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Responsible Public Management

Communicative Assessment of Administrative Doctrines

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Responsible Public Management: Communicative Assessment of Administrative Doctrines

Abstract

This thesis assesses forms of responsibility through the theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas. In the study, the administrative doctrines are represented by bureaucratic theory, New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG). The study is based upon abductive content analysis and a narrative literature review. The study provides an opportunity to understand what practical organizational and management arrangements are required to implement and support responsibility. Research in the topic is needed since governance indices indicate that, despite administrative reforms through decades, public trust in governments has not risen.

Whereas bureaucratic theory emphasizes compliance-based responsibility, NPM highlights the need for assessing accountability in terms of results and NPG accountability in networks. The administrative doctrines open up the issue of responsibility in different ways since they describe technical rationality from different perspectives. The quest for greater efficiency, economy and effectiveness in public administration has given rise to new forms of responsibility, which both complement and complicate previous forms of organisatory arrangements. Results indicate a paradoxical image of responsible public management. Hence, more research is needed to assess the impact of administrative reforms on administrative ethics.

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Abbreviations

CMS   Critical Management Studies

NPM   New Public Governance

NPM   New Public Management

OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PPP   Public-Private Partnership

FOREWORD

This is the translated version of the academic dissertation: "*Vastuullinen julkinen johtaminen: Hallinto-oppien kommunikatiivinen arviointi*". The study relies on the work of communicative rationality by Jürgen Habermas in assessing responsible public management and its many forms found in administrative doctrines.

The reasons for this are quite simple. First of all, administrative science is lacking deeper philosophical discussion regarding its most profound principles. One theme for such discussion is rationality and its effect on administrative systems. This theme links administrative science to a larger context of social sciences, a link that is usually forgotten.

The other theme for the discussion is administrative ethics and its relation to philosophy. Never before has there been so much research on this topic. However, scholars of the field rarely mention philosophers in their works. Problematically, this makes the field ambivalent to its very foundation – and quite technical as well. For example, I can happily declare myself as a philosopher, and I hope many other researchers of Public Administration can too.

Also, there is a growing need for philosophers in administrative ethics in particular. For example, there is no deep understanding of the philosophical presumptions of this field of interest. Rather, Public Administration as a whole is founded upon administrative doctrines that lack scientific or philosophical rigor. This can be seen how the economic criteria (efficiency, economy, effectiveness) for evaluating ethical behaviour is a dominant discourse. However, many ethical problems are hard to grasp using economic language. This, in turn, can be seen how assessing the overall *effectiveness* of ethics policies is quite naïve. As a scholar of this field one may need to use this vocabulary at least partly, but hopefully in a critical fashion.

In addition, some trends are in favor of democratic backsliding rather than deliberation. The relationship between public management reforms and ethics is not an easy task. Even though reforms in ethics policies are comprehensive than ever before, it can be questioned whether they contribute to the principles of good governance, but rather, to democratic backsliding and *critical governance* (Demmke et al. 2021b).

For the sake of democratic systems, there is a need to assess administrative ethics in terms of both democratic principles and responsibility. Historically, through the talk of responsibility, we have been able to assess the role of public managers in democratic systems. Hence, public management, responsibility and the democratic system all need each other. If one of these elements is left out, there might be trouble.

Administrative ethics is troubled by obvious individualism. This is reflected, for example, in the way in which questions of administrative ethics are regulated in practice. The downside of individualism is that institutional factors for unethical behaviour remain obscured. It is not surprising that unethical behaviour is mostly a question of finding a few "bad apples". In this study, administrative doctrines are assessed against the background of what they claim about agency. As we will later see, the overall picture is paradoxical. Hence, instead of individualism, maybe there is a need for a more systemic approach to administrative ethics – an approach that can also take the complexity of public action into account.

This, once again, requires a deeper insight into the philosophical assumptions of the field. More work is needed!

1 INTRODUCTION

Public action takes place in an increasingly complex and unpredictable environment, which makes it difficult to identify and implement responsible public management. According to Salminen (2016: 8), responsibility means following the rules and instructions, being accountable for one's actions to higher parties and acting correctly as an individual on the basis of honesty and trustworthiness. Responsibility is about how well an individual follows the rules and understands their role in their organization. Responsibility and administrative ethics, in general, are often explored as individual activities, although attention should also be paid to the organizational and systemic levels (Demmke et al. 2020: 93). This is the case, for example, with respect to institutional integrity (Kirby 2018).

The assessment of responsible public management is ambiguous. Responsibility is based on the ethics of public management. It is conceivable that more attention will be paid to responsibility in the public sector than in the private sector. Responsibility concerns public administration and service systems as a whole, not to forget internal operations between organizations. In addition, public management is responsible for rapid societal change and react to the best of its ability.

According to Plant (2018), the principle that public managers act responsibly has been central to the development of public administration since its inception. The reason for this is that responsibility has linked administrative ethics with the question of the role of public managers in the democratic system. The keyword here is a *democratic system*, which cannot be underestimated as a representative of universal values in society. According to Mungiu-Pippidi (2020), ethical universalism is a key element of democracy and good governance: regimes that adhere to ethical universalism, emphasize equality, and treat individuals equally and impartially, regardless of their personal characteristics.

At present, ethical universalism faces major challenges in the European context. Responsible public management is hampered by the moral relativism of postmodern societies that challenge traditional principles of public administration (Cooper 2006). "Whereas key phenomena of modernity are assumptions about universal values, absolute values and rationality, currently, trends are towards 'moral relativism' which puts into question important universal concepts such as 'rule of law ', 'the principle of democracy', 'universal human rights' and 'supranationalism'"(Demmke et al. 2020: 21; see also Demmke et al. 2021a).

Ethical universalism is in trouble despite the fact that governments have invested considerable resources to improving ethical standards over two decades. However, the growth of ethical policies does not necessarily increase citizens' trust in government (Rosenson 2006: 137). On the contrary, recent governance indices show worrying trends

in the themes of democracy, inequality and politicization. For example, the Bertelsmann Foundation's (2020) Democracy Index shows that several countries are moving towards bad rather than good governance. According to Gora and de Wilde (2020), the commitment to democracy and the rule of law is declining in European Union. In addition, the politicization of public services has increased (Bowman & West 2018). At the same time, citizens' expectations that public administration operates responsibly have increased year by year.

Why is the situation troubling? There can be many reasons for this, of course. This study focuses on one of them. According to Dubnick (2011), there must be a clear basis for accountability that is not problematic by administrative reform waves. "It is not accountability that is undermining our aspirations for an effective democracy but the reformist aspiration for an effective democracy that is undermining accountability. […] Simply stated, this paradox holds that any effort to improve accountability through reforms generates consequences that in fact alters and often undermines existing forms of accountability already in place "(Dubnick 2011: 705–706).

As Plant (2018) argues, the context of public responsibility must be reconsidered in a critical manner today. Through administrative reforms and doctrines, the context has changed over the decades and influenced the perception of what is regarded as a responsible action. Plant, therefore, raises a key question for research: what if the context of responsibility is wrong? What if the context does not emphasize, for example, ethical action, democratic values, strong public institutions, or integrity of governance? The responsibility of public management is hampered not only by the environment but also by public management reforms. The effectiveness of public management reforms has not only been questionable (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011), but they have also produced new ethical challenges (Demmke & Moilanen 2012: 706).

As a result of administrative reforms, the public administration often has to balance conflicting goals. Like Habermas (1996) argues, in "the modern service administration, however, problems accumulate that require the weighing of collective goods, the choice between competing goals, and the normative evaluation of individual cases. These can be treated rationally only in discourses of justification and application that cannot be contained within the professional confines of a normatively neutral task fulfilment." (Habermas 1996: 440.)

In this study, the responsibility of public management is assessed through the forms of responsibility found in the administrative doctrines. The study examines responsibility through three administrative doctrines: bureaucratic theory, New Public Management (NPM), and New Public Governance (NPG). The responsibility of public leadership has not been previously studied through the principles of these administrative doctrines, despite the fact that they play a key role in shaping the behaviour of public managers.

Administrative doctrines can be used to understand the practice, but they do not have the explanatory function of theories. Therefore, the relationship between doctrine and practice differs from the relationship between a proper or "scientific" theory and practice. This study continues the idea of administrative doctrines as a set of beliefs that influence administrative discourse and practical public management (Hood & Jackson 1991: 17–18). Therefore, doctrines are based on unquestioned initial assumptions, nor do they represent scientifically verifiable principles, but rather rely on rhetorical choices (Frederickson et al. 2012: 112).

Every administrative doctrine has its own way of understanding responsible public management. According to the bureaucratic theory, administrative action is based on rational principles: legitimate governing means written rules and procedures (Weber 1922). Despite its age, Weberian bureaucratic theory is still in force as a solution to the problem of globalization, where a strong state, maintaining legitimacy and helping citizens remain as key features of governance (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 118–120). In addition, the Weberian governance model has found a clear link to economic growth (Drechsler & Kattel 2008; Evans & Rauch 1999).

New Public Management examines public administration in accordance with private sector principles such as cost-effectiveness and economy. NPM, as a neoliberal turn of governance, has contributed to the fact that public leadership is currently assessed primarily on the basis of economic criteria (Hood & Jackson 1991; Dahl & Soss 2014; Tiihonen 2008: 215–217). Because the doctrine has a right-wing background, the administrative doctrine has not, at least directly, appeared in the policies of left-wing parties. In the EU Member States, features suitable for one's own administrative tradition have been chosen from the theory selectively. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 76.) New Public Governance emphasizes network relationships, collaboration and partnerships (Osborne 2010). Like NPM, NPG is based on market- and competition-oriented management relationships, while also emphasizing networking between different actors (Kickert et al. 1997; Haveri & Anttiroiko 2009: 201).

Procedural democracy

The aim of the study is to evaluate the responsibility forms found in the administrative doctrines using the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas (1984a, 1984b, 1996), which is linked to democratic principles. The theory of communicative action follows the logic of procedural democracy, which means the implementation of universal discourse ethics in communication and dialogue (Habermas 1996: 6–7; Meisenbach 2006). According to Habermas, procedural democracy creates new mechanisms for governance in which it is viewed from a deliberative perspective. "This implies a 'democratization' of the administration that, going beyond special obligations to provide

information, would supplement parliamentary and judicial controls on administration from within." (Habermas 1996: 441.)

Deliberative democracy was first written by Bessette (1980). Deliberation refers to the communication in an ideal speech situation where all participants in the discourse are allowed to present their own arguments (Raisio 2014; Mansbridge et al. 2012). In administrative science, Habermas' work is often combined with the topics of inclusion and deliberation (see, for example, Vartiainen et al. 2013).

According to Habermas, the problem with old democratic theories is the assumption that democratic thinking should start from the subject. In such a case, the subject may mean, for example, an individual in a liberal sense or a collective subject in a republican sense. Habermas' alternative to the old theories of democracy is to talk about democracy from the level of communication. Thus, it can be argued that procedural democracy is based on intersubjectivity. (Habermas 1996: 299; Thomassen 2010: 117–118.)

Habermas's attention to procedural democracy lies in the formal terms of communication. Thus, the focus is not so much on what is considered ethical: rather, the aim is to describe the intersubjective processes through which norms are produced (Meisenbach 2006: 40). Thus, procedural democracy is, according to Habermas, independent of ethical views ("this concept [procedural democracy] […] claims to be neutral with respect to competing worldviews and forms of life") (Habermas 1996: 288). In Habermas' thinking, democracy, rational communication, and discourse ethics are united by the pursuit of ethical universalism. This is shown, for example, by the principle of universality, which defines discourse ethics, according to which the acceptability of a norm is based on the fact that all participants in the discourse can accept it (Habermas 1990: 66).

According to Forester (1983: 236), the theory of communicative action makes it possible to perform analysis on three different levels. First, it can be used for empirical analysis of structural assumptions in communication, interpretive analysis of meanings, and normative analysis of systemic distortions (Cukier et al. 2004). The forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines have not previously been assessed within the framework of communicative action theory. This is the primary contribution of research to the scientific debate. In addition, research is scientifically necessary because the forms of responsibility of administrative doctrines must be viewed through the ideal of procedural democracy. The talk of accountability needs to be returned to a level that is not based on seeking efficiency (Dubnick 2011).

Administrative doctrines do not only convey information, but communicate political and moral meanings through their structures: they seek, for example, social acceptance, trust, and sacrifice (Forester 1980; Ahn 2009). Administrative doctrines communicate who a responsible public manager is, how he/she interacts with other actors, or from what

sources public responsibility is legitimized. In the study, arguments are assessed normatively through the terms of Habermas' discourse ethics.

No matter how complex a public administration takes place, its core lies in universal and democratic principles. Administrative doctrines communicate technical, political and moral meanings. The idea continues Plant's (2018) understanding of the importance of responsibility in the development of public administration: the procedural democracy of administrative doctrines influences the behaviour of public managers and, ultimately, the realization of responsibility in public institutions.

1.1 Previous studies of responsible public management

According to Dubnick (2011), administrative reforms have led to new forms of responsibility that call into question the existing forms responsibility. The situation is paradoxical in the sense that the new forms of responsibility aim to improve effectiveness. In reality, the matter has become considerably more complex. The responsibility of public management has been studied from many different perspectives. This fact reflects the complexity of the topic that sometimes seems even contradictory. Attention is paid to, for example, the relationship between responsibility and accountability (Mulgan 2000; Svara 2007; Schillemans 2013), the dichotomy between compliance and integrity (Vogelsang-Coombs 2016; Lawton 2013: 121; Lewis & Gilman 2005) as well as responsiveness to the needs of citizens (Sheaff 2002; Vigoda 2000; Bryer 2007; Löffler 2003).

1.1.1 Responsibility and accountability

In public management, responsibility and accountability are fundamental values (Salminen 2016: 7). The responsibility of civil servants is best reflected in accountability and responsibility for results (Hyyryläinen 2004: 164). In administrative science, the definition of responsibility and accountability has changed over time. In the past, accountability meant exclusively the external dimension of responsibility, such as control mechanisms towards the accountant. Now, responsibility mainly means the internal dimension of accountability. In this case, responsibility is understood according to a narrow definition, in which case the attention is paid to the ethical discretion of the individual. (Mulgan 2000: 557–558.)

There are many definitions of responsibility (Svara 2007: 4). According to Salminen (2016: 7), responsibility "means following the rules and instructions, being accountable for one's actions to higher parties; on the basis of honesty and trustworthiness". The relationship of democratic governance to officials who have not been elected to their position on the basis of a vote is a matter of administrative responsibility (Plant 2018: 1).

Accountability is mainly focused on the specific task, its effective implementation and reporting to the accountability forums. Instead, responsibility is a much broader question than such task management. Public administration has an ethical responsibility to consider factors that are outside of its prescribed processes, but at the same time critical to the functioning of society. In doing so, public administration is socially responsible. Responsibility may even transcend public action and is not just about "managing expectations". Responsibility must exceed the immediate expectations of public administration, as it must also prepare for unforeseen events that can jeopardize public action or the stability of society.

Accountability can be found in a democratic, constitutional and learning perspective. According to the democratic idea, accountability controls and justifies administrative activity. Accountability links administrative activities to a democratic chain of delegation. A key evaluation criterion is how the accountability mechanism enables the ability of democratically elected bodies to evaluate and guide administrative action. The constitutional perspective sees accountability as a necessary factor in preventing the concentration and abuse of power. A key evaluation criterion is how accountability prevents the abuse of administrative power and privileges. The learning perspective emphasizes that governance works more efficiently and effectively through accountability. Its key evaluation criterion is based on how accountability arrangements encourage public administration to achieve better societal outcomes. (Bovens et al. 2008: 230–232.)

The assessment of public performance assumes that the public organization and its actors are accountable to their principal. The problem here is the consideration of all stakeholders, i.e. "too many hands". Responsibility and accountability should also be targeted at the right level. For example, government ministers rarely agree to take responsibility for activities that are the work of their subordinate agencies. (Lawton 1998: 119.)

According to Dubnick (2014), the types of accountability can be considered according to whether they are caused by external activities (moral pulls) or by own activities (moral pushes). These types show that there are many forms and mechanisms of accountability. As forms of external action, they can mean legal responsibility, answerability, or responsiveness. When evaluating the forms of accountability that have been achieved as a result of one's own actions, we are talking about a legal obligation, obedience, amenability, and adaptability. (Dubnick 2014: 32–33.) Accountability is often associated with responsiveness to policymakers and the citizens. Responsiveness is close to controlling in the sense that they both seek to steer public administration according to the preferences of the people. More than responsiveness, control emphasizes the compulsion of external pressures on public administration. Responsiveness refers to the general sympathy of

officials for societal demands that may manifest themselves in the political decision-making system or simply in the needs of clients.

Cooper argues (2006) that the responsibility of civil servants is based on four areas, which are the individual, organizational culture, organizational structure, and societal expectations. Responsibility cannot be reduced to any of these levels, but all of them must be taken into account. At the individual level, the characteristics of responsibility are built on ethical decision-making, personal attitudes, morals, virtues, and professional values. Examples, norms and symbols are present in organizational culture. In the area of organizational structure, responsible management is defined by accountability, co-operation and interaction, pathways in conflict resolution and forms of involvement. Finally, societal expectations are based on participation and influence as well as laws and policies. (Cooper 2006: 188–210.)

Responsibility can be divided into objective and subjective dimensions. Objective responsibility is central to the reliability and predictability of public action. The public management must act in accordance with political decision-making, regardless of what he or she thinks of them personally. Objective accountability is very close to what is meant by accountability. Subjective responsibility is a psychological concept, as it can be described by a person's loyalty and conscience. Thus, responsibility has an external (political) and internal (professional and personal) dimension. It can be argued that responsible public management takes both forms of responsibility into consideration. (Bertelli & Lynn 2003: 260; Salminen 2016: 9; Salminen 2018: 70–71; Mosher 1968.)

When considering responsibility, it is assumed that the moral subject is able to act ethically. However, there is no consensus about how responsibility is best achieved. The question is should the organization rely on the discretion of officials, or whether ethical implementation requires external control mechanisms (Vogelsang-Coombs 2016: 323). The issue is also close to looking at forms of accountability as a virtue or a mechanism: it considers whether accountability should be based primarily on the actor's internal or external sources (Bovens 2010; Jackson 2009).

It can be argued that public responsibility requires both internal and external mechanisms, such as a sense of responsibility or control. However, this does not remove the problem of accountability. The question of accountability is still based on three questions. (1) What are we accountable for? (2) To whom are we accountable? (3) How is accountability best safeguarded? The last question is the most challenging one, as ensuring accountability is not easy. Determining accountability is difficult, but it is even more difficult to monitor. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 125, 128.)

Accountability is an umbrella concept, as it contains conflicting definitions (Bovens 2008: 226). Nevertheless, the importance of accountability should not be underestimated.

Accountability makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of public management, power relations and developments that might lead to inappropriate or unethical behaviour (Viinamäki 2017: 88).

The accountable may be responsible for a variety of content, such as financial, procedural, or communicative content. These differences explain, at least in part, why the assessment standards for accountability vary. Accountability can take a vertical form, in which case it is based on a hierarchical relationship between the accountable and the forum that evaluates it. However, a hierarchical relationship is not necessary. There is also a notion of social accountability that is not based on a formal obligation. Social accountability can therefore be called a voluntary form of accountability. (Bovens et al. 2014: 11–12.)

Public managers have great freedom to apply their own ethical principles in decision-making. Also, they should be able to distinguish the right solutions from the wrong ones, which requires an ability for judgement. Here, accountability refers to the methods and processes that set the values of administrative decision-making. However, this is very difficult as the public sector has become increasingly complex also with regard to values. This has meant that public responsibility requires a balance between competing values. A fair and critical assessment of different values and interests, in turn, requires rational judgement. (Bertelli & Lynn 2003: 260–262.)

In the American research literature, accountability is a normative concept designed to provide tools for assessing the behaviour of actors. When a person or organization is accountable, the activity is considered virtuous. In the European literature, on the other hand, accountability is more limited and mechanistic: accountability is seen as a social mechanism, institutional relationship or arrangement in which the accountability of an actor is assessed by a forum. In this case, the accountability literature does not pay so much attention to the behaviour of actors, as in the interest of institutional arrangements per se. The question is therefore not if the actor is accountable, but whether the accountability forum retrospectively holds the actor accountable. An actor may face the consequences of unethical conduct, but not necessarily. The consequences might be very varied. The consequences can be formalized, such as fines, disciplinary measures or penalties. On the other hand, they can be based on unwritten rules. Sometimes the negative consequences are implicit or informal. (Bovens et al. 2008: 226–227; Bovens 2010: 946–954.)

Accountability is seen as a social relationship or mechanism based on the requirement to explain and justify action. The accountability mechanism is thought to take place in a situation where the accountable party participates in different accountability forums. This is usually based on three steps. The first step is to share information, in which the actor justifies his or her actions to the forum, for example in the form of self-assessment reports. Reports can be based on results, financial metrics, or procedural problems. This is followed by a discussion phase in which the forum evaluates the performance of the accountable

party and asks questions to him or her if necessary. At the discussion stage, the accountable party is given the opportunity to answer questions and explain his or her actions. The debate and its intensity may vary depending on, for example, a personal performance appraisal or a parliamentary debate. The accountability forum is thought to end in a consequential phase when it will penalize, correct or reward the accountable party (if necessary). Accountability forums actually follow clear steps very rarely: the steps can take place at the same time or in reverse order. Also, it is possible that one step is completely missing. (Brandsma & Schillemans 2012: 954–955.)

Baxter and others (2017) mention four accountability problems that have emerged in the empirical studies. It is challenging to combine ethical principles of accountability with existing practices because decision-making and ethical reflection are often done automatically and intuitively. Accountability may sometimes require factors that have not been taken into notice. Another problem with accountability is based on administrative activities in complex networks that require multiple overlapping accountability relationships. The third problem is based on the paradox of autonomous action. Here, the accountable party must comply with top-down administrative principles, standards and codes. On the other hand, a public manager cannot be considered a responsible actor if he has lost his autonomy and discretion. Finally, the accountable party strives to avoid penalties, leading to incomplete reporting and dishonesty.

1.1.2   Accountability overload

Accountability has been criticized for manufacturing and overloading. This means excessive accountability forms, which further bureaucratises public action. The frustration of public actors may be exacerbated by the fact that evaluation criteria are changing and might be impractical, unrealistic and unclear. (Bovens et al. 2008: 227–228.) Excessive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms lead to undesirable results, which ultimately erode citizens' trust in politics, political processes and institutions (Salminen 2016: 9).

In order to lighten the overload, it may make sense to consider accountability through administrative problems. There are usually three types of problems that occur. The first is the most common, in which public officials do what they are supposed to do, but weakly or inefficiently. The problem is primarily managerial and can be solved through better supervision, training, or improved processes. Another and more difficult problem is the situation where public officials exceed their legitimate authority. Solutions can include increasing control in the public organization and compensating for damage. The third and most difficult problem is based on insufficient action or outright passivity on the part of public officials. For example, individual officials may avoid rather than actively participate in the development of their areas of responsibility. (Peters 2014: 212–213.)

In addition to accountability overload, there should be a mention of the accountability deficit, which has historically been a larger problem than now. In such a situation, civil servants have not had to justify their actions to different accountability forums. There are also situations where it has been difficult for policymakers to take responsibility for the unethical activities of ever-growing and increasingly complex agencies. (Bovens et al. 2008: 229.)

In response to talk about accountability overload, Dubnick (2011) has written about accountability as an ontological concept. In this case, accountability relationships are not secondary to governance. On the contrary, they are present in the very establishment of the social relationships that constitute governance. (Dubnick 2011: 707–709.)

As we can see, the issue of responsibility is very complex. This is clearly shown in the accountability overload and the ever-changing forms of responsibility. In order to clarify the situation, the starting point of this study is to look at the responsibility forms on the basis of administrative doctrines. This also delimits the research problem. Each of the three administrative doctrines communicates responsibility following its own kind of logic. For bureaucratic theory, responsibility is something that is implemented in hierarchical arrangements; NPM understands it to be dependent on market-based arrangements; NPG, in turn, emphasizes the priority of networks in achieving accountability. If the administrative doctrines would be ignored, there would be not enough attention to the doctrinal principles that are underlying the different forms of responsibility.

1.1.3 Technical rationality in the responsibility forms

It is difficult to assess responsible public management without talking about administrative reforms (Dubnick 2011). Administrative reform is ultimately based on two goals, which are efficiency or equity: quite often these two goals conflict, with administrations having to seek compromise solutions (Lane 1997).

In public administration, efficiency is generally viewed through rationality, which is defined against different backgrounds: rationality can be understood concerning, for example, human beliefs, taking into account not only the consideration of actual choices but also the interpretation of beliefs about the world (Vakkuri 2009: 11; Elster 1983). According to Jun (2006: 215), technical rationality is essentially anti-democratic, as its focus is on economic goals. Habermas also uses the term cognitive-instrumental rationality for technical rationality (Habermas 1984a: 8–11). In turn, equity can be viewed through communicative rationality, in which case it is related to universal discursive principles (Morris 2009).

Technical rationality is the mainstream of public administration: in recent decades, public activity has been assessed primarily through Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness. In addition to these rather technical values, Menzel (2005: 25) emphasizes the importance of the fourth E, i.e. Ethics. In administrative ethics, the organizational behaviour is examined in an ethical framework (Simon 1997: 360). The task of administrative ethics is the application of moral and ethical principles in governance and decision-making in public organizations (see, e.g., Cooper 2001: 1–36).

Technical rationality can be seen as a child of enlightenment thinking, a line of thought whose consequences have turned against itself. Here, technical rationality doubts everything beyond the limits of calculation and usefulness, and if it can proceed free from external shackles, nothing will stop it (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 24). However, public organizations are not meant for just financial gain – and their responsibility cannot be measured by economic indicators alone. For example, the values of democracy and objectivity are combined with the ethos of public service. Therefore, "technical responsibility" should be complemented by communicative rationality, which is based on the democracy of public action (Habermas 1984a, 1984b).

In terms of communicative rationality, the technical rationality and the economic efficiency of public administration are problematic in the sense that they communicate in a distorted way: this, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of citizens toward public administration (Habermas 1975). Alternatively, *communicatively* rational actors follow ethical principles in discourse: this kind of ideal speech situation leads to undistorted communication, increasing understanding, trust, knowledge, and consensus among participants (Cukier et al. 2004: 239). Thus, the responsibility of public management within the framework of technical rationality is not sufficient if communicative rationality is left out of the discussion.

Traditionally, organizational communication has been outlined through technical rationality. In the bureaucratic organization described by Weber (1980), communication occurs hierarchically downward, where there are usually two forms for conveying information: (1) information about an organization's current or future situation, new organizational practices, decisions, and changes in operational practices; (2) information regarding the performance of tasks, in which case subordinates are technically instructed to achieve objectives in an effective manner (Hirokawa 1979). Katz and Kahn (1966) offer five types of downward communication, which are job guidance, job definition, procedures and practices, feedback, and indoctrination. Indoctrination refers to the process by which a person identifies with the activities and goals of an organization (Beyer et al. 2000). The success of modern organizations also requires *upward* communication, with critical feedback being particularly important (Tourish & Robinson 2006). However, upward

feedback is challenging in many organizations because of the, for example, silence of subordinates (Detert et al. 2010) or resistance (Kassing 2011).

Communication in technical rationality can jeopardize the goals of public action. According to Adams and Balfour (2009), "administrative evil" is disguised as power mechanisms, such as administrative status and role or technical language use. This is especially the case with bureaucratic administration. However, the new forms of responsibility found in NPM and NPG pose their challenges. A culture of technical rationality leads to moral inversions, in which evil is communicated as something positive or constructive (Adams & Balfour 2009: 4, 9). When assessing responsibility, it is important to pay attention to what is *not* communicated in addition to what is – and why (Forester 1980). For example, communication of rules is typically intersubjectively constructed, politically supported, and legally sanctioned (Williams 2015: 587). Therefore, communication is always at least partly founded upon institutional factors.

The administrative doctrines and their technical rationality have not been received merely positively. Both management and leadership have been criticized by researchers. In this respect, the best known "school" is Critical Management Studies (CMS). In addition to the work edited by Alvesson and Willmott (1992a), the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), published in 1979, which was based on a critique of functionalism in organizational research, is considered to have been a key factor in shaping CMS. Management has been criticized since it became a big social factor at the turn of the 18th and 19th century. Smith (2015), for example, criticized the managers of a corporation for not being able to pay as much vigilance to the money of others as, for example, entrepreneurs to their own. Due to the broad theoretical pluralism of CMS, there is no way to distinguish critical from non-critical research, although some criteria may include neglecting efficiency thinking, demonstrating organizational irrationality, and going through a philosophical and methodological debate. (Fournier & Gray 2000; Parker 1995.)

The impact of CMS on the mainstream of management research has been small: although critical management research is empirical research, its theories, methods, and results are strongly tied to their field (Visser 2010). On the other hand, the same can be said about the mainstream of administrative science or its centricity on positivism (Autioniemi 2019). Although CMS, as its name implies, has shown its critique of management practices, criticism rarely translates into practice. (Foster & Wiebe 2010; Alvesson & Willmott 1992b).

In the study, administrative doctrines are assessed through communicative rationality. All three administrative doctrines convey communicative structures to management practices, staff, other organizations and stakeholders, and society through their activities. The doctrines differ in their structures and views about responsible public management.

For example, formality as a form of accountability is a priority for bureaucracy. For network management, formality would make responsibility more difficult.

There is very little research on public management responsibility in terms of communicative action. The closest to the topic is Ahn's (2009) *Position and Responsibility*, which is strongly based on the philosophy of Habermas. In his book, Ahn introduces the concept of positional self in describing the role and responsibilities of civil servants. Ahn argues that the positional self has a broader responsibility than the subjective self to act under the expectations of its formal position. The positional self, however, is not reduced to the responsibility of the formal position, but seeks its moral basis outside this. Thus, the positional self is a member of two worlds – a mediator of the cultural lifeworld and the administrative system. According to Ahn, such agency has two dimensions, the first based on subjectivity and the second on the instrumentality of organizational action.

How, then, can the positional self find its moral basis in the lifeworld and transmit it to the system? According to Ahn, the positional self represents the democratic values and communicative rationality of the lifeworld, according to which he should act responsibly in his formal position in the system. The positional self becomes the moral self when it transcends its subjective dimension by acting following intersubjective moral norms. Ahn complements the positional self with Niebuhr's theory that those in formal positions should approach their duties not only based on law but absolute justice (Ahn 2009: 119, 233).

Ahn's work opens up the relationship between the lifeworld and the system from an administrative point of view. It also shows why this dichotomy is important for the responsibility of public management. Unfortunately, Ahn's work is almost devoid of administrative literature, and its understanding of public administration is based on Weber's theory of bureaucracy. Ahn draws attention to corrupt practices of money and power that are unethical in nature. However, administrative doctrines and different forms of responsibility can open up public management from a broader perspective. Therefore, it is important to apply Habermas' communicative action theory not only to the identity of the public manager, but also to the administrative strata and discourses, which influence the public manager's perception of himself/herself, his/her work, and his/her responsibilities.

Responsible public management needs more philosophical debate. Failure to understand metaphysical background assumptions leads to problems in every discipline. Scott and Hart (2001: 420) present three of these problems for public administration. First, the public administration has implicit assumptions about human agency. Because these assumptions have not been reviewed in a critical light, administrative action has led to aimlessness and morally questionable consequences. Second, if the normative dimension

of public administration is reduced to the values of efficiency and other economical criteria, public administration is in moral bankruptcy. Third, due to technological developments, administrations are in a position to increase technical control. If public administration does not consider its actions morally, technical control can lead to negative consequences – and sometimes to a straightforward totalitarianism.

1.1.4   Administrative reform impact to responsibility

Three different waves can be found for administrative reforms. The first wave prevailed from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, when public administration was developed through rational and hierarchical planning and cost-benefit analysis. The NPM, which began in the late 1970s and lasted until the late 1990s, emphasized the importance of private sector practices to improve efficiency. The last wave, which lasted from the late 1990s to the present day, has no prevailing model, but its key concepts include governance, networks, and partnerships. (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 11.) During the 21st century, ethics has become a central topic in public administration (Menzel 2005: 25).

Perspectives on administrative doctrines are intertwined in the practices of public management, and pure applications derived from them are not easy to find. Also, it is often thought that the doctrines should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as complementary. NPM, for example, is no longer a separate trend, as its principles have become part of the mainstream and core of modern governance thinking. (Kurkinen 2016: 145–146; Denhardt 2011: 149; Hyyryläinen 2012a; Salminen 2008: 71–79; Merilä 2008: 66.)

The mixing of features of administrative reforms is parallel to the hybridization of organizations. Public organizations are not governed by principles based on a single doctrine, which complicates public responsibility. Indeed, a hybrid organization refers to a situation where different operating logics and values from both private and public sectors are present in the organization. In literature, hierarchies and market relations are often thought to form a kind of conceptual dichotomy – in reality, organizations use both forms to organize their activities (Johanson & Vakkuri 2018: 3–4; Karré 2011: 23–25; Skelcher & Smith 2015: 433–435).

By definition, hybrid organizations seek to integrate the interests of civil society and the market, as well as to trade between community solidarity and resources (Jäger & Schröer 2014). Criticism suggests that hybrid organizations represent economic and cultural risk for the public sector. The risk here is the loss of accountability in an increasingly complex management environment. However, it is argued that many negative effects can be prevented through active regulation and high professionalism (Brandsen & Karré 2014). No clear conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the operational logics and governance mechanisms in hybrid organizations – rather, they lead to mixed

consequences that depend on, for example, the service sector, markets, and policy factors (Grohs 2014). For example, in social and health care, there have been difficulties in defining a hybrid organization, due to the diversity of theories and approaches. Hybrid organizations change their chameleon-like shape depending on who perceives them. (Powell & Castelli 2017.)

1.2 Research questions

The research questions are:

1. How has responsible public management been taken into account in the three administrative doctrines, namely, bureaucratic theory, New Public Management and New Public Governance?

2. How can the forms of responsibility highlighted in administrative doctrines be assessed using responsibility as understood in Habermas' communicative way as a starting point?

Examining the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines does not provide a description of how responsibility is realized in practice, but it does include notions of what kind of responsibility is possible and desirable. Therefore, the research provides an opportunity to understand what practical organizational and management arrangements are required to implement and support responsibility. They are not the primary research question of this study, but they can be completely excluded from the study design.

In this study, Habermas' communicative action theory serves as a kind of theoretical lens for the evaluation of the notions of responsibility in administrative doctrines (cf. Reckwitz 2002). The lens here refers to an interpretive frame of reference that allows certain empirical claims to be made and others to be excluded. It forms a heuristic tool that sensitizes to seeing and analyzing perceptions of responsibility in administrative doctrines in a particular way. It can be used to question the familiar and create new ways of thinking. Habermas' theory of communicative action thus helps to say something about the forms of responsibility in bureaucratic theory, New Public Management, and New Public Governance that could not otherwise be stated.

