Democratic control mechanisms over the European Commission
Poskiparta, Meri-Tuulia (2008)
Poskiparta, Meri-Tuulia
2008
Kuvaus
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Tiivistelmä
Modern political decision-making systems have become so complex that legislatures are forced to give rather large discretionary powers for the administration. Yet, large discretionary powers may lead to the erosion of representative democracy, maladministration, corruption or even endanger the legitimacy of a political system. In this respect European Union is facing same problems as any other democratic system of governance. This is a case oriented study where the concept of democratic control is studied in the context of the European Union. The first purpose of the study is to see what democratic control mechanisms are available for the European Parliament, national parliaments, citizens and interest groups to control the European Commission. The second purpose of the study is to look at Max Weber, Robert Dahl and Jürgen Habermas’s ideas about democratic control and see whose ideas correspond to the current status of the European Union. This study is done by using official documents, legislations, academic studies and writings.
Weber thinks that the only legitimate way to control the bureaucracy is through a strong parliament. In this line of thought, strengthening the position of the European Parliament or national parliaments could enhance the parliamentary avenues for control. The European Parliament is fairly limited in its powers. The EP can influence the agenda-setting in pre-proposal legislative stage; it may write its initiative reports and ask the Commission to give proposals. Nevertheless, these measures do not oblige the Commission to act. Furthermore, the heads of the Commission are not drawn from the EP and the EP is in technical matters inferior to Commission. The EP has gained more power through the co-decision procedure but it still shares it with the Council. These findings suggest that the EP continues to be weak in its powers. National parliaments exercise limited influence at the European Union level through the Council of Ministers. Giving the ministers strict mandates, making the ratification process of Community legislation mandatory or creating a second chamber consisting of national parliaments could in principal enhance the position of national parliaments. On the other hand, there seems to be a growing interest in establishing informal links with the EP and national parliaments.
Dahl thinks that, in addition to parliamentary avenues, democratic control requires the involvement of interest groups. In fact, the Commission relies in many ways to outside information. This information is frequently supplied by interest groups. The problem with the interest group participation is that interest groups are not equal in their access to the policy process.
Finally, Habermas argues that participation and deliberation between the public sphere and the political centre is a prerequisite for healthy democratic governance. What it comes to citizen participation it may be argued that the Commission has a long way to go. Open public consultations, on-line chats with Commissioners, citizens’ discussion forums and other new forms of direct participation can only be seen as steps towards greater participation or deliberative democracy.
Weber thinks that the only legitimate way to control the bureaucracy is through a strong parliament. In this line of thought, strengthening the position of the European Parliament or national parliaments could enhance the parliamentary avenues for control. The European Parliament is fairly limited in its powers. The EP can influence the agenda-setting in pre-proposal legislative stage; it may write its initiative reports and ask the Commission to give proposals. Nevertheless, these measures do not oblige the Commission to act. Furthermore, the heads of the Commission are not drawn from the EP and the EP is in technical matters inferior to Commission. The EP has gained more power through the co-decision procedure but it still shares it with the Council. These findings suggest that the EP continues to be weak in its powers. National parliaments exercise limited influence at the European Union level through the Council of Ministers. Giving the ministers strict mandates, making the ratification process of Community legislation mandatory or creating a second chamber consisting of national parliaments could in principal enhance the position of national parliaments. On the other hand, there seems to be a growing interest in establishing informal links with the EP and national parliaments.
Dahl thinks that, in addition to parliamentary avenues, democratic control requires the involvement of interest groups. In fact, the Commission relies in many ways to outside information. This information is frequently supplied by interest groups. The problem with the interest group participation is that interest groups are not equal in their access to the policy process.
Finally, Habermas argues that participation and deliberation between the public sphere and the political centre is a prerequisite for healthy democratic governance. What it comes to citizen participation it may be argued that the Commission has a long way to go. Open public consultations, on-line chats with Commissioners, citizens’ discussion forums and other new forms of direct participation can only be seen as steps towards greater participation or deliberative democracy.