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Age-Dependent Resilience Assessment and Quantification of Distribution systems under Extreme Weather Events

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***Abstract*— The impact of extreme weather events on power system resilience can be seen in historical electrical disruptions. Due to the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events following global warming and climate change, a greater focus is required to design power systems with high resilience and low cost through assessing and quantifying power system resilience. In this way, we propose a transparent methodology and a set of metrics to quantify the resilience of power distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. This methodology includes a probabilistic and detailed approach to modeling the failure probability of overhead power lines and the restoration time of damaged lines in the distribution system. Moreover, the fragility analysis of the power system infrastructure is considered age-dependent, and the system's resilience by considering different lifetimes is assessed. The time-dependent resilience assessment developed in this study constitutes an essential component in risk-informed decision-making for resilience enhancement strategies in the future. Specifically, this paper provides two resilience curve-based metrics: vulnerability rate ($\boldsymbol{R_v}$) and restoration rate ($\boldsymbol{R_r}$). The first metric indicates the power system's ability to resist extreme events, and the second indicates its ability to bounce back to normal performance. Simulations are performed on the IEEE 69-bus distribution test system to validate the suggested methodologies. The results indicate the capability of the proposed methodology and metrics to precisely assess and quantify the resilience of power systems. A significant correlation between the age of power distribution systems and the system's resilience can be seen. These findings can support system management, expansion planning, and resource allocation.**

Index Terms—Resiliency assessment, Fragility curve, Resilience quantification metrics, Distribution system, Extreme Weather condition, Restoration time

NOMENCLATURE

A. Sets and Indices

	Set of the overhead lines in the distribution system
l	Overhead distribution line index
c	Overhead distribution lines conductor index
pl	Power distribution poles index

B. Parameters and Constants

G	Performance function of a structural member
S_{com}	Strength of structural members
S_0	The initial strength of poles
L_{com}	Load demand caused by wind speed
x_S	Random strength parameters
x_L	Random load demand parameters
d_S	Deterministic strength parameters
d_L	Deterministic load demand parameters
P_f^{cpl}	Failure probability of a central pole in three poles system
P_f^{apl}	Failure probability of adjacent poles in three poles system
P_f^{stpl}	Failure probability of a three-pole system
$P_{f,pl}^{l}$	Failure probability of overhead line due to breakdown poles
$P_{f,sec}^{l}$	Failure probability of overhead line due to breakdown sections
$P_{f,c}^{sec}$	Failure probability of individual section due to failure of the conductor
P_f^{pl}	Failure probability of pole
P_f^{c}	Failure probability of conductor
N_{pl}^{l}	Number of poles of line l
N_{dpl}^{l}	Number of damaged poles of line l
N_{dsec}^{l}	Number of damaged sections of line l
N_{sec}^{l}	Number of sections of line l
N_{sp}^{sec}	Number of spans of section
N_r	Number of running times of the MCS
N_f	Number of failure events in MCS
TTR_{pl}	Time to repair damaged poles under normal conditions
TTR_{sec}	Time to repair damaged sections under normal conditions of section due to failure of the conductor
TTR_l	Time to repair overhead line
t_{lrs}	Length of time it takes to return the system to a resilient state
t_w	Waiting time for the end of an extreme event
t_d	Time of disturbance occurrence
t_a	Required time to arrive at the fault location
t_e	End time of the extreme event
t_o	Occurrence time of the extreme event
t_r	Operator response times to contingencies
S_l	Status of overhead distribution line l
R	The change rate of the system performance level
$P(t)$	The performance level of the system over time
R_a	Average change rate
R_v	Vulnerability rate
R_r	Restoration rate
R_i	Impact of the extreme event on the system performance level
α	The binary variables indicate an overhead line outage due to damaged poles (Equal 1 for damaged overhead lines due to failure of poles; otherwise, it would be 0.)
β	The binary variables indicate an overhead line outage due to damaged conductors (Equal 1 for damaged overhead lines due to failure of conductors; otherwise, it would be 0.)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivation

EXTREME weather events, as low-probability and high-impact events, have led to significant social, economic, physical disruptions, and even human casualties worldwide[1]. Power systems as critical infrastructures (CIs) are vulnerable to extreme weather events due to their spread across geographical areas and the increasing intensity of natural hazards. Thus, resiliency assessment is crucial for assessing risks brought by extreme weather events in the power systems and providing prior knowledge for preventing programs. Hence, this study focuses on two main aims, including i) assessment and ii) quantification of resiliency in power systems.