The choice of the research question is justified as follows. A key consideration for public responsibility is that administrative reforms have not improved public trust in the public administration. The abductive assumption of the study is that this is due to the efficiency-centricity and technical rationality of administrative doctrines, as well as the neglect of procedural democracy. Therefore, the various forms of responsibility should be viewed through administrative doctrines, as they function as the underlying principles of these

forms. The different forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines are assessed in terms of communicative action. These criteria can be used to critically assess the procedural democracy (or the lack of) in administrative doctrines. Responsibility forms that emphasize efficiency are not only complex today – but also technicalize and undermine public responsibility. Ultimately, this manifests itself as a weakening of the legitimacy of the public administration.

The study examines forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines through macro, meso, and micro levels (Bowman & West 2018: 26–27). In terms of public responsibility and accountability, consideration of all three levels is needed. The idea is to interact between these levels. For example, societal debate and political decision-making about the role of the public sector lead to changes in the values and practices of public organizations. Changes, in turn, can affect psychological agreements and responsible behaviour at the individual level. Demmke and Moilanen (2012: 706–708) provide three external factors that influence ethical issues in public management. The first of these is administrative doctrines and reforms (meso). Another factor relates to the subjective experience of organizational ethics and fairness (micro). The third factor is the economic dimension and financial cuts that may weaken the organizational culture (macro).

Figure 1. Responsibility in micro, meso and macro levels (Bowman & West 2018: 26).

Responsibility forms can be contradictory. The citizen can expect social justice, honesty, transparency and fairness from the public administration: instead, the public manager can consider independence, legality, economy and cost-consciousness as its core principles. (Salminen 2010: 34–35.) But who determines the order of priority? What is rational in a situation like this? Within the framework of technical rationality, the question cannot be

answered thoroughly. Its focus is on the efficiency of the operation and not on the choice of goals that guide the operation. Instead, the answer to communicative rationality is that importance is determined by the citizen involved in the deliberative dialogue.

Administrative doctrines open up the issue of responsibility in different ways since they describe technical rationality from different perspectives. Each doctrine of administration seeks to improve the effectiveness of public action according to its logic. What one administrative doctrine considers rational is not necessarily within the scope of another doctrine. The same applies to responsible operations in public administration. The internal functioning of a public organization can best be viewed through bureaucratic management doctrine. It is more natural to approach the relationship of a public organization to contractual features such as outsourcing and tendering through market orientation. The operation of public organizations in networks is again determined through the NPG.

The study is based on traditional literature research and aims to form a critical review. The traditional literature review is considered to be the most common form of literature review in the social sciences. The literature review is about a method and research technique that examines the research done. (Efron & Ravid 2019: 21; Salminen 2011: 1, 3.) The purpose of a traditional literature review is to analyze literature and produce a new view of it: where a systematic literature review often forms a quantitative synthesis, the synthesis of a qualitative literature review is qualitative (Gregory & Denniss 2018).

The scope of the research questions is the reason why the traditional approach was chosen as the method of literature review. Nor are the questions explorable empirically, leaving meta-research as the only option. The traditional literature review is the recommended method when dealing with broad research questions rather than specific questions: in addition, the traditional approach is particularly suited to topics of specific problem management and historical development (Cook & Mulrow 1997; Green et al. 2006). The study assesses the responsibility of public management through historical developments represented by administrative reforms. The strengths of the traditional literature review are considered to be interpretation, critique, and deepening of understanding (Greenhalgh et al. 2018).

According to Cook and Mulrow (1997), a traditional literature review may be better suited than a systematic literature review to research with little previous research on the topic. Also, the review can create analogies between two independent research areas and integrate them conceptually. Obviously, communicative theory and the responsibility of public management are two areas of research: the first of these represents social philosophy and the latter public administration. There is no research on the responsibility of public management as communicative action.

A traditional literature review aims to provide a comprehensive description of the phenomenon under study, which may lead to the classification of the phenomena. A traditional literature review provides a broad picture of the topic at hand and describes the history and development of the topic. This traditional literary study is commentary in nature. The traditional literature review is divided into three implementation methods, which are editorial, commentary, and overview. The purpose of a commentary review is to provoke discussion – meaning the literature review is not a strict method. (Efron & Ravid 2019: 25; Salminen 2011: 6–7.)

Due to its commentary nature, the study is normative. Rolin (2006: 16) writes that value freedom in traditional research *is itself a normative position* according to which the researcher should distinguish epistemic from non-epistemic values when assessing the acceptability of a scientific hypothesis or theory. Whereas epistemic values are represented by values of truth, consistency, and honesty, non-epistemic values consist of public interest or views of a just society. In addition to epistemic values, this study is also defined by non-epistemic values, as it seeks to understand public administration from a normative perspective. Applied social science does not always meet the traditional ideal of value freedom. However, this does not mean that the social values of the researcher override the cognitive values of research (Rolin 2006: 33). Instead, it is a situation where societal values influence the interpretation and application of epistemic values. Rolin bases his position on Kuhn's (1962) philosophy of science, according to which non-epistemic values influence the assessment of the acceptability of a theory.

2 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METHODOLOGY

The task of the social sciences can be understood as raising self-understanding and self-control of social systems. As part of the social sciences, administrative science uses social science research methods. At least two partially overlapping tasks can be defined for administrative science. According to the broader task, administrative science studies all types of organized activities of society, in which case the common denominator is administration. The narrower task again starts from the study of the special features of the public activities of the society. In this case, the common denominator is the *public administration*. (Salminen 2002: 19–21.)

Today, the prevailing research approach in administrative science is based on quantitative-statistical and behavioural-empirical starting points. Only a few journals in the field are based on, for example, a hermeneutic-qualitative extract (Frederickson et al. 2012: 162–163). Administrative science follows the key ideals of the positivist scientific tradition, which are the objective observation of scientific research methodology, value neutrality and mathematically formed laws and theories (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti 2006: 133–134). Nevertheless, positivist considerations criticize administrative science for the fragility of identity and lack of boundaries. However, this is not necessarily a weakness in administrative science. According to the opposite view, administrative science must be specifically conceived as an interdisciplinary field based on human practices. (Raadschelders 2010: 131–133; Shafritz & Hyde 2012: 10–11.)

The debate in administrative science on public responsibility can be tentatively addressed through a debate between Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo. How should the topic be studied? Where early administrative science sought the principles of governance from practice, Simon and his successors based their research on scientific principles. Simon's research roots go back to the traditions of positivism and logical positivism, represented, for example, by Comte, Carnap, and the Vienna circle. Simon's greatest critic of positivist science was Waldo: according to him, the problems of administrative science cannot be solved by logical positivism. Whereas the natural sciences are interested in the question "What is the matter?", administrative science includes the sociological question "What should be done?" Waldo emphasizes administrative science as a democratic theory. According to Waldo, the main obstacles to the development of democratic theory are the positivist notions that efficiency is a value-neutral concept and that efficiency must be understood as the central concept of administrative science. (Waldo 1952; Simon et al. 1952; Riccucci 2010: 10–12; Frederickson & Hart 2001.)

This study follows the ethos of Waldo, as it is based on seeing administrative sciences as a democratic theory. The problems of administrative science indeed cannot be solved by scientific ideals. On the contrary, these ideals make it difficult for procedural democracy

to take place in public administration. What Simon's administrative science considers rational is not necessarily rational in Waldo's sense. The rationality of scientific ideals is instrumental or technical rationality that is fundamentally concerned with means and goals (Horkheimer 2008). It concerns the validity of procedures for more or less given goals, that is, self-evident goals and does not put much consideration on whether the goals themselves make sense. According to this study, responsible public management is inevitably an ethical question that cannot be answered objectively or value-neutrally. Attention is inevitably drawn to the rationality of the objectives of the public administration and not only to the rationale of the procedures.

2.1 Abductive content analysis

According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018), theory and research framework mean the same thing in qualitative research in the sense that they both are based on concepts and their meanings. However, the research framework contains the methodology guiding the research and what is already known about the studied phenomenon (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). In any case, the importance of theory should not be underestimated. The cornerstone of qualitative research is the theoretical dependency of observations, according to which the research results depend on the observation method and the characteristics of the researcher. Thus, knowledge cannot be entirely objective, since it depends on subjective features such as the researcher's understanding of the phenomena.

The research is based on abductive content analysis. Content analysis can be deductive, inductive as well as abductive (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002: 98). Content analysis is text analysis in which documents are analyzed systematically and objectively (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). Deductive based content analysis is based on an already existing theory or model. In inductive content analysis, the study proceeds from specific observations to the generalization of the phenomena at hand. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 83).

The abductive content analysis moves between deductive and inductive content analysis, where the goal is not to test a theoretical model, but to evaluate ideas for a new kind of thinking and interpretation in terms of a chosen theoretical framework. In abductive content analysis, the analysis of the data is initially done inductively, in which case the subcategories of the analysis are from the research material. Later, however, the theoretical framework and its upper categories are used in the analysis of the material. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2012: 96, 112; Puusa 2020.) In other words, abductive content analysis is based on examining the phenomenon, identifying themes and models, and examining them with means of a theoretical framework (Dudovskiy 2016).

The idea of abductive content analysis is that making observations depends on a guiding idea, which can be either an intuitive concept or a well-formulated hypothesis. Thus, content analysis is not entirely inductive, but neither is it completely deductive. With the help of the guiding idea, the observations arising from the data can be examined concerning the assumed important facts. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; Grönfors 1982: 33–37.) For this reason, abductive content analysis is suitable for creating a new theory or formulating an existing theory in a new topic (Dudovskiy 2016; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018).

The abductive content analysis of this study is justified by the fact that the theoretical framework is based on Jürgen Habermas' communicative action theory, which is applied in a new context. Habermas' thinking is by no means unknown in administrative science, but it has not been previously applied in the examination of public responsibility. The study evaluates the responsibility of public management at the macro, meso and micro levels based on research material, but the themes arising from them are analyzed through communicative action theory. The choice of abductive analysis is also supported by the fact that there is no purely inductive reasoning or analysis – research is always defined by the researcher's preconceptions and interpretations of the phenomenon under study (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006). The research is also not served by deductive content analysis, as its purpose is not to test the finished theory, but to formulate the theory in a new topic.

As the name implies, abductive content analysis cannot be reduced to either inductive or deductive reasoning alone (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). The analysis is not purely deductive, as the analysis is not based on deductive reasoning. On the other hand, abductive content analysis is not entirely inductive. Although it is based on inductive reasoning in terms of data, the theory is applied to assess the results. Whereas in deductive content analysis the research material is examined by applying a certain theory, in abductive content analysis the researcher approaches the material on its terms and only as the analysis progresses forces it to a certain theory (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). Therefore, in abductive content analysis, there is no ready-made rule as to at what point the theory begins to guide reasoning. For this reason, Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018) write that the analysis of the material is also about "the logic of invention".

According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2018), in abductive content analysis, "theory formation is possible when a guiding idea or clue is involved in making observations". Abductive content analysis usually begins with surprising observations that are sought to be explained by the most probable cause (Timmermans & Tavory 2012). For this reason, abductive content analysis can be called conclusion-based reasoning (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018). Karlsen et al. (2020) write that the abductive element of the analysis can serve as a preliminary premise of research, which is based, for example, on the researcher's

prediction or preliminary review of the research literature on the phenomenon under investigation.

In the study, responsible public management is examined inductively, i.e. material-based, through the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines. A preliminary review of the research literature shows that the literature outlines the themes through the concepts of responsibility, accountability, responsiveness, compliance, and integrity. The deductive part of the study is represented by Habermas' procedural democracy and discourse ethics. Because the research is theory-bound, its upper categories are predetermined.

Although Habermas provides a way to understand discourses, he has not defined a strict methodology for the analysis (Cukier et al. 2004: 239). At the same time, this can be seen as a weakness and strength of his work, as it can be applied from different perspectives. For example, Cukier et al. (2004, 2009) have utilized four validity requirements in their research, which are clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and truthfulness. Instead, Fast (2013) has used three validity requirements instead of four in their study, which are truth/facts, rightness/norms, and truthfulness/sincerity.

In this study, Habermas' discourse ethics is operationalized in the light of four upper categories, from which the forms of responsibility in bureaucratic theory, NPM, and NPG are examined. The four upper categories are derived from the ideal speech situation, namely, the principle of openness, the principle of freedom of speech, the principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity. Such a classification has been applied, for example, by Gillespie et al. (2014) who investigate communication gaps in health care. In this study, the four upper categories are supplemented by four validity requirements within the principle of authenticity, as all of these requirements are ultimately based on a view of the authenticity of discourse.

> **The principle of openness.** The principle means keeping the discourse open to arguments and objections, questions and answers. Everyone should be able to take part in the debate. Everyone should also be active – participation is not enough. Thus, the dialogue is based on an exchange of ideas between the participants.

> **The principle of freedom of speech.** Everyone must have the freedom to interpret and criticize statements, which leads to the elimination of unreflected prejudices from communication. Freedom of speech also means that participants have no power or knowledge or need to be diminished.

> **The principle of authenticity.** All participants should express their beliefs, wishes and needs. Discourse must also produce decisions that lead to practical action. The principle of authenticity also includes requirements for validity of discourse clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and truthfulness.

The principle of reciprocity. Participants have equal opportunities to be accountable and to hold others accountable. This also means that the role and authority of each participant can be taken into account in the discourse.

Since Habermas does not provide an exact methodology for applying his thinking, it is worth elaborating why the four principles constitute the upper categories in this study. For example, the four principles of an ideal speech situation better describe the dynamics between the actors involved in the discourse than the validity requirements. All administrative doctrines have their perceptions of agency. In fact, agency is a very important issue in terms of accountability. It is not just a question of whether the claims communicated by administrative doctrines are clear, honest, legitimate, or truthful. It is also important to assess how the doctrines perceive accountability through openness, which is a key principle for the realization of communicative rationality. Like the claims of validity, the principles of the ideal speech situation also bring administrative doctrines closer to the validity of norms.

Nevertheless, the authenticity of discourse must be viewed critically, both externally (from what preconceptions and motives doctrines *present* responsibility) and internally (how responsibility is *understood* in the discourse). For external authenticity, the requirements for validity are paramount. In this case, attention is paid to the motives and ideological starting points underlying administrative doctrines, which can affect communication in a distorting way. On the other hand, internal authenticity is based on how responsibility is constructed as an internal activity of the discourse. In this case, the focus is not on the authenticity of the background influences of the administrative doctrines, but on the authenticity of the agency they convey.

The criteria for communicative action are rather ideal. Researchers applying communicative action theory understand that discursive ethical principles are constantly violated in practical discourse. However, this is not necessarily a negative side. The principles should often be seen as counterfactual ideals against which conventional communication can be viewed critically (Yuthas 2002: 144). The principles represent the validity of norms from which the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines are assessed (facticity). The principles can be used to ask, for example, what kind of interaction or participation administrative doctrine understands as responsible – or how different values in the discourse are treated.

The purpose of the study is not only that the theoretical framework would structure the research material. Utilizing the material, the study can also specify how Habermas' communicative action theory can be applied in administrative ethics and what *communicatively* responsible public management could mean. The strength of abductive analysis can be seen in the fact that there is a stronger interaction between data and theory (Coffrey & Atkinson 1996). Abductive reasoning sometimes combines material orientation

and ready-made models creatively, which is why something new can emerge as a result (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2018).

But what would responsible public management mean according to communicative criteria? A more detailed answer to the question can be found in the third chapter of the study. In any case, communicative responsibility is based on the openness of communication and dialogical interaction, in which actors are in an authentic and reciprocal relationship with each other. Responsible public management must not only take into account the rational demands of citizens. It should also contribute to the creation of public institutions based on an increase in communicative action in public administration.

Overall, a positive and a negative definition of communicative responsibility can be given. This division is based on Berlin's (1958) characterization of positive and negative freedom, where the former means freedom *to* something and the latter freedom *from* something. The definitions above for communicative responsibility are positive in nature, i.e., something that public management should move toward. Responsibility can also be defined in a negative sense. In this case, any pre-existing forms of responsibility are assessed in terms of an ideal speech situation. Thus, the aim is not so much to actually drive some form of responsibility – but rather to critically assess the prevailing forms of responsibility using the criteria of communicativeness.

The negative definition of communicative responsibility is also an aim of this study. Communicative action theory does not provide an answer to what kind of norms should exist. Instead, theory can be used to evaluate the processes from which norms are formed (Yuthas et al. 2002). Also, Habermas describes his conception of procedural democracy as neutral and independent of competing worldviews, since his attention is focused on the processes of communication (Habermas 1996: 288).

2.2 Process of the literature review

In this study, the traditional literature review is based on five steps (Gregory & Denniss 2018): (1) choice of topic and audience, (2) searching and re-searching for literature, (3) criticism of literature, (4) finding the logical structure of the research, and (5) evaluating the literature review.

The first step is to choose a topic and an audience. The topic is the responsibility of public management assessed in terms of administrative doctrines and communicative action. It should be noted that communicative action theory is considered as one of the background theories of NPG. However, the study does not treat the theory as an internal dimension of

the doctrine. NPG might also contain elements that are problematic in terms of communicative criteria, and hence, require critical assessment.

However, one significant question arises. Does not this study inevitably end up with NPG being closest to the communicative criteria? This is a good remark. Obviously, there are similarities between these two. After all, NPG is intended to increase deliberation in both government and society as a whole. Despite this, NPG is not equal to communicative action. NPG, like the other administrative doctrines, might lead to negative consequences in practice. Even though NPG adds more weight to the communication than other doctrines, this does not mean that this communication can be understood as valid in terms of discourse ethics. For example, deliberation in networks might not be authentic but based upon straightforward manipulation of the participants (Arnstein 1969). The study argues that network-like arrangements in terms of communication are such an important issue for the public responsibility that it cannot simply be ignored.

The audience of the study is administrative and social scientists who are interested in the issues of public responsibility and administrative ethics. Second, the study is useful for all public managers or experts and scholars who lead and develop public administration with ethical issues in mind. The study seeks to provide a reflection on why the public manager leads how he/she leads, and what administrative principles affect his/her actions or responsibilities.

The second step is searching and re-searching for literature. The primary sources of research are scientific articles, monographs, dissertations and edited volumes. Scientific journals include Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, Public Integrity, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Administration & Society, Public Integrity, and Journal of Business Ethics. These journals are considered by many metrics (e.g., Impact factor, Google Scholar Metrics, JUFO) to be the leading scientific publications in the field. Therefore, articles published in these journals enjoy the largest attention among researchers, practitioners and experts alike.

In this study, the research material has been retrieved using databases, which are EBSCO, Sage Journals Online, Emerald Journals, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library and Finnish Elektra. The research material has been searched for with the keywords "responsibility", "accountability", "compliance", "integrity", "responsiveness", "bureaucratic theory", "New Public Management", "New Public Governance" and "Communicative action". The same was done with Finnish equivalents. The source material has been tried to keep broad and interdisciplinary intentionally. This is because the issues of public responsibility are defined by different fields of interest, such as social theory, administrative ethics, and administrative doctrines.

The third step is based on criticism. The literature should not only be compiled but analyzed in a critical fashion. The synthesis of the literature review is based on the characterization by Efron and Ravid (2018: 184). This includes (1) material grouping, (2) source comparison and finding differences, (3) evaluating conflictual findings, and (4) adopting a critical perspective. The study synthesizes through the four principles of discourse ethics at the end of the main chapters.

Qualitative research is based on the hermeneutic idea that human action is nothing without interpretation (Reiter 2006; Gadamer 2004). As Rennie (2012) argues, "qualitative research is hermeneutical, entailing application of the method of the hermeneutic circle to text about experience and/or action" (Rennie 2012: 385). Every interpretation of phenomena depends on historical and cultural dimensions. In addition, the hermeneutic idea according to which pure observation is impossible is followed by Habermas: "Everyday experience that can be transformed into scientific operations is, for its part, already symbolically structured and inaccessible to marine observation" (Habermas 1984a: 110). Thus, the requirement for "objectivity" of knowledge is questionable.

Alasuutari (2011) introduces the factual perspective and the sample perspective to the qualitative data. This study represents the latter. The factual perspective understands research material as a reflection of reality. The sample perspective in turn sees the reality depending on the perspectives and values of different actors and discourses. Therefore, the perspective is based on social constructionism. Administrative doctrines do not only serve as "objective" or "value-free" descriptions of responsibility. As discourses, they also change social reality. Hence, arguments communicated by these doctrines should not be viewed uncritically as neutral or describing theories – and the language they use is not just conveying information.

In philosophy, hermeneutics studies the interpretation and understanding of meanings (Heidegger 2000). In hermeneutics, the process of understanding never actually ends but deepens as a result of new interpretations regarding the world. This process is called the hermeneutic circle. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2003: 34–35; Laine 2001.) Also, the hermeneutic circle does not describe any particular research method. Rather, all human activity relies on this interpretive process (Heidegger 2000: 191, 193). However, understanding the conditions of the hermeneutic circle is also important for research and science. This is the case with misunderstandings and preconceptions, which should not affect, for example, the content analysis in a negative sense. Also, Karlsen et al. (2020) argue that the hermeneutic circle has similarities to abductive content analysis. To both of these approaches, the process of understanding is dependent on the interpretative horizon that gives meaning to phenomena and experience as a whole.

Phenomena   Interpretation

Pre-
understanding

Deepening
understanding

Researcher
understanding

Figure 2. The hermeneutic circle

Greenhalgh and others (2018) specify various forms of research within the literature review, such as probabilistic and hermeneutic understanding. Whereas the probabilistic truth is represented in a meta-analysis of a systematic literature review, the narrative literature review emphasizes the process of understanding based on interpretation (*Verstehen*). In this study, the literature review means critical reflection and in-depth interpretation. Greenhalgh and partners argue that a narrative literature review offers a more in-depth interpretation of the research phenomena than, for example, many methods in systematic literature research which are especially criticized for shallowness (Greenhalgh et al. 2018).

The fourth step for the literature review is to find a logical structure. In addition to the introduction and conclusions, the logical structure of this study is based on the chapters "Responsibility and society", "Bureaucratic theory and hierarchical responsibility", "NPM and responsibility for results" and "NPG and accountability as network accountability". The chapter "Responsibility and society" draws attention to the social and ethical framework for the responsibility of public management. This is represented by Habermas' philosophy and Schwartz's value theory. In addition to communicative action, the themes of the chapter are the democratization of public administration, the idea-based definitions of public administration and responsibility as good governance.

3 RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIETY

This chapter looks at public responsibility at the macro level, from a societal perspective. Thus, the focus is particularly on the systemic nature of public administration. The reason for this is quite simple. If the societal perspective is not taken into account, responsibility issues can be reduced to the technical management of processes and results. Effective management of inputs and outputs is of course of great importance – but in public administration, they also have a social dimension. Responsible public management is a subject that requires an ethical basis. Technical rationality provides an ethical basis for responsibility, albeit a minimal one. For example, an extremely efficient public administration may at the same time be extremely unfair and unethical. Also, through communicative rationality, a broader ethical basis for public responsibility can be defined.

> *Hence, we suffer from the absence of "metaphysical direction." [...] Technological puzzle solving is not sufficient to set a sense of metaphysical direction in administration, unless we are willing to say that it is the purpose of administration. If we accept these kinds of standards as the criteria for judging the behaviour of administrative leadership, then the moral bankruptcy of administration is complete in terms of the inadmission of other ethical criteria, e.g. humanistic, theological political.* (Scott & Hart 2001: 420.)

Public management requires taking into account the ethical and metaphysical dimension so that public responsibility does not become reduced to management under technical rationality. Responsible public management cannot and must not be morally bankrupt. Technical rationality excludes the metaphysical and ethical questions of accountability, which it is unable to address: "its untruth lies not in its analytical method, but in the fact that for it the whole process is already decided in advance" (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 46–47).

3.1 Communicative rationality

Communicative action is one of the main concepts of Habermas. In this study, Habermas' thought is examined particularly through works, *Faktizität und Geltung* (*Between Facts and Norms*) and *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (*The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1 and 2*). This study argues that communicative action follows Waldo's understanding of administrative science as a democratic theory. Communicative rationality constitutes a normative argument against the over-technicalisation of administrative science. For example, it opens up how public responsibility is not based only on organisational forms of responsibility but also on communicative conditions.

According to Habermas (1984a: 8–11), rationality can be divided into two different forms: cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. Cognitive-instrumental

rationality is based on the achievement of an instrumental goal or strategic action in which people are manipulated to act in the desired way. "A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realising his intention to intervene successfully in the world". (Habermas 1984a: 11). Thus, an action can be considered cognitively-meaningfully rational when the actor achieves the goal in the external or social world in an effective way. Indeed, Habermas calls cognitive-instrumental rationality "realistic", as it assumes the world as an external state of affairs, in which interventions are made based on feedback. In the case of an instrumental objective, the intervention takes place in the external world. If, in turn, it is a strategic objective, manipulation occurs in the social world. (Habermas 1984: 10–11.)

In turn, the aim of communicative rationality is consensus (Habermas 1984a: 8). If an action leads to agreement between at least some of the participants, it can be considered as a communicatively rational action. Whereas cognitive instrumental action assumes the world outside the actor, in communicative rationality the world is understood as a shared lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), which is mediated by the actors and the meanings they have given to the world. Thus, the objectivity of the world is something that is built on communicative criteria and the totality of different interpretations. Communicative rationality is based on 'phenomenology' rather than 'realism', as its focus is on the conditions of communication. (Habermas 1984a: 12–13.) Rationality from a phenomenological point of view seems to refer to an ideal speech situation in which, in a free and equal discussion, "the best argument wins" (Huttunen 2014).

3.1.1 Lifeworld as a foundation for communication

To understand what Habermas means by communicative action, it is worth going through the concepts of the lifeworld and the system. The lifeworld derives from the phenomenology of the philosopher Edmund Husserl (2011). Communicative action relies on the lifeworld, which is made up of taken-for-granted background assumptions. The interlocutors meet each other through the lifeworld. They can critique and confirm validity claims, reconcile their differences and reach consensus. In this way, the lifeworld is based on implicit and holistically constructed knowledge, which can never be subordinated to propositional knowledge exhaustively. Hence, the lifeworld is intuitively present, familiar and transparent. Its assumptions must be met for an actual proposition to be meaningful, i.e. valid or invalid. (Habermas 1984a: 335, 336; Habermas 1984b: 126, 131.)

> *The fundamental background knowledge that must tacitly supplement our knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically standardized expressions if hearers are to be able to understand their literal meanings, has remarkable propositions: it is an implicit knowledge that cannot be represented in a finite number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a knowledge that does*

not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we cannot make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please. (Habermas 1984a: 336.)

The lifeworld sets the basis for a communicative situation. In this situation, the subject can express its views on the world and justify them from the pre-conditions that govern communication. These preconditions are linked to the lifeworld and historical factors.

According to Habermas, the lifeworld is colonized by the system when traditional forms of life are segregated. In this case, the structural components of the lifeworld (culture, society and personality) are significantly differentiated. Here, the exchange relations between the lifeworld and the system are regulated by differentiated roles, such as being a client in administrative bureaucracies or being employed in workplaces. The monetary compensation of social rewards is mainly based on consumption and agency. (Habermas 1984b: 356.)

There is no doubt that the rationalisation of Western culture has had positive consequences. Citizens have the opportunity to express their personalities and judgement perhaps more widely than ever before. On the other hand, the negative consequences are also undeniable. It has led to a more complex society. It has also led to a shift of administrative mechanisms beyond the horizon of the lifeworld, which has undermined social openness. In addition to social integration, Habermas speaks of systemic integration, which competes with the principle of integration for understanding. This has disruptive consequences for the lifeworld. In social integration, the integration of the system of action is based on a common understanding, which is achieved communicatively or secured normatively. In systemic integration, integration takes place under non-normative control of the system, independent of individual actors. Systemic integration is non-normative, i.e. it is not based on encounters between members of the lifeworld. Thus, from a systemic perspective, the lifeworld constitutes its subsystem alongside the economy and administration. (Huttunen 2014; Habermas 1984a: 342–343; Habermas 1984b: 115–116.)

In fact, in a highly segregated society, the lifeworld is reduced to a subsystem. However, it should be noted that the lifeworld always defines the social system as a whole. Fundamentally, the administrative and economic subsystems must be anchored to the lifeworld. (Habermas 1984b: 154, 173.) This is done through the institutionalisation of law: "Simultaneously, interaction contexts are juridically structured – that is, formally reorganised in such a way that the participants can refer to legal claims in the case of conflict – where previously the conflicts arising in them had been managed on the basis of habit, loyalty, or trust" (Habermas 1996: 75).

It is quite understandable that for the economy and administration, for example, effective administrative doctrines are a necessity. However, the criticism regarding the doctrines

should not end here. The doctrines do not just simplify communication but reduce it to inputs and outputs such as rewards and punishments. Structural violence by the system means the systematic restriction of communication. Hence, the lifeworld is not required to coordinate action in modern society, as its role is weakened at the expense of efficiency-oriented administrative doctrines. The worlds of economy and administration reduce the costs and risks of communication – and in doing so, mechanise the lifeworld. (Habermas 1984b: 183, 187.)

Also, communication about rationality itself and position in society is narrowed to a great degree. Reason has never really guided social reality, but now it has been stripped of all special inclinations and preferences so thoroughly that it has finally given up judging even human actions and lifestyles (Horkheimer 2008: 21).

This is not all, however. Whether the system likes it or not, it cannot operate independently of the lifeworld. There must be a continuous connection between them. The economic and administrative worlds get their legitimacy from the processes of the lifeworld. If the reproduction of the lifeworld is disrupted, citizens will not give the administration the legitimacy it needs. Here, citizens may perceive the government as alien and irrelevant, and they may not be motivated to act following with its expectations.

However, the disconnection of the system from the lifeworld does not necessarily lead to a disruption of the reproduction of the lifeworld. From the aspect of communicative rationality, the disconnection from the lifeworld is itself a positive thing. However, the problem is that the systemic mechanisms re-enter the lifeworld in a colonializing way. Habermas calls the colonization of the lifeworld a situation in which the processes of renewal and normative regulation of the lifeworld are replaced by the control relations of *money* and *power*. In the Western countries, this has meant the monetarisation and bureaucratisation of the normatively regulated areas of the lifeworld. (Huttunen 2014.)

There is a need to analyse administrative doctrines more closely as structures of communication. Administration can legitimise and renew its activities while extending its power in society. For example, it can systematically exclude different social groups from its decision-making. It may rely on seemingly neutral expertise, which limits public debate, political argumentation and social participation. These factors are often at the root of the administration's communication, or lack thereof. (Forester 1980: 276–277.) However, there is at least one big question. Namely, how can the tension between the lifeworld and the system be mitigated?

3.1.2   Facticity and validity

In *Between Facts and Norms* (*Faktizität und Geltung*) Habermas (1996) examines how the rule of law can form valid norms. For Habermas, valid norm formation requires communicative action that is as free as possible from manipulation (Huttunen & Heikkinen 1998). To explain how this is possible, he uses the distinction between facticity and validity in his analysis.

The concept of facticity concerns not only the written law but also the "unwritten" law and the means of action adopted in practice to apply the law. The facticity of a norm indicates its compelling force. If a person violates a *de facto* norm, he can be censored or punished. (Huttunen 2014.) "I understand 'action norms' as temporally, socially, and substantively generalized behavioral expectations. I include among 'those affected' (or involved) anyone whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice regulated by the norms at issue" (Habermas 1996: 107).

Huttunen (2014) uses the school and the curriculum as an exemplary institution for the reality of norms. The curriculum is not only composed of laws or regulations. It also consists of how a school should operate. In addition to the written curriculum and other administrative regulations, numerous *de facto* norms are not found anywhere in a declared way (Huttunen 2014).

Now, let's think about the administrative doctrines through facticity. In terms of norms, public administration is based, first of all, on law and written law. However, it is not reduced to their imperative nature. Administrative doctrines consist of accepted management practices that seek to apply the law. They also set out, either explicitly or implicitly, what is considered responsible public management. Public responsibility would also justify a critical examination of the implicit norms found in the administrative doctrines. Otherwise, the unstated norms of these doctrines may affect public management in an unforeseeable way.

According to Habermas, normatively significant communication in society can only take place through the law, which is based on communicative action: "In modern societies as well, the law can fulfill the function of stabilizing behavioural expectations only if it preserves an internal connection with the socially integrating force of communicative action" (Habermas 1996: 84).

This cannot be done by living communication alone, which is regarded as inefficient from an economic and administrative point of view. "The circuit of lifeworld communication is interrupted at the points where it runs into the media of money and administrative power, which are deaf to messages in ordinary language; for these special codes not only have been differentiated from a more richly structured ordinary language but have been

separated off from it as well. [...] Law thus functions as the "transformer" that first guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together" (Habermas 1996: 56).

The tension between validity and facticity can be explored as shown in Figure 3 below. Validity refers to the validity of a norm from the point of view of those concerned. The validity of a norm refers to a situation where a rational and free discussion between the parties concerned has led to a consensus on the validity of the norms of action. Thus, facticity is the very opposite of validity – since it refers to the laws, regulations and rules that are actually in force. The idea is that the closer validity and facticity are to each other, the closer the community is to an ideal state. In reality, the validity and the facticity of a norm never correspond. (Habermas 1992; Huttunen 2014.)

VALIDITY

Consensus on the validity of norms
between the participants of rational and
free discussion

FACTICITY

The de-facto accepted binding nature of a norm,
which guides people's expectations of action and
is a prerequisite for social integration

Administrative principles, relationships and
practices

Figure 3.   The tension between validity and facticity (Huttunen & Heikkinen 1998, adapted).

Since the facticity of administrative norms never equals validity, one may ask the following. What is the use of such a task of Sisyphus anyway? One answer for this is that perhaps society can never be a fully ideal democracy, but it is worth striving for. This, at least, is the normative assumption of research. The second question relates to the idea of democracy. Public responsibility has traditionally been considered through the politics-administration dichotomy (Svara 2007: 4–5). Should not the principle of democracy be left at the level of politics – and out of public management?

The answer to this could be next. Responsible public management cannot only mean being in line with the politics-administration dichotomy. For Habermas, procedural democracy

is about undistorted communication in society so that the reproduction of the lifeworld is best guaranteed. Obviously, this distortion does not follow the logic of the dichotomy. The instrumentality of administrative action does not obviate the need to evaluate it from a discourse-ethical point of view. On the very contrary, the process of colonization shows that the administration can formulate its principles (at least partly) for its action, which are disadvantageous to society as a whole: "If the discourse of experts is not coupled with democratic opinion- and will-formation, then the experts' perception of problems will prevail at the citizens' expense. However, every difference of interpretation of this sort must, from the standpoint of the public of citizens, be seen as further confirmation of a systems paternalism that endangers legitimacy" (Habermas 1996: 350–351). As Habermas writes, it is ultimately also a question of the legitimacy of the administration since it is connected to the reproduction of the lifeworld.

Therefore, the public manager is a representative of two worlds – the lifeworld and the system of technical rationality. The separation of administrative action from subjective considerations represents, in part, the disconnection between these two worlds. This means that responsible public managers should be aware that they should not only implement the technical objectives of administrative action, but also the moral norms that emerge through communicative rationality (Ahn 2009).

