lead organisation for the good of the network. A lead organisation can also emerge in horizontal multilateral networks when one organisation has sufficient resources and legitimacy through a central position in the network to endorse a leading role.

Usually the focus on European industrial relations network governance is on the strong German trade unions or the ETUFs, with less emphasis given to Anglo-Saxon regimes, where individual freedom of contract and the reluctance to wield power to the European institutions (e.g. Hyman 2005) like the ETUFs has been strong as the British labour movement still remains predominantly nationally oriented and deeply

divided over the benefits and costs of European integration even before Brexit (e.g. Fetzner 2007; Monks 2009). Similarly, according to Knudsen (2005), trade union attitudes in Nordic countries towards the Europeanisation of industrial relations have been shaped by a cooperative approach, meaning that they might not perceive a need for action at the European-level nor need a “European backbone” to achieve their goals in collective bargaining nationally because of strong institutional foundations that include high unionisation rate and high collective bargaining coverage supported by strong trade unions rights. On the other end are the trade unions from outside the EU15, where there would be a need for strong European presence, but scarce resources, fragmented structures (e.g. Henning 2015) and little attention given by the ETUFs policy-wise have meant that they often lack voice within the ETUFs (Gajewska 2009) especially in the shared governance structures, despite some recent attempts by the ETUFs.

The reason why coordination of collective bargaining never took on in other sectors apart from the metal sector can be traced back both to the institutional structure and attributes of the field where especially in the public sector, there has not been any need to coordinate despite some efforts to launch databases and provide newsletters to the affiliates of the ETUFs regularly. Most of the ETUFs do not have collective bargaining committees, but are instead relying on seminars and ad hoc working groups to activate the affiliates in areas such as training, working time or trade union rights. In the public sector EPSU tried for a brief moment coordination between six Central European countries in the energy sector that also included annual collective bargaining reports, but eventually this was discontinued as there was very little interest from the affiliates to engage in this and in recent years coordination has mostly taken place within EWCs and in form of sectoral social dialogues. This has been the tendency with many other ETUFs also, regardless whether they have sometime been involved in coordination of collective bargaining.

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