On the one hand, many studies on the resiliency of distribution systems have focused on resilience enhancement[2]–[10]. Previous studies rarely addressed the resilience assessment of the distribution networks in detail. To this end, it is required to accurately model distribution lines' failure probability and restoration time. Thus, this paper focuses in detail on fragility modeling and restoration time. So that the lifetime and the correlation of distribution network components are also considered in the modeling.

On the other hand, providing correct resilience quantification metrics and using suitable resilience strategies to enhance the power system resilience will lead to systems with high resilience and low cost (HRLC) from system design perspectives. Accordingly, the present study aims to propose comprehensive metrics in resilience quantification. Hence, two comprehensive quantification metrics for the distribution power systems will be defined based on the vulnerability rate (R_v) and restoration rate (R_r).

B. *Brief Literature Review*

To assess the power system's resilience, the impact of extreme events on its components and infrastructure should be investigated. In this way, a fragility model of individual towers and lines under a range of wind loading in transmission networks has been presented[11], [12]. In[4], the failure probability of transmission network components such as towers due to ice disasters is determined using the fragility model. In [13], the authors presented the failure rate of overhead distribution lines using negative binomial regression, while the failure rate of the poles was not investigated. As discussed earlier, most studies have focused on the resilience enhancement of distribution systems, and the failure probability of vulnerable components has not been investigated [2]–[10]. In [14], the line failure rate of the transmission network is used for the overhead line failure rate of the distribution system, and the fragility model of vulnerable components is determined using probabilistic distribution functions. Therefore, there is a general lack of research on the fragility models of distribution system components used for resilience assessment, with the exception of [2].

Besides, the failure probability of overhead distribution lines and the time to restoration (TTR) of the broken lines must be more broadly investigated. In many studies, restoration time models based on the severity of hurricanes have been obtained. In this way, the Authors have attempted to reflect the intensity and impact of extreme events on restoration time using weight factors [8], [12], [15] and distribution functions[7], [13], [16]. Some authors also assumed that the repair time of damaged overhead lines is a fixed value [2], [14], [17]. In [18], a broader perspective is adopted that other parameters such as the impact of fault location and size of repair crew on time restoration have been considered in addition to the intensity of the extreme event. Similarly, the authors mentioned that extreme events and human responses could affect the restoration time [19]. Some authors also assumed that the restoration time of damaged overhead lines was a fixed value.

Much literature has been published on introducing a metric for quantifying resilience. In [8], the resilience of power systems is assessed and quantified based on the resilience achievement worth (RAW) index. The authors in [20] provided a new index as a resilience index, considering the duration of extreme events (RICD) to evaluate the resilience of the power transmission system. This index measured the system's performance level and considered the disruption characteristics. In addition, the concept of trapezoid resilience is introduced in [15], which can be considered different phases that a power system might experience during extreme events. Then, a resilience quantification metric is proposed for each phase. Furthermore, this study presented the power system's operational and infrastructure resilience concept.

In [21], a quantitative method was investigated that quantified resilience in four phases (initial steady phase, disruptive phase, recovery phase, and a new steady phase) integrated into a resilience metric. Authors in [17] proposed a quantitative framework for the resilience assessment of microgrids in response to low-probability and high-impact events. The resilience of microgrids is quantified in different phases using the vulnerability index, degradation index, restoration efficiency index, and microgrid resilience index.