Habermas' work can be best understood through the themes of modernity, rationality, its universal nature – and perhaps its downfall. Still, all is most definitely not lost. In terms of pessimism and optimism about modernism and rationality, Habermas is somewhere between Durkheim and Weber. He simply analyses the sources of the crisis and offers remedies. For Habermas, rationality opens, structures, enables – and on the other hand – it imposes, tears apart, obscures (Hoffrén 1999: 287). The contradictory nature of rationality is also central, if not the most central, for administrative science. Administrative structures that are intended to reproduce a functionally complex and rational society produce negative consequences for society. This highlights how both public administration and administrative science are the projects of modernity and its belief in rationality.

What criteria, then, should be used to assess the communicativeness of administrative doctrines to bring the facticity and validity of norms closer? To answer this question, it is necessary to go through Habermas' discourse ethics.

3.1.3   Discourse ethics and ideal speech situation

According to Habermas, the validity of a norm is based on the *principle of discourse*. A norm is valid if it is accepted by all participants in rational discourse. The *principle of egalitarianism* can also be found within the principle of discourse. Consensus on norms

emerges from open discussion. Discourse is also guided by the *principle of universalization*: only those norms are acceptable that can be accepted by all participants. The acceptability of a norm is judged by all the consequences that would result for them from following it. Communicative discourse, based on the principles of discourse, egalitarianism and universality, produces intersubjectively generated norms which, for Habermas, are universally accepted. Habermas argues that any norm can be critically tested against these principles. (Habermas 1990: 66; Hoffrén 1999: 289, 292–293).

From these principles, more general criteria for communicative discourse can be derived. The principles of discourse and universality imply a relationship between participants, whereby each participant recognises the right of each participant to accept or not to accept norms. Thus, the terms of communication involve a kind of minimal ethic. They require egalitarian neutrality of political and moral norms. This, in turn, has implications for the system of rights and fundamental rights. The legitimacy of law is based on the legal institutionalisation of the conditions of communication and the guarantee of private and public autonomy that it provides for citizens. The consequence of the intrinsic rationality of communicative action is that political and administrative authority must be derived from the people and their communicative power. Citizens legislate for themselves in a discursively constructed process of opinion and will formation. (Habermas 1990: 197; Hoffrén 1999: 296–297.) In such a situation, the norm can be considered valid.

Citizens are often critical of government communication, which is of course their implicit responsibility. Administrative systems can be effective, but only in limited areas: "Hence they depend on affected clients as citizens to instruct them about their external costs and the negative effects of their internal failures" (Habermas 1996: 350).

The above principles of discourse ethics can be put into more practical terms through an ideal speech situation. According to Habermas, an ideal speech situation is one in which ideal conditions prevail, and the best argument wins. These conditions are not constrained by power or ideology. Although Habermas later stopped talking about the ideal speech situation, the idea is considered a permanent feature of Habermas' work. (Huttunen 2007; Huttunen 2014.)

An ideal speech situation contains four conditions or "postulates". For this study, they will be referred to as "principles". These are the principle of openness, the principle of freedom of speech, the principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity (Habermas 1980: 86; Huttunen 2014). The principle of openness is based on the idea of keeping the discourse open to claims and counterclaims, questions and answers. Also, every participant must be allowed to take part in the discussion. According to the principle of freedom of speech, the freedom to interpret and criticise claims leads to the absence of unreflected biases that would interfere with communication. In this case, each participant is allowed to question any claim in the debate. The principle of openness and the principle

of freedom of speech allows for a communicative action in which the principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity is put into practice. In this case, each participant expresses his or her beliefs, wishes and needs in the debate (principle of authenticity). In addition, participants have equal opportunities to be accountable and to demand accountability from other participants in the discussion (principle of reciprocity). Furthermore, no participant should be prevented from exercising the rights represented by the preceding rules.

Other definitions of the ideal speech situation have been offered. For example, discourse ethics has been further developed by Björn Gustavsen (1992). The democratic dialogue he characterises is applied in communicative action research and the organisation of work conferences (Lehtonen 2004). Gustavsen's democratic dialogue can be presented according to the following rules:

1. The dialogue is based on an exchange of ideas between the participants.

2. Everyone concerned must be able to participate in the debate.

3. The opportunity to participate is not enough. All participants must be active.

4. All participants are equal. This means reducing power and knowledge differences between participants.

5. The genuine experiences of all participants are justified.

6. All participants must understand what is being discussed.

7. All the arguments raised on the subject under discussion are legitimate and cannot be dismissed without sufficient scrutiny.

8. Opinions are expressed orally, not just on paper.

9. Each participant must accept that other participants may have better arguments than him/herself.

10. Each participant's job role and authority, etc. can be discussed.

11. The dialogue must produce decisions that can lead to concrete action. (Gustavsen 1992; Stansbury 2009; Lehtonen 2004: 17-18.)

The *meaningfulness* of discourse is generally assessed by four criteria, which are the requirements for clarity, sincerity, legitimacy and truth. First, the discourse must be clear and coherent. From the point of view of the public administration, there can be no contradictory objectives in its activities. The debate must be based on honesty, i.e. on the

fact that the discourse means what it says. The public administration must do what it claims to do. The debate must take place in the right context. The words and meanings used for the public administration mean what they should. The discussion must be truthful. It also should be based on facts, not on lies or opinions. (Forester 1980: 278; Hyyryläinen 2014: 299.)

The validity of the discourse is called into question if the fulfilment of any criterion is doubtful. The facts on which arguments are based may not be reliable or they may be arbitrarily weighted. There is not always consensus on the meaning of the concepts used. Words can rarely match actions. Discourse may be complicated by contradictory elements. (Hyyryläinen 2014: 299.) From the perspective of public administration, the validity of discourse goes back to the legitimacy, i.e. the credibility of public administration in the eyes of citizens.

Through the lens of communicative action, public responsibility is a communicative phenomenon that can be explored through the following example questions. Is the public manager's communication clear so that everyone understands what he or she is doing? Are the terms used in the debate exclusively technical? Is the public manager's speech based on honesty, or does he mislead? Does he or she exploit the goodwill and lack of information of his or her listeners? Is the speech legitimate and appropriate to the context? Does the public manager abuse his or her professional status when taking into account the involvement of the person concerned? Is communication based on truth or is it false? Is there evidence for the public manager's claims? What do the other participants say?

Communicatively responsible public management

In terms of communicative rationality, the responsibility of public management is best ensured by critically assessing the communicativeness of administrative doctrines. But what can be considered as communicatively responsible public management in practice (a *positive* definition of communicative responsibility)? Communicative responsibility is close to Dubnick's (2011) mention of accountability as an ontological concept. In this case, accountability relations are understood as the creation of the fundamental relations of society, thus constituting governance in general: "Governance takes place within accountability spaces and we need to give priority to research that maps that space as a first step towards understanding the nature and potential of accountable governance" (Dubnick 2011: 704). In this study, this ontology of accountability is explored through Habermas' philosophy. Using discourse ethics, a normative basis for the ontology of accountability relations in governance can be provided by the criteria of communicative action.

Communicatively responsible public management subscribes to the view of the integrity perspective that public agency is determined by societal and collective values, not to forget

the public sector ethos. Since public managers have great freedom to apply their value orientations in decision-making, they should be expected to be capable of high ethical reasoning. The neutrality of public managers does not, therefore, imply value relativism – or that public managers do not have any values. On the contrary, in communicative terms, neutrality is based on the will-formation of procedural democracy and its processes.

Seeing accountability as mechanistic compliance can further undermine the value foundation of public administration because it focuses on formal and instrumental communication. In an increasingly complex society, institutions have imposed formal mechanisms and norms. In this case, the technical control through money and power replace the processes of reproduction of the lifeworld. The control is based on bureaucratisation, which can undermine citizen trust in the public administration. Thus, in addition to individual integrity, communicatively responsible public management is a matter of improving institutional integrity. Administrative doctrines should not focus too much on individualistic presumptions, since communication is always dependent on the nature of public institutions.

Emphasising moral reasoning, rather than just preventing unethical behaviour, is a way to improve the ethical culture and climate of public administration. The standards of communicatively responsible public management are based on social responsibility.

However, the validity of norms depends on their communicativeness. Communicatively responsible public management pays attention to the principles of clarity, honesty, legitimacy and truthfulness. The argument is that openness and transparency towards the public will, in the long run, enhance the legitimacy of public administration.

The key accountability relationship that defines governance is the horizontal relationship between the public administration and the citizen. Naturally, this means increasing horizontal accountability mechanisms. The democratic perspective of accountability emphasises accountability as a controlling and justifying function of the public administration.

Finally, communicatively responsible public management takes into account a dialogical, language-based and dialectical approach. However, new organisational practices in governance (such as contracting, outsourcing, networking) can undermine dialogue and transparency in public action. New practices should therefore be assessed not only in terms of economic efficiency but also through communicative rationality.

3.2 Responsibility as democratisation

Communication is partly determined through culture. This is also true of the system of rights. It is up to citizens themselves to claim and develop their rights in a given social context. (Hoffrén 1999: 297.) Shalom Schwartz's (1999, 2005) theory of values empirically shows how the democratisation of public administration affects equality, social justice and the universality of values in society. If public management does not pay attention to democracy, it may not only erode the legitimacy of public administration but also the value base of society. Hence, there is an undeniable social dimension to *public* responsibility.

According to Schwartz, there are common values independent of cultural factors. The words that describe these values have roughly the same meaning in different languages and cultures. Cultural values express implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about what is good, just and desirable in society. These cultural values form the basis of the norms through which social institutions such as the family or the political system operate. For example, leaders may refer to shared cultural values when justifying their actions in an organisation. (Schwartz 1999.) Schwartz identifies seven types of cultural values that can be observed in every society. These are:

Figure 4. Types of cultural values (Schwartz 1999: 29)

Figure 4 shows that these cultural values operate in tension with each other. This can be broken down into three different cultural tensions. According to Schwartz, the fundamental issue that affects all societies is the relationship between the individual and the group. This dimension is generally described by the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism. A collectivist evaluation of the relationship may argue that the individual's meaningfulness is traced back primarily to his or her social relations. Schwartz calls this

view embeddedness, which emphasises the importance of the group over the individual and the permanence of social relations rather than change. Schwartz calls the primacy of the individual, in turn, intellectual and affective autonomy. Intellectual autonomy refers to the autonomous freedom of individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual orientations. Affective autonomy, on the other hand, implies the freedom of individuals to achieve positive experiences, for example in the form of pleasure or exciting and varied life. (Schwartz 1999: 26–27.)

By hierarchy, Schwartz means a cultural orientation that highlights inequalities in social relations and power. The opposite of hierarchy is egalitarianism, where people perceive each other as morally equal and as individuals sharing basic human needs. Individuals socialised into egalitarianism have a universal interest in the well-being of all – their values transcend mere selfish interests. The third and final theme that concerns all societies is the relationship of humanity to the natural and social world. One response to this is based on the control and transformation of the world according to individualistic preferences or group preferences. By this Schwartz means mastery, a cultural orientation that emphasises control promotes values such as ambition, success, daring and competence. The opposite of mastery is harmony, which highlights unity with the environment. The cultural type of harmony includes, for example, the value of nature conservation (Schwartz 1999: 27–28).

Egalitarian universalism is concerned with the welfare and well-being of all people, which is reflected in the pursuit of social justice and equality. However, universalistic values are not equally inclusive in all societies, as their meaning varies from one society to another: one can therefore speak of societies with a broad or narrow moral universe. In societies with a large moral universe, universalistic values cover all groups in society. Conversely, in narrow societies, the values are thought to apply only to a small community, i.e. a group of close people. (Schwartz 2005: 217.)

Why does the scope of universalistic values in societies vary? Schwartz has explored this through three different cultural characteristics that increase or decrease the scope of values. These are (1) a cultural orientation that highlights egalitarianism, (2) a cultural orientation that emphasises the commitment of individuals to social groups, i.e. a restriction and orientation to the inner group, and (3) the degree of democratisation of governance, i.e. the nature of the administrative system. (Schwartz 2005: 226–227.)

Ethical universalism is a core principle of good governance: however, populism and ethical particularism are challenging universalism in political arenas (Mungiu-Pippidi 2020). This may have long-term consequences for the implementation of various forms of accountability, such as the prevention of corruption. With respect to good governance, neutral public administration is preferable to highly politicised governance (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017).

In an egalitarian society, there is a strong orientation towards equality. Citizens are socialised to experience each other as equals, which also implies a commonality of interests. Schwartz argues that a stronger cultural orientation towards equality is likely to be related to the extent of the moral universe. In an egalitarian society, citizens agree to cooperate voluntarily to manage interdependencies. Moreover, citizens are interested in the well-being of all. (Schwartz 2005: 224–226.) Examples of egalitarianism include market orientation and individualism, which can generate moral conflicts and dilemmas in society (Sandel 2012).

Schwartz refers to the phenomenon of restriction and protection by the inner group, where the culture maintains the status quo and limits the solidarity of the inner group. In this case, individuals have collectively attached individuals who identify with the ingroup, participate in a common way of life and pursue common goals. The ingroup has clear boundaries with outsiders. The assumption is that society's orientation towards cultural protection is linked to the narrowness of the moral universe. The second hypothesis is that societies' protectionism is reflected in the value space by mixing of universalism values with benevolence or other moral values that are oriented closer to the immediate circle of individuals. (Schwartz 2005: 226.)

The third and final factor influencing the scope of the moral universe is the nature of the political system and the degree of democracy. Democracies are characterised by the promotion of individual rights, freedom and equality. Democracies require every citizen to take responsibility for political participation. A high degree of democratisation means more rights, freedoms and responsibilities for citizens. In its ideal form, democracy does not segregate ethnic, religious or political groups, nor does it give them special rights, obligations or disadvantages. Thus, the structure and ideology of democracies contribute to the expansion of the moral universe of citizens. Conversely, in a less democratic political system, some groups are privileged and others are less privileged, which indicates a shrinking moral universe. (Schwartz 2005: 226–227.)

According to Schwartz (1999: 31), Finland, for example, is an egalitarian society in terms of cultural values, i.e. one that promotes social justice and equality. Finland is both morally broad and democratic. Also, in the Finnish state administration, the principles of legality and responsibility have a very high status (Moilanen 2016). It can be argued that in an ethically universalistic country public responsibility is of great importance for the legitimacy of public action.

By moral scope, Schwartz means values such as equality, broad-mindedness and social justice, which represent a separate value component of universalism. Thus, they are not confused with the value components of benevolence, tradition or conformity to tradition. Instead, the degree of democracy refers to the extent of civil rights (e.g. freedom to speak,

write and assemble) and political rights (e.g. the right to vote, to stand for election). (Schwartz 2005: 225.)

3.3 Idea and ideology-based public administration

Changes in administrative systems are shaped by historical and ideological issues. Administrative doctrines do not emerge in a vacuum, as they are influenced by ideological assumptions and historical ideologies (Abel & Sementelli 2007). These changes are linked to the exchange between the lifeworld and the system. How the state is perceived affects the responsibilities of public management.

Responsible public management fundamentally presupposes the existence of the public interest and the state. The public interest can be conceptualised in terms of two arguments: (1) the public interest is based on social institutions that transcend individual preferences; (2) the maintenance of these institutions has historically required the state. Different characterisations of the public interest reflect a belief in the state as a solution to social problems. This can be elaborated through the concepts of the pro-state and the pro-market. Of these, the pro-state is understood as a phenomenon of the public interest that requires a large state. For the pro-market, the public interest implies the relative freedom of individuals, markets and civil society *from* the state. (Autioniemi 2017: 7–9.)

Historically, the responsibilities of the state have changed in waves – and will probably continue to do so. In the early modern period, the mercantilist state regulated trade and commerce, and its responsibilities were framed in terms of civil society and freedom. In the 17th century, state intervention was viewed more critically than before and economic activity was thought to be based on the natural order. The same idea prevailed in early 19th-century liberalism, with its emphasis on the freedom of enterprise. However, at the end of the century, the idea of a broader responsibility for the state emerged as freedom of trade and industrialisation led to the impoverishment of some sections of the population. Night-watchman state was now rivalled by the service state, which was also influenced by the emergence of socialist movements. (Vartola 2005: 35–36; Salminen 2002: 35.)

The Finnish nation-state, in the form of Snellman's doctrine of nationalism, is strongly defined by Hegelian philosophy. With Snellman, a disciple of Hegel, the concept of bureaucracy also came to Finland. At the end of the 19th century, Finnish state thinking was based on etatism, or state-centrism, which remained the dominant principle long after independence. (Vartola 2005: 17–18.) Liberal and Hegelian state thinking can be distinguished: whereas for the former market relations mean freedom and state coercion, for the latter the opposite is true.

In the liberal tradition, civil society refers to an arena of interaction between equal citizens based on mutual agreement, where the state is given the right to exercise power. While citizens pursue their economic interests, the action is ultimately for the good of society as a whole by an invisible hand. In the liberal tradition, politics is about reconciling interests. In the Hegelian framework, the principles that define civil society and the economic activity that takes place within it are not imposed by the people themselves, nor are the interests that take place within civil society shared. The Hegelian critique of the liberal tradition is based on the view that the order of civil society depends on the active intervention of the state. The economic interests of citizens are seen in the Hegelian tradition as the opposite of the common interest. Only in the state is the moral agency and freedom of citizens possible. (Hautamäki 1996: 32–33; Smith 2015; Hegel 1821; Beiser 2005: 249.)

Because of its Hegelian background, the spirit of the Finnish nation-state is one of supra-individuality. The pre-Hegelian Enlightenment individualistic view of the state or nation-state perceives their value only indirectly or relatively in terms of the benefits they bring to the individual. Hegel strongly opposed this view. In Hegel's philosophy, the individual is a member in a larger, supra-individual context. Also, the rational and objective world spirit is in its highest form in the state. Snellman formed the view that the essence of the state consists in the nationality, the national spirit. (Grotenfelt 1927; Hegel 1817; Beiser 2005: 244–245; Pulkkinen 1983: 73–74.)

Although Hegelian philosophy defends individualist rights and liberal values, it differs from the liberal tradition in four ways. Hegel challenged the economic doctrine of classical liberalism, according to which market freedom would benefit all parties. For Hegel, advocating the freedoms of civil society also meant the control of market forces by the state. While full *laissez-faire* is an untenable position, markets should not be over-regulated. Second, Hegel opposed the general doctrine of classical liberalism, according to which the responsibility of the state is exclusively to safeguard natural rights and market freedoms. Hegel argues that such a doctrine leads to a decentralised society of individuals pursuing their own self-interest, which also leads to the disappearance of the public interest. Third, Hegel calls into question the social contract theory, since the identity of the individual is based on society and the state – meaning there are no independent agents "in the state of nature". Fourth, Hegel does not accept the liberals' strictly negative conception of freedom, whereby freedom is made possible by the absence of external restraint. (Beiser 2005: 229-230; Hautamäki 1996: 33.)

According to Habermas, liberal and statist approaches have different views of the democratic process. According to the liberal view, the democratic process takes the form of competing interests alone. Trade-offs are compensated through universal and equal voting rights, the representative composition of parliamentary bodies, decision-making,

rules of procedure, and so on. Such rules are ultimately justified in terms of fundamental liberal rights. (Habermas 1996: 296.)

In contrast, the state-centered or republican approach is based on the view that the constitution is designed to restrain the government through normative provisions such as fundamental rights, separation of powers and statutory control. In addition, the constitution motivates the state to take into account different societal starting points and value judgements. According to Habermas, this view is based on an unrealistic assumption of a civil society capable of collective action. The state-centered approach is not so much oriented towards the rational formation of political will but towards the balancing of the government. (Habermas 1996: 297–298.)

The procedural democracy advocated by Habermas is based on intersubjectivity, which is neither market- nor state-centered. Discourse ethics allows for the formation of rational opinions on socially relevant issues that need to be regulated. According to Habermas, deliberative politics is not based on the collective action of citizens, but on the institutional processes from which deliberation is possible. Procedural democracy understands the constitution as a question of how to institutionalise the structures of communication generating democratic will formation. Similarly, the liberal model does not depend on the democratic sovereignty of citizens who are deliberating. Rather, its focus is on the constitution, which guarantees individual starting points for the pursuit of happiness. (Habermas 1996: 297–298.)

According to Habermas, the basis of the democratic process lies in deliberative politics. Fair outcomes are achieved if the flow of relevant information and its proper treatment is not obstructed. According to this view, rationality is no longer based on universal human rights or the ethical content of a particular community, but on discursive ethical principles whose normativity rests on consensus-building. This normativity derives from the structure and forms of communication. (Habermas 1996: 296–297.)

Thus, procedural democracy does not follow the logic of the market nor the state: "At any rate, this concept of democracy no longer has to operate with the notion of a social whole centered in the state and imagined as a goal-oriented subject writ large. Nor does it represent the whole in a system of constitutional norms mechanically regulating the balance of power and interests in accordance with a market model" (Habermas 1996: 298).

3.4 Responsibility as good governance

Responsibility is also about good governance. The concept was originally coined by the World Bank (1992). Good governance is a process whereby rules and well-functioning institutions are used to promote democracy, human rights, order and security. Good

governance is an institutional component of economic, social and political performance. Governance is linked to its concrete manifestations, such as public management and governance reforms. (Tiihonen 2008: 18, 39; Nag 2018.)

The right to good governance is a fundamental right and part of European administrative law. A specific feature of this right is the individual and the binding nature. Everyone can invoke good governance in his or her own case and expect it to be implemented in practice. For example, according to the Constitution of Finland (section 21), everyone has the right to have his or her affairs handled properly and without undue delay by the competent authority established by law. This implies respect for fundamental procedural rights, such as publicity, the right to be heard and the right to appeal. (Mäenpää 2002: 4–5.)

Mäenpää (2002) mentions principles of good governance in the Finnish framework. First, administrative action must not be based on improper or otherwise alien criteria (*objektiviteettiperiaate*). It must be based on impartiality and objectively justifiable criteria. Second, public action must be proportionate, generally in accordance with the principle of reasonableness (*suhteellisuusperiaate*). Also, powers can only be used for the purpose for which they are defined or otherwise intended (*tarkoitussidonnaisuuden periaate*). Public action must not be based on discrimination or favouritism on grounds such as origin, religion, sex, age, political or social beliefs, trade union activities or other similar grounds (*yhdenvertaisuusperiaate*). In addition, public authorities need to take into account legitimate expectations protected by the rule of law (*luottamuksensuojaperiaate*). In other words, individuals should have the right to rely on the actions of public authorities under certain, justified conditions. (Mäenpää 2002: 127–131.)

The United Nations has adopted eight principles of good governance: (1) participation, (2) rule of law, (3) transparency, (4) responsiveness, (5) consensus orientation, (6) equity and inclusiveness, (7) effectiveness and efficiency and (8) accountability (UNESCAP 2009). Good governance has often been associated with the principles and values associated with democracy, which in Western countries is mainly understood as measures to improve citizen participation and empowerment. This means transparency in political decision-making and governance – not to forget responsiveness and accountability, of course. Thus, good governance is approached in a context where governance values vary according to the sector in which they are applied. Administrative values are also influenced by international debates and pressures for reform, which means that traditional administrative values such as fairness, equality, objectivity and transparency are changing. These values are being challenged by market-oriented approaches such as competition and privatisation. In this changing context, values are increasingly following those of the private sector. (Viinamäki 2008: 67–68.)

The principles of good governance may be lacking concreteness. Also, it might be hard to disagree with the principles as such. Habermas criticizes legal principles for their abstract nature. Instead, the legal dimension should above all refer to the concrete *conditions* for the creation of laws and norms (Habermas 1996: 265). This implies a critique of the communicative structures of public administration and an examination of the procedural conditions of democracy. In practice, it can mean listening to marginalised groups and concretely exercising formally equal rights of participation. In discourse ethics, the rationality of legal decisions does not only mean the appropriateness of the arguments used but the structures of the argumentative process (Habermas 1996: 226).

3.5 Conclusions

Public responsibility is based on the question of the common good. The question of what is socially just is partly an ideological question. The question covers a wide range of questions, such as the size and financing of the public sector, the production of public services and the relationship between the public and private sectors.

Administrative reforms have influenced the development of public administration throughout history. One key factor in this is the social transformation of rationality into technical rationality (Horkheimer 2008: 32–33). On the other hand, public administration is not reformed on pragmatic or technical grounds alone. It is also influenced by the values of each society and culture. These values are the starting points from which social institutions such as the administrative system operate.

According to Schwartz (2005), the extent of the moral universe of a society is influenced by the nature of the political system and the degree of democracy. Public administration influences the moral universe of a given society. Technical rationality and structural violence can lead to the diminishing of the moral universe in society. Bad or critical governance leads to the privileging of some groups and the marginalisation of others, to a reduction in the participation of citizens and to a reduction in their rights, freedoms and responsibilities (Schwartz 2005: 226–227).

Responsible public management should be normative towards social institutions. Habermas argues that communicative action is procedurally democratic by virtue of its inherent conditions. If normative conditions are violated, the conditions of communicativeness and the ontological foundations of the intersubjective agency are violated. On this basis, communicatively responsible public management highlights the views of increasing equality and democratisation of governance. Applying the moral theory by Schwartz, responsible public management should dismantle unnecessary hierarchies and inequalities in power and social relations. Hence, public management promotes egalitarian and universalistic principles in its action.

The technical rationality of government produces structural violence that undermines not only the democratic will formation or the rationality of the legal system but the communicative basis of rationality itself. This is a central problem for this study. The problem is related to the realisation of social justice. Since communicative rationality is based on the democratic will formation and the rational action of the citizens, they have the *freedom* and *responsibility* to demand responsibility from their government. Also, the citizen is entitled to remind the public administration of the relationship between the lifeworld and the system. The lifeworld does not rely on the system, but the system and its subsystems rely on the lifeworld. The administrative system must be created not independently of the citizens, but from within their will formation. In this case, the validity and facticity of the norms of public administration are close to each other.

What can be concluded from this? Communicative rationality can be considered phenomenological, as it is based on a shared lifeworld (Huttunen 2014). Public administration and its doctrines of governance should not be assumed to be objective expertise but should be approached with a hermeneutic or understanding approach. They are states of affairs whose existence is influenced by citizens through their own actions, understandings and preconceptions. Public administration is not necessarily rational for the reason that rationality is a force outside humanity. Instead, the rationality of government is something whose conditions each citizen can judge from his or her very own social being.

4 BUREAUCRATIC THEORY: RESPONSIBILITY AS COMPLIANCE

We are simple clerks who can barely understand an identity card and who have nothing to do with your business except to guard you for ten hours a day and get paid for it. (Kafka*, The Trial*)

Peters (2014) mentions four accountability arrangements: hierarchy, reciprocity, competition and contrived randomness. Of these, hierarchy is probably the most familiar instrument for public administration. In public administration, it is assumed that the civil servant is accountable to his or her superiors in the organisation. More generally, civil servants are held accountable to the minister and the minister in turn to parliament. Reciprocity refers to the mutual observation and control of civil servants and public organisations. At the most basic level, it can mean mutual evaluation between civil servants. Critics argue that reciprocity adds unnecessary duplication and administrative inefficiency. On the other hand, reciprocity is necessary for accountability. A third accountability mechanism is competition, whereby competing in a (quasi-)market increases organisational efficiency and accountability for results. Finally, organised randomness means an external review or audit. (Peters 2014: 217–221.) All these forms of accountability are present in the administrative doctrines. Of the accountability-enhancing arrangements, the hierarchy is most strongly implemented by bureaucratic responsibility, which we will discuss in this chapter.

The word "bureaucracy" is thought to have been first used by the physiocrat Jean de Gournay in 1759. By bureaucracy, he meant the disregard of the citizen by royal officials for the exercise of power and their focus on pursuing their own interests. Of course, bureaucracy has also been used in a positive sense. Hegel was the first to use the term to refer to a civil service whose central function was to look after the public interest. (Vartola 2005: 17.)

4.1 Weber's definition of bureaucracy

Bureaucratic responsibility cannot be assessed without Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy. The theory was part of Weber's sociology of management or governance and became the founding theory of public administration globally: many call it the world's first organisational theory (Vartola 2011: 28). Weber presents his theory of bureaucracy in his posthumously published *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie* (1922).

Weber's aim was not to create a theory of management or the best possible organisation but to define the sociological model of bureaucracy. According to Weber, the phenomenon of bureaucracy must be understood in logical-historical terms. The ideal model of bureaucracy is based on the reproduction of rational ideals in society. The triumph of

capitalism through Protestant ethics required a rational legal system to regulate trade and the economy. It also organised state systems and citizenship in the context of public administration. Furthermore, capitalism required a predictable, reliable system of governing and administration that obeyed its rulers. The legal norms of the rational-legal system of governance were goal- or value-oriented in nature, applying to all those governed. Every citizen was in principle on an equal footing, which meant that privileges and systems of favouritism were, in principle, abolished. (Vartola 2005: 18–20.)

Thus, the capitalist system has historically demanded responsibility from public administration. Weber argues that only Western countries knew the state as a political institution with rationally regulated constitutions and rights. Here, public administration is governed by rational and prescribed rules and laws implemented by professional civil servants (Weber 1980: 12).

According to Weber, bureaucracy is the most socially rational and efficient of the three forms of authority: traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic authority. Traditional authority is defined by the position of the leader in the community, while charismatic authority is defined by the character of the leader. Bureaucratic authority, in turn, is based on written rules and formal accountability. Bureaucracy is characterised by prescribed and formal areas of executive authority, which are prescribed by law or administrative regulations. The hierarchy of offices is based on a strictly regulated system whereby lower offices are managed by higher ones. The worker is required to work full time and continuously. Management requires in-depth training and is based on written documents so that the rules are general, stable, exhaustive and easy to learn. Weber meant two different things by saying that bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient form of government. First, bureaucracy was the most rational and efficient in the historical sense. No other culture had been able to create, for example, a form of government that was as reliable, predictable or precise. Second, bureaucracy was a rational instrument for disciplining citizens, since it was created to guarantee the internal and external security of society. The primary functions of the state are related to internal order, security, combating external threats, warfare and tax collection. (Weber 1922; Allen 2004: 100; Vartola 2005: 18–22; Hood 1976; Peters 1996.)

Habermas criticises Weber for neglecting the relationship of bureaucratic administration to social integration, which tends to instrumentalise communication between administration and society: "According to Weber, the constitutional state does not [...] draw its legitimation from the democratic form of the political will-formation of citizens. Rather, [...] administration is bound by law and has a 'rational' construction" (Habermas 1996: 73). Weber's characterisation of bureaucratic administration is based above all on predictability and efficiency, i.e. technical rationality, which serves the triumphal process of capitalism. Historically, this has certainly been the case. On the other hand, the analysis

should take into account the impact of public administration on social integration, to which it has played a major role. Historically, a complex society has required more differentiated functions, such as the norms of bureaucratic administration (Habermas 1984b: 175).

4.2 Politics-administration dichotomy

Responsibility in bureaucratic theory is based on the dichotomy of politics and governance, which can be defined as follows (Svara 2007: 37, adapted):

1. Politicians are not involved in administrative activities.

2. Civil servants do not participate in politics.

3. Civil servants assume a role of neutral expertise, with responsibility limited to the effective implementation of policy-making.

4. It is assumed that civil servants do not exercise discretion. If civil servants were to exercise their discretion, political practices would be subject to interpretation (which, in turn, is understood as a negative thing).

Communicatively speaking, the dichotomy has certain problematic aspects. The assumption that civil servants do not exercise significant discretion leads to a situation where the lack of discretion instrumentalises the communication of public administration and contributes to a crisis of legitimacy. If responsibility is understood as the idea of effective implementation of policy-making, something is most certainly missing. In communicative terms, responsibility in governance is also a form of communication, which can be eroded by efficiency. Thus, the technical neutrality of public officials can contribute to systemic colonization.

The strict definition for the dichotomy between politics and administration underestimates the discretion of civil servants. Civil servants have a duty to serve not only politicians and their aims but also the citizens. This indicates a sense of normativity. However, civil servants cannot be moral agents if they are treated as neutral. Because they are controlled by others (that is, politicians and higher public officials), they cannot make moral judgments nor act accordingly. Moral decision-making can be further undermined by large public organisations where individuals have no control over the course of events in the bigger picture. On the other hand, organisational roles may not be so clearly defined that there could be no room for individual choice. (Svara 2007: 37–38.)

Bureaucratic responsibility relates to official status, duties and compliance with organisational and regulatory requirements. The stronger the hierarchy in an

organisation, the more likely it is to be bureaucratically accountable. (Isosaari 2008: 205.) Control-based accountability has a strong influence on hierarchical structures. Control is actually a prerequisite for bureaucratic organisations. Professionalism and control-based accountability reflect the tension within bureaucratic structures about accountability as a virtue or mechanism (Bovens 2010). The former understands accountability more as a virtue, while the latter as a mechanism.

However, the traditional bureaucratic interpretation of responsibility is slowly receding for it relies too much on formal sanctions and simplistic accountability relationships. Instead, the focus has shifted from the correctness of policies and processes to the focus on results and effectiveness. (Viinamäki 2017: 87–88.)

At the heart of control is the objective that actors must act in accordance with higher instructions. Where necessary, they can be punished to improve the effectiveness of the control. In a broader sense, control means that politico-administrative actors justify their actions, take responsibility for their actions and accept sanctions where appropriate. In any case, accountability does not always mean simply a mechanism of control – rather, it is often identified with the control itself. The challenge of democratic governance is to create the necessary structures within which the unethical behaviour of civil servants can be curbed. In this sense, accountability involves all institutions that seek to control or limit administrative power. In this context, we are talking about the separation of power, the constitution or the ethical codes. (Mulgan 2000: 563–564.)

Accountability can be understood as a means by which civil servants manage multiple expectations. These expectations can be both internal and external. Romzek and Dubnick define four forms of accountability in bureaucratic theory: bureaucratic, legal, professional and political accountability. Of these, professional and political accountability have a low degree of control, while bureaucratic and legal accountability have higher. (Romzek & Dubnick 1987: 228–230.) In bureaucratic accountability, the civil servant is subject to active control. Legal accountability refers to legal norms and regulations. The idea is that legality produces just outcomes. In contrast, political accountability is based on the politics-administration dichotomy.

Professional accountability is common in bureaucratic organisations. It seeks to take into account both the expertise and the client, with work guided by the ethical code of the profession and a commitment to professional morality (Isosaari 2008: 204–205). Professional accountability is based on the technical expertise of actors, whereby external control is seen as an inappropriate means of accountability. Within professional accountability, it is understood that the accountability of experts ultimately rests on political-administrative authority and the implementation of democracy. The discretionary power of these authorities over experts' decisions is exercised at a general level and is not based on strong control mechanisms. Professional accountability can be

achieved through peer review. This is the case in the medical and legal professions. However, peer review raises questions about the role of the public in the process. (Mulgan 2000: 558–559.)

The political accountability of senior civil refers to a number of factors. First, they have to do what ministers ask them to do. As was stated before, the dichotomy between politics and administration indicates the primacy of political accountability, i.e. the loyalty of the public administration to political decision-makers. At the same time, senior civil servants must take into account professional and managerial principles based on their profession and expertise. Naturally, the action must be in accordance with the law. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 52.) Political accountability emerges in the representativeness of the highest decision-making bodies in public organisations. Hence, it is only reflected within the organisation to the extent that employees feel accountable to citizens. (Isosaari 2008: 204–205.)

On the other hand, professional accountability is not an unproblematic when viewed from the perspective of legitimacy and trust in governance. Professionalism represents a culture of expertise that can appear alienating from the public perspective. As Habermas writes, in "consequence of this professionalization, the distance between expert cultures and the broader public grows greater. [...] cultural rationalization brings with it the danger that a lifeworld devalued in its traditional substance will become impoverished" (Habermas 1984b: 326). Both control and professional accountability reproduce the colonization of the lifeworld, as they both rationalize and mechanize the norms of governance (Habermas 1984b: 326–328).

For a long time, the prevailing idea was that civil servants were bound by the law and the authority of the state. This led to the idea of legal accountability and the primacy of regularity over integrity. In Germany, the idea goes back to Hegel's vision of the state standing above society and citizens with its rules of justice. (Demmke & Moilanen 2012: 699; Hegel 1821/1972.) Similarly, Snellman brought Hegel's ideas on state-centrism to Finland (Grotenfelt 1927).

At least the following principles or precepts, which are close to bureaucratic theory, can be given for public responsibility (Svara 2007: 28). First, the public manager should put public interest before self-interest, show service and be worthy of citizens' trust. Since the public manager must uphold the law, he or she must also be committed to procedural fairness and a democratic process. A responsible public manager must be responsive to the aims of politicians and neutral in assessing policy options. Thus, according to Svara (2007), responsiveness to citizens is only indirectly exercised through political actors.

There is a strong link between responsibility and predictability in public management (Isosaari 2008: 76–77; Lawton 1998: 7). Within an organisation, accountability is the

obligation to act following the requirements of the task (which are known beforehand). In managerial roles, accountability is combined with delegation, i.e. the allocation of authority and responsibility to employees lower down in the hierarchy. This, in turn, increases predictability. Institutional practices shape the implementation of accountability in public organisations. In bureaucratic theory, such practices include hierarchy and accountability to higher levels – civil servants are expected to show obedience to orders. (Dubnick 2014: 31–33; Dubnick 1998: 77–79.)

However, there is a big question as to how simple obedience and compliance with regulations can guarantee that public action is accountable. Bureaucratic theory offers few answers to this problem. Weber (2015) distinguishes between the ethics of attitude (*Gesinnungsethik*) and the ethics of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*). The ethics of responsibility is based on technically correct procedures, not on ends *per se*. In contrast, in the ethics of attitude, the free agent can decide both the end and the methods for realizing it (Kim 2019).

4.3 What about the responsiveness to citizens?

The characterisation of the politics-government dichotomy raises the question – what about the citizens? Does not the dichotomy overemphasise the dependence of the public administration on political decision-making? Do the people not act as the *ultimate* justifiers and of public administration (Habermas 1984b: 82–83)?

It is important that responsibility is considered in relation to citizens, alongside political decision-making and the common good. In many situations, citizens are dependent on and vulnerable to public decision-making. It can also be argued that citizens are the "leaders" of civil servants. Citizens often have reason to expect that they will be treated equally and receive the service to which they are entitled. Serving the public interest means that responsible public management takes into account not only the service provided but also the demands of society (Svara 2007: 4–5, 37–38; Frederickson 1997).

The cynical response of bureaucratic administration to this could be next. Responsiveness to citizens' needs can be counterproductive. The reason is that the needs of citizens are at odds with the common good (or what is portrayed as the common good). However, there is a clear consensus that the policy process must take into account the needs of users of public services. Public administrations are more passive in addressing the needs of their "customers" than companies, as customers of public services do not necessarily have the possibility, for example, to change their service provider. (Vigoda 2000: 165–167, 169, 173.)

This cynical response is problematic for communicative action, increasing tension between the lifeworld and the system. As Habermas scholar and translator Rehg says: "[T]he political system (and the administration in particular) must not become an *independent* system, operating solely according to its own criteria of efficiency and unresponsive to citizen's concerns" (Rehg 1996: xxxi). This lack of responsiveness to citizens is reflected, for example, in the way bureaucratic theory understands public organisation as a hierarchically determined action, potentially undermined by the outside demands. However, today public administration is assumed to cooperate with other sectors, citizens and organisations. This, inevitably, means recognising different value orientations.

Public trust in governance in the West is fragile. One might think that the purpose of good governance would be to bring citizens closer to public action and its actors. In this case, responsiveness to citizens is the lifeblood of governance. Accountability mechanisms are also essential for the virtuous operation and control of public action. Accountability can be described as a democratic chain of delegation at the end of which the people decide or decide not to change policy, at the latest at the time of elections. Thus, the ultimate accountability forum is the citizens as part of the democratic will. (Bovens 2010: 954–955.)

But how does bureaucratic theory demonstrate its accountability to the people? Bryer (2007) writes about dictated, constrained and purposive responsiveness in bureaucratic governance. None of these forms of responsiveness is very effective in terms of responsiveness to citizens. Dictated responsiveness refers, for example, to a situation in which elected politicians direct public policy. Here, communication takes place through command, explicit or implicit pressure, or charismatic or coercive influence. This is particularly evident in hierarchical structures and in the dichotomy of politics and administration. Constrained responsiveness, on the other hand, means that administrative action is constrained by different bureaucratic norms, structures and cultures. In this case, responsiveness is based on technical or rule-based practices and professional norms that shape action in a rational way. It is quite obvious that the attention of citizens does not play a major role in this form either. In purposive responsiveness, civil servants act on the basis of professional or public goals. In this case, responsiveness is based on collectively or individually chosen objectives and their realisation in public action. In this form, citizens can influence public administration in the form of collective objectives. (Bryer 2007: 483–486.) However, even in this form, responsiveness is indirect towards citizens.

Bryer's responsiveness forms show that the bureaucratic definition of responsibility is highly technical. A technical definition of responsibility is a definition of who is responsible for what within the framework of formal criteria or norms. Therefore, responsibility is linked to economic and/or legal criteria. (Anttiroiko 2004: 23–24.) If one is not willing to reduce accountability to the proper and efficient performance of administrative tasks, it

makes sense to broaden the definition. At least from the citizen's point of view, this aim should be of the highest priority.

4.4 Criticism of bureaucratic theory

The bureaucratic theory has been criticised both from within and outside organisational practices, at the micro and macro levels. Bennis (1967) argues that bureaucracy is unable to respond to the problems that will challenge the organisation of the future, many of its features being outdated. This claim has proved to be true. According to Bennis, bureaucracy faces four societal threats: (1) a broader conception of the human being in the organisation; (2) rapid and unpredictable change; (3) an increase in the size of organisations which cannot be sustained by traditional organisational efforts; (4) the complexity of modern technology which requires highly specialised skills. All these threats are worthy of attention in the context of implementing responsibility. Perhaps the greatest problem is that bureaucracy is not based on a realistic concept of agency.

Many of the origins of administrative ethics can be found in the Minnowbrook Group and the *New Public Administration*, an administrative doctrine that has been influential since the late 1960s. (Frederickson et al. 2012: 131–132, 161–162.) The Minnowbrook Group considered that traditional public administration was unable to respond to the social or political challenges of its time. The task of the new public administration is to change the structures and dominant policies that systematically oppose social equality (Frederickson 1971).

According to the Minnowbrook Group, bureaucratic structures undermine responsibility for a number of reasons. First, public administration cannot be neutral or objective, as bureaucracies think, but must adhere to ethical principles. In addition, public administration should be more adaptable and sensitive to changing social, economic and political circumstances. Bureaucratic practices and techniques are not only often dehumanising and instrumentalising, but also inefficient. According to the Minnowbrook Group, cooperation and consensus are better ways to improve effectiveness than the simple exercise of authority. Bureaucracies are also characterised by simple survival, which makes it easy for them to change their objectives. (Frederickson et al. 2012: 132.)

Criticism of bureaucracy has been extended to street level. According to Lipsky (1980), public sector workers who deliver services often shape administrative practices. Lipsky calls teachers, police officers, social workers as street-level bureaucrats who have the power to provide, or not to provide, public services to citizens. Thus, they play a major role not only in shaping practices but also in making public action accountable. The wide discretion and resource management of street-level bureaucrats make them key power players in administrative decision-making. Street-level bureaucrats are in direct and

personal contact with citizens so that they make decisions on the ground, targeting individuals. The poorer the citizen, the more direct influence the street-level bureaucrat has on him or her.

Bureaucratic responsibility has obvious problems. When reviewing these criticisms, it is important to remember that bureaucracy was not originally designed to be citizen-oriented and service-oriented: as the service functions of government increased, so did the criticism of bureaucracy (Vartola 2009: 33).

Because of its hierarchical nature, bureaucracy runs a high risk of immorality, as psychoanalyst Erich Fromm writes: "Those below, the bureaucratic character will hold in contempt, those above, he will admire and fear" (Fromm 1977: 392). According to Fromm, the horrors of bureaucracy are particularly problematic in the context of the increasing mechanisation of administrative activity, which has had historically disastrous consequences.

In bureaucratic theory, responsibility is based on three principles: respect for the law, the pursuit of the public interest, and the integrity and impartiality of officials, which create trust in public action. However, the bureaucratic responsibility is simple and hardly representative of reality. It is best suited to a situation based on repetitive and predictable tasks. Today, a large proportion of public tasks require expertise and are based on more complex job descriptions. Flexibility alone is not enough. At the same time, civil servants are expected to be more involved in policy processes. This means taking into account new forms of accountability. For example, the policy process is defined as the process of reforming administrative, economic and legal elements and systems that create value for society. The role of civil servants in the policy process is not as simple as traditional bureaucratic theory suggests. It is also important to consider for what purposes and how public action is used. (Bourgon 2007: 9–12; Harisalo et al. 2007: 13, 25; Viinamäki 2017: 84.)

4.4.1 Neo-Weberian state as a renewal of bureaucratic theory

There was talk about the death of bureaucratic administration as early as the 1960s – and in the 1970s bureaucratic organisations were expected to disappear by the end of the millennium (Vartola 2005: 7). Despite its critics, the bureaucratic theory has not disappeared from the doctrines of administration. On the contrary, bureaucratic administration is here to stay – although in a somewhat modernised form. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) write about the *Neo-Weberian State* (NWS) in their book about public management reforms. This model is especially represented by continental European modernisers of governance.

What, then, is so Weberian about NWS? Similarities can be seen in the many different forms of responsibility and accountability found in the NWS. First of all, it sees the state as the main actor reconciling problems of globalization, technological change, demographic change and environmental threats. Therefore, the state is seen responsible for many fundamental questions of today's society – not to forget the global perspective. In addition, NWS has elements of democratic accountability since it sees representative democracy as the legitimating element of the state. In terms of legal accountability, administrative law acts as an upholder of the fundamental principles of the relationship between the citizen and the state and as protectors of public services. The idea of public accountability, in turn, is in the preservation of the idea of public service where public service has its own specific status, culture, terms and conditions. NWS also has new features, such as an orientation away from internal bureaucratic compliance towards the external needs and aspirations of citizens. This is done from a professional culture of quality and service, rather than from the creation of market mechanisms. In NWS, representative democracy is complemented by various means of consultation and direct input from citizens. It also emphasises the management of administrative resources and the modernisation of key laws for better results, rather than just the correct process following. The professionalisation of the public service is key. The bureaucrat is not just an expert in his or her field, but a professional manager who is attentive to the demands of citizens (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 118–119).

According to Pollitt and Bouckhaert, NWS was from the outset, not a doctrine or a normative vision but a description of the status quo. However, the model has been applied normatively. NWS is a vision of a modernised, efficient and citizen-friendly public administration. It represents a strong state that seeks to help citizens and maintain legitimacy. In this sense, the model can be seen as a defence of previously corporatist states such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden against globalising neoliberalism. Even if governance reformers consider themselves anti-Weberian, reforms like NWS are reformers of the Weberian tradition rather than its destroyers. (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011: 119–120.) In any case, NWS is advocacy of bureaucratic responsibility and a large state. Thus, it does not seek to abolish the bureaucrat's sphere of responsibility, but to modernise it. Bureaucratic compliance remains – but is complemented by professional values and a citizen-oriented approach.

NWS has acquired a normative meaning in middle-income and less developed countries in two different ways. First, it serves as a critical reminder that bureaucratic administration must exist in the background before modernising governance. Bureaucratic responsibility serves as a backbone for subsequent attempts at administrative reform. This is particularly the case in developed countries, where accountability in public administration can be undermined by corrupt practices. Second, there is a clear link between sustainable economic growth and bureaucratic

administration. The link between capitalism and bureaucracy was already written about by Weber. NWS seems to be a good model of governance for a society seeking innovation, for example. (Drechsler & Kattel 2008; Evans & Rauch 1999.)

Average on scale 1 = not important 5 = very important

LEGALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY	4,44
EXPERTISE	4,24
IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE	4,08
TRUST	4,04
EQUALITY	4,02
SERVICE	3,84
COMMITMENT	3,8
OBEDIENCE	3,78
EFFICIENCY	3,74
EFFECTIVENESS	3,67
COMMON ACCEPTABILITY	3,58
OPENNESS	3,53
COLLEGIALITY	3,51
INNOVATION	3,11

Figure 5. "How well does your agency's work reflect the values of the government?" (n=939) (Moilanen 2016: 18)

As stated, despite the critique, bureaucratic administration has not vanished but has been modernised. Figure 5 shows that the values of traditional bureaucratic organisation, such as expertise, impartiality and independence, are still present in Finnish public administration. It is also noteworthy that in the graph the principle of legality is combined with responsibility – which is a traditional way of conceptualising responsibility in bureaucratic theory. Also, NPM forms of responsibility, such as economy and efficiency, play a lesser role than the forms found in the bureaucratic theory. In any case, responsibility is part of traditional administrative values. Through it, citizens have the opportunity to see how political leadership meets citizens' expectations and what the administration has achieved in practice. Similarly, in the fight against corruption, Transparency International identifies responsibility as one of its core values. In Finland, as a Nordic country, responsibility is an official value of public administration. This is also the case in many other Western countries. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 50; Svara 2007: 4–5.)

4.4.2 Vicious circle of bureaucratic compliance

In bureaucratic theory, responsibility first and foremost is approached as a duty. In a sense of duty, civil servants seek to implement the values of public administration, such as objectivity and transparency. At the same time, there is a demand for new forms of responsibility since citizens have increasingly high expectations of public administration. However, bureaucratic responsibility alone is not sufficient, as it focuses on the renewal of hierarchical relations. Attention should be paid to a shared responsibility between different organisations, actors or sectors. Social accountability implies that public administrations should benchmark their competencies against other countries and communicate this to their citizens. Another issue is how to encourage citizens to participate more actively in society. (Bourgon 2007: 11–12.)

Figure 6. Risks of bureaucratic compliance

What then, are the negative consequences of bureaucratic administration with regards to responsibility? The vicious circle (which is based on the findings of the literature review) of bureaucratic compliance is illustrated above. Bureaucratic communication follows the objectification of its rules and principles. The management of a public organisation is primarily based on the creation of hierarchies, whereby forms of responsibility emphasise control and acting according to rules. The problem with control-based responsibility is that the civil servant sees himself as a sheer instrument of political and administrative power,

with the result of diminishing personal responsibility This leads to an objectification of rules, i.e. unreflective compliance with authority and obligations.

Hence, it is of no surprise when Habermas (1984b: 307) writes the following about Weber and the bureaucratic organisation: "Weber is full of admiration for the organizational accomplishments of modern bureaucracies, but when he adopts the perspective of members and clients, and analyzes the objectification of social relations in organizations as depersonalizing, he describes the rationality of bureaucracies that have been cut loose from vocational-ethical attitudes, from value-rational attitudes in general, and have developed their own internal dynamics, in terms of the image of a rationally operating machine." Bureaucratic administrations strip agency of its ethical principles and clothe it with their internal practices. The result can be a rationally operating but ethically irresponsible machine, not defined by the ethical attitudes of its members.

The more objectified the authority and obligations, the more the organisation will avoid responsibility. The vicious circle of bureaucratic responsibility leads to overall ineffectiveness and possibly corruption – which in turn is sought to be eradicated by increasing control and hierarchy. Bureaucratic responsibility and its dependence on technical rationality is aptly described by Jun: "Policy makers and planners believe that technical rationality is easy to apply in a hierarchical administration [...] It therefore reinforces itself so that it seems like the only way to accomplish organizational activities rationally." (Jun 2006: 249). A bureaucratic administration easily sees that the best way to increase the effectiveness of an organisation is to further increase its rationality (in technical terms). In this case, public management is unable to address *the irrationality of technical rationality* that increases ineffectiveness rather than effectiveness.

4.5 Tension between rules and agency

The central problem with the bureaucratic theory is that the objectification of regulations *and* their faceless implementation are detrimental to responsibility. Civil servants have to balance in a contradictory situation of being controlled and being independent to make decisions (Svara 2007: 35–36). The above-mentioned vicious circle of bureaucratic compliance is based on excessive control and the objectification of rules. However, bureaucratic governance is defined not only by compliance, but also by professional accountability, which is in tension with control. Habermas writes of the problem as follows:

> *To the degree that economic and administrative operations are bureaucratized, however, the purposive rationality of actions (or at least the systemic rationality of their output) has to be secured independently of the value-rational judgments and decisions of organization members. Organization themselves take over the regulation of actions, which now need to be anchored subjectively only in*

> *generalized utilitarian motives. This freeing of subjectivity from the determinations of moral-practical rationality is reflected in the polarization of "specialists without spirit" and "sensualists without heart."* (Habermas 1984a: 352.)

Habermas quotes Weber when writing about specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart. By this, they both mean a rational transformation of culture, in which the action of the individual working in organisations is independent of his/her identity. In this kind of situation, organisational control and objectified rules also supersede professional assumptions. On the other hand, even professionalism, because of its technicality, is not an unproblematic form of accountability since it can also downplay the possibility for subjective responsibility (Habermas 1984b: 326–328).

According to Habermas, in modern societies, the rationality of administrative action is separated from the subjective value orientations of the members of the public organisation. Therefore, the faceless following of rules does not require agency. This inevitably raises the question of responsibility in the public organisation. How can organisational regulation succeed if the subjective dimension is removed from the picture? Habermas criticises Weber's theory of bureaucracy precisely for its lack of agency since no organisation can function without a subjective element. "This purposive model [...] cannot explain the fact that it is not only (or even chiefly) by way of the purposive-rational action of members that organisations resolve problems of self-maintenance" (Habermas 1984b: 306).

In public management, bureaucratic behaviour is often associated with deontological ethics and adherence to universal rules (Svara 2007: 27-28). At the same time, it should be noted that deontological ethics is based on the motivation and freedom of the actor (Kant 1990). According to Kant, only a free agent can be obliged to act ethically. This means that the moral law must be independent of external and contingent factors (Kannisto 2014). Otherwise, the moral law would be influenced by something external and would not be based on freedom. Thus, administrative action should give civil servants enough room for autonomous will formation. The requirement of freedom of the actor also creates another consideration, which is that responsibility cannot be viewed only from an individual perspective. Namely, if the individual has not been free to act responsibly, attention should be paid to the norms and practices surrounding the individual at the institutional level.

Historically, the combination of deontological ethics and bureaucracy has led not only to responsibility but also to atrocities. For example, Adolf Eichmann is known as the organiser of the Holocaust in the Nazi Party during the Second World War. In defending his actions at trial, Eichmann claimed that he had simply acted according to bureaucratic and deontological ethics. Eichmann is a figure of banal evil who does not appear to be a monster in the traditional sense of the word. What *is* banal is the unreflective and faceless

adherence to rules and obligations. Hence, Eichmann can be called "the perfect bureaucrat" (Arendt 1965; Parvikko 2008: 210–213; Frederickson & Hart 2001: 359–360).

In public administration, deontological ethics emphasise the highest level of management, which has the authority to make decisions. Moral rules and ethical standards serve as reference points for the actions of individuals. Thus, they can compare their behaviour with the rules and standards to assess whether their actions are "right" or "wrong". (Hyyryläinen 2010; Svara 2007: 10–11.) The problem with bureaucratic administration, on the other hand, is how following rules become faceless and independent of the agency.

Sometimes acting according to rules can be a way of escaping moral responsibility for the consequences of one's actions, which is of course contrary to deontological ethics. Indeed, philosopher Hannah Arendt writes how Eichmann considered himself a Kantian for whom it was important to stick to his duties: "This was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since Kant's moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man's faculty of judgment, which rules out blind obedience." (Arendt 1965: 136.)

Thus, deontological ethics is not reduced to a rule-based approach. For example, Habermas' discourse ethics is based on duty since it requires the participant in discourse to follow a general rule that determines the validity of any norm (Miller 2002). In Kant's ethics, this is the case with the categorical imperative (Kant 1990). The best-known formulation of the categorical imperative is: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 1990: 421). According to the formulation, the subject must, in accordance with a certain principle, consider whether it can be hoped that everyone will act in accordance with the principle.

For example, Svara (2007: 15) lists the ethical responsibilities of public administration as serving the people, pursuing the public interest and avoiding conflict and personal interest. Dutiful ethical responsibilities would also include taking responsibility for one's own actions, which can lead to whistleblowing and reporting wrongdoing. Thus, deontological principles can work against the compliance-based nature of bureaucratic action in a situation where duties and rules are in conflict. In this case, duties have a higher authority than rules.

4.5.1 More rules, more integrity – or something in between?

How can bureaucratic responsibility be increased? Or, to put it more concretely, how can the objectification of rules and their faceless implementation be overcome? In the classical literature, at least five mechanisms can be found: encouraging responsibility, disciplinary techniques, economic indicators, legally binding guidelines and professionalism

(Friedrich 1946). In the classical literature on management science, four basic elements of managerial accountability are still valid and can be used to outline a guideline. These are *judgment*, *accountability*, *balance* and *rationality*.

The problem can be further assessed by looking at the dichotomy between compliance and integrity. Each of these perspectives has its own assumption about moral agency, which ultimately distinguishes them. The compliance orientation assumes that the action of the civil servants is based on selfish interests and that his/her integrity cannot be trusted. In the integrity orientation, the civil servant is a social being guided by values, principles and the ethos of the public sector. The differences between these trends are further specified in the table below:

Table 1. Compliance and integrity (Lawton 2013: 121; Paine 1994: 113, adapted)

Perspective	Compliance	Integrity
Ethics	Adaptation to external standards and objective responsibilities, *low road*	Subjective responsibility aligned with organisational standards, *high road*
Goal	Prevention of unethical behaviour	Moral reasoning
Assumption about agency	An individual driven by economic self-interest	A social being guided by values, principles and public sector ethos
Practice: Methods and tools	External control, training in rules and guidelines, reduction of discretion and autonomy, auditing, monitoring, sanctioning	Internal control, ethics training, communication and deliberation, ethical leadership, ethical culture and climate, rewarding
Implementation: Standards	Law, criminal law	Mission statement, values, social responsibility
Leadership and staff	Lawyers, compliance officers	Managers, ethics officers
Activities	Top-down standards, reporting violations, leading investigations, overseeing inspections and monitoring, enforcing standards with sanctions	Bottom-up development of organisational values and standards, coaching and communication, integration of organisational systems and culture, consulting, assessment of values and performance, identification and resolution of problems and dilemmas.
Training and coaching	Standards of compliance, statutes	Ethical decision-making, ethical values and facing dilemmas

Table 1 shows the different ways in which the compliance and integrity perspectives influence organisational practices. While the compliance perspective emphasises hierarchical, top-down standards, the integrity perspective highlights the bottom-up development of organisational values and standards. The compliance perspective sees it as difficult to develop values from the bottom up, as its assumption on agency is based on economic self-interest. Thus, the perspective does not see that individuals have a major role to play in the development of values in the organisation. This is reflected in training and coaching, where the compliance perspective relies on standards and guidelines, and the integrity perspective on ethical decision-making. In terms of control, compliance is external, integrity is internal.

In general, the integrity perspective is associated with accountability as a virtue and the compliance perspective with accountability as a mechanism. The debate between Friedrich and Finer (Finer 1941; Friedrich 1935) is a good example of this. It is noteworthy that the competing positions of Friedrich and Finer can be located inside the bureaucratic theory. Thus, the administrative doctrine does not have a single answer to the conflict arising from this dichotomy. According to Friedrich, responsibility does not just mean blind compliance with rules but professional standards such as objectivity and independence. However, individual officials cannot be held personally responsible for their actions, as the ultimate responsibility lies with the public organisation. Also, public administration should pay attention to publicising their activities and educating the public. The opposite of Friedrich's argument is Finer's compliance approach. According to Finer, responsibility is based on the threat of reprimand and punishment of the official – in the worst case, dismissal. (Finer 1941; Friedrich 1935; Plant 2018: 3.)

Historically, the tension between Friedrich's and Finer's perspectives reflected change and the end of the dichotomy between politics and administration (at least in some respect). This is because administrative functions were increasingly complex and could no longer be explained as purely mechanistic or detached from politics. However, this gave birth the new problems. For example, if these functions required discretion, how could the democratic nature of decision-making be taken into account? (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 121.)

While the low road emphasises laws and regulations, the high road relies on the responsible behaviour and values of the individual (Bowman & West 2018: 167). But is there a choice to be made between the two? Not necessarily. A *fusion road* can be placed between them, adopting features from both directions. Fusion road offers civil servants the opportunity to reflect, decide and act independently with professional values in unethical situations (Lawton et al. 2013: 123; Lewis & Gilman 2005: 15–17; Vogelsang-Coombs 2016: 323–324; Paine 1994.) It can be argued that integrity requires reflection, compliance requires conformity. Reflection refers to a critical self-assessment of one's

motives and preconceptions. As such, this kind of reflection is close to hermeneutics (Heidegger 2000; Gadamer 2004).

Nor is the emphasis on integrity an entirely unproblematic position in terms of responsibility. The integrity approach can also produce a paradox, which proceeds along with the following logic (Nieuwenburg 2007). Public integrity can be seen as a positive thing, as it improves public trust in public administration. However, the relationship between integrity and trust is not simple. The problem arises when integrity requires a public manager to report wrongdoing, which can lead to a loss of trust in the eyes of citizens. On the other hand, reporting is necessary because it is a prerequisite for the integrity of the public manager.

It is also paradoxical that a public manager can be considered a "good" manager while committing immoral acts. Public managers are also affected by the problem of "dirty hands", whereby they make utilitarian decisions that are acceptable but, as such, unethical (Waltzer 1973). The bureaucratic organisation can therefore easily be understood as a mechanical implementation of utilitarian objectives, which cannot take into account the unethicality of decisions taken in the face of "the bigger picture". On the other hand, utilitarianism is not reduced to bureaucratic administration, but is present, for example, in the way NPM conceives of efficiency in terms of an ethics of consequence: economic efficiency requires large-scale calculation and maximisation.

4.5.2   Three paradoxes of responsibility

In the bureaucratic theory, the tension between compliance and faceless agency can be further clarified by the paradoxes of responsibility (Harmon 1995). These paradoxes are based on the questions of agency, freedom and the binding nature of rules.

Table 2.   Harmon's responsibility paradoxes (Harmon 1995; Roberts 2002, adapted)

Paradox	Content	Pathologies
The paradox of obligation	If civil servants are at the same time free to choose and obliged to act, they are not free. Alternatively, if civil servants are free to choose, their actions may violate their obligations, making freedom of choice irresponsible.	Bureaucratic opportunism, i.e. neglect of obligations and pursuit of self-interest Objectification of authority and obligations, i.e. reflexive adherence to principles
The paradox of agency	If individuals subscribe to the view of their personal and moral agency, they deny their ultimate responsibility to others. Alternatively, if they subscribe to the view of the ultimate responsibility of others, they deny their own moral agency.	Avoiding responsibility and looking for a scapegoat The atrophy and sacrifice of individual moral agency Avoiding individual responsibility
The paradox of accountability	If the accountability of civil servants reverts back to being instruments of political and administrative power, they have no personal responsibility for the results of their actions. Alternatively, if civil servants are involved in defining public goals, their accountability to higher authority is called into question.	The atrophy of personal responsibility: civil servants do not sign up to the consequences of their actions if they are not accountable for public goals The erosion of political authority: if civil servants are given the power to set public goals, they are ultimately accountable only to themselves.

These paradoxes return to the understanding of the role of the civil servant and produce pathologies in governance. The paradox of obligation is about the relationship between obligations and freedom of choice. The idea is that the obligations of an organisation are not based on the freedom of choice of civil servants. On the contrary, the freedom of choice of civil servants can be in conflict with the obligations of the organisation. The paradox of obligation produces bureaucratic opportunism and the objectification of authority and regulations. The paradox of agency, on the other hand, is about how personal choice is possible in the face of external obligations. For example, moral agency cannot be subjective if it is determined by external responsibilities. The paradox of accountability is about personal responsibility and its dependence on a higher authority. In this case, the instrumentality of officials is thought to be independent of personal responsibilities. On the other hand, high authority calls into question the ability of civil servants to independently assess their goals. (Roberts 2002: 658–660.)

The paradoxes of responsibility reflect the Weberian view of civil servants as specialists without spirit, i.e. subjective value judgements (as was mentioned earlier). Here, responsibility is influenced by external obligations and the instrumentality of administrative power, rather than by individual choice, agency and personal responsibility. This also has ethical consequences in terms of duty, since, according to Kant, only free agents are bound by the moral law.

It should be noted that the paradoxes of responsibility are by their very nature extreme. For example, external obligation and freedom of choice are not necessarily in conflict. In the paradox of agency, on the other hand, the responsible agency can be thought of as having both personal and external elements – not either/or. Naturally, it is not always the case that responsibility in public management leads, for example, to the objectification of rules or bureaucratic opportunism. In modern public management, negotiation also has a role to play. There is plenty of room between the extremes.

The civil servant is not just a subject of personal choice, moral decision making or responsibility. Nor, of course, is he or she an object of external obligation, responsibility or instrumentality. Administrative obligations are not purely external to the public administrator, since they are created as part of the democratic decision-making process, in which every citizen participates, at least as a voter. Nor is freedom of choice necessarily irresponsible from the point of view of administrative obligations.

4.6 Communicative responsibility of bureaucratic theory

4.6.1 Principle of openness

In bureaucratic theory, one could argue that a civil servant is a faceless bureaucrat who follows slavishly objectified rules. The responsibility of a bureaucratic administration is hierarchical and rule-based. This has a number of consequences for why bureaucratic administration does not implement Habermas' principle of openness very well. First, the principle of openness is based on keeping the discourse open to arguments, questions and answers. Moreover, everyone must be able to participate in the discourse.

Bureaucratic theory is based on the implementation of a task delegated by the political level, and in hierarchical structures, the interaction of actors is top-down and mechanical. Thus, in bureaucratic administration, the scope of action depends on the hierarchical position. The most optimal position is that of senior civil servants who control the public organisation on the terms dictated by political decision-making. Officials are expected to comply with the rules, i.e. to follow them properly. On the other hand, bureaucratic responsibility is also determined by professional values, which become more important

the higher the level at which a civil servant operates. However, its overall significance is less than compliance in an organisation characterised by technical rationality and machine-like mechanisms (Habermas 1984b: 307).

According to the principle of openness, everyone should be active in the discourse, which is why mere participation is not enough. The problem with compliance is that officials do not have to be genuinely active outside the rules. In bureaucratic administration, there is actually very little room for activity. In hierarchies, there is no prerequisite for equal activity by participants. For reasons of efficiency, it is impossible to respect the principle of equal activity. Officials perform different tasks based on their position in the organisation. Therefore, there are precise definitions of appropriate and inappropriate administrative behaviour. This also means that there is little to no exchange of ideas or debate. From the citizen perspective, participation in the decision-making process of a bureaucracy is limited, mainly in terms of using public services or being a "subordinate" of the government.

4.6.2   Principle of freedom of speech

According to the principle of freedom of speech, everyone must be free to interpret and criticise claims, which leads to the elimination of unreflective prejudices from communication. Freedom of speech also means that participants have no difference in power or knowledge – or they must be narrowed. Bureaucratic administration easily leads to the objectification of rules that cannot be freely interpreted or criticised. The lack of reflection of rules further instrumentalises organisational communication. In hierarchies, technical rationality and instrumental values take precedence over other starting points, and diversity of opinion and values is not tolerated.

There is no mechanism in bureaucratic governance to unlock unreflective rules or practices. Closer to a mechanism, again, are probably professional approaches of civil servants. A mechanism would require moral reflection, whereby the organisational behaviour would be influenced by non-systemic and instrumental norms. This would mean that management would take account of the existential context that underpins morality. The process of colonization makes such attention difficult. Habermas writes: "Organizations not only disconnect themselves from cultural commitments and from attitudes and orientations specific to given personalities; they also make themselves independent from lifeworld contexts by neutralizing the normative background of informal, customary, morally regulated contexts of action" (Habermas 1984b: 309).

Bureaucratic administration is a hierarchical system with wide disparities of power and knowledge. These differences are justified by the fact that they allow for the delegation and implementation of tasks in an efficient way. In other words, power and knowledge

differentials are the lifeblood of bureaucratic responsibility. In a hierarchy, the subordinate is provided with the amount of information that is sufficient for the performance of his or her tasks. In this way, communication is not only efficient but also appropriate for the performance of the tasks. Hierarchy is based on the existence of power and knowledge differences and does not narrow them.

In hierarchies, the expression of empirical opinions is limited and can even be viewed negatively. Communication requires technical clarity based on legislation, regulations and reporting. In a bureaucratic administration, action is justified by administrative efficiency and control and by legislation. In hierarchies, claims are formal and are presented following the functions of the administration and their legitimacy. The collective acceptance of ideas is generated through electoral arrangements and political decision-making, whose will the hierarchy seeks to implement.

4.6.3   Principle of authenticity

Compliance and the objectification of rules undermine the principle of authenticity in bureaucratic theory. According to the principle of authenticity, all participants express their beliefs, desires and needs. Bureaucratic responsibility is seen as independent of the authentic views of the civil servants. The discourse should also produce decisions that lead to practical action. However, in bureaucratic administration, dialogue is limited and there is no dialogue that automatically leads to practical action.

The principle of authenticity includes the requirements of clarity, honesty, legitimacy, and truthfulness of the discourse. Clarity is based on the demonstration of responsibility on the basis of coherence of principles. What are the principles on which the clarity and internal coherence of administrative doctrine are based? The concept of responsibility in bureaucratic theory is based on the unambiguity of laws and rules. When the standards set above are implemented, responsibility is achieved. In this light, responsibility is very procedural, as the focus is on the correctness of the measures. However, there is a contradiction between compliance and integrity approaches.