The main contributions of this paper are summarised as follows:

i. First, using the limit state function, the fragility curve of vulnerable elements in power distribution systems is obtained under a range of wind loads. Given that power system infrastructures are prone to deterioration over time because of decay, corrosion, etc., an age-dependent fragility curve of vulnerable components is provided.

ii. The failure probability of overhead lines is modeled by considering the characteristics of power distribution systems. Accordingly, a pole's failure increases mechanical forces on adjacent poles due to the short distance between poles. Consequently, the failure of poles is considered dependent on one another. Also, the overhead lines are divided into sections consisting of several spans. The conductor's failure in one span leads to a reduced failure probability in the other spans. However, the possibility of the conductor failing in other sections remains. These characteristics are used to model the failure probability of overhead lines. Besides, the restoration time is presented by considering the factors affecting the duration of overhead line restoration.

iii. *Resilience* can be defined as the ability to withstand extreme events and bounce back to a pre-disturbance state. Accordingly, two resilience curve-based metrics are introduced: vulnerability rate (R_v) and restoration rate (R_r). The vulnerability rate is an indicator of the ability of the power system to withstand extreme events. Likewise, the restoration rate indicates the ability of the system to bounce back to a normal state.

The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two begins by introducing the vulnerable components of the distribution system under extreme weather events, and then the fragility of these components is modeled. In the following, the failure probability of the overhead lines is described in detail. In addition to modeling the impact of extreme events on the failure probability of overhead lines, the impact of these events on the restoration time of damaged overhead lines is investigated. The third section is concerned with the method used for assessing resilience in power systems. The fourth section presents new resilience quantification metrics, focusing on system performance during and after the extreme event. Section five provides the simulation results and analysis to validate the proposed models and assessment framework. Finally, the conclusion is given in section six.

II. FAILURE PROBABILITY OF OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION LINES AND RESTORATION TIME

The first question in this study is to determine the vulnerable components of power distribution infrastructure under extreme events. Vulnerable component types can also vary depending on the type of disruptive event (flood, earthquake, hurricane, etc.). The present study considers the assessment of distribution system resilience under extreme weather conditions. Hence, the distribution poles and conductors are considered vulnerable components under hurricanes because they are not designed to withstand high wind speeds.

A. Fragility analysis

The failure probability of power system components depends on weather conditions. A fragility analysis is required to calculate the failure probability. For fragility analysis, the limit state or performance function of a structural member is defined as [22][23]:

$$G(x) = S_{com}(x_S, d_S) - L_{com}(x_L, d_L) \quad (1)$$

The failure probability or non-performance of the structural members is defined as ($G < 0$), which means the load demand is greater than the strength ($S_{com} < L_{com}$). A Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) calculates the failure probabilities. As discussed above, if the $G\,(x)$ value is less than 0, the failure occurs. Therefore, for different values of random variables, failure events are identified by checking the sign of $G(x)$. Hence, the failure probability (P_f^{com}) is calculated by counting the number of times the applied load on the structure is greater than its strength.

$$P_f^{com} = \frac{N_f}{N_r} \quad (2)$$

The fragility curve is used to show the probability of failure. In other words, the fragility curve characterises the failure probability of vulnerable components in the power distribution system for a specific load. This curve can be provided by the lognormal cumulative distribution function [24].

$$F_R(v) = \varphi\left[\frac{\ln(v/m_r)}{\xi_r}\right] \quad (3)$$

The timber poles are made of organic materials, and due to fungal attacks, insects and other living organisms are susceptible to decay. The decay of timber poles customarily occurs in areas in contact with the ground. The decay rate of timber poles depends on many factors, such as timber species, climatic conditions (rainfall, humidity, and temperature), the nature of fungal and insect attacks, and soil factors. Therefore, as the age of the poles increases, their strength decreases. The strength remaining of the poles as a function of time, considering the probability of decay, is modeled by:

$$S_{pole}(t) = S_0[1 - min(max(a_1 t - a_2, 0), 1).min(max(b_1 t^{b_2}, 0), 1)] \quad (4)$$

The values of constant coefficients a_1, a_2, b_1, and b_2 were evaluated as 0.014418, 0.10683, 1.3×10^{-4}, and 1.846 , respectively, from the regression analysis. Interested readers can refer to [25] for more details about fragility analysis.

B. Failure probability of overhead distribution lines

The collapse of poles and breakdown of the conductor along an overhead line cause the entire line to be disconnected. Hence, the failure probability of overhead lines is calculated using the failure probability of poles and conductors as vulnerable components under extreme weather events, which will be explained as follows.