Honesty, in turn, is based on demonstrating responsibility in practice. What are the means by which it is demonstrated, and do they achieve what they claim to do? Bureaucratic theory suggests that responsibility is enhanced by things like reliability, predictability, honesty, coherence, continuity and integrity. However, history has shown that bureaucratic responsibility has not always been effective to prevent atrocities.

Legitimacy is based on demonstrating responsibility in the light of public recognition of principles. How and on what basis does administrative doctrine legitimise its principles? Bureaucratic theory legitimises its action on the principle that the state legitimises itself.

The state is a systemic entity, binding on the basis of power and norms. The responsibility of a bureaucratic administration is to be a rational machine that carries out the will of the state and politicians. In the context of democratic ideals, public administration is understood as a means for the state to achieve collective goals.

Truthfulness is based on whether the communicated principles of administrative doctrine correspond to reality. Differences in power and knowledge, objectified rules and lack of agency make bureaucratic governance difficult to achieve. If the norms governing action do not correspond to reality, so much the worse for reality. What matters most for bureaucratic responsibility is the efficiency of processes: whether processes have a greater impact on the environment is secondary. Bureaucratic administration is concerned with the effectiveness of the means to achieve the ends, not with the relationship between ends and goals (Habermas 1984b: 209). Moreover, the principles of bureaucratic theory rely on the goals of the state and the public sector. The question arises as to what is meant by public interest. In this case, a question should be asked: does the public administration actually fulfil the needs of citizens and the public interest?

4.6.4   Principle of reciprocity

According to the principle of reciprocity, participants in the discourse should have equal opportunities to be accountable and to demand accountability from others. This also means that the role and authority of each participant can be subject to assertion. However, hierarchy makes it impossible to have an arrangement whereby those at a lower level demand accountability from those above them. Differences in power and knowledge can lead to negative consequences where officials follow unreflective rules of which they have no precise knowledge of the consequences. This also undermines the capacity of the public administration to learn new and substantial information. It is impossible to learn from mistakes if there is no knowledge of their existence, or if the knowledge remains at lower levels of the public organisation.

4.7 Conclusions

In public administration, forms of responsibility are often justified through ethics (Renouard 2010; Svara 2007). Hence, it is of no surprise that the field of interest involves many philosophical questions such as the following. Are civil servants autonomous in deciding their actions, or are they bound by an external source? The question is not just empirical – but perhaps first and foremost theoretical. Or, what is ultimately meant by responsibility? According to Finer (1941), public managers are responsible to the political level and cannot independently choose the principles of their actions. However, should

this always be the case? And does a responsible public manager always respect the rules and obligations imposed on him or her?

The answer to this may be no. It is still difficult to give general answers to these questions. However, a responsible public manager can assess his or her performance in a conflict situation by asking the following questions (Leys 2001). What is always and everywhere good? And what is not necessary? What do citizens want? What are the subjective views of the public manager? Which choices may seem less important in the future?

The central tension of bureaucratic responsibility is based on the relationship between the technical rationality that arises from administrative compliance and subjective value judgements. This tension is fundamental since it raises the question of the paradoxical nature of responsibility and agency. If a public manager is not free to act according to his or her value orientations, how can he or she be considered responsible? The compliance and integrity perspectives, that are close to this question, understand responsibility from different perspectives. Also, the concepts of responsibility and accountability reflect how the topic is approached from both internal and external dimensions.

One thing is for certain. Only the actions of the morally responsible can be assessed ethically (Talbert 2019; Thompson 2001). However, this insight does not lead us very far. Moral responsibility can be difficult to demonstrate in a public administration where decision-making is influenced by a wide range of actors. For example, the responsibility of public management is challenged by three structural issues (Thompson 2001). The first is the view that no single individual can bring about an organisational outcome. The second is based on the distinction between individual intentions and collective outcomes. The third challenge lies in role expectations, where individuals act responsibly from their limited job description – but the overall organisational output does not reflect responsibility.

The control perspective has long dominated administrative ethics. At its heart is the legal nature of public action. The control perspective emphasises the importance of organisational directives, rules and prohibitions that govern public action, as well as the importance of laws and regulations that govern public action. However, public organisations are increasingly expected to be able to adapt to new ways of working, without losing sight of the citizen's perspective. Simple compliance with the law should not become a comfort zone for civil servants that ignores the real needs of citizens. (Hyyryläinen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2013: 270.) The control perspective is often unable to take into account the continuous expansion and socialisation of responsibility.

Today, it is seen that control based on reward and punishment is a weaker tool for developing individuals than performance-based assessment. The sense of responsibility of staff can be developed by involving them in the decision-making process of the

organisation. If the views of staff are listened to, the staff will be more active in solving ethical problems. (Svara 2007: 137–138.) Increased control and sanctions can increase the perception that bad behaviour is more common and acceptable in an organisation than it is perceived to be (Schulze & Frank 2003).

Public HR policy is in a state of flux due to the destandardisation of public administration, which may have unpredictable consequences for the responsibility of public management (Demmke 2019). Motivating and engaging staff in the public sector can be slowed down by the fact that organisational communication still follows bureaucratic elements. The structure and formal policies of public organisations can act as a barrier to dialogue between staff groups. Changing this would, in turn, require a substantial administrative reform. (Strandman 2009: 209.)

A key influence on bureaucratic theory is the politics-administration dichotomy. However, there is some dispute about how well the dichotomy has been implemented historically in administrations. Svara (2007) proposes a counterweight to the politics-administration dichotomy in the form of a reciprocity model, which he argues is more historically valid. This model accepts the distinction between politics and administration, but also the shared and overlapping functions. In this way, responsibility takes on a new shape. Political decision-makers and civil servants base their actions on clear distinctions based on different values and formal positions. Politicians exercise political control over the administration, while civil servants participate in the policy process. Hence, the relationship between politicians and civil servants is based on reciprocity and interdependence. (Svara 2007: 42.)

Based on the reciprocity model, Svara (2007) has defined the following obligations for civil servants. Civil servants must uphold the law, respect political authority and recognise the need for accountability. On the other hand, they should be loyal to the goals of the public organisation. Their responsibilities also include serving the people, upholding the public interest and supporting the democratic process. This may mean that maintaining the public interest may lead to conflict with political decision-makers. On the other hand, civil servants must take responsibility for their actions by being independent and committed to professional values and competences. Even when conflicts with politicians arise, civil servants must be honest about the ways in which they interact with politicians. Officials should also encourage policy-makers in the discharge of their responsibilities. (Svara 2007: 42–43.) From all of this, it can certainly be argued that public management is not without obligations.

5 NPM: RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RESULTS

According to Hood (1991), the rise of New Public Management (NPM) was influenced by four administrative megatrends at the time. These were the slowing of state growth, privatisation, the development of automation (especially in information technology), and the increasing internationalisation of public management and policy-making.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the dismantling of socialist systems left only one path for the development of governance – the liberal democratic market economy. The spread of Western administrative practices was made possible more rapidly by international organisations such as the European Union and the OECD. (Hyyryläinen 1999: 25–26; Kuusela 2001: 28–29.)

In the second half of the 1980s, the bureaucratic theory was in crisis – new management techniques were needed to do things in a more cost-effective way. The public-private dichotomy was interpreted in terms of a politically liberal and economic model. Many industrial states found that the growing public sector, bureaucratic mechanisms and public authorities were unable to solve economic or social problems. Critics called for an end to market and social regulation and the decentralisation of power and government. The problems of bureaucracy and public administration were quite easy targets for critics. Criticism was directed at the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, such as blind rule-following, risk-aversion, dogmatism, the bureaucratisation of society and the growing asymmetry of power and authority in bureaucratic organisations. Reformers sought to eradicate the authoritarian hierarchical system represented by the traditional bureaucracy. However, this was nothing new, as such. Already after the Second World War, Weber's ideal of bureaucracy was seen as outdated, with the management doctrines that defined huge organisations taking over. (Tiihonen 2008: 207–208, 210–211.)

At the turn of the millennium, administrative reforms were based on following the example of successful companies. The idea was that a single administrative sector would form a business-world-like concern, with a ministry as its main unit. On the other hand, many felt that it was not appropriate to merge organisations in the private *or* public sector. Instead, information processing was seen as a way of improving regional, provincial and territorial cooperation. For example, during the so-called "managerialist" period, Finnish administration was seen in relation to successful companies. If its management is not efficient, competent or effective, it was not good. (Vartola 2005: 7–8.)

Whereas in the bureaucratic theory the responsibility of the public manager is focused on the correctness of processes and procedures, the NPM made public managers accountable for results. As a principle of NPM, accountability is close to what is meant by the concept in the private sector – that is, managerial accountability and result orientation. Accountability is defined by economy, efficiency and effectiveness. From an NPM

perspective, the economic criteria of accountability are a response to the need to improve the legitimacy of public administration. The objective is that taxpayers feel that they are getting value for money in the form of services provided by public services. (Lähdesmäki 2003: 76–77.) Hence, public action has mainly been assessed in terms of economic values. However, at the same time, the importance of ethics is also emphasised (Menzel 2005: 25).

However, the relationship between NPM and administrative ethics is far from clear. For example, NPM reforms have undermined the public service ethos and its implementation in the public sector (Lawton 1998: 58). The public service ethos refers to a moral outlook and state of mind: the public service ethos is the antithesis of the private sector in that it is based, at least ideally, on notions of selfless and altruistic work and the pursuit of the public good (Frederickson 1997; Salminen & Mäntysalo 2013).

According to Denhardt and Denhardt (2007), both the bureaucratic theory and NPM simplify the subject of responsibility. Whereas in bureaucratic theory, officials are directly accountable to politicians, in NPM accountability is measured by efficiency, cost-saving and responsiveness to market forces. Also, there are other expectations and needs of citizens that bureaucratic theory and NPM simply cannot meet. These include democratic principles such as ideals of citizenship and the public interest. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 119–120, 131.)

In Hegelian philosophy, the state seeks to control the negative consequences of the market (Hegel 1821; Beiser 2005: 249). Through NPM, the situation is another way around. With the application of private-sector-influenced administrative doctrines, market principles are now applied in public administration. These changes have influenced what civil servants consider to be responsible behaviour. As Habermas writes: "To the degree that the economic system subjects the life-forms of [...] employees to its imperatives, consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance, and competition gain the force to shape behaviour."(Habermas 1984b: 325)

For NPM, market exploitation, individualism, performance, and competition are key factors in accountability in public administration. On the other hand, for Hegel, the domination of market forces implies a fragmented society of selfish individuals. This supremacy implies a public organisation of selfish civil servants in public administration, leading to opportunistic behaviour and the erosion of the public sector ethos.

5.1 Market-liberal ideology of NPM

Each EU Member State has taken features of NPM that are appropriate to its own tradition of governance. Because the doctrine is based on right-wing ideology, its principles are not mediated as such in the policies of left-wing parties (Hyyryläinen 2004: 76). Naturally, the

ways of implementing reforms change from context to context. In Finland, political ideology has generally not been sufficient to bring about changes in public administration. Hence, in-depth reform of the administration is so strongly resisted that these kinds of projects are considered to succeed only in extreme situations (Vartola 2005: 109).

The market-liberal background of NPM can be found in terms of new right and neoliberalism, whose central theorist since the 1970s was F.A. Hayek. Neoliberalism does not represent classical liberalism, since it believed that the state should be taken over to create markets, rather than simply being demolished. Whereas classical liberalism advocated the withdrawal from the state to natural freedom, the new right conception of freedom was based on European tax avoidance and anti-statism. In Europe, the relationship between liberty and the state differs from the United States because of the long tradition of taxation of European kings. Following Hegel, freedom is realized in the state. Thus, state-based social policy is not only a feature of the Nordic model, but of much of Europe. To put it bluntly, while the American seeks freedom from the state, the European seeks freedom from the market. (Yliaska 2014: 72–75.)

5.1.1   Justice according to Nozick

When considering the ideological background of the NPM, Robert Nozick's theory of justice should also be taken into account, as he laid the groundwork for the right-wing administrative reforms of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Häyry 2000). Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974) is partly based on a critique of Rawls's (1988) theory of justice. According to Rawls, the aim of a responsible public administration pursues social and economic equality. Nozick disagreed strongly with this idea.

The early chapters of Nozick's work deal with the problem of the state in anarchism, i.e. whether the state should be established at all (Nozick 1974: 4–25). Nozick writes, contrary to the view of traditional anarchists, that a minimal state can be established without violating rights. His conceptions of the responsibilities of the state relate to limited functions concerning violence, theft, fraud and the enforcement of contracts (Nozick 1974: 101–119). All other functions of the state violate individual rights, which are the most fundamental of rights. Thus, re-distribution of wealth and taxation, in general, are restrictions on liberty and, hence, are problematic in nature. According to Nozick, the state should not use its public power to help citizens: to help the disadvantaged, individual charity is sufficient. Contrary to Rawls, economic and social inequality is not problematic, but a consequence of the inherent capacities of individuals.

For those used to the welfare state, Nozick's philosophy may seem incomprehensible. What about the sick, the disabled or the elderly in society? What if there is not enough charity? Also, who has the ultimate responsibility to care for the underprivileged (if not

the state)? Should not the better-off, if only for their own sake, take into account the need to prevent the sharp division of society in the face of threats of unrest and violence? In the West, the moderate right has favoured the line that social policy can prevent and control social conflict. (Häyry 2000: 171–172; Russell 1987.)

The libertarian perspective of Nozick blurs the relationship of citizenship to the system, the economy and governance. For Nozick, the focus is not on the citizen but the individual – stripped of the practices and institutions of life, not to mention the intersubjective nature of all communication (and communicative rationality). The so-called "inviolability" of individual rights leads to a paradoxical situation in which the rights of individuals *are in fact violated* by removing the social and intersubjective roots of human agency (cf. Habermas 1984b: 59–60). This is because individuals are dependent on intersubjectively identified normative qualifications through which they reproduce and coordinate the common lifeworld (Huttunen 2014). Otherwise, there would be disturbances in social integration.

At the same time, Nozick fails to problematise the mechanisms of social inequality and the inequalities generated by free markets. According to Nozick, this is due to the arbitrary nature of societal decision-making. On the other hand, decision-making is always more or less uncertain, and this should not eliminate the need to take account of injustices. Similarly, Habermas stresses that communication should be free of power relations, whether or not economic inequalities are the cause.

5.1.2   Minimalist corporate social responsibility

The minimalist definition of responsibility can be thought of in terms of corporate social responsibility and Milton Friedman's view that the ultimate responsibility of a company is to increase its economic profit. In Friedman's view, spending money on (socially) responsible activities is wrong for the core business. This is because responsible activities are based on promoting social and other public values, not on maximising owners' profits. Friedman argues that only natural persons are capable of being responsible: therefore, companies themselves cannot be responsible actors. If a company's assets are used for purposes other than ensuring the best possible return, this would be using the assets of others to promote the public interest and would mean hidden taxation. In addition, customers would suffer as a result of the public interest activity, as it would be reflected in the higher price of the product or service. Employees would also be effectively paying for the activity. (Friedman 1970; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 26–27.)

Arguably, this minimum definition for responsibility can be applied to the public administration so that its responsibility means the maintenance of the economy in the most efficient way. Of course, public organisations are not characterised by the pursuit of

profit. However, after the NPM reforms, performance management has an undeniable role in modern public management. Also, this is not only a question of applying management practices, but also of transmitting values to the sector. Continuing with the minimum definition, public organisations should keep their focus on their core activities and on serving their customers. In terms of the core business, other pursuits are detrimental to the public organization's finances, to the effective service of customers, and to the conditions of employees within the organization.

Relying on libertarianism (and right-wing ideology in general), the NPM reforms blur the debate on administrative ethics, since individualism and resource orientation reproduce the primacy of a technical and economical definition of public responsibility. However, despite their ideological background, many defenders of NPM think that the doctrine is *politically neutral.* Concerning ideology, for example, Scandinavian countries are typically understood as social-democratic and managerial systems (Hall 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). These traits do not appear contradictory in practice. Moreover, it can be applied to very different kinds of organisations. In other words, NPM is easily adaptable. The question arises, however, what then makes the doctrine distinctive? It has been argued that NPM can be understood as an umbrella concept, as it contains contradictory elements to improve the efficiency of public administration. (Hood 1991: 8–9.)

5.2 NPM principles of responsibility

NPM includes at least the following key principles (Hood 1991; Hood 1995: 95–98, adapted):

1. Public management must be practical and based on discretionary control by organisations

2. Outcomes rather than processes: explicit standards and indicators are used to assess public performance

3. The public departments are being broken down into smaller and more manageable units

4. Competition is seen as a solution towards lower costs and better standards

5. Management practices are adopted from the private sector

6. Saving resources – public organisations must do more with less than before

From a communicative point of view, the above principles can be criticised on the following grounds. First, simple austerity is not a key driver of accountability. Rather,

public organisations must move away from technical and economical criteria towards a more dialogical approach to citizens and the rest of society. Moreover, the management practices adopted by the private sector do not communicate in the way that public administration does or should. The benefits of managerial autonomy also depend on the objectives being pursued. Seeking competition may be a solution towards lower costs, but at the same time, it undermines the communicative nature of public management and increases the systemic values of the economy in public action. This is reflected, for example, in the rise of measurement and standards in governance.

NPM reforms in most OECD countries were based on different theoretical backgrounds and practical needs (see e.g. Hall 2013; Hood 1995: 99–106; Aucoin 1990: 134–135). Shick (2001) has identified four models behind the administrative doctrine. First, the doctrine can be understood as a market model, where markets are seen as efficient and bureaucratic monopolies as inefficient. Second, the doctrine has a general idea of management, i.e. "management is management" regardless of the sector. The idea of the doctrine is that freeing managers from predetermined inputs and operational processes improves organisational efficiency. The third model is program strategy. Here, the key to reforming the modern state is the efficient allocation of public resources to achieve the state's fundamental goals. The incremental strategy, on the other hand, is based on general prudence and a sequential approach. Therefore, changes are made cautiously only when options open up. (Shick 2001: 136–139.)

As will be seen, NPM is not a simple and easy-to-grasp set of ideas. In some respects, NPM appears to be a contradictory package, as is the case with the management ethos and the tightening of political steering. Many advocates of NPM have acknowledged that there are contradictions between the approach and the trends that influence it. The reconciliation remains to be seen in practical governance reforms (Lähdesmäki 2003: 51; Aucoin 1990: 129–130).

5.2.1 Technical rationality in NPM

NPM combines the ideas of rational management and market exploitation, reflecting the market liberalist background of the doctrine. The idea of NPM is that rationality in public management is linked to economic productivity thinking (Vakkuri et al. 2012: 142–143). According to Habermas, the market-liberal view of administrative power is based on rational choices, as it is equated with competition in the market: "If represented by the liberal model of market competition, a contest of power is determined by the rational choice of optimal strategies" (Habermas 1996: 273–275). However, the problem with the market-liberal perspective is what Habermas sees as the normative core of practical reasoning, which focuses only on strategic choices and apparent value neutrality.

However, an all-encompassing theory of rationality can never be achieved (even for public administration) if it is based on economic thinking and productivity. Problematically, the starting point of technical rationality excludes different forms of responsibility that reject economic logic (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 46–47). It can be argued, for example, that an economically rational input-output system can be simultaneously efficient, colonizing the lifeworld and undermining the legitimacy of public administration.

NPM considers performance accountability as an important criterion for governance. In the context of rational management, NPM is close to Neo-Taylorism. On the other hand, NPM differs from Neo-Taylorism in the sense that it seeks to change the culture of management instead of just focusing on methods of efficiency. Achieving as much as possible with as few resources as possible is one formulation of the principle of efficiency, which is at the heart of management theory – alongside the emphasis on hierarchical organisation and managerial functions. What is new, however, is the way in which efforts have been made to limit or outright reduce the growth of public finances. Governance is more often viewed through the lens of new trends in institutional economics. (Pollitt 1993: 186–187; Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50, 52.) These theories have implications for how NPM understands responsible actors or activities and how they can be managed at all. Indeed, post-NPM public management makes use of outsourcing and the associated contractualisation of public activities (Lane 2000: 224).

NPM is a strong advocate of managerialism, a belief, which is represented by the rarely tested idea that better management solves economic and social problems. Hence, improving efficiency requires increasing the autonomy of public management (Pollitt 1993: 1–2; Aucoin 1990: 117–118). For example, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) distinguish *steering* from *rowing*: bureaucratic management is fertile ground for the former but destructive for the latter. They offer ten values for entrepreneurial public management: competition, citizen empowerment, performance, mission, customer service, problem prevention, making money rather than spending it, decentralisation, market practices and intersectoral cooperation (Osborne & Gaebler 1992: 20).

5.3 Theories defining NPM

In the relationship between NPM and responsibility, it should be noted that the former has been influenced by economic views such as transactional theory, principal-agent theory and public choice theory. Managerialism is also based on economic principles. The aspects of these theories are present in what NPM considers to be a responsible action. For example, the principal-agent theory is based on the lack of trust between principal and agent. The contribution of the underlying theories that influence NPM (public choice theory, managerialism, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics) can be

illustrated in the table below. These influences are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.

Table 3.   Influences of NPM (Lähdesmäki 2003: 52, adapted)

The impact of public choice theory on the formation of NPM	**The impact of managerialism on the formation of NPM**
• A better administration is always smaller • The idea of the civil servant is summed up in the idea of bureaucrats wasting taxpayers' money • The call for stronger political guidance in the administration • Citizens are seen as consumers making choices	• Generalisability of management • The idealisation of leadership • Focus on results and cost-effectiveness • Rewarding staff based on performance
Influences of principal-agent theory on the formation of NPM	**The impact of transaction cost economics on the formation of NPM**
• Differentiation of the roles of subscribers and producers • Self-interest and respect for the agreement • The problem of trust • The principal's role is to encourage and supervise the agent, to engage the agent	• Positive attitude towards the market and competition • Operating in the market itself entails costs • Outsourcing and privatisation of public services • Attention to transaction costs in management studies

5.3.1 Public choice theory

Public choice theory approaches its field of research from a methodological individualist perspective: individuals make decisions in different situations according to their own preferences and aims. Public choice theory's conception of the individual as a rational agent (*homo economicus*) maximising the utility function has its origins in neoclassical economics. (Buchanan & Tullock 1962; Arrow 1951; Tullock 1987.) Through its methodological outlook, the theory challenges the traditional view of the civil servant as a pursuer of collective values. Naturally, this has implications for how public accountability should be understood. For example, is it even possible to think about accountability in a broad sense if the civil servant is primarily a selfish one?

Within the public choice theory, there are differences in what is rational for actors. In any case, the theory moves the rationality of public action away from collectivism towards individualism. Downs recognises altruism as one of the motivations of actors alongside self-interest. He argues that individuals in different situations have a variety of ways of acting rationally. The analysis of Niskanen, in turn, highlights how the actions of a rational

bureaucrat lead to socially negative consequences. For example, the bureaucrat seeks to increase his or her budget to increase influence, which increases the size of the public sector and reduces efficiency. (Hyyryläinen 2005: 12; Downs 1967: 85–85; Niskanen 1971: 47–48.)

According to public choice theory, there is no guarantee that public decision-making will benefit everyone. The problem is compounded by the lack of an optimal organisational structure and processes in the public sector. There are no unambiguous indicators of public sector performance, making it difficult to assess the performance of agencies and individuals. In addition, the public choice theory assumes that public organisations are overly protected from competition. (Boyne et al. 2003: 6–7; Aucoin 1990: 116–117.)

Public administration under public choice theory is based on five criticisms. (1) Only individuals are capable of rational choices. (2) Public administration should be efficient and small. (3) Public administration should favour competition and private modes of production. (4) Public organisations should be put in competition with each other. (5) An economically optimal size for the public sector should be found. (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 111; Aucoin 1990: 119–120; Niskanen 1971: 227–230.)

It is the thinking of *homo economicus* that leads NPM to take the minimal agency found in the bureaucratic theory to its logical conclusion. Habermas writes about the agency of experts in organisations as follows: "To the extent that methodical-rational conduct of life gets uprooted, purposive-rational action orientations become self-sufficient; technically intelligent adaptation to the objectified milieu of large organizations is combined with utilitarian calculation of the actor's own interests" (Habermas 1984b: 323).

According to Habermas, the behaviour of experts is based on instrumental goals rather than on ethical obligations. Experts see these goals as individualistic opportunities for money and career advancement (Habermas 1984b: 323–324.) Although the responsibility of bureaucratic theory is primarily a matter of compliance, the doctrine is also influenced by professional accountability and the ethos of public service. These influences serve a broader understanding of responsibility in public administration than individualism.

The individualistic and economic conception of agency also leads to what NPM (Tiihonen 2008: 215–217) has later been criticised for – namely, atomism (Habermas 1984b: 209). Economic rationality does not provide a mechanism for coordinating action between different actors. Unlike markets, where self-interest can serve the public interest, public action can hardly be described by the mechanism of the invisible hand (Smith 2015).

Another significant problem with the public choice theory is that it leads to a Hobbesian state of nature in the social context, "the war of all against all" (Habermas 1996: 336–337). This is the logical conclusion of the individualistic approach. First of all, the public choice

theory cannot explain how strategic actors are able to maintain their social relations through their rational decisions. Furthermore, it is implausible to assume that all social behaviour is strategic in nature and that it can be explained in terms of individual-centred utilitarianism. "If people always engaged in opportunistic behaviour when they could get away with it, civilization as we know would not exist" (Habermas 1996: 337). This remark can be applied more specifically to public administration. If the behaviour of civil servants were based on opportunism, public administration as we know it would simply not exist! People are driven not only by opportunistic behaviour but also, for example, by honesty and a sense of duty (Habermas 1996: 337).

5.3.2   Managerialism

In addition to public choice theory, NPM is influenced by managerialism, which is seen as improving the accountability and performance of government. Today, it can be claimed that the impact of managerialism on modern public management has been significant. For example, the characteristics of managerialism are listed as professionalism, freedom of action and accountability. Also, managerialism is expressed in terms of ideology, organisational practices and efficiency-oriented, individual-centered management. (Viinamäki 2008: 47–48; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993.)

Habermas writes of a market-liberal conception of politics that has similarities with NPM managerialism: "politics [is] normally the business of managers and bureaucrats whose behaviour matches the liberal description of strategic market competition steered by personal interests" (Habermas 1996: 277). As a market-liberal doctrine, NPM also sees public administration as the domain of managers, whose behaviour is best described by the strategic nature of their actions, their market orientation and their personal interests.

Managerialism can be divided into Neo-Taylorist and general management. Managerialism is inspired by the principles of Taylorism, or scientific management, which include improving work efficiency, measuring performance, rewarding performance and linking human resources to productivity. An important Taylorist principle is the view of management as a science. Hence, management can be applied to all human activities and includes certain universal principles and rules. (Hood 1995: 96–97; Taylor 1911; Fayol 1916; Lähdesmäki 2003: 49; Pollitt 1993: 177).

Like Neo-Taylorism, NPM is focused on increasing efficiency, which is also a key element of responsibility. On the other hand, what distinguishes NPM from Neo-Taylorism is its emphasis on the quality of public service delivery. (Pollitt 1993: 186–197.) Other Neo-Taylorist features of NPM include, for example, increased control and cost allocation in line with private-sector practices; accountability for results, i.e. the achievement of

predetermined goals; individual reward and sanctions for errors and underperformance. (Keraudren & van Mierlo 1998; Aucoin 1990: 121.)

Taylor's work is based on Bentham's philosophy. Therefore, it is not surprising to find Benthamian features in managerialism. In this case, we can speak of responsibility as austerity. Bentham, for example, thought that public management should be approached through the principle of frugality, i.e. cutting costs and doing more work with fewer resources (Hood 1991; Bowrey & Smark 2010). According to Bentham, good public management is related to two aspects, namely, the nature of the public service and the universal notion of good management as frugality (Bentham 1843: 28).

In addition to Bentham, managerialism has other utilitarian and consequentialist starting points. The consequentialist manager pursues the maximum pursuit of the public good: this means choosing the action in decision-making that ensures the greatest possible aggregate welfare or benefit (Svara 1997; Mill 2000: 16–20, 24; Bentham 2000: 31; Svara 1997). In this way, responsibility is easy to conceptualise, for example, in the marketplace.

On the other hand, Goodin (1998) sees utilitarianism as a philosophy particularly suited to public administration. This is due to utilitarianism's emphasis on maximising welfare, as public managers rarely have the resources to consider all the details in their decision-making. However, Goodin's argument for the applicability of utilitarianism to public management is more technically rational (it is efficient) than substantively normative. For example, the utilitarian view of justice pays no attention to how the sum of well-being is distributed among individuals or to how individuals distribute their well-being over time (Rawls 1988: 25–27). However, these are key questions for public administration that need to be addressed.

5.3.3 Principal-agent theory

After decades, the view of public administration as a strictly public and monopolistic system has changed to a multifunctional arrangement. The public sector's own activities and cooperation with other actors are now almost as important. This cooperation is commonly conceptualised in terms of principal-agent theory, where the principal hires the agent to act in accordance with his interests (Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50).

The principal-agent theory is based on the assumption that the principal has an interest in holding the agent accountable for his or her actions. The theory assumes that a rational agent will seek to exploit information asymmetry arising from the relationship. In other words, the agent cannot be considered as an accountable agent in the absence of control by the principal. Thus, the principal seeks to control and enforce the compliance of the agent with aims and norms. However, this does not imply that the principal spends a lot

of time and resources on this effort. Ultimately, sanctions and other harsh control mechanisms are costly methods for the principal, who may opt for more indirect means of control to assess the accountable party. The principal-agent theory also relies on the assumption that the principal is interested in the performance of the delegated task or that he or she seeks to correct the accountable person and his or her actions. Research suggests that principal-agent problems generate additional costs for both principal and agent. For the principal, the costs consist of incentivising and controlling the agent. For example, incentive rewards imply a cost that would otherwise be spent on other activities of the public organisation and on ensuring that the organisation's employees act in the organisation's best interests (Schillemans 2014: 198–199; Hyyryläinen 2004: 49–50, 59–61; Arrow 1985: 38–39).

The principal-agent theory is in many ways the opposite of what Habermas (1996: 119) characterises as the communicative action of participants. In principal-agent theory, coordination is based on the interest of the principal; in communicative action, coordination is based on the consensus between the participants. The principal-agent relationship also depends on the reward received by the agent and the realisation of the principal's interest. The relationship between communicative agents is based on openness and dialogue. Whereas principal-agent theory emphasises the realisation of interests, communicative action highlight the emergence of consensus. Moreover, the assumptions of the principal-agent theory are independent of the extrinsic motivations of the actors – in communicative action, the opposite is the case, and external incentives are secondary. Habermas writes:

> *Communicatively acting subjects commit themselves to coordinating their action plans on the basis of a consensus that depends in turn on their reciprocally taking positions on, and intersubjectively recognizing, validity claims. From this it follows that only those reasons count that all the participating parties together find acceptable. It is in each case the same kinds of reasons that have a rationally motivating force for those involved in communicative action. By contrast, the actor who simply decides as she wishes is not concerned whether the reasons that are decisive for her could also be accepted by others. In the case of purposive-rational behavior, agent-relative reasons suffice.* (Habermas 1996: 119–120.)

How the principal-agent theory can be applied in the public sector is a question of its own. Nevertheless, its application in public accountability is common. At the very least, information asymmetry is evident, which may undermine accountability. In Finland, for example, civil servants are, as a rule, highly educated and knowledgeable. Either we simply have to rely on the loyalty of the civil service to policymakers and the public, or we have to create a system of incentives and controls to prevent opportunistic behaviour. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 65; Gailmard 2014: 90–91.) The application of different policy options relies on the notion of agency and its capacity for responsible action.

The relationship between principal and agent is probably closer to a situation where different sectoral actors cooperate. In recent decades, public-private partnerships (PPP*)* have become more common in public administration. For once, they require more than just smart purchasing from public managers. For example, the life-cycle model requires different public and private actors to trust each other in projects that can last for decades (Forrer 2010: 477–478; Johanson et al. 2012: 219, 231–232; Greve & Hodge 2010: 149–150).

The life cycle model is based on two promises. First, private sector contributions will ease the pressure on public finances. In addition, public services offer more value for money. The shift from bureaucratic governance to collaborative arrangements makes it more difficult to assess traditional accountability since it is increasingly difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible for what. Also, accountability to politicians is also becoming more complex, and new forms of accountability alone will not be sufficient to remedy the situation. Collaborative arrangements will be judged by results-oriented accountability mechanisms. Hence, their focus will be on governance performance, not on whether they operate fairly or in accordance with laws and standards. (Willems & Van Dooren 2011: 524–525.) Unfortunately, little empirical research has been conducted on how accountability is implemented in outsourced functions of government (ter Bogt 2018: 3–4*).*

5.3.4   Transaction cost theory

Transaction cost theory is based on the view that market activity is not costless – it also takes time and money. The different types of costs can be broken down, for example, as follows. First, the buyer has to find a suitable seller on the market who has the specified goods or services (search costs). Next, they have to find out whether the product or service is what they are looking for (information costs). In addition, the buyer has to agree, for example, on quantity, price, quality and delivery terms (contract costs). Finally, the contract has to be put into practice (implementation costs). Naturally, some of these costs are *ex ante*, others *ex post*. If the up-front costs are compromised, it is likely that more resources will have to be devoted to solving problems afterwards. It is also likely that higher up-front costs will lead to lower ex-post costs. In terms of overall costs, the issue is not straightforward. However, the scale of the acquisition plays a major role in terms of legitimate transaction costs. In a large investment, a small mistake can lead to large losses. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 55; Coase 1993; Demsetz 1993.)

Transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory are united by the idea that social institutions and arrangements in markets and hierarchical organisations are understood as the most efficient solutions to economic problems. In other words, the historical, social and political factors that contributed to their emergence are secondary to efficiency. There

are also differences between the two theories. The transaction cost theory and the principal-agent theory are distinguished by views on the organisation and the rationality of the individual in pursuing self-interest. Transaction cost theory is guided by the expediency of the organisation, although this would mean abandoning the idea that rational agents pursue their own interests. In principal-agent theory, this assumption is most essential – leading to the theory's abandonment of the most appropriate organisation possible. At the same time, they emphasise the role of contracts in the organisation's internal (with management and owners) and external (with business and partners) relationships. (Hyyryläinen 2004: 53–54; Hood 1995: 94.)

5.4 Blurring of accountability

NPM perspective emphasises accountability, which means holding public managers to account for a wide range of issues. These include democratic and legal activities; responsibilities concerning governance and its different levels; publicity, media and information; professional activities; values in communities and society; service to citizens. Assigning accountability can be problematic, as activities may be dispersed across different organisations. Also, measuring and evaluating the achievement of accountability are difficult objectives. The problem with performance measurement is that it emphasises measurables rather than actual needs. In addition, measurement is difficult to measure accurately. There is a risk that accountability will degenerate to a level where it is mainly about monitoring and sanctioning. (Viinamäki 2008: 50–51.)