1) Failure probability of overhead line due to failure of poles

The failure probability of the overhead line is different from the failure probability of the transmission line. Failure occurs if the conductors are broken or dropped to the ground. Therefore, the failure of a single pole may not necessarily lead to the failure of the overhead line. However, the failure of a single pole due to load sharing increases the mechanical forces on adjacent poles. If the central pole fails, the adjacent poles may also fail. In this respect, the failure probability of the overhead distribution lines is calculated using the failure probability of the three consecutive poles system (interested readers can refer to [26] for more information). The failure probability of a three-pole system that is applied to each pole along the overhead distribution line can be written as follows:

$$P_f^{stpl} = P_f^{cpl}\left[2P_f^{apl} - \left(P_f^{apl}\right)^2\right] \quad (5)$$

The poles in the distribution lines are connected in series. Assuming that the failure probability of the overhead lines is caused by the failure of poles, considering the three-pole system, all failure modes can be fully independent or fully dependent, given by (6) and (7), respectively.

$$P_{f,pl}^{l} = 1 - \left(1 - P_f^{stp}\right)^{N_{pl}^{l}} \quad (6)$$

$$P_{f,pl}^{l} = max\left[P_f^{stpl}\right] \quad (7)$$

These equations represent the upper and lower bounds of the failure probability of overhead lines due to the failure of poles. The exact failure probability of overhead lines lies somewhere between the provided bounds. However, (6) as an upper bound of failure probability is used for conservatism in this paper.

2) Failure probability of overhead line due to failure of conductors

Besides the poles, failure of the conductors leads to the outage of the overhead lines. It is impossible to model the overall system to calculate the failure probability of overhead lines because they are very long and include many sections and spans. This problem can be solved by modeling the failure probability of a part of the overhead line and generalising it to the remainder of the lines. The sections are connected in series and contain some spans and continuous conductors. The failure probability of the overhead lines due to conductors' breakdown is obtained using the failure probability of sections. The failure of conductors in one span decreases the failure probability of conductors in other spans for each section. In addition, a failure in one or more section spans has the same result and will lead to an outage of the overhead lines. According to these assumptions, the failure probability of sections using the binomial distribution can be calculated as follows:

$$P_{f,c}^{sec} = \binom{N_{sp}^{sec}}{1}.P_f^c.\left(1 - P_f^c\right)^{N_{sp}^{sec}-1} \quad (8)$$
$$= N_{sp}^{sec}.P_f^{con}.\left(1 - P_f^c\right)^{N_{sp}^{sec}-1}$$

The sections in the overhead distribution lines are connected in series. Therefore, the failure probability of an overhead line due to the failure of sections is given as follows:

$$P_{f,c}^{l} = 1 - \left(1 - P_{f,c}^{sec}\right)^{N_{sec}^{l}} \quad (9)$$

The restoration time of damaged overhead lines will be argued in the following.

C. Restoration time

Under extreme weather events, the overhead lines will be subjected to a new failure rate, so a new restoration time must be calculated. When the power distribution system components experience an outage, data on damaged lines are collected. Then crews are allocated to repair the damaged components, and after repairing the damaged lines, the distribution system returns to its normal state.

Following a weather event, the repair process depends on several factors, such as weather intensity, the location of the affected lines, the size of the repair crew, and the repair or replacement of a damaged component. An accurate model of restoration time should be considered to increase the accuracy of the resilience assessment of the power systems. For the safety of repair personnel and to determine the worst impact of an extreme weather event on the distribution system, it is believed that damaged components cannot be fixed during a severe event. As a result, after the extreme event is over, repair crews are dispatched to the affected lines.

Concerning the discussion above, the proposed model of restoration time is as follows:

1) Waiting time

As discussed earlier, during an extreme weather event, it is assumed that damaged components cannot be fixed, and these components must wait for the severe event to end. Note that the occurrence time of the extreme event may not be the time of the disturbance in the power systems. Hence, the time interval between the time of disturbance occurrence and when the extreme event ends is defined as "*waiting time*" and calculated as follows:

$$t_w = t_e - t_d \tag{10}$$

2) Arrival time

According to the distance between the fault location and the repair crew's departure location, and considering the average speed of vehicles, the time it takes for the repair crew to arrive at the fault location must be considered. Hence, the time it takes for the repair crew to arrive at the fault location is defined as "*arrival time*" and calculated as follows:

$$t_a = \frac{L_{dis}}{V_c} \tag{11}$$

Due to the lack of data on the repair crew's departure location in this study, the required time to arrive at the fault location is modeled as a probability distribution using the Poisson random variable.

3) Repair time

To estimate the time to repair damaged overhead lines, broken components must be identified and counted. The number of potentially damaged components in each line is obtained using the failure probability of overhead lines due to poles or conductors and their total number in overhead lines.

$$N_{dpl}^l = N_{pl}^l \times P_{f,pl}^l \tag{12}$$

$$N_{dsec}^l = N_{sec}^l \times P_{f,sec}^l \tag{13}$$

By multiplying the number of damaged components by the required time to repair one of them under normal conditions, the time to repair damaged overhead lines is calculated as follows:

$$t_{ttr} = N_{dpl}^l . ttr_{pl} . \alpha + N_{dsec}^l . ttr_{sec} . \beta \tag{14}$$

4) Response time

Lack of individual situation awareness leads to the incorrect actions of system operators and inadequate response times to contingencies. Furthermore, the ineffective coordination of the crew repairers and system operators leads to delays in restoring damaged overhead lines. So, the human response delay in restoration must be considered.

TTR of the damaged overhead line can be calculated as follows, taking into account the mentioned topics:

$$TTR_l = t_w + t_a + t_{ttr} + t_r \tag{15}$$

III. RESILIENCY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Extreme weather events such as hurricanes move across a power distribution system. Hence, the Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (SMCS) can represent their multi-spatial and multi-temporal impact. Under extreme weather events, the distribution system's performance level should be evaluated to determine resilience by considering supply, infrastructure, and demand changes. This paper focuses on changing infrastructure policies, such as the status of overhead lines determined by the functional states. The input of the functional states is the failure probability of overhead lines due to vulnerable components, and the output of that is overhead line status. Overhead lines can be considered in two states: operational and damaged. Hence, the outputs of the functional states are 0 and 1, which signify the damaged and operational states.

The related vulnerable component failure probability of the overhead lines in every step of the SMCS procedure is continuously updated according to the prevailing weather conditions. This update provides a realistic model of the weather event as a continuously fluctuating phenomenon. The failure probability of overhead lines will also be updated by updating the weather conditions. After that, the failure probability is compared with a uniformly distributed random number r~U (0, 1) to determine the overhead line functional states in the form of:

$$F_c^l(P_{f,sec}^l, r) = \begin{cases} 1 & P_{f,sec}^l < r \\ 0 & P_{f,sec}^l > r \end{cases} \tag{16}$$

$$F_{pl}^l(P_{f,pl}^l, r) = \begin{cases} 1 & P_{f,pl}^l < r \\ 0 & P_{f,pl}^l > r \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

Finally, the status of overhead lines can be obtained as:

$$S^l = F_c^l \times F_{pl}^l \tag{5}$$

While the functional states of the pole and conductor or both equal zero, the overhead line is in the damaged state ($S^l = 0$). Thus, the overhead line is in the operational state when the results of both functional states equal one ($S^l = 1$). The overhead line's status can be determined using the probabilistic framework provided for each simulation step. Following determining the state of overhead lines, the TTR for damaged ones should be created as described previously.

When multiple overhead lines are outage, the power distribution system is divided into several subsystems. There are two possible situations for each subsystem in this condition: (i) it does not have distributed generation resources, and (ii) it has one or more distributed generation resources. In the first situation, a lack of distributed generation resources leads to a loss of load at buses. The second situation is divided into two parts. The distributed generating resources in the subsystem supply the customer's demands in the first portion. In the second part, these resources cannot supply all consumer demands, resulting in load shedding until supply and demand are balanced. Afterward, the load-flow analysis is performed using the backward/forward sweep method in every simulation step to model the distribution system's behavior under real-time operating conditions. These steps are repeated, and the results are stored until the end of the simulation. Finally, the distribution system's resilience can be assessed using the recorded data of the distribution system's performance level before, during, and after extreme weather events.