At the same time, NPM reforms have led to a reduction in hierarchies and a weakening of accountability in governance. Measuring moral action has always been difficult, but as hierarchies have been reduced, it has become even more difficult (Dicke & Boonyarak 2005; Demmke 2019). NPM sees accountability as something easy to measure, and that individuals respond positively to performance measurement. Both of these assumptions have been questioned. (Dubnick 2014: 29–30.)

In the context of NPM accountability, performance measurement is thought to improve the accountability of civil servants. However, measuring performance becomes challenging when outputs, outcomes and their relationship are unclear. Performance accountability is most easily measured in a situation where both outputs and outcomes are simply observable (Jennings & Haist 2004). Accountability in public management is influenced by broad collective values, the realisation of which cannot be unambiguously measured through management of results. These values include public acceptability, transparency, collegiality, trust, expertise, impartiality and independence. The accountability of public management must be assessed primarily in the light of these values.

It should be noted that NPM conceptualises accountability from the economic world. However, the accountability issues in politics and public administration are different from those in economics. For example, a political leader is accountable to his or her electorate and citizens, a civil servant to his or her supervisor a higher administrative unit: a business leader, on the other hand, is accountable to shareholders or the board of directors of the company (Salminen 2016: 9; Salminen 2018: 67–68).

These forms of accountability are based on different institutional arrangements. Mulgan (2002) defines accountability as a relationship "in which one party, the holder of accountability, has the right to seek information about, to investigate and to scrutinize the actions of another party, the giver of accountability" (Mulgan 2002: 3). Sullivan (2009: 66) points out that the rights and obligations of the holder of accountability and the giver of accountability change from context to context. Hence, for this reason, accountability should be viewed in a sociological sense, where actors negotiate their identities, responsibilities and obligations with each other. Sullivan calls his model mutual accountability.

According to Mattei (2007: 369), NPM has led to a decline in political accountability. Managerial accountability is characterised by a focus on value-neutral and economic management of administrative functions, rather than problematising wider societal issues. On the other hand, accountable public action should require integrity and moral agency from the individual civil servant up to the political-administrative level. Viewing accountability as a technical and neutral activity has reduced the capacity of political actors to exercise democratic control. This has been particularly the case in the UK, while in Germany managerialist reforms have been slowed down by the state-centredness of the country. (Mattei 2007: 369–371, 383.)

One of the objectives of the NPM reforms has been to increase transparency and accountability in public administration. Accountability information can make public action more transparent and provide a basis for control. Against this information, it is easier to assess results when considering outsourcing or, more generally, public sector cooperation with other actors. The problem arises when accountability practices and performance monitoring are informal. In such cases, trust, shared values, autonomy and cooperation are important. Although well-documented accountability information is available, it is very rarely used as a means of increasing control. In outsourcing, there are few situations involving mechanistic, market relations and principal-agent theory. (ter Bogt 2018: 2–3; Mills & Koliba 2014: 4–6.)

NPM has also led to the growth of stakeholder thinking in public administration. This issue is also linked to the accountability and responsiveness of public administrations. Stakeholders are used to assess and justify the performance and legitimacy of the public sector. The assumption is that the organisation will improve its performance, management

and results by interacting with the environment. It is also assumed that an organisation is effective when it is responsive to its stakeholders. Stakeholders can be both direct and indirect and can have very different expectations of the organisation's performance. In stakeholder thinking, organisations are resource dependent on their stakeholders. If the organisation does not meet the demands of its stakeholders, they will stop resourcing the organisation. In other words, organisations need to act responsively and innovate in response to the needs of their stakeholders. For example, public service provision can be subject to certain general criteria relating to the adequacy, targeting and quality of services and the correctness of solutions. (Viinamäki 2008: 57–58, 62.)

Keeping customer and stakeholder thinking as accountability mechanisms poses its own problems. Defining clients and stakeholders in the public sector is challenging because of the collective nature of financing the public service. Collectivity makes, in principle, all citizens customers of public administrations. However, accountability mechanisms will simply not work if they are understood too broadly. Moreover, the concept of the customer means very different things depending on the characteristics of the public service. For example, there is a difference between the "customer service" of a prison guard and that of a teacher. (Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228.) In NPM, customer service is generally thought to improve the quality of public services and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the public sector. On the other hand, private sector management doctrines may at the same time lead to improved efficiency and reduced responsiveness and accessibility of services (Viinamäki 2008: 65).

As NPM gives public managers a wide degree of autonomy, the doctrine underlines the importance of negotiation. This also means reconciling the different actors' values and conflicts. Public managers seek to strike a balance between multiple and potentially competing for demands, making negotiation and conflict resolution skills important leadership qualities (Bryer 2007: 486–489.) On the other hand, negotiation can further blur accountability relationships.

5.5 Criticism of NPM

NPM has led to the adoption of new strategic methods in public administration. In management theory, it is thought that strategic market intervention ultimately increases the accountability of public management. Economically this may be true, but at the same time, private sector management practices reduce the accountability of public administration. "Buyers and sellers act 'strategically' rather than communicatively inasmuch as they make decisions according to their own interests and external market conditions" (Rehg 1996: xviii). Strategic methods undermine accountability and trust

between actors. Communicatively, NPM is not primarily interested in building consensus, but in economic benefits and accountability for results.

Deregulation has led to the adoption of market mechanisms in public organisations, and many administrations have transformed themselves into independent public corporations or semi-public enterprises. This has reduced the core functions of the state and delegated responsibility for state management to lower levels. This delegation of responsibility makes it difficult to see the big picture and to be accountable. (Tiihonen 2008: 215–217; Hood 1995: 106–107; Aucoin 1990: 129–135.)

5.5.1   Strategic action

Communicatively, the problem with NPM is its dependence on accountability and negotiation, which reproduce the technical rationality and strategic action. "The practice of *reaching understanding* differs from that of *bargaining* with respect to its intended aim: the desired agreement is understood in one case as consensus, in the other as negotiated agreement or contract. In the former case, appeal is made to the consideration of norms and values; in the latter, to that of interest positions" (Habermas 1996: 140).

According to Habermas, consensus can be reached through dialogue based on discourse ethics. Negotiation, on the other hand, is not based on the observance of norms or values, but the realisation of interests. This means that accountability for results is assessed through technical-economic criteria such as performance. There is a risk that performance accountability will not take into account norms that cannot be assessed within the framework of technical rationality. Since accountability for results is conceptualised in technical terms, normativity and rationality of action are mutually exclusive: coordination is then based on negotiation and compromise between strategically behaving actors (Habermas 1996: 338). The tools of NPM are instrumental or strategic: they mean either intervention in the world outside the actor or manipulation of people in the social world.

5.5.2   Diminishment of public values

NPM has been criticised in particular for its financial and results-oriented approach, which overlooks equality and equity in governance (Viinamäki 2008: 50). The reduced range of values in public management undermines the realisation of public values in society. In contrast to the private sector, the public sector is concerned with social welfare, equality, equal opportunities and the equitable distribution of public resources (Vigoda 2000: 167).

The diminishment of public values in public management is partly due to the NPM arrangements, which approach accountability through the value of economy. Adherence to a general value approach is difficult in the context of outsourcing, which not only

undermines accountability and transparency, but also the concrete role and freedom of staff. Legal accountability and compliance with standards in an outsourced service is a particular challenge. Outsourcing can also make bureaucratic accountability more difficult if the public sector is unable to monitor contracts. Performance management makes political accountability for goals that are not based on the delivery of tasks more difficult. Such goals include, for example, legal transparency of information or freedom of information. They are central to the overall quality of governance, but are not a priority for the day-to-day tasks of public organisations. (Chan & Rosenbloom 2010: 15–17; Romzek & Dubnick 1987: 28.)

The way how values have changed in public administration has had also a legal impact. In Finland, legal accountability has been hampered by the fact that the distinction between private law and public law is often blurred. In principle, the relationship between a public authority and a client can be a legal relationship under administrative law or a contractual relationship under private law. The problem is not limited to Finland. It has complicated legal accountability in countries that have undergone NPM reforms. For example, municipalities have delegated to private law entities activities which, broadly construed, can at least sometimes involve the exercise of public authority. There are still many open questions about outsourcing, such as how good governance principles are implemented at the different stages of outsourcing. This is a key issue when considering the implications and limitations of outsourcing in public administration. (Komulainen 2010: 33–34; Mäenpää 2002: 18; Chan & Rosenbloom 2010: 17.)

5.5.3 Naïve managerial outlook

Among the forms of responsibility, accountability is linked to the autonomy of public management and the responsibility to report to different bodies. NPM was once a proponent of this theme. The more autonomy given is to managers, the greater the accountability. However, NPM fails to address the question of how accountability can be enforced in increasingly complex relationships where public and private sector responsibilities are blurred. This is the case, for example, with outsourcing. The current accountability setup is very different from that of bureaucratic theory. Traditionally, bureaucracy has been guided by a sense of obligation, whereby civil servants are obliged to be open, honest, fair, objective and impartial. (Viinamäki 2017: 84–85; Chan 2010: 15.)

The problem is how to ensure the accountability of the public manager while at the same time giving him or her greater autonomy and discretion. From the NPM perspective, the answer lies in performance. Accountability for results requires demonstrating performance, which is done by measuring and evaluating results. (Lähdesmäki 2003: 77–78.) The idea is that public management can be given greater freedom as long as it is accountable, i.e. cost-effective. In other words, public managers are trusted in their ability

to act responsibly. However, this is *in contrast* to another NPM view, which often argues that public service delivery should be conceptualised through principal-agent theory and low-trust relationships (Hyyryläinen 2004).

NPM relies above all on the ability of public managers to act in a performance-oriented way. The situation is not so simple with other actors. One might pose a difficult question. What makes public managers more responsible than other actors? This is probably an assumption, like the claim that accountability in the private sector produces more accountable behaviour in the public sector. From the NPM perspective, trust is distrust (Viinamäki 2017: 109). More freedom of action may, in fact, reduce responsibility (Lähdesmäki 2003: 79).

In any case, NPM will place a stronger obligation on public management to demonstrate accountability. This is particularly the case for individual managers. On the other hand, performance management and the measurement of issues, implementation and delivery narrow the range of values in public management. The focus of management is on values that can be operationalised in terms of indicators and measurable quantities. Accountability and accountability are broader in content and form, but conceptually difficult and poorly operationalised. They therefore require particular attention. (Viinamäki 2017: 85–86.)

5.5.4   Public-Private Partnerships

According to Greve and Hodge (2010), the five main threats are contract complexity, conflicting roles of governance, partnership choice, partnership management and contract length. First, complex contracts make it difficult to achieve technical accountability, where the focus is on formal standards. However, the problems of public-private partnerships are not limited to technical criteria. The conflicting roles of government call into question the principle of communicative authenticity, whereby the integrity and consistency of the actor should be trusted. This is also reflected in the motives behind the public organisation's choice of partnerships. In terms of partnership management, accountability is not something that lies solely in the hands of the public actor – the accountability of the private partnership should also be ensured. Finally, the length of the contract makes it difficult to predict the environment. The longer the contract, the more difficult it is to manage partnerships with different roles.

Greve and Hodge (2010) present five threats to public governance posed by PPPs that undermine accountability and responsibility in public action:

Table 4. Threats to accountability (Greve & Hodge 2010: 153–155)

The threat	Details
The complexity of contracts	Public-private partnerships are based on complex contracts, usually of long duration. Understanding the contractual terms requires financial and legal expertise. Contract negotiations are often complex and rarely involve consultation with citizens or stakeholders.
Conflicting roles for the administration	Governments find themselves in many conflicting interests, such as public finance, economic development or political-ideological alignment. The finance minister can be both an advocate of privatisation and a steward of public finances.
Choosing partnership	Public-private partnerships are one form of governance among others. The choice of governance is not necessarily based on deliberation or on weighing strengths and weaknesses.
Partnership management	The challenge for governance is how to manage a private partner or its strategic agenda. Companies can neglect their responsibilities and mutually agreed contractual terms.
Length of contract	PPP contracts are difficult in the sense that their length usually varies between 30 and 40 years. It is therefore almost impossible to predict which environmental factors will affect public governance or the partnership over that period.

A key feature of market-based management and partnership relationships is the reconciliation of public and private interests, which easily leads to a loss of control and public decision-making. The problem with NPM reforms is that market orientation dominates public management practices and detaches public management from the principles of community. Perhaps the ultimate justification for public administration is that it seeks to serve society and the wider public. Often the result is that the public sector is unable to, or even does not seek to, stabilise social development. (Anttiroiko 2004: 46–47.)

From the NPM outlook, citizenship is perceived through customer service and selfish self-interest. Public organisations are primarily accountable to their customers, not to citizens as such. Responsible government provides appropriate services to its customers, where accountability is about satisfying individual preferences. As NPM seeks to outsource public activities, accountability will at least partly shift from the public sector to the private sector. The accountability of an outsourcing administration will be based on delivering services and goods in the most cost-effective way and satisfying customer needs. Accountability standards are lower in the private sector than in the public sector, as responsiveness to customers is different from responsiveness to citizens. Furthermore, accountability issues

are not limited to serving partnerships and customers. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 131–133.)

5.5.5   Vicious circle of accountability for results

What does responsibility mean in NPM? It means accountability for results, i.e. achieving pre-set goals and reporting accountability to someone; efficiency and performance management; austerity, i.e. cutting costs and doing more work with fewer resources or saving money; inclination towards market forces and customers, which is why public administration is outsourced or privatised. Fundamentally, NPM sees responsibility as something that can be managed in terms of rationality. In this case, rationality refers to instrumental rationality, i.e. seeing public administration as an input-output system in the context of productivity thinking.

NPM represents a minimalist view of responsibility. Within this framework, responsibility issues are translated back into effective action at the individual and organisational levels. The social responsibility of public organisations is based on efficiency through competition and customer service. Within the NPM framework, competition in the (quasi-)market is thought to enable public organisations to be efficient. Internal accountability mechanisms are primarily based on economic criteria and the achievement of results. This undermines accountability for issues that are not assessed within the processes. Of all the administrative doctrines, NPM requires the least ethical motivation from the civil servant.

What distinguishes NPM from bureaucratic compliance is the demonstration of accountability through result-orientation and financial metrics. However, the problem is that accountability is influenced by many phenomena that cannot be easily measured. In the past, the criteria were based on bureaucratic administration and its hierarchical principles, and on the relatively limited discretion of officials. At the same time, and contradictorily, NPM stresses the need to increase the autonomy of public managers, while emphasising a more minimalist conception of moral agency than bureaucratic theory. The question arises as to what criteria can be used to guarantee more autonomy to public managers if they do not have the conditions for ethical behaviour.

Figure 7. Risks of accountability for results

On the basis of the literature review, public management under NPM can pose the following risks for accountability. First, public management for results leads to outsourcing and contracting. As Habermas (1996: 216) writes: "the principle of freedom of contract, and hence the liberal vision of society as a regulated competition between private persons acting in a purposive-rational manner, is upheld". The communication between agents is based on the principal-agent relationship and the utilitarian mentality with the growth of opportunism. Consequently, the agent's opportunistic behaviour is likely to lead to a loss of trust between the agents (if it is not already weak).

In a situation of low trust, accountability mechanisms are formal and financial. The vicious circle is complete and the same methods are being used to improve the situation. Accountability for results leads to new outsourcing and contracting, defined by principal-agent relationships and lower levels of trust. Moreover, it is difficult for the public manager to check that the outsourced service has been provided in a responsible manner. He or she can demand accountability within the terms of the contract, but does not have a direct link with the activities of the external organisation. Thus, communication between management and production is technical and becomes more complex.

The vicious circle illustrated above shows only *one side* of market relations. For example, the relations could be based on high trust and the creation of innovative solutions. However, the vicious circle is defined by NPM ideals of economy and efficiency, which have led to cuts and austerity in the public sector. Increasing opportunism and loss of

confidence lead to increasing opportunism. This makes it increasingly difficult for public management to convey public or collective values in its actions.

The market orientation found in NPM shows how a moral phenomenon such as responsibility can be assessed in terms of an "economic yardstick". Accountability is a management tool that does not require philosophical argumentation or a sense of moral consciousness to make the "right decision". This reflects the influence of the economic world in determining individual action, so that individuals judge themselves by their own market value and what they are they learn from how they fare in economical thinking (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 274).

Hence, criteria for public management are sought from technical values and do not have to be intrinsic or moral. Questions of responsibility and accountability return to rational and economic measures of performance accountability. The evaluation of the performance of public management is based on clear standards measured by economic figures. At the same time, the autonomy of the public manager is emphasised (Pollitt 1993: 1–3). The concept of agency is framed in terms of economic theories and perspectives that highlight the importance of individuals and their selfish preferences.

Whereas bureaucratic theory stresses the primacy of duties over consequences, NPM sees things the other way round. Ultimately, responsibility in public management comes back to the measurable consequences of the action. In terms of duties, a conflict arises between private and public values. The actions of public officials are still based on a number of values that emphasise duty, such as the principle of legality, impartiality and independence. If civil servants pursue their own selfish preferences, what is the role of public values? The principles of duty are difficult to quantify in economic terms, as they must be present in public life all the time (at least ideally speaking).

5.6 NPM's communicative responsibility

5.6.1 Principle of openness

In NPM, the principle of openness is limited by a concept of agency based on technical rationality. Communication between actors is instrumental and strategic, rather than consensual. Technical rationality offers the tools for accountability for results. The administrative doctrines represents a market-liberal view of public agency in which democratic will formation is conceived as a mediation of individuals' self-interests and as a phenomenon parallel to the market (Habermas 1996: 268–269).

It is not possible to talk about NPM without management practices in the private sector or the use of (quasi-)markets, as accountability for results has led to managerialism and the outsourcing of public services. In NPM, the responsible actor is *homo economicus*, who is acting in a cost-effective way on the basis of economic indicators. NPM thinks of arrangements as improving the accountability of public administrations through the principle of frugality (more results with fewer resources). In the markets, arrangements are based on buyers and sellers, economic information and the added value of the relationship. In the market, accountability is minimal: it is the realisation of the individual preferences of actors and the resulting cost-effectiveness. This is reflected in public choice theory and principal-agent theory.

In markets, the key role is negotiation, which usually excludes parties and stakeholders affected by externalities. Here, the activity of market participants is based on the amount of value added to the relationship. The activity of market participants is constrained by capital, supply/demand ratios, product prices and transaction costs. Lack of information also plays a crucial role in making optimal decisions.

NPM is defined by the phenomenon of outsourcing, which does not simply complicate accountability relationships. Outsourcing also means a weakening of the principle of transparency in public administration, as, for example, the incorporation of public enterprises places resources outside public control. Transparency has also been undermined by the values of the economic world, which are at odds with the public service ethos.

5.6.2   Principle of freedom of speech

In NPM, communication is understood in terms of economic criteria, the negotiation situation and the autonomy of the manager, which makes implementing the principle of freedom of speech difficult. In this way, the administrative doctrine reproduces the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic theory, although the methods are partly different. Negotiation is rarely between two equal partners, economic criteria are determined from the top-down – and the manager even has the right to make decisions without consulting the other parties. Collective acceptance does not come about except through negotiated agreements. The market situation is also based on the conditions and price mechanism created by supply and demand. On the other hand, the price mechanism is challenging to operate in a quasi-market situation.

Public-private partnerships make it more difficult to monitor public management responsibility and accountability. The contractual terms that define partnerships undermine the communicative nature of the activity, as they often require technical expertise to interpret. In contractualisation, managing responsibility can be reduced to

contract management and the maintenance of a low level of trust. This is particularly the case when a public organisation seeks cost efficiency through the outsourcing of public services.

In a quasi-quasi market situation, operators are at least in principle on an equal footing as buyers and sellers. This is at least a liberal view of the nature of the market since each agent has equal freedom to buy or not to buy a service or product (Habermas 1996: 44). However, it is obvious that there are inequalities of wealth and opportunity. As Habermas states, "[t]he liberal market model tends to ignore and trivialize actual inequalities" (Habermas 1996: 424). Of course, everyone has the freedom to interpret and criticise market relations, but there is no mechanism of communication other than through price. Differences in knowledge also lead to different transaction costs and hence to inequalities between actors.

5.6.3 Principle of authenticity

According to the principle of authenticity, actors express their beliefs, desires and needs. The NPM's accountability for results inevitably leads to a situation in which the rationality of agency is based, at least in part, on dishonesty when it makes sense from the view of economic effectiveness. Accountability for results has meant a loss of trust and an increase in opportunism in public administration. However, in the context of accountability for results, it can be argued that opportunistic behaviour can also be beneficial, as long as it is carried out in a market towards other actors.

The relationship between buyer and seller is built on trust or lack of it. In general, market activity is based on low levels of trust. This also comes back to the issue of contractualisation. For example, in a partnership, contractuality is based on consideration of the other party and an equal relationship between the parties, with the aim of sharing risks and benefits. On the other hand, the relationship is always built on self-interest. Trust exists as long as the partnership serves this principle. This is also a prerequisite for dialogue leading to concrete action.

NPM seeks clarity through the unambiguity of economic criteria: responsibility equals cost-effectiveness and the private sector management practices that rely on it. Public managers demonstrate their accountability for results through the achievement of financial indicators. However, the clarity of the discourse is challenged when the principles of the economic world are applied to public management through simple assertions. The context of public administration is different from the economic context. There are more forms of accountability in public administration than in the economy – and many of them do not follow economic principles. In terms of discursive honesty, it can be argued that the principles of NPM have not produced the results that they are claimed to have produced.

NPM has not simplified accountability and transparency in public administration, but has made them more complex.

The managerialist talk of *managerial omnipotence* ("let managers manage") in a discourse where the pursuit of selfish interests is the central assumption of agency can also be seen as dishonest. In market relations, the pathologies of responsibility largely follow the same lack of moral agency. The emphasis on managerial autonomy can lead to opportunistic behaviour on the part of management.

The legitimacy of NPM is problematic, as it seeks its legitimacy in a different context – the values of the private sector. This means that public sector values are somewhat neglected. This, in turn, narrows the scope of public responsibility, such as the public interest and the extent of social responsibility. Citizens may not be seen as subordinates, but is mere customer discourse much better? The question is also ideological in nature. In terms of truthfulness, the NPM can be said to be coloured by political-ideological premises. This raises a number of questions. Why is accountability for results the most important of all forms of responsibility? Why should those values and principles of governance that cannot be measured in financial terms be secondary to this kind of accountability?

Habermas (1984b) links the economic system to the colonization of the private sphere and the administrative system to the colonization of the public sphere. "As the private sphere is undermined and eroded by the economic system, so too is the public sphere by the administrative system" (Habermas 1984b: 325). The situation, however, is more complex than this. Also, there is internal colonization between the economic and administrative systems. As a result of administrative reforms, the economy plays an increasingly important role in administrative norms and practices. This is not a new situation, since the monetisation of social communication has influenced public administration, for example in the form of taxation (Habermas 1984b: 267). However, the forms of internal colonization have changed. The techniques used have become more sophisticated methods of management, influencing the norms and policies of public administration.

NPM obliges civil servants to act according to externally imposed financial standards, which undermines moral agency and personal accountability. At the same time, incentives are based on individual goals. Although the scope of personal accountability may be wider than in hierarchical relationships, it is primarily based on the demonstration of accountability for results. This undermines the importance of values outside the process. Although individual responsibility is lower in hierarchies, they also legitimise action on the basis of collective principles.

5.6.4   Principle of reciprocity

NPM is not an effective administrative doctrine for questioning authority. This is reflected in managerialism and the notion of managerial autonomy. In a quasi-market, contracting can be a means where everyone has, at least in principle, equal opportunities to demonstrate accountability and in turn to hold others to account. However, the contract only covers the parties that have signed it. This is one of the most obvious weaknesses of NPM accountability. Contractualism easily leads to complicated, let alone controlling, accountability relationships. The doctrine is based on the principal-agent theory, in which the actors do not, in principle, require reciprocity from each other. The principal's control over the agent's action is sufficient, and there is no normative element in the agent's interests. As such, market relations cannot be based on reciprocity in the first place.

5.7 Conclusions

Public management is influenced by the organisational values of the private sector, with a focus on productivity, efficiency, economy and customer service. These often give way to the values that guide work in civil service, such as equity, fairness, independence and transparency. (Viinamäki 2013: 43, 173, 175–178, 180; Frederickson 1997; Brady 2003.)

Public management is not fully comparable to management in the private sector, as public administration has its own specific characteristics. The management doctrines of the private sector do not work in a straightforward way in public administration. Public administrations implement public policies and public tasks, and therefore have a wider range of responsibilities than the private sector. Public management is also a public function, which from time to time faces harsh public criticism. (Virtanen & Wennberg 2005: 49.)

Although NPM has not earned the uncritical approval of the administration or the scientific community in Finland, its ideas play a significant role in the development of public administration (Rannisto 2005: 34). In public organisations, attention is paid to measuring the impact of the results achieved and to the organisational structures. Market-driven service models are being developed and new contractual partnerships are being created between the public and other sectors. Public organisations are making use of different management ideas originally designed for the private sector. (Virtanen & Wennberg 2005: 46.)

However, one may question whether public organisations have changed in a more democratic direction. It is widely believed that companies are undemocratic places, where management is accountable in principle only to the owners. The assumption that management practices adopted from the private sector automatically make public

administration more democratic or responsible – is questionable. (Virtanen & Wennberg 2005: 47; Bakan 2004.) The achievement of democratic, fair, equal or transparent operations is of secondary importance for the performance of companies. Despite this, concepts imported from the business world are repeated in administrative doctrines without any further critique of their applicability to the public sector.

Although NPM is above all a management doctrine, it does not pay attention to the importance of subjective responsibility. On the contrary, within the doctrine, agency is seen as a selfish pursuit of self-interest, which is why a consideration of accountability presupposes conformity. On the other hand, the doctrine contradictorily emphasises managerial autonomy, which reduces the impact of accountability mechanisms in practical management work.

Individualistic values in society undermine the understanding of responsibility and injustice in public administration. Individualism assumes that individuals are free, autonomous and independent of social relations. Also, individualistic values make it difficult to understand group and organisational dynamics, which play an important role in human behaviour. When group or organisational dynamics are not understood, evil is often reduced to a single individual, a "manifestation of evil". (Adams 2011: 282, 284.)

More than just financial or other measurable incentives are needed to motivate and engage staff. It is often more effective to replace governance and regulation with values that guide and motivate staff towards shared goals and results. (Viinamäki 2012: 41). Leading through organisational values can be seen as one form of organisational regulation from a rational culture, where the subjective value orientations of actors do not play a major role in the organisation's operations.

6 NPG: RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY IN NETWORKS

In public management, we talk not only about administration and management – but also about *governance.* Governance was first discussed by World Bank (1992) in politics and public administration. According to the report, governance is the exercise of power through which the economic and social resources of the state are used to promote overall development. The definition of governance is used in several different senses, depending on the concept of governance that is sought to justify it. Governance can cover, for example, the institutions of public administration, management methods and techniques, as well as issues such as relations between government and citizens, the interaction between business and citizens, and the role of the state.

In a certain sense, NPG can be understood as a continuation of the NPM reforms. There is much more to modern governance than efficiency. Also, governance is about democratic participation, accountability and empowerment: the idea is that governance must maintain its legitimacy with the consent of those it governs. (Lähdesmäki 2003: 35; Jessop 2000: 11–12.) NPG further expands the accountability issues of public management. Where bureaucratic theory and NPM focus primarily on processes within an organisation, NPG shifts the focus to networks between different actors and their complex accountability relationships.

Osborne (2010) argues that NPM can be seen as a transient administrative doctrine towards NPG. NPG has its theoretical background in organisational sociology and network theory, which makes it able to respond to the new challenges and uncertainties in public management in this century. According to Osborne, NPG combines the strengths of bureaucratic theory and NPM in its understanding of legitimacy and the interactive relationship between political practices and service delivery. However, there are also opposing views to this. Bovaird and Löffler (2003: 8) argue that characterising NPG is akin to opening a kind of "Pandora's box", as there are a considerable number of definitions for the doctrine.

NPG continues certain themes that NPM started with. One of these is contracting and the outsourcing of public services. Contractualisation can be divided into horizontal and vertical, with the former referring, for example, to cooperation between municipalities and the latter to performance contracts between the ministry and universities. (Hyyryläinen 2000, 2004.) New definitions of political governance often approach governance with a rejection of authoritarianism and refer to a change in governance, with top-down management moving towards public-private partnerships and combining resources. (Tiihonen 2008: 32.) On the other hand, NPM reforms have led to fragmentation of governance and weakening of central control. In the post-NPM era, the opposite has happened: attention is now focused on the administration as a whole and its horizontal

relations. In turn, NPG seeks a balance between decentralised management and control. (Halligan 2010: 235.)

NPM and the NPG share views on the diminishing role of policymakers. If so, what does this mean for responsibility in public administration? In governance, policymakers have a responsibility to develop networks and mobilise public and private resources. Political leadership is less linked to formal status. In NPM, the role of politicians is more minimalist. Politicians define the longer-term objectives of the public sector, while public managers who implement the objectives have wide discretion. However, a question arises. If politicians have little control over public managers, how can they be held accountable for their decisions? (Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228.)

In principle, NPG is seen as an administrative response to the problems of post-industrial society. However, in the internal world of public organisations, bureaucratic management is still the dominant model. For example, municipal organisations are often described as rigid and slow, with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of a few (Strandman 2009: 208; Hamel 2007). Although the management of public organisations is still based on bureaucratic and rational principles, their structural blurring may mark a broader change. In public administration, change can be partial. A radical shift towards networks is at least not yet possible: for example, municipalities are still slow to move between markets, hierarchies and networks. Public service provision is mainly driven by hierarchies. This also means the persistence of traditional forms of responsibility in public management practices. (Nyholm 2008: 223–225.)

6.1 Defining governance

In governance, the idea is that policy and administration should focus on a phenomenon-based assessment of social problems between different actors. Dialogue between different sectors of society is necessary, as there are wicked problems in society that are very difficult or impossible to solve (Vartiainen et al. 2013). Taming or coping with wicked problems becomes much more difficult if efforts to find solutions are siloed to follow a particular institutional or organizational logic. Given the intersectional nature of social problems, cooperation between the public, private and third sectors is required – not to forget the importance of citizens.

The complexity of governance can be unpacked through informational, institutional and strategic uncertainty. Informational uncertainty addresses the question: how can we be accountable if there is no information to support our decision-making? Too little is known about the nature of the problems that determine decision-making. Information is in the hands of many different actors. Information on the phenomenon may not even exist. Institutional uncertainty relates to the question: How do institutional arrangements

enable responsible action? Social problems do not follow the form of existing organisations or networks. Decision-making requires the interconnection of different arenas within networks. Governance is increasingly contextualised. Institutional arrangements depend on negotiations, interests and resources between actors. Strategic uncertainty is based on the question: how to be accountable for strategic action between multiple actors? Strategic interactions can lead to unforeseen consequences, as numerous actors from different interpretative frameworks and interests are involved in shaping the strategy. Hence, it is increasingly difficult to predict behaviour. (Klijn 2002: 152–153; Peters & Pierre 2008: 245.)

Governance is about the realisation of collective interests where the state pursues a goal in cooperation with other social actors (Peters & Pierre 2008: 242). Hence, governance is a broader term than administration because it is not based solely on the state or its institutions. Governance is based on a shared set of goals and actions, which do not necessarily arise from a legal and formal authority.

One of the challenges of governance systems is the relationship between the national and international levels. Current changes in national governance are part of growing interdependence and interaction between international, national and local actors. The transformation of closed national governance systems is now defined by multi-level interactions. (Bevir 2013: 1–2; Tiihonen 2008: 21–23.) Governance can be approached from many different levels, such as international, state or municipal. According to Peters and Pierre (2008: 238–240), the first wave of governance was concerned with the state, globalisation and international cooperation: the second wave put much more emphasis on society.

March and Olsen (1995) have created a framework for democratic governance from the perspective of new institutionalism. They argue that improving democracy also improves political governance. March and Olsen emphasise the development of democratic identities and the ability to create meaningful political action among citizens, groups and institutions. Democratic governance requires political decisions as they determine the options and possibilities for action in a democracy. Finally, the political system must be adaptable, so that it can cope with changing demands and a changing environment. Hyden (1992) argues that governance as political legitimacy is concerned mainly with the rules of political power. Therefore, governance is the deliberate management of the administrative system to enhance the legitimacy of the public sector.

According to Rosenau (1992, 1995), governance is a wider phenomenon than just state power. It is influenced by non-governmental institutions and informal mechanisms that carry out their objectives. Governance can be understood as the process by which an organisation or society governs itself. At the global level, governance is a myriad of millions of different control mechanisms, making it impossible to identify hierarchical authority

structures. The exercise of authority is based on traditional norms and customs, informal consensus, shared premises and other practices that lead to consent in accordance with their rules of conduct.

The concept of governance is defined from several different perspectives. For example, Rhodes (1996) argues that the term governance is used in six different senses: governance as a minimal state, corporate governance, New Public Management, good governance, socio-cybernetic system and self-organising network.

Furthermore, the governance of the minimal state can be opened up from two different perspectives. From the perspective of NPM, governance reforms have led to a situation where a large amount of public service delivery is outsourced to private organisations. At the same time, public policy is based on cost savings and cuts. From this perspective, governance should be based on contracts and other market mechanisms. From the perspective of NPG, "the hollowing out of the state" is a consequence of the complexity of society, since the pursuit of public goals requires public organisations to demonstrate their dependence on other actors. From this perspective, governance should be based on strategies and network management (Rhodes 1996: 653–654; Klijn 2002: 150–151; Peters & Pierre 1998: 223–224).

Kettl (2000, 2010) has used the concept of management to assess the internal processes and results of NPM. Contractualism as a new way of organising management and services is a consequence of both neo-managerialism and management theory (Rhodes 1996: 655). Kettl (2010) argues that contracting will lead to major management problems if it is not managed well in the public sector: contracting would be essential to take into account the nature of goods and services, monopolies, monopsonies and the integration of services.

6.2 Principles of responsibility according to NPG

Osborne (2006, 2010) defines NPG in five different areas:

1. *Socio-political governance.* Governance as a clarifier of the institutions that influence society. The legitimacy of public administration is based on the fact that it takes into account other social actors in public policy.

2. *Public policy governance.* Governance as the understanding of how political elites and networks interact and control the public policy process.

3. *Administrative governance.* Governance as a means of improving the efficiency of public administration and taming complexity.

4. *Contract governance.* Governance of public service tendering and contract management.

5. *Network governance.* Governance as the operation of self-organised networks and the delivery of public services, with or without public administration. (Osborne 2010: 6-7.)

The principles of NPG can be viewed in terms of communicative action in the following way. First, NPG sees the provision of services as possible without public administration. Service delivery without public administration usually means outsourcing and private service provision, which undermine the communication and accountability of decision-making. Also, governance cannot tame or cope with complexity if its underlying motive is efficiency and economic logic. Nor should governance be based on (power) relations between political elites and networks, but on the communicative features of networks. NPG can improve socio-political governance if networks genuinely take citizens and democratic principles into account.