IV. RESILIENCE QUANTIFICATION METRICS

According to the resilience definition, a resilience system has two main features. The first feature of an engineered system is its ability to withstand or survive disruptive events, and the second one is its ability to bounce back to a pre-disrupted state. Hence, the vulnerability and restoration rates are proposed as resilience indicators in this respect, which will be discussed in the following.

The resilience of engineering systems is typically represented and assessed using a resilience curve with the horizontal axis of time and the vertical axis of distribution system performance. This curve is created with the same time resolution as the weather model. The time resolution of the weather model depends on weather data availability. Although higher time resolution leads to accuracy in the assessment, the hourly time resolution is considered in this study (t^*). The change rate can be obtained in systems with changes in performance level. The change rate of the system performance level at each interval time between t_i and $t_i - t^*$ is given by:

$$R(i) = \frac{P(t_i)}{P(t_i - t^*)} - 1 \tag{19}$$

The above relation calculates the system's performance level change rates over a specific time duration. Usually, the geometric mean is used to calculate the average change rate of a variable over a particular period. Hence, the average change rate of the system performance level is achieved using the following geometric mean.

$$R_a = \sqrt[N_{ti}]{(R(1) + 1) \times \ldots \times (R(N_{ti}) + 1)} - 1 = \sqrt[N_{ti}]{\prod_{i=1}^{N_{ti}} (R(i) + 1)} - 1 \tag{20}$$

$$(t_k = t_{k+1} - t^*, k = 1,2, \ldots, N_{ti})$$

Rewriting (20) by (19), the average change rate is described as

$$R_a = \sqrt[N_{ti}]{\left(\frac{P(t_1)}{P(t_1-t^*)}\right) \times \ldots \times \left(\frac{P(t_{N_{ti}})}{P(t_{N_{ti}}-t^*)}\right)} - 1 \quad (21)$$

$$= \sqrt[N_{ti}]{\frac{P(t_{N_{ti}})}{P(t_1-t^*)}} - 1$$

Since resilience is associated with the degradation of system performance level after an extreme event, the resilience curve can be calculated as the average change rate of the performance level of the power distribution system under extreme weather events. Generally, there are three phases in the distribution system resilience concept; these states are described as the unreliability state, the degraded state, and the restoration state. In the unreliable state, the system performance level decreases. Then, the system is in a degraded state until the restoration process begins. The system's performance level increases in the restoration state until it operates normally. Therefore, two vulnerability and restoration rates have been proposed to assess the power system's resilience:

$$R_v = \sqrt[t_e-t_o]{\frac{P(t_e)}{P(t_o)}} - 1 \quad (22)$$

$$R_r = \sqrt[t_n-t_e]{\frac{P(t_n)}{P(t_e)}} - 1 \quad (23)$$

The vulnerability rate means how much the system performance level changes under extreme weather events per hour and is related to the unreliability state. Likewise, the restoration rate indicates the average system performance increase after the extreme event's end per hour. This index is also related to the degraded state and restoration state states. Therefore, according to the concept of resilience, the two main features of withstanding and quick recovery can be quantified using these indicators. Besides, these indexes can be used to compare two separate systems under one type of extreme event regardless of their duration.



Fig. 1. The novel concept of notional engineering resilience behavior following a disruptive event

The impact of the extreme event on system performance is equal to the difference between the initial and final performance levels in the unreliability state, which is calculated as follows:

$$R_i = 1 - (1 + R_v)^{t_{ee}-t_{se}} \quad (24)$$

As a result, the quantity of system performance level degradation is predictable by forecasting the duration of future extreme weather events and considering the vulnerability rate of the distribution system obtained from past extreme events. Also, depending on the vulnerability and restoration rate, the time required to return the system to a resilient state is given by:

$$T_r = \frac{log\frac{1}{(1+R_v)^{tee-tse}}}{log(1+R_r)} \quad (25)$$

The vulnerability and restoration rate are the two main indicators from which other indices can be obtained. In addition, the vulnerability and restoration rates of power systems under different extreme weather events can be compared. Also, using the restoration and vulnerability rates of power systems, their behavior can be predicted in the face of future extreme weather events. Accordingly, by predicting the duration of future extreme weather events and knowing the vulnerability and restoration rate, it can be determined how much the system performance level may decrease and how long it takes to return to normal status.