According to Haveri and Anttiroiko (2009: 201), the NPG's relationship with public management can be categorised by four different themes. In terms of management and governance relations, NPG emphasises market- and competition-oriented governance relations, whereby services and goods in their most central form are procured from outside the government. Competence in these governance relationships requires specific procurement and tendering skills. Market mechanisms have led to the use of networks and partnerships in development policy and investment financing. In addition to market and network governance, governance is also linked to citizen participation or control. In addition to these relationships, the municipality also has upward networks, for example with the government or international organisations, which is referred to as international governance.

NPG relies on the self-management of social and economic organisations through feedback and self-correction. NPG is based on the principles of transparency, accountability, trust and networking. In its ideal form, authoritarian management would be abandoned altogether and market regulation would be collaborative. State intervention in the management of national affairs would be based on the joint action of the market and civil society. NPG is a step towards finding a "balance" between the state and civil society and towards increasing autonomy for organisations. Although the interactive and network-based form of governance is challenging some traditional forms of state governance, the political sphere remains a key principle of leadership. NPG does not remove the responsibility of the state to maintain the well-being of citizens or to create positive conditions for the economy. Government leadership retains its role as a key driver of governance processes. (Tiihonen 2008: 32–33; Dunsire 1993: 21–33; Dunsire 1996: 299–334.)

NPG poses new challenges for understanding public participation. While attempts have been made to interpret bureaucratic behaviour within the framework of public choice theory and market-driven governance within the framework of principal-agent theory, these theories are rather incomplete in networked settings. Theories of agency in networks have been explored, for example, through post-foundationalist theories in philosophy and sociology. In these theories, agency is based on sense-making in a network situation influenced by the social context (Bevir 2013: 35–37).

In terms of accountability, NPG is a doctrine that places great emphasis on horizontal accountability. However, horizontal accountability mechanisms occur more in the internal processes of public administration than in external relations with society. This is particularly the case at the meso and micro levels. The horizontal accountability of public organisations to citizens relies on media attention and the publication of information in annual reports and on the internet. Public organisations are accountable to specific interest group organisations, such as consumer organisations and user groups. They are also accountable to accountability forums such as ombudsmen and external performance evaluations. At the micro level, internal horizontalism is based on peer review, team consultation and consultation with colleagues. In the case of external horizontalisation, accountability mechanisms at macro level may include annual reports to the general public on themes such as social and environmental issues. At the meso level, external horizontalisation would mean direct accountability to policy-relevant groups. At the micro level, attention would focus on the direct accountability of civil servants and their interaction with society. However, no accountability mechanisms are found at meso and micro levels. (Michels & Meijer 2008: 168–169.)

At a micro level, changes in society have an impact on how employee responsibility is understood in the organisation. For individuals, network organisations and network-like relationships are partly reshaping the power positions maintained by the modern organisation. With more individualistic values, individuals become differentiated from the roles and rules imposed on them by society. The last decades have seen a shift in the way management and employees are perceived. Employees are expected to take more responsibility for themselves and their development. Individuals seek security through skills development and growth opportunities rather than a permanent job. (Nyholm 2008: 52–54.)

6.3 NPG as broader social responsibility

Public responsibility can be approached from a narrow and a broad perspective. Whereas the narrow perspective refers to the responsibility of civil servants for their work and results, the broad perspective refers to the relationship between public administration and

citizens (Lähdesmäki 2003: 76). In the broad sense, responsible public management takes into account the stakeholders relevant to public action. In the public sector, these include citizens, communities, non-profit organisations, businesses, the media, public organisations and policymakers. Naturally, the composition of stakeholders varies greatly depending on time and place (Löffler 2003: 170).

The widening scope of public responsibility is understandable from the NPG's perspective, which argues that responding to the complexity of society requires the involvement of citizens and stakeholders in public decision-making. The link between citizens and public administration is unbreakable in the sense that each requires the other: "The public opinion that is worked up via democratic procedures into communicative power cannot 'rule' of itself but can only point the use of administrative power in specific directions" (Habermas 1996: 300). Thus, the legitimacy of the administration depends on the citizens, while the citizens depend on the power of the public administration to achieve results.

Broadly speaking, responsibility in public management refers to the general social context and the fundamental values of community and social life. While public responsibility is partly about governance and control, it is justified in terms of the boundaries and values of social life. (Anttiroiko 2004: 22–23, 29.) NPG also focuses on issues of social and environmental responsibility. Public management has a responsibility for the well-being of the people in the organisation's domain and their conditions. Similarly, environmental responsibility refers to the impact of an organisation's activities on the environment and natural resources and its critical evaluation. (Jussila 2010: 15–16.)

NPG subscribes to the principles of collective and moral responsibility. The ultimate basis of the collective definition of responsibility lies in the community's moral standards and interpretation of responsibility. However, the process of modernisation has led to a situation in which collective responsibility has largely been replaced by technical criteria (as the colonization of the lifeworld shows). Moral responsibility, on the other hand, subscribes to the view that questions of responsibility are best understood from a moral perspective. The question is ultimately one of right and wrong or good and evil. The responsibility of an act goes back to the morality of the perpetrator or the moral nature of the act. (Anttiroiko 2004: 23–24.)

Also, *responsiveness* in public administration is about taking citizens' needs into account, which in turn highlights the need for a broader social responsibility. In public administration, demands are easily perceived as somewhat irrational or without proper evidence. In order to increase and appreciate deliberation, we must speak of rational demands from citizens, based on rational arguments and evidence. Public management should also take into account those citizens who, for one reason or another, are unable to make their own demands. (Sheaff 2002: 435–436, 449.)

As was argued in the chapter about bureaucratic theory, the sheer compliance to norms guiding the action of public organisations is not sufficient. However, this is not all. It is also important to consider the impact of organisations and their moral evaluation in terms of systemic and societal thinking. The perspectives that further deepen responsibility can be divided into two main types, namely modern systems thinking and radical social and moral philosophy (Anttiroiko 2004: 27–28; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 29–30; Mashaw 1984: 55–57).

In modern systems thinking, organisations are an integral part of society as a whole. Their responsibility cannot, therefore, be reduced to rational objectives or self-interest. The central issue is the legitimacy of organisations, i.e. their justification and public acceptance in society and among citizens. Modern systems thinking is present in NPG, as public management must take into account the overall benefits and well-being of society and its stakeholders. Radical responsibility, in turn, considers that morality determines the existence and functioning of an organisation. For this reason, an organisation must emphasise moral principles, which are present in its strategy and policies. (Anttiroiko 2004: 28; Talvio & Välimaa 2004: 32–33.)

NPG has partly led to the public sector sharing responsibilities with third sector organisations and non-profit organisations. This goes back at least in part to the fact that neither sector seeks to make a profit from its activities. Both the public and the third sector seek to serve people from a citizenship perspective. The third sector is also characterised by a broad sense of civic responsibility. In these organisations, responsibility is not limited to client groups – but is embedded in wider societal expectations. Therefore, public managers must serve and be accountable to the people, promote the public interest, act responsibly within the public organisation and to political authorities, and uphold the law. (Svara 2007: 3–5.)

Denhardt and Denhardt's (2007) NPS, or *New Public Service,* outlines the role of public management through the roles of leader, steward and emissary of the public interest. Hence, NPS is close to what NPG means with social responsibility. The theory holds that legal and democratic principles are the primary values for responsible public action. The authority of public managers is based on citizenship rather than on individualistic premises. First and foremost, the accountability of public managers requires them to listen and interact with citizens. This reinforces and renews their role in democratic governance. This kind of accountability requires citizens to be seen as members of a democratic community, rather than customers. Responsibility and accountability are best achieved when public managers are aware of and responsive to the multiple values that influence their decision-making. Balancing the different value orientations is best achieved through civil dialogue. (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007: 133–135.)

6.4 Deliberative democracy

Because of NPG, we talk about meta-governance – which is a kind of "governance of governance". Here, a large number of public organisations and processes have acquired a significant degree of autonomy, which in turn creates a problem of sustained control of governance (Peters 2010). The involvement of broader groups in political decision-making has consequences for what is meant by democratic processes. In governance, we are talking about democratic network governance, i.e. how networks can achieve democratic goals. In particular, the definition of a democratic network, meta-governance, and norms of transparency and citizen participation become topics for discussion (Denhardt 2011: 194.)

Deliberative democracy is linked to NPG, which takes into account the citizen perspective in public responsibility. Deliberation inevitably leads to changes in the power relations in public organisations. Here responsiveness to citizens is based on collaboration, as common norms emerge through social interaction. In a collaborative form, public organisations are ready to listen to new ways of thinking, generated through a consensus-based debate among stakeholders. (Bryer 2007: 486–489.)

NPG's conception of accountability is influenced by the fact that it is framed in terms of deliberative arrangements that limit and control the power of political authorities. The idea is that these arrangements enhance the accountability and responsiveness of those in authority to citizens. (Dubnick 2014: 29–30.) In concrete terms, the focus of decision-making should be on information sharing, expertise and trust – not on formal or hierarchical positions (Nyholm 2008: 227). Techniques for participatory governance can include deliberative forums, citizen panels and citizen participation in decision-making bodies of public institutions (Newman 2005: 128–129).

Accountability is linked to public dialogue and consequently to democratic principles such as deliberative democracy. Here, dialogue refers to the linguistic nature of accountability, rather than to institutional or motivational factors. Accountability is a dialectical activity in which the accountable are expected to answer, explain and justify their actions to the accountability forum. In turn, the accountability forum assesses, questions and criticises the positions of the accountable parties, taking into account the public interest. (Mulgan 2000: 569–570.)

Rawls's (1988) theory of justice represents a kind of philosophical example of the possibilities of deliberative democracy and dialogue. Rawls's theory is based on the notion of an imaginary original position that serves as the basis for the definition of justice. The initial position is understood as a hypothetical situation, a veil of ignorance in which no one knows his or her place, class or social status in society (Rawls 1988: 20; Svara 2007: 54–55; Wenar 2013). According to Rawls, dealing with justice behind the veil of ignorance

creates two principles (Rawls 1988: 21). According to the first principle, the liberty principle, society should guarantee its members the maximum liberty possible, as long as it is compatible with the liberty of others. The second principle, the difference principle, argues that economic systems should be organized so that the least advantaged members are better off than they would be in any other arrangement.

However, governance or communication in networks is not only seen in a positive light. Deliberative democracy is in a sense the opposite of the concept of *governmentality*. Whereas deliberation emphasises the potential of governance to produce democratic practices to support public decision-making, governmentality builds new forms of reflexivity in subjects that regulate and norm behaviour in society and networks. The ethos of the former is positive, the latter negative. (Torfing & Sorensen 2014: 338; Foucault 1980; Alhanen 2007: 134–136.) In this sense, governance is a complex and difficult concept for accountability. Examples of behavioural norms include citizen participation and pseudo-influence (Arnstein 1969). Citizen participation can mean manipulation and the apparent consideration of citizens, rather than real influence.

Therefore, there is a good reason to assess network arrangements and their actual impact in deliberation. According to Habermas (1996: 18), a conflict-free network is based on the ability of the participants to coordinate their activities from a common starting point. "As long as language is used only as a medium for transmitting information, action coordination proceeds through the mutual influence that participants exert on each other in a purposive-rational manner. On the other hand, as soon as the illocutionary forces of speech acts take on an action-coordinating role, language itself supplies the primary source of social integration. Only in this case should one speak of 'communicative action'" (Habermas 1996: 18).

Network-like arrangements are no guarantee of freedom from conflict, not to mention communicative action. Nor do they automatically produce social integration in society. As long as the communication of a network is instrumental, its functioning will follow the ideals of technical rationality and economic utility. A network can only function as an arena for communicative action when its language is based on discourse ethics. In this case, the network can also be considered democratically accountable.

Klijn and Skelcher (2007) argue that the democratisation of networks is usually assessed between two competing perspectives. These two competing perspectives complement Habermas' characterisation of instrumental and communicative action in networks. The first perspective sees networks as arenas from which citizens and key stakeholders influence public decision-making (communicative action). The second perspective sees networks as centralised bastions of power that provide structural privileges to private interests (instrumental action). The characteristics of the table below can be listed as principles of effective and democratic network governance, the latter embodying the ideal

of deliberation (Sorensen & Torfing 2009). The table assesses network governance through efficiency and democracy at the stages of planning, defining, management and participation: the challenge is how to manage networks on the values of effectiveness and democracy at the same time.

Table 5.   Effective and democratic management of networks (Sorensen & Torfing 2009: 248)

	Effectiveness	**Democracy**
Planning the network	Precise focus on goals and innovative practices Setting clear time limits for practices Ending inefficient and failed networks	Public information on the composition and results of the network Inviting relevant participants to the network Creating or supporting alternative networks
Defining the network	Building coordination and consensus Creating interdependencies between participants to exchange resources Sharing achievements with the network	Communicating discursive assumptions Relating productivity to the conditions that define the network Decision on sanctions for non-compliance
Managing the network	Ensuring adequate resources to reduce transaction costs Preventing negative tensions, sticking to the agenda, mediation Flexibility in methods to increase innovation	Encouraging weak and marginalised participants to promote equality Improving transparency by sharing relevant information Exploring how private stakeholders are trusted
Participation in the network	Shared ownership of quick results, which maintains cooperation Showing trust to earn trust Institutionalising good processes and learning from failures	Maintaining a broad agenda, large-scale storytelling Open and responsive deliberation of options Evaluating the results of the network in relation to democratic principles

As the table shows, network design is based on effectiveness such as precise targets, time limits and the closure of inefficient networks. In contrast, a democratic approach sees planning as an activity in which all relevant participants are invited into the network. In defining the network, the efficiency perspective sees consensus and interdependencies as

a priority. More important for democratic governance is the communication of common norms of action to all participants. In network management, effectiveness means sufficient resources and reconciliation between competing points of view, while democracy means equality and transparency. Last, in terms of effectiveness, network participation means building trust through gains, while democracy emphasises transparency about the norms from which the network participates.

There are many arguments in favour of networks. Interest groups and implementing organisations may influence policy practices together. The knowledge of as many participants as possible is applied. The participation of different individuals, groups and organisations is democratically a positive thing. Also, it is expected that social acceptance of public policies will increase. Despite their limited capacity, networks can reveal social needs and problems. Thus, the effectiveness of governance and problem-solving skills will improve. (Kickert et al. 1997: 171.)

The network approach challenges the traditional view of governance as a guardian of the public interest. The public interest has become a somewhat fuzzy norm that is challenging to define. Also, it is difficult to identify the public interest in networks, where secondary interests, in particular, are pursued. The role of government is to ensure that collective values influence networks. Therefore, it has a dual role in the network. Public managers are network participants in the same way as others, as they seek to maximise their interests. On the other hand, they must ensure the presence of the values that are collectively most central. This normative dimension may conflict with network effectiveness. Thus, the public manager faces several dilemmas arising from the conflict between effectiveness and normativity (de Bruijn & Ringeling 1997: 159–162.; Klijn & Skelcher 2007: 603–604).

However, in communicative terms, the public interest, both inside and outside the networks, is simple. The public interest should serve the democratic procedure, the results of which are based on sufficient knowledge and its factual communication (Habermas 1996: 296): "According to this view, practical reason [...] resides [...] in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding" (Habermas 1996: 296–297). The normativity of the public interest is based on the validity of its norms. It is therefore essential for accountability that the secondary interests of the public manager in networks do not harm the primacy of democratic will formation.

In any case, public managers can neutralise many risks in networks, thus improving the conditions for the network to be communicative. For example, a manager can use his or her authority accountable by breaking up the power structures in the network or by exploiting them for the public good. The manager can make choices about whom to cooperate with and who not to cooperate with. The public manager can be a builder of

normativity by adhering to the ethical principles used in the network. The role of the manager is also to protect the nature of public decision-making, which risks becoming informal and unprincipled. (de Bruijn & Ringeling 1997: 161.)

6.4.1 Stewardship theory as virtue-ethics

The NPG's view of agency is based on the stewardship theory. In many respects, the stewardship theory is quite different from the principal-agent theory on which NPM relies. The stewardship theory is focused on the responsible and autonomic action, which reduces the need for hierarchical and institutional management practices. (Schillemans 2013: 544–545.)

Table 6.   The principal-agent theory and the stewardship theory (Schillemans 2013: 546)

	The principal-agent theory	**The stewardship theory**
Interests	Conflicting interests	Consistency or alignment of interests
Attention	Own interest	Collective and social objectives
Motivation	External	Internal
Power distance	High	Low
Power	Institutional	Personal
Leadership style	External management	Limited, self-regulating

As the table shows, the principal-agent theory conceptualises accountability through the selfish interests of the agent. In the stewardship theory, the agency is based on the pursuit of collective goals or the attempt to act as a steward based on the interests of the principal. Thus, there are no conflicting interests between the principal and the agent since interests can be reconciled or they are aligned. The focus of the steward is not so much on self-interest, but on collective and social goals. In the principal-agent theory, in turn, the agent is motivated by external factors such as monetary incentives. In the stewardship theory, the agent's incentives, praise, and reputation matter.

Some might argue that the stewardship theory portrays a somewhat idealistic picture of agency. Indeed, the table indicates how there are several virtuous starting points in the stewardship theory. According to virtue ethics (Aristotle 2005), morality should be understood primarily through classical virtues of practical reason and justice (Aristotle 1991, 2005; MacIntyre 1988).

Virtue ethics is based on the view that human beings need communities to live purposefully. In the context of public administration, responsible civil servants can use their practical reason and fairness to take account of different value orientations in changing contexts (Svara 1997). Hence, this means different interests can be aligned or reconciled. Virtue ethics works also as the starting point for practices that cultivate individual morality. Thus, virtue ethics and the stewardship theory subscribe to views of collective and social goals and the intrinsic nature of motivation. Virtue ethics emphasises management as close as possible to the "floor" and the staff: in this case, management focuses on tactical and operational decisions (Hyyryläinen 2010; Svara 2007: 10–11). This means that the exercise of power and authority is not so much institutional as personal. In networks, power distances are also small – at least ideally speaking.

A responsible public administration based on virtue ethics promotes the capacity of its citizens to be virtuous and happy (Tholen 2018). Here, virtue is linked to social practices, which ethical governance should contribute to. Thus, virtue ethics and happiness depend on social institutions and the relationships between actors.

Also, virtue ethics emphasises the development of moral and ethical judgment, which is thought to have a positive impact on responsible behaviour. Responsible public management takes into account environmental factors that contribute to moral development and enhance ethical discernment in public administration professionals and citizens. Public governance should be made up of high values that nurture society as a more civilised community. The goal or *telos* of public management is the public good. (Lynch 2004.)

Virtue ethics emphasises the importance of public service values in the responsibility of public management. The perspective helps to see how these values are contextualised in attitudes, skills and behaviours (Molina 2015). Virtue ethics does not look at individual situations or decisions. Rather, responsibility is based on an attitude to achieve something good (Tholen 2018). Virtue ethics in governance include demonstrating integrity and being respectful and consistent (Svara 2007: 15).

6.4.2   Characteristics of the accountability forum

Studies show that the relationship between the accountable agent and the accountability forum is far from always based on a principal-agent-like situation (Busuioc et al. 2011; Schillemans 2011; Schillemans 2013; Flinders 2001; Brandsma 2010). Hence, the stewardship theory might not be always far from the truth. Also, there are other reasons that mostly have to do with the characteristics of the accountability forum itself.

For example, the accountability forum is not necessarily interested in the delegated task or its effective implementation. Research suggests that a key problem with accountability lies in the activation of the accountability forum and its responsibilities. The accountable party may also be strongly committed to the performance of its task. In addition, the accountable party is much less autonomous than previously expected. Managing contracts, meeting the demands of external organisations and producing accountability information significantly reduces autonomy. The findings also show that the accountable party often shares information on its initiative and wants the accountability mechanisms to be active and supervised. On the other hand, the accountability forum may neglect information and accountability mechanisms – and may not correct the wrongdoings of the accountable party. (Schillemans 2014: 200–202.)

Based on the social contingency theory, the practical arrangements of the accountability forum deserve critical attention (Schillemans 2015). For example, reputation affects the way in which the accountable party and accountability forum interact: accountability is about how an actor is able to improve its reputation in relation to different audiences (Busuioc 2016). It is assumed that reputation plays a greater role in networked arrangements, where authority is often based on informal terms. For example, it is not irrelevant for the reputation of the principal whether the agent goes out to challenge the relationship. Therefore, the maintenance and enhancement of reputation play a major role in what can be expected from an accountability forum. (Busuioc 2016: 92–94.)

Accountability also produces negative consequences: the social contingency theory of organisations is that they seek to adapt to their environment (Tetlock 1992). Through this theory, accountability is viewed in terms of three strategies: acceptability heuristic, pre-emptive self-criticism and defensive bolstering. According to the acceptability heuristic, the accountable party chooses the option that is cognitively easiest for it. In this way, the accountable party appears credible in the eyes of the audience, which is secondary to the achievement of accountability. According to pre-emptive self-criticism, the familiarity of the audience influences the choices made by the accountable party. If the accountable party is aware of the audience's views, it is likely to act in accordance with the acceptability heuristic. On the other hand, if the accountable officer *is not* familiar with the audience's views, it is likely to be more critical of its positions. Last, the defensive bolstering is based on social psychological studies which show that people have a more or less natural tendency to defend themselves if they have had time to choose a decision or course of action that suits them in a given situation. Hence, it is of great importance whether the accountable party is confronted with the public before or after the decision has been taken. If the accountable party has taken decisions, it is more exposed to defending its positions. (Tetlock 1992: 340–346.)

Without a doubt, the characteristics of accountability forums alone do not determine whether decision-making has been responsible. The form of organisation also plays a crucial role. In an organisation, accountability of decision-making is underpinned by evaluation standards and process-based accountability that are unknown to the accountable party. However, applying such criteria to, for example, bureaucratic organisations is challenging. This is because for bureaucracies the clarity of evaluation standards is important. In contrast, in networked arrangements, there is more flexibility in the choice of standards. (Schillemans 2015: 9–12.)

6.5 Criticism of NPG

6.5.1   Network arrangements are not deliberative

Networking is one of the core principles of NPG. For example, network scholars Friedland and others (2006) criticise Habermas' theory of communicative action for neglecting network arrangements in public discourse: "The political system does depend on the economic (functional) system and civil society, [...] [b]ut these functional systems are becoming reorganised as networks, and this reorganisation promises to change the extent, the degree, and the quality of their dependence" (Friendland et al. 2006: 10). Friedland and others argue that the subsystems of government are being reorganised as networks, which will be seen in the extent and quality of public debate, for example. According to them, the change is mainly positive: "Networked communication allows the public sphere to be organised distributively, [...] as active publics online form to read, discuss, argue, and challenge the assumptions of elites in the public sphere" (Friedland et al. 2006: 23–24).

On the other hand, Habermas' thinking can be used *to criticise network arrangements*. This is because network arrangements are ambivalent in terms of communication criteria. For example, Friedland and others (2006: 18–19) use online discussion as an example of the democratic nature of these arrangements. Indeed, digitalisation is undeniably one of the major factors of our time – also in terms of reforming public administration. Unfortunately, the time has shown that the internet cannot be regarded as a haven of democracy. Its problems include cyberbullying, hate speech or the disproportionate power of a few large companies. Also, the question has arisen as to how rational public debate can be saved from the negative effects of online discussion. The question is far from simple.

Under NPG, communication breakdowns are more informal than in bureaucratic theory and NPM. For example, the performance of networks is not judged by formal criteria such as economic efficiency or the achievement of political objectives. In governance, the main objectives are subject to constant negotiation and re-evaluation. Difficulties arise if there is no consensus on the main objectives between the different actors. (Jessop 2000: 14–

16.) In networks, problems easily arise between effectiveness and the consideration of other values. (Provan & Kenis 2007: 242).

Rehg (1996) writes how the administration cannot act independently of the needs of society and citizens. On the other hand, a situation in which informal relations are given too much space in public decision-making can also be seen as problematic from an accountability perspective. "[T]he political system (and the administration in particular) must not become an independent system, operating solely according to its own criteria of efficiency and unresponsive to citizens' concerns; *nor must it become too subservient to particular interests that have access to administrative power through unofficial paths of influence that bypass the democratic process*" (Rehg 1996: xxxi, italics added). Unofficial paths can be represented, for example, by old-boy networks based on the selfish gain by members (Heald 1983; Choi 2007). Of course, there are also less dramatic examples of network-like arrangements – but in any case, attention is drawn to the weakening of accountability.

6.5.2   Contradictions in assessing accountability

It can be argued that there is an obvious contradiction in the NPG's approach to responsibility. Indeed, the view of NPG as good governance is based on the principles of increasing administrative transparency and diminishing corruption (Lawton 2013: 112–113; Peters & Pierre 2008: 245; Peters & Pierre 1998: 227–228). At the same time, the administrative doctrine risks *undermining* the transparency and accountability of public action (Sorensen & Torfing 2009). In this sense, NPG is similar to NPM, which was originally praised as a means of increasing accountability and transparency in public administration, although the opposite is often the case.

For example, the problems in network arrangements can be summarised as neglect of collective interests, lack of transparency of processes, insufficient legitimacy and obstacles to policy innovation. Networks lead to negotiation and compromise, with the result that predetermined goals are not always achieved. This naturally prolongs decision-making processes. Also, informal interactions and overlapping administrative structures make it difficult to assign responsibilities, with the risk that no one is ultimately accountable for the collective responsibility for decisions. Interaction between public authorities and private interest groups undermines the influence of political representatives on policy. Political representatives are faced with compromises that can no longer be changed. Network arrangements also often prevent new problems from being solved and indicators from being implemented. (Kickert et al. 1997: 170–171.)

Unlike in formal organisations, most networks do not have predefined decision-making rules. This, in turn, affects the conditions and quality of decision-making. Governance

leads to poor decisions or indecision if there are no clear *ex-ante* rules or informal norms in the network. Traditionally, networks are seen as a means to improve citizen participation or involvement. However, the extent to which networks serve societal interests is questionable. At a minimum, participation in networks requires some level of organisation, but the most disadvantaged in society tend to have the weakest organisational skills. Networks are also more difficult to coordinate than public organisations. As a result, networks undermine accountability and the ability to correct errors. In addition, it is important to remark that the new accountability mechanisms of networks cannot replace the primacy of political accountability in public action in the state system. (Peters 2010: 40–43.)

Hence, networks can undermine accountability. Formal and structural accountability mechanisms that are considered traditional are often present in networks. This is not enough, as understanding cooperation between actors requires highlighting the impact of informal relationships (Romzek et al. 2013). One of the main problems of accountability in networks is based on the lack of an authority that would guide the network actions according to the political will. This has negative implications for the realisation of the public interest and the accountability that guides it. (Agranoff 2007: 191). According to Habermas (1996: 298), deliberation cannot be based on civic engagement alone, but on the institutionalisation of appropriate procedures and communicativeness. In networks, institutionalising practices is challenging due to the informality of networks.

6.5.3   Are networks and democratic decision-making compatible?

Klijn and Skelcher (2007) argue that the relationship between networks and democratic decision-making can be thought through four starting points. The first of these is based on the idea of incompatibility. The idea is that networks and democratic principles have conflicting institutional rules that cannot ultimately be reconciled. The second premise emphasises the complementarity of principles. Unlike traditional democratic decision-making structures, networks involve different participants in solving complex problems. However, the second premise leaves unclear the relationship between complex problem solving and democracy. The third premise refers to the transition from centralised power to a decentralised model of governance. Here, an increasing amount of public decision-making is organised through non-hierarchical arrangements. The fourth premise is obviously instrumental: the administration strengthens its capacity to implement public policies through the use of networks.

These four starting points can be thought of in the context of accountability as follows (Klijn & Skelcher 2007). For example, under traditional accountability, the primary accountability is based on the position of elected politicians. Of course, accountability is by no means limited to this. Shared accountability takes into account the different starting

points and values of participants, complementing traditional forms of accountability such as economic indicators or governments. Accountability can also be conceptualised in terms of *checks and balances*, based on openness in decision-making and transparency in new forms of accountability. On the other hand, accountability can also be instrumental, with elected politicians ensuring accountability. In this case, politicians use other forms of accountability, such as economic indicators, to control other actors and decision-making. (Klijn & Skelcher 2007: 592.)

6.5.4   Myriad accountability forms

NPG is criticized for too many forms of accountability. Accountability requires transparent responsibilities, well-defined parties, information sharing, debate and, if necessary, sanctions. This is difficult to achieve in networks where none of the participants can *order* the other to act in a certain way. Thus, the impact of horizontal accountability in networks is a much more difficult subject than vertical accountability as such. (Michels & Meijer 2008: 169–171; Mills & Koliba 2014: 6.)

Governance refers to institutions and organisations both inside and outside the administration. It also recognises that the boundaries between social and economic responsibilities are blurred. Institutional power is dependent on collective action, while governance is about autonomous and self-directed network actors. Thus, the completion of affairs and decisions is not based solely on the power or authority of the public administration. The mechanisms of governance will inevitably become more context-specific – and so will the forms of accountability. (Stoker 1998: 17–18, 26.)

Taking into account network arrangements, the following shortcomings of current accountability mechanisms can be listed, as described by Michels and Meijer (2008). Horizontal accountability between civil servants may improve the quality of work, but it has no link with societal stakeholders. In this case, accountability to citizens is neglected. The nature of different responsibilities is an issue in its own right. Cooperation between public and private actors may provide performance-based information, but the accountability issues of such cooperation are not transparent. Also, organisations may produce too little information to be assessed in terms of social responsibility. Horizontal accountability at the macro level would require more information. In addition, public organisations often seek to be more accountable through their websites. However, not all websites offer citizens the opportunity to respond, or there is a reluctance to display responses. There are also shortcomings in sanctions and interventions. Although public organisations are accountable to their customers, it is unclear whether they are sanctioned for their improper actions. At the same time, it is often impossible to change the service provider to another public organisation. (Michels & Meijer 2008: 169–170.)

Willems and Dooren (2011) argue that collaborative arrangements between the private and public sectors lead to negative consequences for accountability. They are by no means alone in their argument (see e.g. Flinders 2005; Coghill & Woodward 2005). In such partnerships, public administrations can disengage from serving the public interest. Partnership agreements can be complex in form and difficult to interpret, increasing the relative power of economists, consultants and lawyers. (Greve & Hodge 2010: 150.)

6.5.5 (In)effective network arrangements

Provan and Kenis (2007) argue that the effectiveness of networks depends on trust, the number of participants, agreement on the goal(s) and the challenge of the task. Trust is reduced in a network where the number of participants increases, interests become more complex and the task becomes more difficult to define. The forms of governance can be assessed more precisely in terms of shared governance, lead organisation and network administrative organisation, each of which has its own starting point for networking. Shared governance is the simplest and most common form of management: it is managed by the network actors themselves, without the presence of a formal or administrative actor. Lead organisation refers to a situation where one organisation coordinates the central activities and decision-making of the network. In the private sector, a buyer may manage a large number of small sellers, or a regional hospital may assume the role of a management organisation in the social and health care sector. The idea of network administrative organisation is that an external organisation is set up to manage the network. Although the network participants interact with each other, the management is centralised. The management organisation can be public or non-profit – even in a situation where the network's objective is based on financial profit. It can also be created by the participants in the network. (Provan & Kenis 2007: 233–236.)

Bureaucratic administration can undermine the network cooperation of public organisations with participants who are not used to hierarchical principles. The change in local governance and the networking of public organisations can create a chaotic atmosphere. In this case, public organisations have not been able to transform their activities into networked ones in a changing environment. Despite numerous administrative reforms, critics argue that they have changed little from the traditional prototype of a public organisation. Networking involves different participants, different interests and values – and more complex processes. This, in turn, creates a need for stronger leadership. (Nyholm 2008: 224–225, 228–229.) Public responsibility is also associated with the ability of public organisations to innovate and renew themselves in the pursuit of better productivity and economic solutions. This requires public organisations to have partnership and procurement skills and networking skills (Yliherva 2006: 11).

The responsibility of public management is defined by the arena between administration and policy. The arena is the space in which the public manager interacts with, for example, the organisation's staff, stakeholders and political leaders. Other participants determine the scope of the public manager's room for manoeuvre, either by limiting or enabling action. This interaction is based on a decision-making culture, which can be irregular and unpredictable in nature. The demands and expectations of citizens and the media create their own dynamics of interaction. Different rules, practices and strategies are present. Some of these are conscious and visible, such as legislation, management rules and commonly accepted operational norms, guidelines and policies. However, a large part of the interaction is based on implicit practices. Implicit practices also refer to shadow networks driven by the shared interests and objectives of the participants. These factors mean that the arenas are very different from one another, which means that the room for managing is relative. (Leinonen 2012: 192–194.)

Research shows that transparency in networks requires the creation of new accountability mechanisms. Such mechanisms should take into account the main features of network structures. In the age of networks, organisations are expected to become flexible, informal and information and service oriented. In a network organisation, organisational boundaries become irrelevant, as their functioning is based on free decision-making, information sharing and trust. (Nyholm 2008: 52–53; Bevir 2013: 9–10.)

6.5.6   Vicious circle of accountability in networks

The problem with governance under NPM and NPG reforms is not that it is disappearing in favour of markets and networks. The main problem is that it is still regarded as ineffective and distrusted by the public. Both the market and governance undermine the role of public administration as a service provider and major social institution. Contractualisation issues such as outsourcing, networking and privatisation have had negative effects in many other countries. The accountability and reliability of public administrations in the provision of public services has been undermined, as has their responsiveness to the expectations and needs of citizens. At the same time, cost-cutting in the public sector has led to more difficult monitoring of contracts concluded in networks and markets. This in turn has led to a loss of the most important aspects of administrative ethics, such as the public interest and fairness in the delivery of public services. (Adams & Balfour 2010: 619–621.)

Overall, the NPG conceptualises accountability as: a responsibility to develop networks and harness the resources of all sectors in line with collective interests; a responsibility to develop political governance; a responsibility to listen to other participants, based on the constraints of a complex environment and uncertainty; and finally, a responsibility to increase transparency. The NPG's concept of responsibility has elements of broader social

responsibility and deliberation. Within NPG, responsibility is conceptualised in terms of problematic accountability relationships and new governance mechanisms. Hence, it can be argued that accountability is a key problem for the overall success of NPG. Also, there is a risk that the NPG and new forms of governance will make traditional definitions of accountability look old or inadequate. (Plant 2018: 11.)

Figure 8. Accountability risks for networks

The risks of networks can be illustrated as above. Networks are based on cooperation between different sectoral participants. According to Habermas (1996: 18), the success of a network depends on whether its communication is based on a shared understanding or instrumental goals. The key to accountability is to reconcile the interests and starting points of the different actors so that networks serve the public interest. However, networks can be managed according to a variety of principles, such as effectiveness, economic value or social equity. In a network, some participants may be marginalised by stronger ones and achievements may not be shared by all. Accountability in networks is difficult to achieve simply because of the diversity of participants. For example, if there is no consensus on the rules of the network, sanctions may not be possible. Moreover, irrelevant participants may be involved in the network, and information sharing is not necessarily open. This can lead to a loss of legitimacy. For example, Habermas uses the term "bargaining network" to describe a network of economic interests, a bargaining network in which communication is based on instrumental language and strategic action (see e.g. Habermas 1996: 319–320, 348, 349).