V. TEST NETWORK AND SIMULATION

The resilience assessment process is performed using a case study on the IEEE 69-bus test radial distribution system. Total system loads are 3802.19 kW and 2694.06 kVAr labeled from 1 to 69. This test system contains 69 buses, 68 distribution corridors, and 68 sectionalizing switches. The initial states of all the sectionalizing switches are closed. Also, this test system has seven lateral lines. The parameters and load data are given in [27]. Ideally, to accurately assess the resilience of the distribution systems, the number of poles, span lengths, and geographical data such as the location of the poles should be included in distribution system modeling. Due to the lack of data, we have assumed that the number of spans in each distribution corridor exposed to the hurricane is random ($N_i^{span} \sim U(3,20), i, 1,2, \ldots, 68$). It is also assumed that the span length for all spans is the same and equals 45 m.

First, the fragility analysis of the conductor and poles, considering their lifespan by the limit state function at various wind speeds, is calculated. Accordingly, the Monte Carlo simulation method was used. In this method, one million random numbers for the variables involved in the formulation for different wind speeds were generated, and then this function was assessed. As discussed earlier, failure occurs when the structure's strength is unable to withstand the applied load (G(x) <0).



Fig. 2. Fragility curves of timber poles at 0, 20, 40, 60, and 80



Fig. 3. Fragility curves of conductors.

Note that the failure probability at a specific wind speed equals the ratio of failures to the total number of simulations. Following this approach, the fragility curve of the conductor and timber poles, taking into account their lifespan, was obtained. As shown in Fig. 2, the decay of timber poles causes them to become more vulnerable. Hence, their failure probability at lower wind speeds increases. The results obtained from the analysis of fragility poles and conductors' parameters are summarized in Table I.

TABLE I
Lognormal parameters for fragility curve of the poles and conductors

Age	$ln(m)$	ζ
Timber pole		
New poles	3.81	0.135
20-year-old	3.80	0.134
40-year-old	3.78	0.136
60-year-old	3.70	0.135
80-year-old	3.53	0.137
Conductors		
0 to 20 years old	3.63	0.0946

As explained earlier, the restoration time of the overhead distribution lines depends on several factors, such as weather intensity, location of the affected area, etc. When a fault or collapse of a vulnerable component occurs, the restoration time of the damaged line is generated randomly. The uncertain parameters in the calculation of the restoration time are summarised in Table II.

TABLE II
Restoration time parameters of overhead distribution lines based the timber poles and conductors

	Distribution function	Vulnerable components	
		Conductor	Timber pole
t_{ttr}	Normal	$\mu = 4\,h, \sigma = 1\,h$	$\mu = 5\,h, \sigma = 2.5\,h$
t_a	Poisson	$\lambda = 3\,h$	$\lambda = 3\,h$
t_r	Normal	$\mu = 15\,min, \sigma = 5\,min$	$\mu = 15\,min, \sigma = 5\,min$
t_w	---	*	*

* Depending on the time of damage occurrence

Millions of consumers in Florida experienced power outages due to the Irma hurricane in September 2017. In this study, to create a time-series wind profile, the historical weather observations of this hurricane for one week related to areas of Orlando were obtained from [28]. This wind profile is used as input in the simulation, as shown in Fig. 4. Note that in weather-related studies, weather conditions are considered homogeneous within the entire region of the distribution system. Hence, the distribution system is exposed to the same weather conditions everywhere. Furthermore, the sequential Monte Carlo simulation captures the extreme weather event's space- and time-dependent nature.



Fig. 4. The hourly wind profiles.

The distribution system's resilience could be affected by various features. This study assessed the distribution system's resilience by considering different ages under the same weather conditions. The resilience curve was obtained based on the distribution system's performance, or, in other words, the amount of power required by consumers. As indicated in Fig. 5, the performance of distribution systems 40 and 60 years old was reduced at the start of the hurricane. In contrast, the new distribution system has withstood the storm for several hours. As a result, it can be argued that timber poles become more vulnerable as their lifespan increases. Hence, they are more susceptible to failure during extreme weather events, reducing distribution systems' resilience.

On the other hand, while the new distribution system was still exposed to extreme weather events, its declining performance stopped. This process continues in distribution networks that are 40 and 60 years old until the end of the extreme weather event. Table III shows that the reduction rate for the new power distribution system is lower than for the 40-year-old distribution system. On the other hand, the 60-year-old power distribution system has the most reduction in performance level compared to other distribution networks with a shorter lifespan. The reduction rate for the new power distribution system is lower than for the 40-year-old distribution system. On the other hand, the 60-year-old power distribution system has the most reduction in performance level compared to other distribution networks with a shorter lifespan.



Fig. 5. Resilience curve of the distribution system at 0, 40, and 60 years.

TABLE III
Resilience indicators for different ages of the distribution system

Resilience dimension		New	At 40 years	At 60 years
Vulnerability growth rate	R_v	-6.024	-7.048	-7.492
Restoration growth rate	R_r	6.92	4.99	4.64
Impact	R_i	58.09	64.05	66.38
Area	S	70.66	61.00	59.08

Depending on the emergency plans and intensity of extreme weather events, the time it takes for the power systems to return to a normal state will be different. In other words, a distribution system that is 40 or 60 years old can be planned so that, relative to the new distribution system, it returns to a normal state faster. Assuming that the planning for the restoration of the distribution system at different ages is the same, it can be observed that the growth rate of recoverability of new distribution systems is higher than that of distribution systems aged 40 and 60 years. After the extreme weather event, the power distribution system is degraded. In contrast to the 40- and 60-year-old distribution systems, the infrastructure of the new distribution system is less affected. Hence, the vulnerable points have been identified earlier, and adequate repair crews will be sent to repair them. Therefore, the new distribution system remains degraded for a shorter period.

The results of this study indicate a significant correlation between the age of power distribution systems and the resilience of the systems. This feature is demonstrated through the proposed indicators for assessing resilience. With the aging distribution network, the vulnerability rate increases, and the restoration rate decreases. Also, according to the obtained data, with the age of power distribution systems, the impact of extreme weather events on the performance of this system will increase. In addition, the area under the resilience curve has been calculated to assess resilience. The area under the resilience curve depends on the vulnerability rate, the restoration rate, and the duration of the extreme event. Hence, reducing the vulnerability rate or increasing the restoration rate increases the area metric. Following this approach, the area under system performance is expected to reduce with the increasing age of distribution systems.

VI. Conclusion

This paper provides a probabilistic and detailed methodology to assess the resilience of power distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. In this regard, the fragility curve of the pole and conductor was calculated, and then the poles' failure probability, concerning their dependence on one another, was modeled. Since the power system infrastructure is prone to failure over time due to decay, corrosion, etc., an age-dependent fragility analysis of poles was considered. Likewise, the resilience assessment of the system has been presented according to the different lifetimes. Due to the continuous nature of the conductors, failing a conductor in a single span reduced its failure probability in other spans. Hence, the failure probability of the overhead lines caused by failing conductors has been formulated, taking this feature into account. The restoration time of overhead lines was also modeled as a function of the possible number of damaged components and experimental parameters. The second significant finding of this paper was to provide a novel resilience quantification framework. Consequently, vulnerability and restoration rates were proposed as indicators for assessing resilience.

The numerical results indicated a significant correlation between the age of power distribution systems and the system's resilience. According to the obtained data, with the age of power distribution systems, the impact of extreme weather events on the performance of these systems will increase. So, with the aging distribution network, the vulnerability rate increases, and the restoration rate decreases. Besides, the proposed metrics, the vulnerability, and the restoration rate can be used to compare several independent power systems. Also, using these metrics, the behavior of power systems can be predicted in the face of future extreme weather events. Most studies on power distribution system resilience have been focused on resilience enhancement. Depending on the age of distribution systems, the proposed solutions to enhance resilience can be different. Therefore, it is suggested that resilience enhancement of power distribution systems by considering the age of these systems is investigated in future studies.

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