NPG requires the participant to take into account and reconcile conflicting values within networks. At the same time, the public manager should take into account the collective values and goals of public action. Of the three administrative doctrines, NPG requires the public manager to have the broadest moral autonomy. Managing in networks would require from the public manager ethical competence and even virtuous behaviour.

Governance risks undermining transparency and accountability of public action. The risk of networks is that they do not necessarily pay attention to differences in power, information and norms. In an ideal network, participants recognise their role through equality. In networks, structural violence does not only mean technical, bureaucratic or economic communication. Communication in networks can be very informal and, at the same time, be based on significant power differences among participants.

6.6 NPG's communicative responsibility

6.6.1   Principle of openness

In terms of accountability, NPG has the greatest potential of the administrative doctrines – but also the greatest risks. The reason for the risks is the non-binding nature of norms in networks. The opportunities for interaction, exchange of ideas and debate are widest in networks, but depend on the relationships within each network. It can be argued that in NPG, the public manager is a perpetual networker, exploiting network-like relationships under the cross-pressure of blurring accountability relations. Network relations cannot be considered monolithic, as social interaction is based on different types of social ties. Hence, the content of the social relationship determines the best network structure for the participants (Johanson 1998: 26). In networks, action is also justified based on contradictory premises: for example, the public interest, the pursuit of economic goals and the promotion of deliberation in governance.

Participants' involvement in networks depends on the nature of the social interaction. The definitions of these responsibilities of participants set the starting points for networking. In this way, manipulation can be prevented by network management. The activity of participants in networks is also a context-dependent issue. In some participants may be equally active, in others the opposite may be true. The situation is determined not only by the individualistic interests of the participants, but also by the network context, such as power differentials and the existence of cliques.

6.6.2 Principle of freedom of speech

The principle of freedom of speech is linked to the issue of power and knowledge differentials and their narrowing. This is also a contextual issue in networks. It is likely that in high-trust networks, power and knowledge differences are smaller than in low-trust networks. Compared to markets, and especially hierarchies, networks are more likely to have high levels of trust between participants. However, in practice, equality between participants is rare.

The practices of each network set the conditions for the criteria for communication and their collective acceptance. Here the public manager has the key responsibility. For example, ensuring inclusiveness is an absolute starting point since all participants must feel part of the network (Lehto et al. 2019: 263). As in markets, the extent to which opinions are expressed in networks depends on the level of trust. Building trust between participants is one of the key objectives of a network manager. In networks, the public manager has greater autonomy to act from a wider range of starting points, as their legitimacy is less often decided in advance. On the other hand, they also have a greater responsibility to act ethically.

6.6.3 Principle of authenticity

The increasing complexity of accountability makes the principle of authenticity more difficult to achieve. In networks, the diversity of opinions and values is at its widest. Hence, different perspectives can be identified, but not necessarily in a way that influences decision-making. In addition, networks often lead to compromises that no one really intended. Dialogue may or may not lead to practical action. Differences of opinion and values are masked, for example, by powerful participants and cliques. Networks can be built on normative deliberation, where each party should be listened to. On the other hand, it can be based purely on economic efficiency. The risk is that decision-making is informal in nature. This undermines the collective acceptance of better ideas. In networks, opinions and arguments are diverse and take place in different arenas. Arguments can be made in informal arenas that are inaccessible to some participants.

Authenticity in networks can be illustrated by the following (and classic) example of manipulation in civic participation:

> *In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of "educating" them or engineering their support. [...] This style of nonparticipation has since been applied to other programs encompassing the poor. Examples of this are seen in Community Action Agencies (CAAs) which have created structures called "neighbourhood councils" or "neighbourhood advisory groups". These bodies have no legitimate function or power. The CAA's use them to "prove" that "grassroots people" are*

involved in the programme. But the programme may not have been discussed with "the people". Or it may have been described at a meeting in the most general terms; "We need your signatures on this proposal for multiservice centre which will house, under one roof, doctors from the health department, workers from the welfare department, and specialists from the employment service." The signatories are not informed that the $2 million-per-year center will only refer residents to the same old waiting lines at the same old agencies across town. No one is asked if such a referral center is really needed in his neighbourhood. No one realizes that the contractor for the building is the mayor's brother-in-law, or that the new director of the center will be the same old community organization specialist from the urban renewal agency. (Arnstein 1969: 218.)

In this example, civic participation is based on the idea of common interest. However, it is up to the participants to decide what is meant by this cooperation and on what basis they want to talk about it and push it forward. The different perspectives of the participants are recognised, but they are not recognised as part of the common goals to be pursued. In this example, public management is not honest: talk has been misleading and communication has been disingenuous (Forester 1980). As Arnstein shows, conflicts need not be visible, as they can only become apparent after the collaboration has taken place. In network-based interaction, it is always up to the participants to decide what the network is aiming at and what they are willing to do within the network. The invitation to network collaboration is not necessarily based on honest motives.

In terms of clarity, NPG is the most complex of administrative doctrines. On the other hand, what is clear is the partial withdrawal of the state and public administration in society. What complicates the administrative doctrine is the recognition of the multiplicity of institutional logics and value orientations. The consideration of different values and logics in networks makes it difficult to monitor the responsibility and accountability of public management.

NPG requires networks to build trust between participants. In this case, trust is a social phenomenon that cannot be reduced to laws and norms or economic criteria. NPG and legitimacy are based on the assumption that the accountability and social acceptance of governance is enhanced by openness to the demands of citizens and network participants.

Network relationships also raise questions. How transparent are the results achieved in networks? How can informal relationships be evaluated in a sustainable way from an accountability perspective? Is the public interest served by networked cooperation or are decisions based on sub-optimality? Do networks reflect a broader public perspective? Why should public organisations and citizens be satisfied with the outcome? Who is ultimately accountable?

Finally, NPG is close to the accountability discourse of institutionalisation, with the promise of democratisation at its heart. NPG requires the public manager to consider

multiple types of accountability, which are consequences of both external and internal actions.

It is in networks that the paradox of responsibility is most widely manifested. This is due to the context-dependence of networks, the ambiguity of participants' responsibilities and the lack of binding authority. Paradoxically, the pathologies of accountability can take the form of opportunism or the objectification of obligations, the denial of personal responsibility or the atrophy and defiance of political authority. The manifestation of pathologies in networks is influenced by the circumstances of the network and the moral premises of the participants, such as ethical principles and integrity.

6.6.4   Principle of reciprocity

In networks, the interaction between participants can be reciprocal, with attention also being paid to the authority. On the other hand, it can be something else entirely. In any case, the idea behind network arrangements is that the participants are, at least in principle, in a reciprocal position with each other.

6.7 Conclusions

Networks are context-bound interactions, which reduces the assessment of responsibilities in the context of universal obligations such as laws and norms. Accountability is currently assessed from a wide variety of perspectives. For example, Dubnick (2014: 33) identifies eight different types of accountability. The contextual nature of networks means that the consequences of public action cannot be given as much attention in the NPG as in other governance theories. For the public interest, actions are sub-optimised to take into account and reconcile the perspectives of participants in the network. On the other hand, sub-optimisation can be a matter of maximising the self-interest of individual actors.

NPG is a doctrine of governance where accountability should also be demonstrated through responsiveness, i.e. through citizens and political actors. However, the environment is not limited to citizens but is a broader social responsibility. Responsibility in public management can be thought of as having three levels: organisational role, agency and environment. The environment has given rise to new forms of responsibility, for example through outsourcing, where accountability is not dictated by hierarchy but by contractualisation. Demonstrating accountability requires extensive communication with public administrations, organisations and citizens.

Modern public management must pay attention to the tension between bureaucratic public organisations and post-industrial society. Social changes have made organisations flexible and informal. This makes it difficult to monitor accountability. Contemporary organisations are often approached through the concept of a network, which challenges the traditional understanding of what an organisation ultimately is. (Nyholm 2008: 52–53.)

Professional requirements are being replaced, at least in part, by competences based on personal qualities. This has implications for the issue of responsibility. Responsibility is not measured in terms of substantive competence alone, as the new responsibilities of the civil servant include continuous self-development and the improvement of interpersonal skills and intrinsic motivation. These requirements are therefore in line with the changes in management. (Demmke 2019; Kuokkanen 2015: 84.)

This is also the case for public administration. For example, managing networks requires public managers and staff to have qualities such as social interaction and networking skills that would not necessarily be necessary in a traditional hierarchical-bureaucratic administration.

Due to the informal nature of networking, the nature of accountability forums should be given special attention. For example, an accountability forum could assess the accountability of the accountable party before or after an activity. A related issue is that of unforeseen or anticipated accountability. Unforeseen accountability can also trigger defensiveness in the accountable party, even to a greater extent than in the case of *ex post* accountability. In contrast, anticipated accountability, under the right circumstances, induces preventive self-reflection on the causes and motivation of the action. Accountability is taken more seriously by accountable parties in a respected public accountability forum. Furthermore, accountability standards are taken more seriously in a situation where the forum itself is responsible for the norms and guidelines that define accountability. (Schillemans 2015: 9–11.)

Accountability in the age of networks also touches on the problem of measurement. There are undeniable problems with measuring public performance. It is often thought that performance measures determine and control public management (Lähdesmäki 2003: 78). In the age of networks, the situation is more ambiguous than before. For example, one can imagine a threatening scenario in which networks determine and control the use of performance indicators. This raises new questions of accountability previous principles of public management were unable to address.

7 CONCLUSIONS

The study was based on an examination of responsible public management using the criteria of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas. The forms of responsibility in public management were examined through three administrative doctrines, namely bureaucratic theory, New Public Management (NPM), and New Public Governance (NPG).

In this study, the forms of responsibility in public management were examined according to four principles: the principle of openness, the principle of freedom of speech, the principle of authenticity and the principle of reciprocity. The study was based on abductive content analysis (Karlsen et al. 2020). The study started from the observation that new waves of administrative reform have not improved the legitimacy of the administration. The abductive guiding principle of the study was that this is due to the efficiency-centredness and technical rationality of the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines. Administrative doctrines should be examined through discourse ethics. The idea follows Habermas' view of a system whose communicative structures technicalise the lifeworld. The study continues the Habermasian vision by taking the analysis to the discourses of administrative doctrines. The study uses Habermas' theory of communicative action as a theoretical lens for evaluating forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines.

The research questions were:

1. How has responsible public management been taken into account in the three administrative doctrines, namely, bureaucratic theory, New Public Management, and New Public Governance?

2. How can the forms of responsibility highlighted in administrative doctrines be assessed using responsibility as understood in Habermas' communicative way as a starting point?

The following observations can be drawn from these questions.

7.1 Evaluating administrative doctrines

7.1.1   Forms of responsibility in public management

Administrative doctrines complicate the understanding, measurement and evaluation of responsibility in public management. The drive to improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of public administration has given rise to new forms of responsibility that both complement and complicate previous forms. For example, network accountability

looks at responsibility in a very different way from bureaucratic compliance. In bureaucratic theory, responsibility is achieved through formal tasks and well-defined compliance. NPM shifts responsibility towards accountability for results, contract management and outsourcing by autonomous managers. NPG further extends responsibility to the levels of network management and meta-governance. Administrative doctrines alone do not solve the problem of accountability and responsibility in public management. Sometimes the factors that make the form of responsibility work open up new problems for other administrative doctrines.

In bureaucratic theory, responsibility is seen as a problem related to the compliance and integrity of the civil servant. In this administrative doctrine, control and compliance are thought to improve the efficiency and obedience of civil servants. Public administration also has a distinct identity, values and methods of operation, which are influenced not only by compliance but also by professional accountability. From all administrative doctrines, the bureaucratic theory requires the least attention to the external environment for responsibility to take place.

NPM is broader in scope, focusing on private sector practices, problematising the nature of public administration and the emergence of new values. Accountability for results in public management has managerialist and Taylorist features: for example, increased managerial power and autonomy, economic values and performance-based rewards. Economic values make public organisations more efficient – or at least appear to be more efficient. This understanding of responsibility is seen in the increasing application of private sector management practices to public management.

The result-orientation of NPM has led, for example, to outsourcing, which undermines accountability and transparency in public management. NPM reciprocity is hampered by the hierarchical nature of managerialism and the inherent inequality of market relations. As a doctrine, NPM pays little attention to subjective responsibility or innate sources of ethical behaviour, despite its idea of "letting managers manage". Also, the doctrine has diminished the professional values of public administration. NPM accountability is also based on principal-agent theory, which focuses on the opportunistic actions of the agent.

NPG emphasises broad horizontal accountability. In other words, for NPG, the focus is on networks of self-governing actors and their management (Rannisto 2005: 36). NPG also requires public managers to have a high degree of integrity, as their actions in a network-like, norm-loose environment require them to adopt a public sector ethos. At the same time, the NPG shifts traditional responsibilities from the state to social actors. It thus challenges the identity of the public administration as a problem solver, thus extending accountability to a social and inter-actor phenomenon.

For bureaucratic theory, responsiveness to citizens has traditionally been low, which is reflected in its tendency to emphasise the dictated, limited and restricted form of responsiveness. This means that the doctrine is based on instrumentality in relation to the control of elected politicians, norm-centredness and professionalism.

NPM has meant an increase in entrepreneurial responsiveness in public administration, whereby responsiveness to citizens is articulated through a discourse of clienthood. There is also a certain degree of negotiated responsiveness, i.e. the reconciliation of value orientations and a willingness to compromise.

In the sense of negotiation, NPM has more horizontal accountability mechanisms than bureaucratic theory. On the other hand, negotiation can lead to horizontal as well as hierarchical accountability relationships – determined, for example, by power and authority relations between actors. However, horizontal accountability mechanisms are most prevalent in NPG. The doctrine also understands responsiveness through negotiation, but it is not limited to this. In networks, responsiveness also implies deliberation, i.e. social interaction and listening to and involving citizens in public decision-making.

In bureaucratic theory, the law ultimately determines the responsible behaviour of a public manager. In contrast, NPM is based on the view that performance measurement and standards lead to improved accountability in the public sector. Similarly, NPG sees accountability forums and horizontal accountability as complementary to traditional forms of responsibility.

Social responsibility in bureaucratic theory is technical, which emphasises the legal dimension of responsibility and the principle of compliance with norms. This more minimalist position is represented by NPM, which sees responsibility not only as a technical definition of responsibility but also as an economic one. For NPG, on the other hand, a community-based definition of responsibility is important, without forgetting modern systems thinking. Hence, public management has a social responsibility that cannot be superseded by economic or technical considerations alone. On the other hand, NPG can undermine accountability and responsibility, due to the complexity of responsibility and accountability mechanisms in networks.

The problem with the conceptions of responsibility in administrative doctrines is a kind of relativism: a logic of action can be justified from one doctrine and criticised from another. This is demonstrated by the implicit contradiction in the conceptions of agency that define the doctrines. The divergent criteria of the doctrines make it difficult to implement, justify and monitor responsibility and accountability. *If the question of public responsibility is complex, so are the means of demonstrating it.*

The paradoxical nature of responsible public management in administrative doctrines can be illustrated by the following tensions. The public manager is expected to act as an autonomous agent driven by self-interest but obedient to the public administration. Public manager is both ethical and strategic. A public manager must take the public interest into account in his or her decisions, even if he or she is perceived to be selfish in his or her thinking.

On the other hand, responsibility is associated with acting in accordance with the traditional public sector ethos, while new values, such as innovation, should be taken into account by civil servants. The responsible public manager is responsible for the public organisation, but makes use of outsourcing, with many accountability issues crossing the boundaries of the public organisation. This makes it difficult to monitor ethical and legal issues. Therefore, opportunities should be sought in the market while keeping the focus on the public interest.

In addition, a responsible public manager should be neutral, but be aware of and benefit from political tendencies. They should lead hierarchically, influence networks, cooperate and seek partnerships. Public manager should play by the rules and remember the needs of customers. In this way, management enhances trust and the legitimacy of governance. On the other hand, trust is just a tool among others, for managing networks and operating in the market.

The question arises as to how, in the light of administrative doctrines, the public manager can be regarded as a logically coherent or unified agent. Traditionally, the identity of the public manager is listed as integrity, the central feature of which is precisely coherence. At the same time, however, it should be noted that values such as objectivity and independence are still listed as the most important values of public organisations, as in the case of bureaucratic theory. Thus, the claims of administrative doctrines do not directly correspond to practice – although there is a link between them.

7.1.2 Communicative assessment of responsibility in administrative doctrines

As administrative doctrines contain conflicting statements, there is a risk that there is no consistent set of criteria for assessing responsible public management. In this study, the responsibility forms found in the administrative doctrines have been assessed through Habermas' communicative criteria, represented by the principles of openness, freedom of speech, authenticity and reciprocity. From this perspective, the forms of responsibility can be opened up as shown in the following table:

Table 7. Administrative doctrines and principles of communication

Principle/Doctrine	Bureaucratic theory	NPM	NPG
The principle of openness	Constrained by compliance and politics-administration dichotomy	Limited by the accountability for results and the instrumental and strategic action	Openness of participation is undermined by the context-bound nature of cooperation and different interests
The principle of freedom of speech	Responsibility is based on the existence of power and knowledge differences	Weakened by managerialism, economic criteria and negotiating power	Depends on the level of trust and network practices
The principle of authenticity	Objectification of rules undermines responsible behaviour Should you follow the rules or act according to subjective principles (compliance vs. integrity)?	Result-orientation has led to outsourcing, which undermines accountability and transparency in public management Problems related to validity requirements	The blurring of accountability Dependent on network conditions (power differences and cliques), dependent on recognition of different starting points
Principle of reciprocity	Prevented by hierarchy	Complicated by managerialism and market inequalities, opportunities under contractualism	Desirable, but not certain

Historically, public responsibility goes back to the theme of compliance. Today, however, responsibility is a wider problem than just that, and compliance is not seen as a sufficient form of responsibility. Historically, compliance has also meant immoral acts in which civil servants become blind to the wrongs they have committed. The bureaucratic apparatus can thus steal from civil servants the meaning of their actions (Habermas 1984b: 302).

In bureaucratic theory, the principle of transparency is hampered by compliance and politics-administration dichotomy. In terms of freedom of speech, responsibility presupposes differences in knowledge and power between actors, in other words, hierarchy. Otherwise, Weberian principles, such as instructions from above, lack a basis. This bureaucratic doctrine, in Weberian terms, is based on ethics as a responsibility, i.e. a technically correct procedure, not on ends as such. Hence, hierarchy means responsibility based on control, i.e. the formality and objectivity of communication, which leads to the avoidance of personal responsibility and ultimately to overall ineffectiveness.

In terms of authenticity, the objectification of rules has consequences for responsible behaviour. Moreover, in bureaucratic theory there is an obvious tension between rules and agency, as illustrated by the contradiction between compliance and integrity. This can be seen in the way how top-down rules are set against professional assumptions. In bureaucratic theory, it is impossible to demonstrate reciprocity.

In NPM, the principle of openness is limited by a concept of agency that communicates in an instrumental or strategic way, rather than seeking to build consensus. Instrumentality and strategicity are therefore ways of demonstrating accountability for results. Because NPM communicates in terms of economic criteria, negotiation and managerial autonomy, it is, like the bureaucratic theory, partly hierarchical. Indeed, the negotiation is rarely between two equal partners, the economic criteria are defined from above and the public manager can make decisions without consulting his or her subordinates.

NPM's accountability for results undermines the principle of authenticity, since instrumental and strategic activities are based, at least in part, on dishonesty or the pursuit of economic value. The authenticity of management doctrine is undermined by problems of clarity, honesty, legitimacy and truthfulness, since its theoretical and ideological background is found in the world of economy. This, in turn, limits its understanding of the scope of the responsibilities of public administration.

In NPG, the principle of openness is undermined by the contextual nature of cooperation and the many different interests from which, for example, networks are drawn. Thus, the principle of freedom of speech is equally dependent on the level of trust and the practices of the individual network. The principle of authenticity is obscured by the complex accountability relations and the conditions under which networked contexts operate, such as the existence of power differences or cliques. In the doctrine, there is a possibility for reciprocity – *but no guarantee of it*. In cooperation and networks, it is possible to act instrumentally, strategically and communicatively. Consequently, they are influenced by the most diverse conceptions of responsibility, which shape action between network participants.

But does not NPG represent precisely the kind of administrative doctrine that approaches accountability through communicative rationality? The problem of legitimacy cannot therefore be reduced to a focus on efficiency or technical rationality, since governance has also been reformed from the opposite perspective. In terms of the "external" validity requirements of the discourse (clarity, honesty, legitimacy, truthfulness), one could think in this way, even though NPM influences are also present in NPG. Also, NPG has complemented some of the NPM reforms, such as the outsourcing and contractualisation of public activities. Thus, accountability for results also has an impact within NPG. Attention is not so much focused on the starting points and motivations from which this doctrine presents responsibility. How the discourse internally constructs responsibility,

however, poses problems. In other words, the doctrine fails to provide the tools to ensure the accountability of network participants in an increasingly complex environment.

The realisation of the public interest in networks can sometimes be blurred, leaving plenty of room for opportunistic behaviour by the public manager. This changes the identity of the civil servant, which is traditionally based on obedience, apolitical and neutral competence. Opportunistic behaviour can result from the public manager's efforts to mitigate network risk factors. It can actively influence the network's power structures and the involvement of its partners. The public manager is assumed to act in a generally normative way and as an enabler of collective values such as equality and justice. It is also assumed that the public manager takes into account public and self-interest. Of course, these two interests do not always mean the same thing.

Since NPG's connection to deliberation was obvious, it was not surprising that its forms of responsibility followed the principles of procedural democracy. However, the results show that it was a good thing to keep the doctrine in the study. The analysis demonstrated the tension between NPG and discourse ethics in networks where accountability relations and norms of action can become blurred. Hence, it is useful to continue to explore NPG principles through communicative criteria, as the forms of communication it mediates are also vulnerable to communicative distortions.

Moreover, the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines can create vicious circles: in the discourses they convey, negative consequences are contradictorily resolved by the very factors that have created the negative situation in the first place. The justification for this can be found in the internal logic of administrative doctrines – and in the values of what is considered administratively "rational".

7.2 Reflection

The study is based on responsible public management. But what is it in practice? Some universal criteria can be given, which can be found in both the private and public sectors. First, modern management is not based on coercion. Employees have a shared understanding of the structure of the organisation, the division of tasks and their acceptability. Central to a public organisation is its legitimacy, i.e. the acceptability and credibility of its activities and authority structures. The authority of the manager is accepted without any real threat of punishment, although the modern organisation has ways of improving its authority and compliance. In general, different administrative doctrines imply that the choice of a particular management model is based on clarity and rationality in doing things right – in other words, they do not want to acknowledge the possibility that things could be done differently. (Kuokkanen 2015: 37–38; Scott 2001: 58–59; Weber 1922; Pollitt 1993: 1–3.)

The question of the ways in which technical rationality is insufficient to achieve responsibility in public management represents a direction for further research. This theme also comes back to the topic of the role of rationality in society and its effect on maintaining the relationship between the system and the lifeworld – not to forget the legitimization crisis of public institutions.

The technical rationality of administrative culture is not a new topic. It is a Weberian "iron cage", and can be seen historically as one of the roots of administrative evil. Different doctrinal perspectives respond to the problem of legitimacy with conflicting views. Whereas for market-driven reforms, administrative legitimacy is a matter of fiscal balance and austerity, network-based reforms seek legitimacy through cooperation between different societal actors. Hence, there is no equally comprehensive "Weberian" theory of modern bureaucracy. Instead, changes in the rational criteria of knowledge, or what is considered rational in general, have led to constant waves of administrative reform.

The broad scope of administrative doctrines is obvious. Their practical implementation is also influenced by societal factors such as fundamental cultural values, the extent of the moral universe, attitudes towards equality and inclusion, and the degree of democratisation of public administration. It is likely that a broader approach to public management will undermine traditional public values. The integration will be challenging as long as doctrines and structures remain incoherent and inconsistent. The identity of the public manager is not coherent in the light of management doctrines and narratives, making it difficult to implement and monitor accountability.

From the perspective of Public Administration education, responsibility in public management should be considered in a broader context of social, philosophical and ideological debate. Ideas and practices in the field of governance do not come out of thin air. They are often cloaked in apparent objectivity, transforming forms of responsibility into technical tools of universal managerialism. Therefore, the public managers of the future will have to be self-reflective in their ethical behaviour and able to communicate in accordance with the principles that guide public action. The task will be more difficult if the links and contradictions between administrative doctrines remain unclear to the public manager.

Also, responsibility is already affected by issues of digitalisation and AI. The application of AI in governance is rapidly driving public management in a more digital direction. Public management is required to embrace digital practices – and not at least as a result of the Covid-19. In the case of AI, responsibility issues in public management are once again facing new challenges. Many questions arise. How far can AI be applied to public management? For example, can AI be considered a responsible agent? One obvious answer to the latter question is: of course not. Only humans can be responsible for their actions because they are able to distinguish right from wrong.

Another answer to the question could be: maybe. In this case, responsibility is not viewed through agency but action. Public managers, administrative experts and researchers have an interpretation of what is generally considered to be publicly accountable. An action can be judged as either responsible or irresponsible, regardless of whether it is a human being or an AI behind the action. Moreover, it is quite clear that the issue of accountability and AI is too large not to be critically examined.

It can be argued that the forms of responsibility identified in this study apply to AI with varying degrees of success. This is due to AI's limited ability to perceive the human lifeworld as a whole. For example, compliance and accountability may be more amenable to AI than responsiveness to citizens, as they are more mechanistic forms of responsibility and require less perception of the context. The broader the view of responsibility, the more difficult it is for AI. Examples of broader responsibility include communicative action, deliberation, dialogue and social equity. In this case, the application of AI is likely to be very limited.

This study has represented the tradition of Critical Management Studies (CMS). Overall, CMS is a somewhat contradictory set of different background theories. Of course, there are also worthwhile and coherent features to strive for. One of these is the reflexivity of research (Fournier & Grey 2000). Management research should make its position clear in terms of how it approaches the preconceptions of management studies and what are the possible philosophical shortcomings of the research. Such criticism of research in the field is justified in the light of good scientific practice. Criticality as such does not follow the principles of any other philosophical school, nor does it follow the philosophical assumptions of science in general. Ideally, critique is part of all disciplines, so that its possible neglect says something about the research practices and *a priori* assumptions about the object of research in a given discipline. The lack of scientific criticality can also arise from the social phenomena that affect scientific practices.

According to Lintula, when assessing the practical benefits, CMS can support the continuity and profitability of the organisation *and* the promotion of a worthy life at the same time (Lintula 2010). However, Lintula goes on to say that this goal is quite utopian, for example, in Finnish working life, which is still too bureaucratic and hierarchical.

Also, the responsibility of public management should be examined more closely from an integrity perspective. According to OECD (2018), behavioural science can enhance integrity in many ways, as ethical behaviour never takes place in a vacuum, but as part of social interaction. The first way is to rethink existing practices and systems. Negative behaviour can be anticipated by identifying responsibilities. Structures that obscure responsibility can pose risks to integrity. Such structures include, for example, involving too many actors or ensuring integrity only based on formal criteria. Ethical reflection can increase integration in an organisation. It is even thought that personal signing of

documents encourages individuals to behave ethically. The second tool relates to time-limited interventions based on knowledge of people's biases, cognitive constraints and social preferences. The intervention acts as a kind of *nudge*, a subtle guide to ethical choices. An example of such nudging can be a quiz on ethical rules. (OECD: 2018: 7–8.)

However, integrity is not just an individualistic issue. In addition to the integrity of individuals, it is necessary to talk about the integrity of institutions. Integrity can be considered in the context of an integrity framework, which aims to improve public integration by taking into account the institutions, practices and instruments that serve the task (OECD 2020; Hoekstra & Kaptein 2012). The national integrity system is often described through the 11 pillars of the Greek temple, such as legislation, governance, civil society and media (Pope 2000). The pillars rest on public awareness and societal values. The integrity system is not based solely on the internal practices of public organisations, but aims to link the organisational level with the social institutions that reinforce integrity.

According to Kirby (2018: 14–29), the integrity of individuals and institutions is based on purpose, legitimacy, pursuit, consistency with commitments and robustness. First of all, a public institution must have a well-defined purpose. If it has several purposes, the relationship between them must be disclosed. Also, the purpose must be legitimate. A public institution can have a legitimate purpose, but if it does not pursue that purpose legitimately, it loses its integrity. A public institution must pursue its legitimate purpose to the best of its ability with the resources at its disposal. Public institutions have obligations both to society and to their members as employees. It must, therefore, be committed, consistent and trustworthy at all levels of its activities. A public institution must be strong, i.e. able to withstand time and changing circumstances. Interestingly, administrative doctrines have challenged the purpose, coherence and robustness of institutions, not to mention the legitimacy of government and the trust of citizens. Perhaps the pursuit has come at the expense of these principles.

In public management, individual and institutional integrity is undermined by many different elements. First, the purpose of public action should be legitimate. However, administrative doctrines have divergent views on the purpose of government. Although similarities exist, the purpose of public action is not well defined. The purpose should also be legitimate, but each doctrine has reservations about the principles of the other. Individual and institutional integrity would require consistency, i.e. commitment and trust at all levels of action, which is not currently the case. In NPM, for example, communication is consistent, committed and trustworthy only in a given market situation. Integrity also implies strength, i.e. the individual and the institution must be able to withstand time and changing circumstances. However, governance has been subject to constant reform – meaning the process of modernisation is ongoing.

For Husserl, the philosopher behind the concept of the lifeworld, science is in crisis when it produces knowledge that is alienated from life. This insight can be applied to the lessons of public administration. On the one hand, public administration is supposed to be alienated from life, technical and efficiency-oriented – but, paradoxically, it respects the living and communicative basis on which it is founded as a scientific discipline. All research in public administration refers to pre-scientific life and the interpretative horizon. The administrative scientist must therefore respect the communicative criteria of the lifeworld in order not to continue to alienate and colonize his or her discipline. The accountability of public management must be critically assessed, for the alternative is only to blindly follow the negative aspects of Enlightenment. "Enlightenment doubts everything that cannot be measured in terms of calculability and utility, and if it can only proceed free of external shackles, nothing will stop it" (Adorno & Horkheimer 2008: 24).

7.3 Limitations of the analysis

In the abductive content analysis, the four principles of discourse ethics appear counterfactual and ideal in relation to the concepts of responsibility in administrative doctrines. This is both the strength and weakness of the content analysis. On the other hand, the counterfactuality of the principles provides a convenient yardstick against which to normatively assess the doctrines of governance. This is particularly the case if administrative science is understood as a democratic theory (Waldo). Technical rationality can unnecessarily marginalise questions of administrative ethics in particular. The principles show which factors limit the accountability of management theory.

Although the study has not followed a traditional hermeneutic reading, a more hermeneutically in-depth reading would have required a smaller literature review. The hermeneutic dimension of the research has been represented by the researcher's internal interpretative process – on which all qualitative research is based. It has therefore been justified to argue that the research has been based on hermeneutic principles, as it has been qualitative, theoretical and content-analytical.

Over the last century, the hermeneutic tradition has moved from a purely textual method to include (scientific) philosophical principles of interpretation. Indeed, hermeneutic principles have been applied in many abductive and theory-based content analyses (Karlsen et al. 2020). In any case, a traditional, hermeneutic reading approach could have been implemented by a careful and in-depth reading of a few sources. This could be a good option for further research, as it could fill gaps in the research on this topic.

Another key question is how Habermas' discourse ethics have been applied. This is because Habermas himself has not provided precise guidelines for the application of his philosophy. Consequently, discourse ethics has been applied from different angles. In this

study, it was decided to approach discourse ethics through the four principles of the ideal speech situation (openness, freedom of speech, authenticity and reciprocity). This choice has been justified by the choice of the research topic, the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines, where agency has played a crucial role. The principles of the ideal speech situation have thus provided a set of criteria within which agency has been assessed within the discourses of the doctrines. However, the principles of ideal discourse have been complemented by four validity criteria, which have opened up more discursive background assumptions in the doctrines, such as value assumptions or ideological views. In this study, the validity claims are embedded within the principle of authenticity. It has also been possible to assess the facticity and validity of the forms of responsibility through the ideal speech situation, as these also represent discursive ethical and universal criteria of communication. The principles and validity requirements of the ideal speech situation are not contradictory but complementary.

The content analysis used in the study is based on abductive reasoning. In this case, the research begins with the researcher's preliminary understanding or a preliminary review of the research literature, which leads to the generation of a guiding idea. The aim is to draw attention to elements in the research data that would allow existing theory to be formulated in a new thematic area. It should be noted that the main idea of abductive reasoning is not necessarily easy to test, despite the fact that the whole study proceeds according to its logic. In theory, even the intuition of the researcher is sufficient as a guiding principle for the content analysis. This can be seen as a weakness of theory-based content analysis. The guiding idea used in this study is that the technical rationality of the forms of responsibility in administrative doctrines has undermined the legitimacy of public administration. Of course, this is really difficult to prove. The study has also assumed that the forms of responsibility must be evaluated in terms of discourse ethics. The premise is also based on Habermas' work on the distortion of communicative structures, and can therefore be justified according to previous research.

This research has been close to CMS in the sense that it has criticised the shortcomings of administrative doctrines in terms of responsibility. This evaluation has been done through Habermas' theory of communicative action, which also represents the Critical School. However, whether the defence of procedural democracy makes the research "critical" is a question of its own. Democracy has always been at the heart of governance, and defending it is not necessarily ideological, for example. Habermas himself considers his discourse-ethical procedural democracy neutral to different value orientations (Habermas 1996: 288). Moreover, Habermas' work is thought to be situated somewhere between social democracy and political liberalism (Huttunen 2014).

On the other hand, the study can be defended by the relatively uncritical attitude towards the forms of responsibility found in the administrative doctrines. Indeed, Pollitt and Hupe

(2011) speak of magical concepts in administrative science that are general in nature and normatively loaded. One of these is accountability. They argue that magical concepts blur traditional social science concerns about conflicts or divergent interests. If one seeks to understand governance in uncritical terms, the legitimacy of governance will erode over time – as will the credibility of public administration as a discipline.

There is no single answer to responsible public management, which is why this study has examined the topic within the framework of three administrative doctrines. The study has also simplified the overload of accountability and responsibility, which are complex to analyse from the very outset. In the past, management methods in the private sector have been alien to public administration. However, over time, they have become permanent tools of public management. This is also true of NPG, which has led to a broadening of the scope of responsibility. Either case, the question is what will be the next lesson after NPG – a doctrine that is already 20 years old (which can also be seen in the references of this literature review). This would provide an answer to how responsibility in public management is changing even further.

The values and principles present in the administrative doctrines show why they are not theories in the strict sense of the word. Rather, they consist of scientifically untested beliefs about responsible public management. The subject cannot be studied in an exclusively objective or neutral way, since questions of responsible public management are also political and ideological.

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